Chicago Journal of International Law
Volume 21

Number 2

Article 2

1-1-2021

Whole Issue (Winter 2021 / 21.2)

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
(2021) "Whole Issue (Winter 2021 / 21.2)," Chicago Journal of International Law: Vol. 21: No. 2, Article 2.
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol21/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Chicago Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please
contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Environment, Mobility, and International Law:
A New Approach in the Americas
David James Cantor

Abstract
The role of international law in regulating international movement in the context of global
environment change and hazards remains a topic of intense debate among both legal scholars and
practitioners. Yet, as this Article shows, we have largely reached the limits of what existing
international law methods and approaches can tell us about the future of the law in this area. By
contrast, this Article draws on a detailed regional case study to offer a distinct perspective to that
ongoing debate about the role and future of international law. Against the backdrop of emerging
patterns of mobility linked to devastating environmental disasters in the Americas, this Article
derives new legal insights from in-depth analysis of a developing body of comparative and
international legal practice by countries from across this key region.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
Global society appears ever more conscious of how environmental
phenomena shape human mobility.1 The immobility enforced on populations by
lockdowns in many countries as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic is only
the most recent example. Yet environmental threats can also help to push the
movement of persons. For example, in the context of climate change, the wellpublicized risk posed to the ongoing viability of human settlement of small islands
in the Pacific Ocean by rising sea levels fuels globalized concern that their
populations will end up as “climate refugees.”2 This long-term “sinking” Pacific
island scenario is but one of many scenarios where movement is shaped by
environmental processes. Some reflect hazards that are more sudden-onset in
character. For example, in the Americas, as recently as 2017, around 160,000
inhabitants of Puerto Rico fled to the United States mainland after the sudden
devastation wrought on that island by Hurricane Maria, some temporarily and
others on a more permanent basis.3 Indeed, a diverse range of environmental
threats generates a far-reaching mobility impact on populations across the world.
These are global challenges, both in the sense that few countries are immune to
their effects and also in that such environmental phenomena and their
consequences do not respect the territorial boundaries claimed by nation states,
and they are often cross-border in nature.
The risks posed by such environmental phenomena, especially in the context
of a process of global climate change, have prompted attempts by states, civil
society, and other actors to coordinate international action. This includes efforts
to develop appropriate structures of international law in such fields as climate
change mitigation and adaptation and also disaster risk management. More
recently, normative frameworks in each of these fields have begun to directly
acknowledge the human mobility dimensions of these environmental phenomena.
Most prominently, under the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change,4 the 2010 Cancun Agreement invites states to “enhance
understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change

1

The term “mobility” is used here to signal an emphasis on agency in movement, in other words,
not only the act of movement itself but also the wider capacity to move, and to attempt to avoid
importing implicit value judgments as to the voluntary or involuntary nature of such movement
that are often implicit in the use of terms such as “migration” or “displacement.”

2

For a critical perspective, see Carol Farbotko & Heather Lazrus, The First Climate Refugees? Contesting
Global Narratives of Climate Change in Tuvalu, 22 GLOB. ENV’T CHANGE 382 (2012).

3

JENNIFER HINOJOSA & EDWIN MELÉNDEZ, CENTER FOR PUERTO RICAN STUDIES, PUERTO RICAN
EXODUS: ONE YEAR SINCE HURRICANE MARIA (2018), https://perma.cc/T3ZH-TW53.

4

U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc No, 10238, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, at 5.
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induced displacement, migration and planned relocation.”5 Likewise, in the
disaster risk management field, the non-binding 2015 Sendai Framework for
Disaster Risk Reduction calls on states to address “disaster-induced human
mobility,” including by “transboundary cooperation.”6
Up to this point, the global frameworks calling for cooperation on human
mobility challenges in the context of environmental threats offer little guidance
on the form that such responses should take.7 In this regard, a largely blank canvas
appears to exist, waiting for legal development. Yet, as this Article will show, a
long-standing parallel body of legal research and debate seeks to fill this apparently
blank canvas. Based on a preoccupation that existing international law does not
adequately protect people who leave their countries due to environmental push
factors, particularly those linked to climate change, these international law studies
already articulate a diverse range of innovative potential solutions to this perceived
gap in the law.8 They are complemented by the small number of extant judicial
decisions that explore how existing international law rules on refugee status and
human rights protection might apply to such scenarios.9 Overall, this body of
5

A Displacement Task Force was also created under the UNFCCC Warsaw International
Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts in 2015. See 2010
Cancun Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1. Yet, while climate-related mobility has
become increasingly embedded as a topic of concern within the UNFCCC loss and damage
mechanism, some suggest that its placement there may actually weaken efforts to promote climaterelated mobility as a standalone issue and to develop consensus on responses, due to the
particularities of that mechanism. See generally Chloé Anne Vlassopoulos, When Climate-Induced
Migration Meets Loss and Damage: A Weakening Agenda-Setting Process?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW 376 (Benoît Mayer & François Crépeau eds., 2017).

6

Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/224/CRP.1,
⁋ 28, ⁋ 30. Yet, while subsequent policy developing this DDR framework acknowledges the number
of “permanently displaced people” as a potential indicator for the “human impact” and “economic
impact” of a disaster, specific guidance on measures to respond to such impact remains lacking. See,
e.g., U.N. OFFICE FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, WORDS INTO ACTION GUIDELINES, (2017),
https://perma.cc/UTF7-JAXK.

7

See supra notes 5–6.
The parallel literature on the mandate and role of institutions at the international level will not be
addressed here except as it bears on the question of international law development on the status of
affected persons. See, e.g., SINJA HANTSCHER, THE UNHCR AND DISASTER DISPLACEMENT IN THE
21ST CENTURY: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (2019); NINA HALL, DISPLACEMENT,
DEVELOPMENT, AND CLIMATE CHANGE: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MOVING BEYOND
THEIR MANDATES (2016); ANDREA C. SIMONELLI, GOVERNING CLIMATE INDUCED MIGRATION
AND DISPLACEMENT: IGO EXPANSION AND GLOBAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2015);
ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION (Kerstin Rosenow-Williams &
François Gemenne eds., 2016).

8

9

See, for example, the national judicial decisions on how international refugee law concepts are to
be interpreted in relation to claims for asylum by persons fleeing climate change or disasters,
including the Supreme Court of Canada and the Supreme Court of New Zealand. See Canada
(Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689; Teitiota v. Chief Executive of the Ministry of
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scholarly insight and creative thinking represents a rich resource for states and
other international actors as they consider how the global response to human
mobility in the context of environmental threats might be further developed in
the face of evidence that global warming is accelerating rapidly.
This Article contributes to this topical international law debate by offering a
new perspective rooted in empirical evidence and legal practice from the region
of the Americas. It starts by highlighting key features of the existing legal literature
on what we might call the “environment-mobility” nexus (Section II).10 It shows
that most legal studies adopt a particular approach, focusing on how international
law, usually at the global level, could be developed to address a perceived gap in
protection for people who are displaced to other countries due to environmental
push factors. However, it contends that we have largely reached the limits of what
that methodology can tell us about the current or future role of law in this area. It
suggests that studying the legal issues as they play out in practice in one specific
region provides a useful complementary perspective. Moreover, as a region, the
Americas offer a useful counterpoint to emerging legal scholarship with a regional
focus on the sinking islands in the Pacific.11 Section II leads us not only to revisit
certain widely held assumptions in the existing legal literature but also to
reconsider the likely pathways for future development of international law in this
field.
This Article continues by evaluating international mobility linked to
environmental factors in the Americas to gain a sharper empirical understanding
of where exactly the law might usefully act in this region (Section III). It then
challenges the widely held assumption that states lack the legal tools to respond

10

11

Business, Innovation and Employment, [2015] NZSC 107. The application of international human
rights as protection against refoulement in the context of climate change was recently addressed by
the U.N. Human Rights Committee (UNHRC). See Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 (2020).
Benoît Mayer and François Crépeau coined the idea of a “climate-mobility nexus.” That of an
“environment-mobility nexus” encapsulates a similar understanding that human mobility can be
shaped in many different ways, and often indirectly, by environmental factors more broadly and
not just climate change. Benoît Mayer & François Crépeau, Introduction to RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW 1 (Benoît Mayer & François Crépeau eds., 2017).
This study thus develops the relatively sparse legal literature on this topic in the Americas as a
region. See DAVID JAMES CANTOR, PLATFORM ON DISASTER DISPLACEMENT, CROSS-BORDER
DISPLACEMENT, CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISASTERS: LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (2018),
https://perma.cc/D6NE-DCFC [hereinafter CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT]; Erika
Pires Ramos & Fernanda de Salles Cavedon-Capdeville, Regional Responses to Climate Change and
Migration in Latin America, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE
LAW, supra note 10, at 262; NICOLÁS RODRÍGUEZ SERNA, NANSEN INITIATIVE, HUMAN MOBILITY
IN THE CONTEXT OF NATURAL HAZARD‑RELATED DISASTERS IN SOUTH AMERICA (2015),
https://perma.cc/X7HJ-38ZP; DAVID JAMES CANTOR, NANSEN INITIATIVE, LAW, POLICY AND
PRACTICE CONCERNING THE HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION OF ALIENS ON A TEMPORARY BASIS IN
THE CONTEXT OF DISASTERS (2015), https://perma.cc/2ETM-8NTT [hereinafter CANTOR, LAW,
POLICY AND PRACTICE].
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to such mobility by illustrating how pertinent provisions exist, and are used for
that purpose in practice, by many states in the Americas. Crucially, such provisions
are found less in refugee and human rights law on “international protection”
(Section IV) than in immigration law (Section V). The analysis of how states
actually approach the issue in practice is helpful in that it adds an understanding
not only of where international rules may be needed but also the specific form
that they might take. The Article also shows how these understandings are being
actively promoted by intergovernmental bodies at the subregional level in the
Americas (Section VI). On the environment-mobility nexus, the findings support
the view that the international law predicament will be resolved not by producing
new legal or analytical concepts but by thinking differently about existing concepts
(Section VII).12

II. T HE E NVIRONMENT -M OBILITY N EXUS AS A L EGAL
P ROBLEM
Legal scholarship is increasingly preoccupied with the challenge posed to
human mobility by climate change and other environmental factors. Students of
international law, in particular, have led this debate, and most legal studies pursue
the inquiry in terms of international law.13 On its face, the fact that international
law is at the core of this research agenda is hardly surprising. Indeed, climate
change, the environment, and human mobility are all global phenomena and thus
seem appropriate topics for international law. Yet many legal studies are rooted in
highly particular assumptions about the nature of both the underlying empirical
phenomena and the resulting legal problem. This Section illustrates these
assumptions by sketching out some of the main areas of legal debate. In this
regard, it does not claim to be a comprehensive survey of the burgeoning literature
on this topical concern. Rather, it builds on critical review of the existing legal
scholarship to elucidate where and how a case study of the region of the Americas
might advance the wider legal debate in this field.

12

13

Calum T.M. Nicholson, ‘Climate-Induced Migration’: Ways Forward in the Face of an Intrinsically Equivocal
Concept, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW, supra note 10,
at 49, 50. In this sense, it is not a “new” challenge needing “new” responses. See Etienne Piguet,
Antoine Pécoud & Paul de Guchteneire, Migration and Climate Change, in MIGRATION AND CLIMATE
CHANGE 1, 24 (Etienne Piguet et al. eds., 2011).
However, a couple of studies examine the issue in relation to the national law or policy of one
country. See, e.g., Eric Omeziri & Christopher Gore, Temporary Measures: Canadian Refugee Policy and
Environmental Migration, 29 REFUGE 43 (2014); Chelsea Krombel, The Prospective Role of Temporary
Protected Status: How Discretionary Designation Has Hindered the United States’ Ability to Protect Those
Displaced by Environmental Disaster, 28 CONN. J. INT’L L. 153 (2012).
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A. Understanding the Empirical Phenomenon
The underlying empirical phenomenon is described using diverse
overlapping and often competing terms, each loaded with assumptions about how
states should respond.14 However, “[w]e should not be distracted by semantic
discussions with little practical meaning about whether to call affected persons
‘climate change refugees’, ‘environmental migrants’ or something else.”15 Rather,
analyses must focus on how the broad nexus between “environment” and
“mobility” is constituted empirically across a range of contexts and forms.
Although a paucity of robust empirical studies on this nexus was long a cause for
concern,16 the evidence base has begun to expand over the last decade or so.17 In
tandem, while the superficial engagement of many legal scholars with this
empirical evidence is regularly criticized,18 a growing number are now reflecting
more seriously on the empirical research and its potentially far-reaching
implications for understanding the role of law in this context. As a result, several
important discussions about the empirical nature of the environment-mobility
nexus can now be discerned as pertinent to shaping the approach and direction of
legal studies.
Firstly, on the nature of the nexus between mobility and environmental
factors, most legal studies frame it in terms of a causal relationship.19 Moreover,
in general, these legal studies are concerned with causality in one direction only—
in other words, environmental change as a cause of movement (although
migration as a cause of environmental change is also considered by the social
sciences).20 Likewise, the legal literature focuses squarely on adverse
environmental conditions as a “push” factor prompting people to leave the
country of origin. Especially in the climate change context, it frames the resulting
mobility as a new challenge, although environmental adversity and change have
14
15

16

Piguet et al., supra note 12, at 17–21.
Walter Kälin, The Climate Change-Displacement Nexus, BROOKINGS (July 16, 2008),
https://perma.cc/JB4H-G9HL.
Dominic Kniveton, Kerstin Schmidt-Verkerk, Christopher Smith & Richard Black, Climate Change
and Migration: Improving Methodologies to Estimate Flows, 32–33 INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION
MIGRATION RSCH. SERIES 1 (2008).

17

Stephen Castles, Concluding Remarks on the Climate Change-Migration Nexus, in MIGRATION
CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 12, at 415, 419–22.

18

This critique has been advanced by many scholars within and outside the field. See, e.g., Benoît
Mayer, Who Are “Climate Refugees”? Academic Engagement in the Post-truth Era, in CLIMATE REFUGEES:
BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE? 89, 94 (Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent eds., 2018); Richard Black,
Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality? 1 (Univ. of Sussex, Working Paper No. 34, (2001),
https://perma.cc/W3T4-X9XF.
See generally Calum T.M. Nicholson, Climate Change and the Politics of Causal Reasoning: The Case of Climate
Change and Migration, 180 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 151 (2014).
See, e.g., RICHARD BLACK, REFUGEES, ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (1998).

19

20
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probably shaped human mobility throughout history.21 Yet this primary interest in
how environmental conditions act as a “push” factor for mobility has led legal
researchers to overlook other pertinent ways in which environmental change can
shape the experience of human mobility, including as a “pull” factor for migrants
(as for example, in places where new economic opportunities emerge as a result
of certain climate change impacts).22
Secondly, on the content of this causal nexus, legal scholars often adopt an
“alarmist” or “maximalist” understanding of “environmental migration.”23
Rooted in natural sciences and security studies, this view uses deductive methods
to forecast vast future waves of migration driven by environmental change.24 The
approach posits the nexus in mono-causal terms, with environmental factors
acting as the sole drivers of predicted movement. However, empirical evidence
from local level studies in the social sciences instead points to the multi-causal
nature of migration and shows how environmental change is often just one of
many interconnected factors influencing mobility.25 On this basis, “skeptical” or
“minimalist” scholars have argued that, empirically, environmental factors cannot
be isolated as a primary driver of movement, questioning whether “environmental
migration” really exists as distinct phenomenon.26 Others, though, attempt to
transcend the divide by analyzing environmental factors as a proximate cause of
movement that, even if it does interact with other factors, may produce distinct
forms of mobility, as in circumstances of sudden or extreme environmental

21

ANTHONY PENNA, THE HUMAN FOOTPRINT: A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 4–8, 56–58,
106–7 (2d ed. 2014). Indeed, environmental factors have been recognized by migration theories as
early as the 1880s, although they only made a resurgence in the 1980s after references to them
dwindled during much of the twentieth century. See Etienne Piguet, From “Primitive Migration” to
“Climate Refugees”: The Curious Fate of the Natural Environment in Migration Studies, 103 ASS’N. AM.
GEOGRAPHERS 148 (2013).

22

BENOÎT MAYER, THE CONCEPT OF CLIMATE MIGRATION: ADVOCACY AND ITS PROSPECTS 22–25
(2016).

23

See François Gemenne, How They Became the Human Face of Climate Change: Research and Policy Interactions
in the Birth of the “Environmental Migration” Concept, in MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note
12, at 225, 230–39.
See, e.g., NORMAN MYERS & JENNIFER KENT, ENVIRONMENTAL EXODUS: AN EMERGENT CRISIS IN
THE GLOBAL ARENA (1995).
See Marion Borderon et al., Migration Influenced by Environmental Change in Africa: A Systematic Review of
Empirical Evidence, 41 DEMOGRAPHIC RSCH. 491 (2019); Stephen Castles, Environmental Change and
Forced Migration: Making Sense of the Debate 1 (Oxford, Working Paper No. 70, 2002),
https://perma.cc/W7X9-NM7R. See generally JoAnn McGregor, Refugees and the Environment, in
GEOGRAPHY AND REFUGEES: PATTERNS AND PROCESSES OF CHANGE 157 (Richard Black &
Vaughan Robinson eds., 1993).
See, e.g., Castles, supra note 25; Black, supra note 18; William B. Wood, Ecomigration: Linkages Between
Environmental Change and Migration, in GLOBAL MIGRANTS, GLOBAL REFUGEES: PROBLEMS AND
SOLUTIONS 42 (Aristide R. Zolberg & Peter M. Benda eds., 2001).

24

25

26
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change.27 As the empirical evidence base grows, this approach seems to be gaining
increasing acceptance.28
Such debate about the multi-causal nature of migration has crucial
implications for legal scholarship. Certainly, empirical evidence of the multi-causal
reality of movement suggests that the legal studies that adopt a mono-causal
understanding of this nexus adopt a faulty premise. This view matters because the
perception of a gap in legal protection in fact emerged from the “maximalist”
literature that assumes a distinct class of migrants forced to leave their homes as
a result of environmental change can be identified for the purpose of intervention.
However, even for those legal studies that frame environmental factors as but one
proximate cause of movement in this context, the question of how to
accommodate the multi-causal nature of such mobility persists. On the one hand,
it poses the question of just how proximate such environmental factors need to
be in order to be treated as a legally significant “cause” of movement. On the
other hand, given that vulnerability to environmental threats is mediated by social,
political, and economic factors,29 an important question also arises about the
extent to which such human factors can or should be accommodated in law.30
Thirdly, many legal scholars frame the “environment” side of the nexus
explicitly in terms of “climate change.”31 For some, this is a strategic gambit to
raise the profile of the issue by linking it to powerful discourses on climate
change.32 For others, it is a matter of global justice that responsibility for resettling
poor people forced out of their homes in the Global South should fall on the
states in the Global North that contribute most to global warming.33 Yet this
27

See, e.g., ASTRI SUHRKE, PRESSURE POINTS: ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION, MIGRATION AND
CONFLICT (1993); Graeme Hugo, Environmental Concerns and International Migration, 301 INT’L
MIGRATION REV. 105 (1996).

28

Castles, supra note 25, at 419–24; Piguet et al., supra note 12, at 5.
Robert McLeman, Climate-Related Migration and its Linkages to Vulnerability, Adaptation, and SocioEconomic Inequality: Evidence from Recent Examples, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
MIGRATION AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 29; Mike Hulme, Attributing Weather Extremes to “Climate
Change”: A Review, 38 PROGRESS PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 499 (2014); Kniveton et al., supra note 16.
For instance, some scholars have argued that underlying processes of discrimination in the social
construction of vulnerability raise the prospect that affected persons may have a claim to refugee
status. See, e.g., MATTHEW SCOTT, CLIMATE CHANGE, DISASTERS, AND THE REFUGEE CONVENTION
(2020); Bruce Burson, Environmentally Induced Displacement and the 1951 Refugee Convention: Pathways to
Recognition, in ENVIRONMENT, FORCED MIGRATION AND SOCIAL VULNERABILITY 3 (Tamer Afifi &
Jill Jäger eds., 2010).
Gemenne, supra note 23, at 225.

29

30

31
32
33

MAYER, supra note 22, at 43–47.
Maxine Burkett, Justice and Climate Migration: The Importance of Nomenclature in the Discourse on TwentyFirst-Century Mobility, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE?, supra note 18, at 73;
Giovanni Bettini, Sarah Louise Nash & Giovanna Gioli, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Fading
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approach poses challenges for legal analyses. For instance, global warming seems
to act on mobility by influencing more “proximate” environmental drivers, such
as storms, drought, or desertification. If it is already difficult to empirically isolate
the role of such proximate environmental factors in pushing migration in any
specific case, then climate change adds an additional layer of complexity, as it sits
one step behind those drivers (and two if the link to human activities as a cause
of climate change is also to be made).34 Establishing the respective contribution
to climate change of particular states adds a third additional layer of complexity.35
Despite these challenges, even some of those scholars who recognize the “multicausality” of migration end up proposing solutions for “climate migrants” as if
they were a definite and identifiable group of persons.36
Yet, even if such factual and legal determinations were possible in particular
cases, this emphasis on climate change alone has other conceptual limitations.
Indeed, as a “push” factor for mobility, it is not clear that the impact of climaterelated phenomena, which could be influenced by global warming, differs
substantially from that of other environmental phenomena, such as volcanoes or
earthquakes.37 Moreover, even for climate related “push” factors such as storms
or flooding, it is not obvious how events caused, or exacerbated, by climate change
can be distinguished, in terms of their impact on human mobility, from those that
are not.38 For these reasons, some legal studies have instead sought to frame this
side of the nexus in terms of broader concepts of the “environment.”39 Particularly
since the late 2000s, scholars and policymakers have increasingly conceptualized
the environment side of the nexus more broadly in terms of disasters, an approach
that obviates many of the flaws of focusing solely on “climate change.”40 Indeed,
Contours of (In)Justice in Competing Discourses on Climate Migration, 2 GEOGRAPHIC J. 348 (2016); François
Gemenne, One Good Reason to Speak of ‘Climate Refugees’, 49 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 70 (2015);
LAURA WESTRA, SATVINDER JUSS & TULLIO SCOVAZZI, TOWARDS A REFUGEE ORIENTED RIGHT
OF ASYLUM (2015).
34

Walter Kälin, Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT:
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 81, 85 (Jane McAdam ed., 2010).

35

Moreover, even if the contribution of particular states to climate change could be characterized as
internationally wrongful acts under international law, others argue that the principle of reparation
in the law of state responsibility does not extend to a duty on responsible states to adopt particular
policies in relation to climate migration, such as resettlement of affected individuals. See Benoít
Mayer, Climate Change, Migration and the Law of State Responsibility, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW, supra note 5, 238.

36

Mayer, supra note 18, at 97.
MAYER, supra note 22, at 12.

37
38
39
40

Id. at 26.
Id. at 12–16.
Kälin, supra note 34, at 85; MAYER, supra note 22, at 12–16 (arguing that, conceptually, “climate
migration” is a component of “environmental migration” and cannot, and should not, be addressed
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disasters are widely understood as encompassing both sudden- and slow-onset
events and also as constituted not only by the manifestation of hazardous events
but also by societal vulnerability to those hazards.41 On this approach, climate
change remains relevant but takes a background role in causal terms, as a process
that may exacerbate more immediate climate-related hazards in particular
contexts.42
The “disaster” concept usefully foregrounds the more proximate
environmental factors influencing human mobility. Yet it also raises questions.
Crucially, different definitions of the disaster concept exist, despite a similar
overall approach.43 Even the widely used U.N. definition has particularities that
need consideration in the mobility context. For instance, while it recognizes that
a hazard need not have the potential for collective impact,44 it requires that a
“hazardous event” result in a serious collective impact in order to qualify as a

41

in isolation). Some also raise the fear that states have proved resistant to addressing problems
framed in terms of climate change. See, e.g., Michel Prieur, Towards an International Legal Status of
Environmentally Displaced Persons, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE?, supra note
18, at 233, 241; JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION, AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 240 (2012)
For instance, U.N. policy defines a “disaster” as “[a] serious disruption of the functioning of a
community or a society at any scale due to hazardous events interacting with conditions of
exposure, vulnerability, and capacity, leading to one or more of the following: human, material,
economic and environmental losses and impacts.” A sudden-onset disaster is one “triggered by a
hazardous event that emerges quickly or unexpectedly” while a slow-onset disaster “emerges
gradually over time.” See, e.g., U.N. Gen. Assembly, Rep. of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental
Expert Working Group on Indicators and Terminology Relating to Disaster Risk Reduction, U.N.
Doc. A/71/644, 13 (2016) [hereinafter U.N. Report]. In short, disasters are never solely
“environmental” or “natural” in character but equally reflect societal vulnerabilities to hazards that
may be “natural” or “man-made.” See also ILAN KELMAN, DISASTER BY CHOICE: HOW OUR ACTIONS
TURN NATURAL HAZARDS INTO CATASTROPHES (2020).

42

“A changing climate leads to changes in the frequency, intensity, spatial extent, duration, and timing
of extreme weather and climate events, and can result in unprecedented extreme weather and
climate events.” INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MANAGING THE RISKS OF
EXTREME EVENTS AND DISASTERS TO ADVANCE CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 7 (2012). See also
Martine Rebetez, The Main Climate Change Forecasts that Might Cause Human Displacements, in
MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 12, at 37.

43

The different approaches reflect consensus that disasters result from the interaction between
hazards and societal resilience to them but differ in other material aspects. For instance, compare
the widely-endorsed U.N. definition of the “disaster” concept, supra note 41, to that developed by
the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) for its Emergency Events
Database (EM-DAT), and apparently still used by the International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies, which defines a disaster as a “[s]ituation or event, which overwhelms local
capacity, necessitating a request to national or international level for external assistance . . .; An
unforeseen and often sudden event that causes great damage, destruction and human suffering.”
Glossary, EM-DAT, https://perma.cc/4K6R-U8TY.
The U.N. approach defines a “hazard” as a “process, phenomenon or human activity that may
cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, social and economic disruption
or environmental degradation.” U.N. Report, supra note 41, at 18.

44

Winter 2021

273

Chicago Journal of International Law

“disaster.”45 But do people really move in response only to “disasters” or do they
also move because of perceived hazards? And which concept should we favor?
Moreover, each rendering of the disaster concept also differs in how it classifies
different hazards in terms of both their origins46 and types.47 For our purposes,
this may complicate efforts to identify which particular hazards are to be treated
as “environmental” in character (and whether by reference to origins or type).48
Indeed, the most consistent approach may be simply to treat all of the identified
hazard types as essentially “environmental.”49
Lastly, some scholars have expressed concern that the “disaster”-based
approach risks introduce a false binary between slow- and sudden-onset events,
which might end up privileging more easily identifiable sudden-onset disasters and
temporary forms of protection when more durable solutions could be required in

45

The U.N. approach defines a “hazardous event” as the “manifestation of a hazard in a particular
place during a particular period of time.” U.N. Report, supra note 41, at 20.

46

The U.N. approach views the origins of hazards as, respectively, “natural, anthropogenic or
socionatural” locating both environmental degradation and climate change in the last category. U.N.
Report, supra note 41, at 18. By contrast, the CRED approach distinguishes between “natural” and
“technological or man-made” hazards, locating environmental degradation under the latter, but
treating climate change as an “aggravating factor.” See Types of Disasters: Definition of Hazard, IFRC,
https://perma.cc/K5AR-YLJX.

47

Alongside “technological or man-made” hazards (that include environmental degradation and
pollution), the CRED approach sub-divides the hazards of “natural” origin into geophysical,
hydrological, climatological, meteorological, and biological types. As noted above, climate change
is not treated as a hazard in its own right but rather an “aggravating factor.” Types of Disasters:
Definition of Hazard, supra note 46. By contrast, the U.N. approach lists biological, environmental,
geological, hydrometeorological, and technological types of hazard without relating them to
particular origins. Environmental degradation is listed under “environmental hazards.” However,
this category is qualified by the assertion that many of the processes that fall into it “may be termed
drivers of hazard and risk rather than hazards in themselves, such as soil degradation, deforestation,
loss of biodiversity, salinization and sea-level rise.” U.N. Report, supra note 41, at 19. A more recent
U.N. document offers a still more diverse typology of hazards as geophysical, hydrological,
meteorological, climatological, extra-terrestrial, environment degradation, biological, and
technological. See U.N. OFFICE FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, TECHNICAL GUIDANCE FOR
MONITORING AND REPORTING ON PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING THE GLOBAL TARGETS OF THE
SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION 172–73 (2017) .
In other words, it is necessary to decide how a focus on environmental factors maps onto the
different approaches to classifying hazards. For instance, on the U.N. approach, is it to be done by
origin, in which case does the term “environmental” cover only hazards of “natural” origin or also
those of “socionatural origin” (or even those of “anthropogenic” origin); or by type, in which case,
does the term cover all types (“biological,” “geological,” etc.) or only some (only “environmental,”
for instance, or “not technological”)?
The most recent U.N. approach includes geophysical, hydrological, meteorological, climatological,
extra-terrestrial, environment degradation, biological, and technological hazards. U.N. OFFICE FOR
DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, supra note 47. However, with reference to the origins of the hazards,
the U.N. approach expressly excludes “armed conflicts and other situations of social instability or
tension.” U.N. Report supra note 41, at 18.

48
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some situations.50 Such criticisms foreground important questions about whether
disparate types of hazardous events might impact in different ways on mobility
decisions or on any resulting patterns of movement, pointing to a need for distinct
kinds of legal responses. 51
Meanwhile, on the “human mobility” side of the nexus, legal studies tend to
privilege movement with an international character.52 This mirrors wider public
concern, which engages mainly with the cross-border aspect of climate and
disaster mobility. Yet empirical evidence suggests that international movement is
a less significant form of mobility in this context, in terms of numbers and
vulnerability, than internal displacement or enforced immobility.53 Many legal
studies also seem to assume that movement caused by environmental factors will
be from Global South to North.54 Moreover, they regularly cite the predicament
of “sinking” Pacific islands as the archetypal empirical problem scenario for the
law and, among international environmental lawyers, resettlement of the climatedisplaced to the Global North is often advanced as a solution.55 Much of the legal
literature also seems to assume that the movement has an essentially “forced”
character,56 reflecting its framing of environmental change as a “push” factor.

50
51

52

53

54

55

56

MCADAM, supra note 40, at 247–49; MAYER, supra note 22, at 87–89.
For discussion of the empirical evidence in relation to the distinct climate-related hazards of (1)
storms, rains and floods, (2) droughts and desertification, and (3) sea level rise. See Piguet et al.,
supra note 12, at 6–12, 14–16. Indeed, the distinctions between the various forms of migration are
not always neat. See generally Graeme Hugo, Lessons from Past Forced Resettlement for Climate Change
Migration, in MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 12, at 260.
Piguet et al., supra note 12, at 15. However, some of the “solutions” proposed are extended also to
those internally displaced by climate change. See, e.g., David Hodgkinson, Tess Burton, Heather
Anderson & Lucy Young, ‘The Hour When the Ship Comes In’: A Convention for Persons Displaced by
Climate Change, 36 MONASH U.L. REV. 69 (2010); Frank Biermann & Ingrid Boas, Preparing for a
Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees, 10 GLOB. ENV’T POL. 60
(2010). Most legal studies, however, tend to treat internal displacement in this context as adequately
addressed by the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.
On the former, see Khalid Koser, Climate Change and Internal Displacement: Challenges to the Normative
Framework, in MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 12, at 289. On the latter, those most
vulnerable to the effects of climate change often do not have the resources to move internationally
or at all. See Dug Cubie, In-Situ Adaptation: Non-Migration as a Coping Strategy for Vulnerable Persons, in
CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 99 (Dimitra
Manou et al. eds., 2017).
Carol Farbotko, Representation and Misrepresentation of Climate Migrants, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 67, 70–77; Piguet, et al., supra note
12, at 15; Gemenne, supra note 23, at 231–35.
Katrina M. Wyman, Ethical Duties to Climate Migrants, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 347. It is evident too in the emphasis on legal
proposals for international “resettlement” of climate migrants that seem to presuppose the
unavailability of internal mobility options. See, e.g., Biermann & Boas, supra note 52. This may reflect
wider stereotypes about this issue. See Simonelli, supra note 8, at 23–53.
Gemenne, supra note 23, at 253; Piguet et al., supra note 12, at 15.
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Even where the potential for “voluntary” movement is acknowledged, the main
focus of legal studies remains on responding to the forced aspects of mobility in
this context.57 Similarly, it is well recognized that we should avoid characterizing
migration merely as a failure to adapt to environmental change, since movement
is not only a reactive last resort but can also be a proactive adaptive coping
strategy.58
Finally, returning briefly to the intersection between “mobility” and “the
environment,” it is important to acknowledge the recent surge of interest among
scholars in how the coronavirus pandemic will shape the movement of persons
globally.59 In tandem, many governments around the world have imposed
measures to strictly limit international movement into their territories, especially
by non-nationals travelling from any territory where the virus appears to have
been poorly contained.60 On the one hand, the situation in 2020 is a stark
illustration of the fact that the “environment-mobility” nexus can manifest itself
in diverse forms. On the other hand, it shows that their legal implications may
differ. In this regard, epidemics and pandemics, as specific kinds of biological
hazard, represent something of a special case. Given that human mobility within
and between states is often one of the main vectors by which the hazard is
transmitted to new communities, along with the attendant risk of disaster, they
raise particular sets of questions in the mobility context around the legal
framework for (exceptional) measures regulating or restricting entry and free
movement to minimize the transmission of infection.61 Since these legal issues are
57

See, e.g., Kälin, supra note 34, at 96.

58

Piguet et al., supra note 12, at 15–16; Richard Black et al., Migration as Adaptation, 478 NATURE 447,
449 (2011).

59

See, for example, the contributions to the Coronavirus and Mobility Forum hosted by the Centre
on Migration, Policy, and Society at the University of Oxford, available at The Coronavirus and Mobility
Forum, COMPAS, https://perma.cc/6QVV-VL6G.
In the U.S., for example, the President issued a proclamation in April 2020 suspending entry into
its territory for certain immigrants who may present risk to the U.S. labor market’s ability to recover
from economic downturns related to the COVID-19 outbreak. Proclamation No. 10,014, 85 Fed.
Reg. 23,441 (Apr. 22, 2020). Globally, it is reported that “nearly all” states have imposed entry
restrictions for persons travelling from territories where the virus has become widespread, with
some temporarily prohibiting the entry of all non-citizens and non-residents. Moreover, “nearly all”
states have introduced additional health screening procedures at ports of entry, with “most”
requiring travelers from affected territories to be quarantined for a period of time on entry. Most
countries also advise their nationals against non-essential international travel or to specific
jurisdictions where the outbreak is more severe. See Immigration Update: Coronavirus, FRAGOMEN
NEWS (Sept. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/2S49-L6L4.

60

61

Among the many short legal analyses recently published on this topic, see, for example, Adina
Ponta, Human Rights Law in the Time of the Coronavirus, 24 ASIL INSIGHTS (Apr. 20, 2020),
https://perma.cc/HLT9-4TDW; Elspeth Guild, EU Fundamental Rights, Human Rights and Free
Movement in Times of Covid19, RLI BLOG (May 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/7DRQ-EQGV; Bríd
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important in and of themselves, and they are separate from those relating generally
to the entry and stay of people affected by other kinds of hazards, they deserve
study in their own right and will not be addressed further here.

B. Defining the Legal Problem
Legal debate on the environment-mobility nexus is underpinned by certain
assumptions about not only the nature of the underlying empirical situation but
also the framing of the legal problem. This debate assumes the essential legal
problem to be that the law does not adequately regulate the situation of persons
who leave their country due to environmental factors, especially climate change.
Implicit in that statement are empirical assumptions about which parts of the
environment-mobility nexus are important for legal regulation, as outlined above.
But the way that legal scholarship addresses this perceived gap in the law also
reflects certain legal assumptions about how that gap in the law is itself constituted
and, ultimately, resolved. Those assumptions serve both to channel the resulting
legal debate in particular directions and to eclipse other productive lines of inquiry.
By elucidating these underpinning premises, we can better understand where and
how a case study of the Americas might contribute to debate on legal responses
to the environment-mobility nexus.
Firstly, legal scholarship reflects an international law standpoint. Indeed, in
essence, this is a debate about international law. This focus on international law
in particular is hardly surprising, since both migration and the environment are
intuitively global phenomena. Naturally, it seems to follow that international
mobility due to environmental drivers, as a global problem, calls for an international
legal response. Yet this conception of the legal problem as inherently one of
international law shapes the resulting analyses. As the following discussion will
show, not only is the problem framed as a gap in international law, but also
solutions to this problem are both located within international law and built from
existing international law.62 Although international law at the global level is the
focus of most legal studies, growing numbers of legal scholars now argue that new
norms of international law are more likely to be developed at the regional or even
bilateral level, at least in the first instance.63 Cooperation of this kind at the regional

62
63

Ní Ghráinne, Covid-19, Border Closures, and International Law, INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS PRAGUE (May 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/M35L-TJEW. For an example from
international institutions, see U.N. Comm. on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of their Families and U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants,
Joint Guidance Note on the Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Human Rights of
Migrants (May 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/RZ5F-PN2E.
See, e.g., sources cited notes 83–90.
Platform on Disaster Displacement, State-led, Regional Consultative Processes: Opportunities to Develop
Legal Frameworks on Disaster Displacement, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE? 126
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level is seen as attractive to states since most migration is intra-regional in nature
already, regions are likely to face similar kinds of environmental processes, and
regional forms of international cooperation are already the status quo in most
parts of the world.64
By contrast, law at the national level is seen as largely irrelevant by the legal
literature. Even scholars who assess the few national law provisions on
environmental displacement ultimately dismiss them as “ad hoc” and
“inadequate,”65 “unpredictable” in terms of application and status,66 and full of
“vague language.”67 Such national law is further characterized as “inconsistent”
and “varying from one country to another.”68 It is also said to lack “legal
certainty,” as it is “not rooted in existing legal duties” but relies on “discretion
rather than legal obligation.”69 Of course, many of these complaints about vague
language, inconsistency, and so on appear overstated since they could be leveled
equally at international law. Likewise, the notion that national law cannot create
legal rules and duties for the state concerned is simply incorrect. Moreover, it is
notable that most scholars simply cite the same few protection provisions of
national law from states in the Global North.70 As a result, national law from states

64

(Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent eds., 2018); Karoline Popp, Regional Policy Perspectives, in PEOPLE
ON THE MOVE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE 230 (Etienne Piguet & Frank Laczko eds., 2014); Philippe
Boncour & Bruce Burson, Climate Change and Migration in the South Pacific Region: Policy Perspectives, in
CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION: SOUTH PACIFIC PERSPECTIVES 5, 22 (Bruce Burson ed., 2010);
Vikram Kolmannskog & Finn Myrstad, Environmental Displacement in European Asylum Law, 11 EUR.
J. MIGRATION & L. 313 (2009); Angela Williams, Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees
in International Law, 30 L. & POL’Y 502 (2008).
Popp, supra note 63, at 230; see also Black et al., supra note 58, at 449.

65

Christel Cournil, The Protection of “Environmental Refugees” in International Law, in MIGRATION AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 359, 369–70 (Étienne Piguet et al. eds., 2011); Thekli Anastasiou, Public
International Law’s Applicability to Migration as Adaptation, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: BEYOND THE LEGAL
IMPASSE? 172, 183–84 (Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent eds., 2018).

66

MCADAM, supra note 40, at 117.
Anastasiou, supra note 65, at 183–84.

67
68
69

70

MCADAM, supra note 40, at 117; Kälin, supra note 34, at 100.
Susan F. Martin, Towards an Extension of Complementary Protection?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 449, 449–50; Anastasiou, supra note
65, at 183–84.
This usually includes one or more of the following provisions: Temporary Protected Status in the
U.S. (8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (2020)); subsidiary protection provisions in Sweden (4 ch. 2.3 § Aliens Act
(Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 2005:716)) and Finland (Aliens Act, Act No. 301/2004, Apr. 30,
2004, s. 109(1)); the European Union (E.U.) Temporary Protection Directive (Council Directive
2001/55, 2001 O.J. (L 212) (EC)) (as a tool for harmonizing national law); and, sometimes,
temporary suspensions of removals such as those applied in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake.
See, e.g., Mayer & Crépeau, supra note 10, at 12 n.11–12; Martin, supra note 69, at 461–64; Vikram
Kolmannskog & Lisetta Trebbi, Climate Change, Natural Disasters, and Displacement: A Multi-Track
Approach to Filling the Protection Gaps, 92 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 713, 727–28 (2010)). A somewhat
wider range of provisions is cited by MCADAM, supra note 40, at 99–118.
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in the Global South is largely absent from the analysis.71 Furthermore, the focus
in these analyses on “international protection” provisions means that the wider
provisions of national immigration law are also largely overlooked.72 This is a
direct consequence of setting the legal debate so firmly within international law
parameters: in contrast to the law on international protection, immigration law is
not yet well established as a distinct body of international law.
Secondly, the perception of a gap in international law is the starting point
for most legal studies. It is clear that, in general, persons displaced across borders
by environmental factors do not benefit from international legal guarantees
relating to “refugees” (or those on “migrant workers”).73 Certainly, the extant
treaties dealing, respectively, with refugees, statelessness, human rights, or the
environment do not specifically address this situation.74 As will be discussed
below, many legal scholars seem to take this fact as sufficient evidence of a legal
gap in relation to the “protection” of such persons (and thus, by extension, of a
gap in relation to their envisaged need for “resettlement” to the Global North).
However, some scholars argue for a narrower gap that exists only in respect of
certain specific needs that are not covered by international human rights law,
which continues to benefit such persons.75 In particular, they argue that the general
gap in legal protection actually exists mainly in relation to the “legal status” of
these persons, to aspects of their “admission [and] continued stay [in the reception
country], and [to] protection against forcible return to their country of origin.”76

71

72

This may partly reflect the perception that the Global North will be the recipient of arrivals in this
context. As an exception, see the few counter examples from Africa and one from Argentina cited
in passing by MCADAM, supra note 40, at 105, 107.
For exceptions, see text at note 96 below. “International protection” refers to the assumption of an
obligation to provide protection to people who are outside their own country and face certain
specified kinds of persecution or harm in that country but lack the protection of their own state.

73

See, e.g., WALTER KÄLIN & NINA SCHREPFER, UNHCR LEGAL AND PROTECTION POLICY RESEARCH
SERIES, NO. 24: PROTECTING PEOPLE CROSSING BORDERS IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE:
NORMATIVE GAPS AND POSSIBLE APPROACHES 4, 49–56 (2012); Christel Cournil, Les réfugiés
écologiques: Quelle(s) protection(s), quel(s) statut(s)?, 4 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 1035 (2006).

74

See supra note 73; see also MCADAM, supra note 40, at 39–98. McAdam equally dismisses the muchdebated prospect of the international law on statelessness resolving the situation of “sinking” small
island states. See MCADAM, supra note 40, at 119–60.
See Kälin, supra note 34, at 87–89. See also Siobhán McInerney-Lankford, Climate Change, Human
Rights and Migration: A Legal Analysis of Challenges and Opportunities, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 131, 131.

75

76

Platform on Disaster Displacement, supra note 63, at 145; Kälin, supra note 34, at 89. The recent
comments of the UNHRC in Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016,
¶¶ 9.11–.14 (2020) suggest that, in principle, the effects of climate change (and possibly other forms
of environmental degradation) in an applicant’s country of origin could generate a sufficient threat
to the right to life to prevent refoulement on human rights grounds, although that threat would have
to be highly imminent. It would also not require states to grant admission or stay.
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Among legal scholars, the gap in legal international standards also tends to
be perceived in terms of an absence of “international protection” for persons who
flee their countries due solely to the impact of environmental factors.77 This
analogy with the situation of refugees, and other beneficiaries of international
protection, is evident from the literature’s principal concern with persons
unwillingly outside their country, recalling the “‘exilic’ bias” of refugee law.78 Some
scholars even explicitly frame the legal problem in this context as an absence of
international protection for forced movements, with “voluntary migration” simply
left to the discretion of states in national law.79 Yet those scholars not only
underestimate the difficulty of distinguishing “forced” and “voluntary” movement
in this context80 but also misrepresent the logic of international protection, which
turns on prospective risk in the country of origin and a lack of national protection
rather than the supposedly forced quality of movement.81 Even so, they show that,
analogous to the situation of refugees, the legal gap in relation to mobility on
environmental grounds is conceived principally as one of “international
protection” under international law.
Thirdly, the legal debate is “not about the law as it exists (lex lata), but about
what the law ought to be (lex ferenda).”82 In other words, the problem is largely
accepted, and the debate is really about solutions. In most cases, legal scholars
turn to international law to close this legal gap. Two main methods are evident.
On the one hand, certain scholars, particularly those from the international
refugee and human rights law fields, argue in favor of more expansively
interpreting existing norms of international law. Many of them advocate for
interpreting international refugee definitions broadly to properly take account of
how “human” inputs also shape “natural” disasters in any particular society.83
77

See MCADAM, supra note 40, at 36.

78

See Gervase J.L. Coles, The Human Rights Approach to the Solution of the Refugee Problem: A Theoretical
and Practical Enquiry, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 195, 209 (Alan E. Nash ed., 1988).
See KÄLIN & SCHREPFER, supra note 73, at 62; Kälin, supra note 34, at 89–90, 95–96.

79
80

81
82
83

This reflects the complex intermingling of environmental and human factors, including adaptation
strategies and coping mechanisms, especially in the face of slow-onset processes See supra note 25
and accompanying text.
See generally MCADAM, supra note 40, at 98; McGregor, supra note 25.
See Mayer & Crépeau, supra note 10, at 13.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text. This approach can be discerned in SCOTT, supra note 30;
SANJULA WEERASINGHE, UNHCR LEGAL AND PROTECTION POLICY RESEARCH SERIES, NO. 39:
IN HARM'S WAY: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF NEXUS DYNAMICS BETWEEN
CONFLICT OR VIOLENCE AND DISASTER OR CLIMATE CHANGE 109–10 (2018); Madeline Garlick,
Marine Franck & Erica Bower, Enhancing Legal Protection for People Displaced in the Context of Disasters
and Climate Change, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE?, supra note 18, at 118,
121; Selwyn Fraser, Climate Persecutors: Climate Change Displacement and the International Community as
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Some also propose the development of soft law instruments to provide temporary
or similar protection to the broader class of persons fleeing environmental
factors.84 Such proposals, often touted as merely a first step on the path to creating
a new treaty dedicated to this challenge, also often creatively draw on, and develop,
existing international law principles from the field of international protection
law.85
On the other hand, an alternative approach, more common among
international environmental law scholars, proposes new treaty law to fill the legal
gap. A few argue for amending the terms of existing treaties in the refugee field,86
although the idea is rightly dismissed by refugee law authorities as unworkable.87
Many others call for a new treaty, either standalone or under the framework of
international environmental law, for which they provide draft proposals.88 At their
Persecutor, 20 N.Z. J. ENV’T L. 107, 110 (2016); Christopher M. Kozoll, Poisoning the Well: Persecution,
the Environment, Refugee Status, 15 COLO. J. INT’L ENV’T L. & POL’Y 271, 297 (2004).
84

85

86

87

88

See Camilla Schloss, Cross-border Displacement Due to Environmental Disaster: A Proposal for UN Guiding
Principles to Fill the Legal Protection Gap, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE?, supra
note 18, at 243, 247–48; Elizabeth Ferris & Jonas Bergmann, Soft Law, Migration and Climate Change
Governance, 8 J. HUM. RIGHTS & ENV’T 6, 12 (2017); Tamara Wood, Developing Temporary Protection in
Africa, 49 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 23, 23 (2015); MCADAM, supra note 40, at 256–66.
Several of these proposals focus on the provision of “temporary protection” for people who flee
disasters or climate change but do not qualify as refugees. See, e.g., Garlick et al., supra note 83, at
121–22; Volker Türk, Temporary Protection Arrangements to Fill a Gap in the Protection Regime, 49 FORCED
MIGRATION REV. 40, 40–41(2015); Wood, supra note 84, at 23–25; MCADAM, supra note 40, at 256–
66.
See, e.g., Beatriz Felipe Pérez, Beyond the Shortcomings of International Law: A Proposal for the Legal Protection
of Climate Migrants, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE?, supra note 18, at 214,
223–24.
See, e.g., MCADAM, supra note 40, at 197–200; Bruce Burson, Protecting the Rights of People Displaced by
Climate Change: Global Issues and Regional Perspectives, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION: SOUTH
PACIFIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 63, at 159, 160–61; UNHCR, CLIMATE CHANGE, NATURAL
DISASTERS AND HUMAN DISPLACEMENTS: A UNHCR PERSPECTIVE 9 (2009),
https://perma.cc/6LFH-CR2Q.
See, e.g., The INTERNATIONAL CENTRE OF COMPARATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, Draft Convention on
the Status of Environmentally Displaced Persons, (4th ed. 2018), https://perma.cc/6JLH-QCMN; see also
Prieur, supra note 40, at 238–41 (providing further commentary); Biermann & Boas, supra note 52,
at 76 (proposing the Protocol on Recognition, Protection and Resettlement of Climate Migrants);
Hodgkinson et al., supra note 52 (proposing the Convention for Persons Displaced by Climate
Change); Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on
Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 349, 372 (2009) (proposing the international
convention on climate refugees); Kara Moberg, Extending Refugee Definitions to Cover Environmentally
Displaced Persons Displaces Necessary Protection, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1135–36 (2008) (proposing the
global environmentally-based immigration visa program); Williams, supra note 63, at 519–23
(proposing regional agreements for climate refugees); Dana Zartner, Stemming the Flow of
Environmental Displacement: Creating a Convention to Protect Persons and Preserve the Environment, 13 COLO.
J. INT’L ENV’T L. & POL’Y 1, 21–22 (2001) (proposing the Convention on the Protection of
Environmentally Displaced Persons); Gregory S. McCue, Note, Environmental Refugees: Applying
International Environmental Law to Involuntary Migration, 6 GEO. INT’L ENV’T L. REV. 151, 177 (1994)
(proposing the international convention on refugees).
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core, though, these proposals seek to promote status-based forms of international
protection for their respective classes of refugee-like beneficiaries,89 whether they
are defined in the draft instruments as, variously, “environmentally displaced
persons,” “climate migrants,” “persons displaced by climate change,” or “climate
refugees.” Likewise, many of the new obligations that these proposals envisage in
areas such as resettlement and distribution serve to reproduce or develop existing
legal principles drawn from the law of international protection or from
international environmental law.90 None of the proposals have yet been taken up
by states.91
Finally, as no clear ethical basis exists for privileging environmental factors
over drivers of migration such as poverty, there is debate over whether such
special protection can be justified.92 Rather than arbitrarily creating new regimes
for a privileged few, some suggest that we should instead focus on fully promoting
the basic human rights of all migrants without distinction.93 Similarly, recognition
of the way that environmental and human factors intertwine to shape vulnerability
and mobility leads some to argue that a focus on protecting the displaced misses
the bigger picture “that such migration is a consequence of the human insecurity
imposed on the South in the current global order.”94 These approaches suggest
that mobility in this context cannot be addressed in isolation from the pressing
need to respond to wider migration, environmental, and development challenges
and their impact on countries that are particularly exposed to the risk of disaster.95
For instance, certain scholars working in the Pacific have begun to analyze climate
mobility in the context of wider migration patterns and processes.96 As a result,
89

See Christel Cournil, The Protection of “Environmental Refugees” in International Law, in MIGRATION AND
CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 12, at 359, 361–63 (listing scholarly proposals identified as sharing a
concept of “protection” as their common basis).

90

On the latter point, see, for example, AVIDAN KENT & SIMON BEHRMAN, FACILITATING THE
RESETTLEMENT AND RIGHTS OF CLIMATE REFUGEES: AN ARGUMENT FOR DEVELOPING EXISTING
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 122–59 (2018).
The currently limited extent of formal state interest in creating a new treaty can be evidenced from
the few examples cited in Prieur, supra note 40, at 237. See also MCADAM, supra note 40, at 187–201.
See MAYER, supra note 22, at 31–35; Peter Penz, International Ethical Responsibilities to “Climate Change
Refugees”, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note
34, at 151, 152–54.

91
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See MAYER, supra note 22, at 159–85.
Stephen Castles, Concluding Remarks on the Climate Change-Migration Nexus, in MIGRATION
CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 12, at 415, 425.
Id. at 424–26; see also MAYER, supra note 22, at 16–35.
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See, e.g., BRUCE BURSON & RICHARD BEDFORD, NANSEN INITIATIVE, CLUSTERS AND HUBS:
TOWARD A REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE FOR VOLUNTARY ADAPTIVE MIGRATION IN THE PACIFIC
(2013), https://perma.cc/6TL8-AZ3Q; Jon Barnett & Michael Webber, Migration as Adaptation:
Opportunities and Limits, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY
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they now argue that climate migration might be addressed “within existing
international migration mechanisms,”97 and ask how immigration law in Australia
and New Zealand could be tweaked, or how bilateral or regional arrangements
may be developed, to accommodate future mobility linked to climate change.98

C. Framing the Case Study of the Americas
Legal debate on the environment-mobility nexus revolves principally around
the question of how to respond to international mobility shaped by environmental
factors. As such, this Article aims to contribute to that core legal debate rather
than to consider the legal implications of other aspects of this nexus, such as
internal mobility linked to environmental factors.99 Nonetheless, this Article draws
on insights from the preceding literature review as points of entry into the legal
debate. Firstly, on the “mobility” side of the nexus, it focuses on travel, entry, and
stay for non-nationals, or “aliens,” as the key challenge. Secondly, on the
“environment” side of the nexus, it focuses broadly on disasters and the
underlying hazards rather than limiting the analysis to climate change alone.
Thirdly, on causality, it addresses not only how such environmental factors
contribute to displacement but also how they might impact international mobility
in other ways. These insights provide a strong foundation for renewed
consideration of key areas of the legal debate, such as the scope of existing legal
protection, the nature of potential legal development in this field, and how to
accommodate the multicausal nature of migration.
This Article interrogates these questions through a case study of the
Americas. On the one hand, this approach reflects the contention that abstract
analysis of international law at the global level has largely reached the limits of
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 34, at 37, 39–41; Catherine Locke, W. Neil Adger & P. Mick Kelly,
Changing Places: Migration’s Social and Environmental Consequences, 42 ENV’T 24, 26–29 (2000); BLACK,
supra note 20, at 23–52; Hugo, supra note 27, at 119–120.
97

BURSON & BEDFORD, supra note 96, at 10; MCADAM, supra note 40, at 201–11; Graeme Hugo,
Climate Change-Induced Mobility and the Existing Migration Regime in Asia and the Pacific, in CLIMATE
CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 34, at 9, 33; see also
Jon Barnett & Natasha Chamberlain, Migration as Climate Change Adaptation: Implications for the Pacific,
in CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION: SOUTH PACIFIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 63, at 51, 56;
Richard Bedford & Charlotte Bedford, International Migration and Climate Change: A Post-Copenhagen
Perspective on Options for Kiribati and Tuvalu, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION: SOUTH PACIFIC
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 63, at 89, 125.

98

See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
The existing human rights-based framework codified in the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement is usually seen as sufficient to address the situation of people forcibly displaced by
climate change within their own country. See Kälin, supra note 34, at 93–94. However, elaboration
of the norms may be needed in relation to durable solutions and accountability for climate change
drivers. See Elizabeth Ferris, The Relevance of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement for the Climate
Change-Migration Nexus, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE
LAW, supra note 5, at 108, 119.
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what it can contribute to advancing these kinds of legal debates. On the other
hand, it takes seriously the observation by some scholars that international
mobility linked to environmental factors—as well as the development of legal
responses and cooperation by states—is most likely to play out within particular
regions rather than at the global level, at least initially. As a case study, the
Americas offer a contrasting example to the oft-cited Pacific case.100 Certainly, like
those in the Pacific, countries in the Americas are exposed regularly to sundry
hazards. Yet, in other ways, the Americas are more diverse, comprising two
continents with extensive land borders, in contrast to the small island states that
make up most of the Pacific. Moreover, the Americas are twenty times more
populous than the Pacific and contain not only some of the world’s largest and
richest countries but also some of its poorest, as well as many others located in
between these two extremes.101

III. E MPIRICAL D YNAMICS IN THE A MERICAS
The gaps in protection identified by legal scholars writing on the
environment-mobility nexus exist only in relation to the presumed reality of
international movement caused by environmental threats in the country of origin.
In other words, the legal problem corresponds to an assumed underlying empirical
phenomenon. Yet many legal scholars seem merely to rely on vague and poorlyevidenced, even rather speculative, assertions about this phenomenon’s existence,
scope, and characteristics, often citing disjointed and rather particular examples as
if they demonstrated some general trend.102 However, if we want to truly assess
the adequacy of the law in relation to specific empirical phenomena, such as the
international movement of persons in the context of environmental push factors,
then we need to engage more robustly with the growing body of natural and social
science research on this topic.103 Toward this end, the present Article seeks to
derive a more precise understanding of the environment-mobility nexus in the
region of the Americas from the somewhat fragmentary research that exists thus
far. From this point of entry, this Article elucidates a few of the main ways in
which disasters and hazards appear, firstly, to act as a push factor for diverse
dynamics of international movement in the Americas and, secondly, to shape the

100
101

102

103

See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
International Database: Population by Continent 1980 to 2050, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2010),
https://perma.cc/94KE-UUR4.
See, for example, the empirical “scene-setting” in Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent, Overcoming the
Legal Impasse? Setting the Scene, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE?, supra note 18,
at 3–6.
Calls for more robust engagement with the empirical evidence are made by some legal scholars. See,
e.g., Mayer, supra note 18, at 90–91.
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experience of international mobility in other ways that are important for the law
to consider.

A. International Movement Lin ked to Environmental Threats
in the Americas
Empirical research confirms that the diverse environmental threats to which
countries in the Americas are exposed can act as a push factor for movement.
Evidence of this impact exists for both sudden-onset events, such as storms,
hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes, and slow-onset events, such as drought,
erosion, desertification, and glacier retreat that may be linked to climate change.104
Social scientists have suggested that these different kinds of hazards produce
distinct patterns of mobility in terms of duration, distance, and character, although
the evidence remains somewhat mixed.105 Even so, the data is clear that suddenand slow-onset disasters now push millions of incidents of internal movement by
individuals in the countries of the Americas each year.106 By contrast, data on
international movement due to disasters are more fragmentary and not routinely
collected. Yet, as the following discussion shows, international movement linked
to both slow- and sudden-onset events in this region is a present reality and not
just an abstract legal concern, even if its scale seems less significant than that of
internal movement.107 Of course, given that the latter is predicted to increase with
time,108 so may the former. These trends in the Americas accord with those in
other regions of the world,109 suggesting that this region is not an anomaly in that
respect.
104

105

See generally Raoul Kaenzig & Etienne Piguet, Migration and Climate Change in Latin America and the
Caribbean, in PEOPLE ON THE MOVE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE supra note 63, at 155. There are also
areas of Suriname, Guyana, and the Bahamas where the impact of sea-level rises on economic
livelihoods could force migration in the future. Id. at 169.
Id. at 155; Piguet et al., supra note 12, at 6–12, 15–16.

106

Calculations by the author based on figures in INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTRE
(IDMC), ANNUAL REPORTS 2019 (2019), https://perma.cc/AZ7S-3W7B, suggest that, between
2008 and 2018, over 28.5 million reported instances of internal movement due to sudden-onset
disasters linked to natural hazards occurred in the Americas region. Across the same time period,
the figures for internal displacements by sub-region are: Central America (798,472); Caribbean
(6,705,000); North America (9,851,300); South America (11,184,180).

107

For instance, for the U.S. as a key destination country, approximate calculations by the author of
instances of immigration linked to disasters from other countries in the Americas, including those
granted entry or stay under normal immigration categories—drawing on Onelica C. Andrade
Afonso, Natural Disasters and Migration: Storms in Central America and the Caribbean and Immigration to
the U.S., 14 EXPL. 1, 10 (2011)—and under temporary protected status in disaster contexts, suggest
an average annual upper ceiling in the tens of thousands.

108

See WORLD BANK GROUP [WBO], GROUNDSWELL: PREPARING FOR INTERNAL CLIMATE
MIGRATION; POLICY NOTE #3: INTERNAL CLIMATE MIGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 1 (2018),
https://perma.cc/9Y5L-ASPE.
See Kaenzig & Piguet, supra note 104, at 171; Piguet et al., supra note 12, at 6–12, 15–16.

109

Winter 2021

285

Chicago Journal of International Law

As in other regions, such mobility is shaped by multiple, intersecting drivers,
with environmental pressures often just one more push factor in contexts
sometimes riven by deep inequality.110 Even so, empirical evidence from the
Americas suggests that at least three different strands of international movement
pushed by environmental factors can be discerned. The most visible form of
movement takes place shortly before or after a sudden-onset hazardous event is
perceived as approaching, as people living near land borders may temporarily
cross into the neighboring country to escape the impact of the event or to access
better shelter or aid on the other side of the border. The movement usually follows
existing, well-established patterns of daily back-and-forth migratory crossings in
border regions. Examples include north Guatemalans crossing the border into
Mexico to better weather tropical storms, victims of flooding seeking respite by
crossing from south Colombia to Ecuador or from Amazonian Bolivia and Peru
to Brazil, and Chileans affected by earthquakes or mudslides in frontier zones that
are cut off from other parts of Chile seeking aid in accessible Argentinian towns.111
Crucially, most people move temporarily to escape not only actual disasters but
also perceived oncoming disasters or hazardous events.
Another strand of international movement in the Americas consists of those
persons who leave their countries in the context of slow-onset disasters. The data
shows that these persons, who are often from populations or social sectors whose
livelihood depends on particular forms of agriculture, also tend to follow existing
migration routes out of the country. For example, severe droughts linked to
climatic factors are shown to increase migration from affected parts of rural
Mexico to the U.S.112 Similarly, slow-onset events linked to changing weather and
rainfall patterns, soil erosion, and other environmental degradation appear to have
helped push migration from rural parts of the Dominican Republic and Haiti,

110
111

112

See Kaenzig & Piguet, supra note 104, at 171.
See CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11, at 17; CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND
PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 12.
See Isabelle Chort & Maëlys de la Rupelle, Determinants of Mexico-US Outward and Return Migration
Flows: A State-Level Panel Data Analysis, 53 DEMOGRAPHY 1453, 1474 (2016); Raphael J. Nawrotzki,
Fernando Riosmena & Lori M. Hunter, Do Rainfall Deficits Predict U.S.-Bound Migration from Rural
Mexico? Evidence from the Mexican Census, 32 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 129, 144–47 (2013);
THE NATIONAL HERITAGE INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND MIGRATION: THE
U.S.-MEXICO CASE STUDY 25 (1997). One study suggests that climate-related international
migration from rural Mexico is predominantly undocumented. See Raphael J Nawrotzki, Fernando
Riosmena, Lori M. Hunter & Daniel M. Runfola, Undocumented Migration in response to Climate Change,
1 INT’L J. POPULATION STUD. 60, 67 (2015). Some suggest that temporary migration of up to two
years is the predominant form of international migration by those affected by drought and
desertification, rather than permanent migration. See Michelle Leighton, Drought, Desertification and
Migration: Past Experiences, Predicted Impacts and Human Rights Issues, in MIGRATION AND CLIMATE
CHANGE supra note 12, at 331, 349.
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sometimes to other countries.113 Given that the impact of such slow-onset
disasters is often mediated via social factors to a greater extent than for suddenonset events, their role in driving mobility can be highly contextual.114 However,
it is not always possible to differentiate the respective contribution of slow- and
sudden-onset events to pushing movement, especially in locations where they
overlap. For instance, research in some rural areas of Honduras and Haiti shows
how migration out of the country from those areas is driven by spiraling livelihood
pressures resulting from the combined impact of slow-onset environmental
degradation with sudden-onset tropical storms.115
Similar questions about how to frame the impact of disasters and hazards as
a push factor for mobility emerge in evidence of a third form of international
movement in the Americas that takes place up to a year or more after a suddenonset disaster has occurred. This “delayed” movement seems to be driven not so
much by the hazard’s sudden and immediate disaster impact as by its enduring
implications for the viability of long-term household livelihood plans.116 It is
documented mainly in poorer and less-resilient Central American and Caribbean
countries where a tropical storm or earthquake has had a particularly devastating
effect on society and infrastructure at the national level.117 That data dovetails with
other research showing that regular migration to the U.S. increases after severe
storms in these countries, and also in Mexico, albeit only after a lag period of up
to a year.118 Like the other two strands of movement, this one also tends to follow

113

See Stefan Alscher, Environmental Degradation and Migration on Hispaniola Island, 49 INT’L MIGRATION
164, 169 (2011); Lykke Andersen, Lotte Lund & Dorte Verner, Migration and Climate Change, in
REDUCING POVERTY, PROTECTING LIVELIHOODS, AND BUILDING ASSETS IN A CHANGING
CLIMATE: SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
195, 202 (Dorte Verner ed., 2010).
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See Piguet et al., supra note 12, at 8–12.
See Alscher, supra note 113, at 170–73; David J. Wrathall, Migration Amidst Social-Ecological Regime
Shift: The Search for Stability in Garífuna Villages of Northern Honduras, 40 HUM. ECOLOGY 583, 594
(2012).
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This lag may reflect both the diminishing access to humanitarian aid in the disaster-affected country
as the months pass and the time needed for households to collect the resources for travel. See
CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 12–13. Alternatively, if people are able to
rebuild homes and replant crops during the initial recovery, households or household members may
then migrate to seek alternative income sources. See McLeman, supra note 29, at 43–44.
See McLeman, supra note 29, at 43–44; Raphael J. Nawrotzki & Jack DeWaar, Climate Shocks and the
Timing of Migration from Mexico, 38 POPULATION & ENV’T 72, 86–87 (2016); Afonso, supra note 107,
at 9; Marlene Attzs, Natural Disasters and Remittances: Exploring the Linkages Between Poverty, Gender, and
Disaster Vulnerability in Caribbean SIDS, 61 UNU-WIDER RES. PAPER 1, 9 (2008).
See Parag Mahajan & Dean Yang, Taken by Storm: Hurricanes, Migrant Networks, and U.S. Immigration,
17, 22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23756, 2017), https://perma.cc/PE5ADJDE; Afonso, supra note 107, at 9.
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traditional migration routes from the affected country.119 However, where the
routes are blocked, then it seems that new ones are forged, as with the new
patterns of Haitian mobility that reoriented toward South American countries
when some traditional Haitian migration destination countries such as the U.S.
tried to close their borders after the 2010 earthquake.120
This growing evidence base shows that environmental phenomena in the
Americas do contribute to pushing diverse forms of international movement.
Indeed, the three strands of movement identified here likely provide only a few
pertinent examples of how the wider mobility dynamics play out.121 Certainly, it
seems that only in rare cases will these forms of movement be likely to satisfy the
long-established legal bases for international protection by states.122 Equally,
though, they do suggest that, while framing the empirical problem in terms of
“disasters” offers a useful point of entry for understanding how environmental
factors influence human mobility, a limitation of the “disaster” concept is that it
describes only one way in which hazards can act as drivers of mobility. In this
regard, the examples imply that people do not leave only due to the occurrence or
risk of disasters at the societal level.123 Rather, some movement also occurs
preemptively due to the perceived potential impact of a hazard at the individual
or household level, regardless of whether its collective impact at the societal level
will result in a “disaster.” Likewise, other patterns of movement occur after the
“disaster” phase has passed due to the hazard’s perceived longer-term or ongoing
impact on the viability of individual or household livelihood strategies. In other
words, while a hazardous event is a prerequisite for a “disaster,” the perceived or
actual impact of a hazard or hazardous event at the household level can be
sufficient to drive movement by the affected people, even in the absence of
disaster conditions at the societal level.
These three strands of movement also suggest that any analytical distinction
between sudden- and slow-onset disasters may prove less relevant for our
purposes than the recognition that hazardous events and disasters can have both

119

Social scientists have observed that international movements in this context tend to occur most
frequently where pre-existing relationships of migration exist between the sending and receiving
countries. See, e.g., Kaenzig & Piguet, supra note 104, at 171.
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PATRICIA WEISS FAGEN, NANSEN INITIATIVE, RECEIVING HAITIAN MIGRANTS IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE 2010 EARTHQUAKE 27, (2013), https://perma.cc/7BBF-BYWA; Nikola Gütermann & Eve
Schneider, The Earthquake in Haiti, in THE STATE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION 39, 44 (François
Gemenne et al. eds., 2011).

121

For instance, other scenarios might include movement away from communities that are exposed to
the repeated impact of sudden-onset events.

122

See MCADAM, supra note 40, at 52–98. See Section IV below for discussion of why the legal criteria
for international protection are likely to be engaged only rarely by these circumstances.

123

On the U.N. approach, even the concept of “disaster risk” is defined in terms of potential impact
at the collective level on “a system, society or a community.” See U.N. Report, supra note 41, at 14.
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short-term and long-term impacts on mobility at the household level, even if their
relative proximity as push factors for mobility may diminish over the long-term.
In general, then, these conclusions point to a need for researchers to engage with
the broader ways in which hazards impact human mobility, and to recognize that
the occurrence of a “disaster” is but one way in which those hazards can shape
movement. But what does this mean for the law? Certainly, the “disaster” concept
was not designed to be applied as a legal basis for regulating movement. At the
same time, it has definite advantages over concepts such as “climate change” or
“the environment” that suggest its application to this legal context merits
consideration. As a potential basis for regulating entry and stay by non-nationals,
though, the empirical evidence suggests that lawmakers will need to reflect
carefully on whether to use the concept of “disasters” strictly as a threshold that
requires that a hazard has an impact at the collective level in the affected country
or, instead, to advance a more granular approach to the wider ways in which
“hazardous events” or the underlying “hazards” impact mobility options at the
individual or household level.

B. Other Forms of Environmental Impact on International
Mobility
The legal literature is principally concerned with environmental factors as a
driver of international mobility or “push factor.” It is recognized that this causality
can play out in diverse scenarios—for instance, as a result of sudden-onset
disasters, slow-onset disasters, the impact of climate on conflict over natural
resources, etc.—but the emphasis remains on how such phenomena act as drivers
of movement by affected persons.124 More recently, though, some legal scholars
have argued in favor of a broader conception of this causal nexus by pointing to
the possibility that environmental factors might also shape mobility by acting as a
“pull factor” due to the new opportunities created by climate change or by
mitigation or adaptation activities.125 Building on those analyses, the present
Article contends that engagement with the empirical evidence from the Americas
discloses still other ways in which disasters may shape the phenomenon of
international mobility. Moreover, these further configurations of the
environment-mobility nexus pose particularly acute questions for the law,
especially in relation to travel, entry, and stay for affected persons.
Certainly, the evidence from the Americas confirms that not all international
mobility in the context of environmental threats will take the form of a
spontaneous movement by affected persons. In the Pacific region, scholars have
long debated the prospect of inhabitants of “sinking” small island states being
124
125

See, e.g., Kälin, supra note 34, at 84–92.
See MAYER, supra note 22, at 22–25.
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relocated to other countries and the legal implications of such measures. 126
However, data from the Americas verifies that organized transfers of disasteraffected persons by states already take place in the form of evacuations carried out
before or shortly after a sudden-onset disaster.127 Such evacuations are often
undertaken by a foreign state for its nationals unfortunate enough to be caught up
in a serious disaster overseas. In the Americas, however, empirical data shows that
nationals of the disaster-affected country have sometimes also been evacuated to
other countries by those states. Examples include the evacuation to other
Caribbean islands as well as to the U.K. and U.S. of most of the population of
Montserrat when the volcano erupted in 1995 and certain profiles of Haitian
nationals evacuated on medical or similar grounds by Canada, Mexico, and the
U.S. after the 2010 Haiti earthquake.128 This raises the question of how the law
treats such organized transfers in terms of travel, entry, and stay.
Crucially, studies of the Americas region show that disasters can impact a
range of other legal aspects of international mobility for aliens.129 Thus, where a
disaster occurs in the country of origin, it may limit possibilities for return,
whether voluntary or enforced, with particular legal implications in terms of
removal and stay for nationals of that country. It may also reduce the flow of
resources from family or businesses in the home country that are needed for the
alien to support maintenance during studies or other lawful forms of stay in the
host country. Likewise, where a disaster occurs in the host country, it may impede
the alien’s basis for stay as a result of the death of the family member on whom
legal status depends, the destruction of the business that provides the basis for a
work permit, or an inability to comply with immigration reporting restrictions due
to damage to transport and communication infrastructures in the host country.
The disaster may also reduce or interrupt the capacity of immigration authorities
in the host country to process applications from aliens for travel, entry, and stay.
Overall, these scenarios suggest that the law needs to take a broader conception
of the environment-mobility nexus if it is to adequately regulate international
mobility in the context of environmental threats.

126

127

128
129

See generally, e.g., Bruce Burson, Walter Kälin, Jane McAdam & Sanjula Weerasinghe, The Duty to Move
People Out of Harm’s Way in the Context of Climate Change and Disasters, 37 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 379
(2018); Jane McAdam & Elizabeth Ferris, Planned Relocations in the Context of Climate Change: Unpacking
the Legal and Conceptual Issues, 4 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L COMPAR. L. 137 (2015).
Evacuations can also involve internal movement, as with the 2017 precautionary wholesale
mandatory evacuation by Antigua and Barbuda of the island of Barbuda and by the Bahamas of its
southern islands. See Kate Lyons, The Night Barbuda Died: How Hurricane Irma Created a Caribbean
Ghost Town, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/A4RN-SPNF; Bahamas to Evacuate
Islands in Path of “Irma”, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/PSH7-ZCTZ.
CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 13.
See id. at 13–14 for these examples.
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IV. I NTERNATIONAL P ROTECTION L AW IN THE A MERICAS
International law scholarship treats international mobility in the context of
environmental pressures as a new challenge that the existing law does not yet
adequately address. Moreover, most contributors to this debate frame that legal
gap, and its solution, principally in terms of international protection for affected
persons. At first glance, recent practice in the Americas appears to confirm this
point. Certainly, states rarely extend international protection to persons fleeing
environmental threats, despite claims by scholars as to the relevance of certain
regional legal instruments. Yet a detailed analysis of legal practice in this region
offers a more nuanced understanding. Crucially, this Section will show that certain
states have actually long recognized the challenge of international mobility caused
by disasters and, initially at least, some dealt with it as a matter of refugee
protection. Further, although this international protection approach waned as
states in the Americas increasingly became integrated into the global refugee law
regime, the underlying legal challenge was not discounted. Rather, a distinct new
legal approach toward the entry and stay of persons affected by a disaster can be
discerned in some of the national laws on refugees and international protection
adopted by states in the Americas.

A. Disasters and International Protection
At present, most states in the Americas are parties to the main binding U.N.
treaties on refugee protection and have incorporated pertinent aspects of the
“universal” refugee definition into national law.130 In Latin America, fifteen states
have also incorporated the regional expanded refugee definition endorsed by the
non-binding Cartagena Declaration into their national law.131 In a small number
130

These U.N. treaties define a “refugee” positively as any person who “owing to well-founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.” See Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees art. 1A(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954); Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(2)), Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered
into force Oct. 4, 1967). The Caribbean is the exception in this region: only eight of thirteen states
are parties to the Protocol and only four have incorporated the refugee definition into national law
and policy. See CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11, at 64.
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The Cartagena Declaration defines “refugees” also as “persons who have fled their country because
their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression,
internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously
disturbed public order.” Cartagena Declaration on Refugees § 3,(3), Nov. 1984, reprinted in 3
UNHCR, COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND OTHER LEGAL TEXTS
CONCERNING REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS: REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS 1196, 1197 (2007).
Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay incorporate the expanded definition in national legislation.
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of states, national law also provides for complementary forms of international
protection based on non-refoulement standards in international human rights
treaties.132 None of these international instruments specifically mention the
occurrence or risk of a “disaster” in the country of origin as a basis for
international protection. Yet some legal scholars argue that these universal and
regional treaty norms could be interpreted to provide international protection to
persons fleeing disasters.133 Some limited practice exists in support of this
proposal. For example, after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, several Latin American
states did recognize a small number of Haitians as refugees due to the violence
unleashed by the disaster.134 Similarly, the French territories of the Antilles and
Guiana granted “subsidiary” forms of complementary international protection to
some Haitian asylum seekers in light of the security and other risks generated by
the earthquake.135
Crucially, though, in each case where states in the Americas did grant
international protection, whether under refugee law or complementary forms of
international protection, this was conferred due to the breakdown in the
institutions of national protection in Haiti and associated risks of violence
generated by the disaster. The fact that such violence and the lack of national
protection resulted from a disaster, as opposed to some other cause, was thus
treated as legally irrelevant for the purposes of determining international
Costa Rica applies it in national law by order of the courts. See U.N.H.C.R. REGIONAL LEGAL UNIT
OF THE BUREAU OF THE AMERICAS, TABLE 1: REGIONAL DEFINITION OF REFUGEE,
https://perma.cc/L7DS-LUS3.
132

Non-refoulement standards forbid the sending of a person to another country where they may face
specific kinds of persecution or other serious harms. Alongside the well-established rules on the
non-refoulement of refugees in refugee law, international human rights law prohibitions on sending a
person to a territory where the risk of torture exists form the main source of “complementary”
protection (in other words complementary to refugee protection) against refoulement for persons who
may not qualify as refugees stricto sensu under refugee law. In the Americas, national law in countries
such as Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, and the U.S. mostly reflects the
non-refoulement standards expressed by the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, (entered into force
June 26, 1987). See CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11, at 41, 52–53.
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See, e.g., KÄLIN & SCHREPFER, supra note 73, at 34 (arguing that the Cartagena Declaration definition
may accommodate disaster-affected persons under the element relating to “other circumstances
which have seriously disturbed public order”).
Mexico, Panama, Ecuador, and Peru recognized some Haitians as refugees under the definitions
provided by one or other of these international instruments for refugee protection, based on the
rise of insecurity in Haiti resulting from the 2010 earthquake. See CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND
PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 17–18.
See Cedric Audebert, The Recent Geodynamics of Haitian Migration in the Americas: Refugees or Economic
Migrants?, 34 REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE ESTUDOS DE POPULAÇÃO 55, 61 (2017). The “subsidiary
protection” provided under E.U. law is based ultimately on the non-refoulement protection provided
by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
3, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), to which France is also a party.
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protection. In fact, as a matter of national law, almost no state in the Americas
treats a disaster as, in itself, a basis for international protection under “universal”
or “regional” refugee definitions at the international level.136 Indeed, in some
states, national law expressly rules out such an interpretation.137 In practice, certain
states have even gone so far as to channel asylum claims by nationals of a disasteraffected country out of the international protection procedures so they can be
resolved instead under other legal provisions unrelated to international
protection.138 Thus, states in this region tend not to view persons fleeing a disaster
as requiring international protection, except in certain specific cases where its
impact includes clear risks of persecution or violence that fit with existing
concepts of international protection. The fact of the disaster itself, though, is
treated as legally irrelevant to determining international protection.
On its face, the current approach might seem to confirm the presumption
that law in the Americas has yet to come to terms with the challenge of
international mobility linked to environmental threats. However, a retrospective
analysis of legal practice in this region shows that states have not always taken this
approach to the application of international protection law. Indeed, between 1952
and 1980, national law in the U.S. expressly provided for different categories of
“persons uprooted by catastrophic natural calamity” to be resettled to the U.S. as
“refugees.”139 Moreover, during this early period, the U.S. was not alone in viewing
the challenge of persons displaced by disasters as a matter of refugee protection.
For instance, in 1978, Cuba adopted a definition of refugees including, inter alia,
persons who leave their country “due to cataclysm or other phenomena of
nature.”140 In 1979, the government of Trinidad and Tobago also contemplated
the challenge of “refugees from natural disasters” and decided that such cases “be
decided, when the need arises, on the basis of the circumstances prevailing in
Trinidad and Tobago at the particular period in time.”141
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137

138

139

140
141

Cuba is the exception to this consensus. See Decreto No. 26, art. 80, July 19, 1978 (Cuba),
https://perma.cc/F9MW-25VR [hereinafter Cuba Decree].
For example, Mexico expressly interprets the “other circumstances which have seriously disturbed
public order” element of the Cartagena Declaration refugee definition as applicable only to “acts
attributable to man.” See Reglamento de la Ley Sobre Refugiados y Protección Complementaria
[Regulations of the Law on Refugees and Complementary Protections] [RLRPC], art. 4(XI), Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 21-02-2012 (Mex.), https://perma.cc/5ZDY-A6TF (author
translation).
See, for example, Weerasinghe, supra note 83, at 64–75 for a discussion of the Brazilian procedural
response to Haitian asylum seekers after the earthquake.
See Royce Bernstein Murray & Sarah Petrin Williamson, Migration as a Tool for Disaster Recovery: A
Case Study on U.S. Policy Options for Post-Earthquake Haiti 27–30 (Ctr. for Glob. Dev., Working Paper
255, 2011), https://perma.cc/66TG-DKUW.
See Cuba Decree, supra note 136 (author translation).
Cabinet Decision, Minute No. 4809, Nov. 16, 1979 (Trin. and Tobago).
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These examples show that, contrary to the assumption by some legal
scholars that international mobility linked to environmental threats represents a
new legal gap, this challenge has long been recognized in the practice of certain
states in the Americas. Indeed, the initial approach of those states to legally
resolving the challenge by adopting unilateral and sui generis refugee definitions in
national law waned only during the 1980s, as states across the Americas
increasingly joined the U.N. refugee treaties and incorporated their “universal”
refugee definition in national law. As a result, in this region today, the earlier
approach persists solely in Cuba, which remains outside the U.N. refugee treaty
regime. The role played by international law in this shift in approach is
noteworthy. In this instance, whereas the legal scholarship usually envisages a
positive role for international law in extending international protection to persons
fleeing disaster contexts, here it appears to have curtailed the protection available
to such persons under existing national law and thus helped create a “gap” as a
result of promoting the harmonization of national law with U.N. refugee treaty
law. Although this observation cannot be generalized beyond these specific
examples, it calls us to think more critically about the relationship between
national and international law in responding to this challenge.

B. An Alternative Legal Approach
From the 1990s, an alternative legal approach to the challenge of
international mobility linked to environmental threats can be discerned in the
broader “international protection” practice of certain states in the Americas. The
creation of “temporary protected status” (TPS) in the national law of the U.S.
offers one prominent example. Indeed, legal scholarship routinely cites the
“environmental disaster” limb of TPS as one of a small number of protection
provisions at the level of national law.142 This provision allows the U.S. authorities
to designate a foreign state (or part of it) for TPS relief if:
(i) there has been an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other
environmental disaster in the state resulting in a substantial, but temporary,
disruption of living conditions in the area affected,
(ii) the foreign state is unable, temporarily, to handle adequately the return
to the state of aliens who are nationals of the state, and
(iii) the foreign state officially has requested designation under this
subparagraph.143

142

See note 70 and accompanying text.

143

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 244A(b), 104 Stat. 4978 (1990)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254a).
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At the individual level, access to TPS is usually limited to nationals of the
designated country who are already present in the U.S.144 It thus serves principally
to temporarily regularize the immigration status of persons present irregularly. In
most cases, though, TPS has turned out to be anything but temporary, with the
affected countries repeatedly re-designated for TPS owing to the continuation of
unstable conditions.145
Foreign countries are designated for TPS only relatively infrequently.
However, over the years, the status has benefitted a substantial number of
persons.146 Thus, over 331,000 nationals of Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador
benefited from stay in the U.S. from TPS designations under this “environmental
disaster” limb following the 1998 Hurricane Mitch in Honduras and Nicaragua
and the 2000 earthquake in El Salvador. Likewise, an additional 55,000 Haitian
nationals received TPS in the U.S. after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The Haiti
designation, though, was done under a separate TPS limb that requires instead
that the U.S. authorities determine the existence of “extraordinary and temporary
conditions in the foreign state that prevent aliens who are nationals of the state
from returning to the state in safety,” unless “permitting the aliens to remain
temporarily in the United States is contrary to the national interest of the United
States.”147 The 1997 volcanic eruption in Montserrat was designated
simultaneously under both this “extraordinary and temporary conditions” limb
and that relating to “environmental disaster.”
The TPS provision reflects the recognition that wider humanitarian
circumstances beyond the rules of international protection law may legitimately
be considered for stay. Indeed, it is not granted on the basis of any international
obligation. Moreover, its relationship to “international protection” is somewhat
144

See, e.g., Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 75 Fed. Reg. 3476 (Jan. 21, 2010)
(illustrating that, in this regard, the re-designation of Haiti in 2011 to offer access to TPS for
Haitians who had been continuously residing in the U.S. from a date prior to one year after the
earthquake is exceptional.); see also Extension and Redesignation of Haiti for Temporary Protected
Status, 76 Fed. Reg. 29,000 (May 19, 2011).

145

Attempts since 2017 by the Trump administration to terminate long-standing TPS designations for
nationals of certain countries continue, at the time of writing, to be litigated before the U.S. courts.
See, e.g., Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp.3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2018), vacated and remanded by Ramos v.
Wolf, 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020). The attempts to terminate TPS were apparently pursued by the
administration in the face of advice from the U.S. State Department that this would put national
security, foreign relations, and the beneficiaries’ American-born children at risk. Nicole Narea, State
Department Officials Warned Trump Not to Revoke Protections for Immigrants, VOX (Nov. 7, 2019),
https://perma.cc/DMX2-23C3.

146

See generally JILL H. WILSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS20844, TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS:
OVERVIEW AND CURRENT ISSUES 2, 5 (2020) (illustrating that TPS has also been used for contexts
of war); see also Temporary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (Sept. 8, 2020),
https://perma.cc/SH48-PMPD (providing full list of TPS countries and designation
documentation).
§ 1254a (b)(1)(C).

147
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tenuous. For instance, while “extraordinary and temporary conditions” at least
speaks to protection concerns in terms of the “safety” of returning nationals, the
“environmental disasters” limb turns on relations between the U.S. and the
disaster-affected state and the latter’s capacity to “adequately” receive returns.
Moreover, even for disasters that meet the formal criteria for one or other limbs,
no legal expectation exists that TPS will be designated. Nor can individuals apply
for protection absent a determination of TPS for their country by the U.S.
authorities, which remains at the complete discretion of the U.S. authorities.
Although legal scholars have criticized TPS on those grounds,148 the analysis here
is not intended to downplay its utility but to simply point out that it reflects a
distinct legal approach not easily aligned with wider notions of international
protection based on the severance of the protection relationship between
individuals and their state of origin and an envisaged risk of serious harm if
returned.
Most scholarship views TPS as an isolated example of states legislating for
mobility in the disaster context. However, a brief review of national refugee law
instruments in the Americas suggests that it actually forms part of a wider
tendency to legislate for discretionary powers to allow entry and stay on broader
humanitarian grounds, particularly where protection claims are not recognized.
These powers have been used to benefit persons affected by disasters. In the
Caribbean, for instance, the power to grant leave to remain to rejected asylumseekers on “humanitarian grounds” was applied by Jamaica to Haitians after the
2010 earthquake.149 Similar powers exist in the refugee laws of the Cayman Islands
and Montserrat in respect of rejected asylum-seekers who cannot be returned for
“obvious and compelling reasons.”150 Suriname allows a residence permit to be
granted to a rejected asylum-seeker if “he cannot in the light of the social and
political situation in his country of origin and his personal circumstances
reasonably be required to return to that country.”151 Like TPS, these provisions
treat the disaster as an event that, in its own right, may engage broader
humanitarian considerations for the entry and stay of persons who do not qualify
for international protection. Rooted in the positive exercise of state discretion in
immigration matters, these provisions in turn reflect a wider approach to
addressing such situations in the broader immigration law of this region.
148

See CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 37–40; see also Bill Frelick, What’s Wrong
with Temporary Protected Status and How to Fix It: Exploring a Complementary Protection Regime, 8 J.
MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 42 (2020).

149

See Refugee Policy, ¶¶ 12(a)(iii), 13(f), 2009 (Jam.), https://perma.cc/U2RB-AT8Y.
Immigration Law (2015 Revision), Law 34/2003, § 84(8) (Cayman Is.), July 17, 2015,
https://perma.cc/SUU8-UDQM; Immigration Act and Subsidiary Legislation, ch. 13.01, § 45(5),
Jan. 1, 2013 (Montserrat), https://perma.cc/68XY-8FEZ.
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Aliens Act 1991, Law Concerning the Admission and the Expulsion of Aliens, art. 17, Jan. 16, 1992,
(Surin.), https://perma.cc/7V3K-4QDC.
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V. I MMIGRATION L AW IN THE A MERICAS
The legal literature on the environment-mobility nexus largely overlooks
how wider immigration law could address international mobility challenges linked
to adverse environmental conditions.152 This partly reflects a perception that the
situation of persons fleeing environmental threats is analogous to that of refugees,
thus requiring international protection rather than immigration relief.153 Yet it also
reflects a tendency to view the problem and its solution in terms of international
law, thus discounting the relevance of immigration law as a field constituted
principally at the national level.154 Indeed, most of the legal scholarship is quite
dismissive of the role of national law in general.155 Even so, in the Pacific region,
certain scholars have argued that international movement linked to climate change
could be accommodated within existing migration mechanisms at the bilateral or
regional level or by making tweaks to national immigration law in common
destination countries in the region such as Australia or New Zealand.156
In the Americas, the insight that immigration law might accommodate
international mobility linked to environmental threats represents an important
starting point for analyzing state practice. Yet, in contrast with the relative paucity
of documented legal practice in other regions of the world, the use of immigration
law to address this mobility challenge by states in the Americas is not merely a
matter of speculation for the future.157 Indeed, the creation by the U.S. of an
“environmental disaster” limb within TPS, which is essentially an immigration law
provision for regularizing status in disaster contexts rather than a tool of
international protection,158 in 1990 is just one early example of pertinent practice
in this region. In Central America, for example, various states adopted legal

152

The same is also true for disaster risk management law and policy frameworks. These mostly
address cross-border mobility issues only in relation to the entry of personnel and assistance to a
disaster-affected state, although some regional disaster risk management forums in the Americas
have recently made general reference to the promotion of mechanisms to receive persons displaced
across borders by a disaster. See CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11, at 26–30.
Yet such provisions seem to remain absent from disaster risk management frameworks at the
national level in the Americas, except in Costa Rica. See MICHELLE YONETANI, PLATFORM ON
DISASTER DISPLACEMENT, MAPPING THE BASELINE: TO WHAT EXTENT ARE DISPLACEMENT AND
OTHER FORMS OF HUMAN MOBILITY INTEGRATED IN NATIONAL AND REGIONAL DISASTER RISK
REDUCTION STRATEGIES? 29–31 (2018), https://perma.cc/8MRL-ZHBQ.
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See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text.
See supra note 97–98 and accompanying text.
As such, this existing practice also provides a counterpoint to analyses that claim the security fears
of states have prevented them from using immigration law to address mobility linked to
environmental factors. See, e.g., Anastasiou, supra note 65, at 187–89.
See supra notes 143–148 and accompanying text.
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decrees in 1998 to regularize the immigration status of irregular migrants from
other countries in the region that had been devastated by the effects of Hurricane
Mitch.159 In Costa Rica alone, the resulting program regularized around 150,000
disaster-affected migrants.160 It thus seems that the use of national immigration
law in the Americas to resolve mobility challenges linked to the environment
already represents fairly long-standing practice by some states in this region.
This Article advances legal debate on the environment-mobility nexus on
several points. Most importantly, it shows just how widespread the use of
immigration law instruments and concepts to resolve these challenges is among
states in the Americas. It starts by illustrating how “ordinary” migration categories
in national immigration law in this region have accommodated international
mobility challenges linked to environmental factors. It then shows how a range of
“exceptional” migration categories have also been created and deployed by states
to accommodate persons whose legal situation cannot be resolved by application
of “ordinary migration categories.” Overall, this analysis reinforces the impression
of a shift in this region away from treating such challenges as matters of
international protection to an approach based on immigration law.161 This means
that, contrary to the assumptions of the existing legal scholarship, we cannot
simply treat the regulation of mobility in this context as a blank canvas for
international law. Rather, we must acknowledge that a distinctive legal approach
to the problem already exists in the Americas and that it finds articulation among
states not only in the Global North but also in the Global South.

A. “Ordinary” Migration Categories
A standard function of national immigration law is to codify and regulate
access to what we might call “ordinary” migration categories. These ordinary
migration categories usually exist to facilitate migration that is based primarily on
pull factors in the country of destination or, in other words, an actual or
prospective link on the part of the individual applicant with that country.
Examples of short-term ordinary migration categories include such categories as
159

160

161

Decreto No. 27457-G-RE, Reglamento del Régimen de Excepción 1999, LA GACETA [L.G.], Nov.
24, 1998 (Costa Rica), https://perma.cc/NVB5-BC8R; Decreto No. 94-98, 21 Dec. 1998, Para
Ciudadanos Centroamericanos que se Encuentran en el Territorio Nacional, LA GACETA, DIARIO
OFICIAL [L.G.], 7 Jan. 1999 (Nicar.), https://perma.cc/RHA8-X67Z; Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34,
Por el Cual se Dictan Algunas Medidas Administrativas para Legalizar la Residencia Definitiva de
Nacionales de la Republica de Nicaragua, que se Encuentran Indocumentados en el País, GACETA
OFICIAL [G.O.], Feb. 9, 1999 (Pan.), https://perma.cc/DHZ2-EZQT.
ABELARDO MORALES GAMBOA, FLASCO, AMNISTÍA MIGRATOTIA EN COSTA RICA: ANÁLISIS DE
LOS ALCANCES SOCIALES Y DEL IMPACTO DEL RÉGIMEN DE EXCEPCIÓN MIGRATORIA PARA LOS
INMIGRANTES DE ORIGEN CENTROAMERICANO EN COSTA RICA 31 (1999),
https://perma.cc/5NQ4-29E2.
See supra Section IV.
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visits or tourism, while longer-term ones include studies, employment, or joining
family in the country of destination. Thus, as a basis for travel, entry, or stay by
non-nationals, circumstances in the country of origin do not provide the principal
rationale for these categories, which turns rather on certain forms of connection
to the country of destination.162 Even so, and despite the scant attention paid to
these migration pathways in existing legal research on the environment-mobility
nexus, this Article shows that, in the Americas, they have accommodated mobility
linked to environmental factors in a number of important ways.
Firstly, it is clear that these ordinary migration categories are used in practice
by persons leaving a disaster-affected country as a way to enter or stay in another
country. For sudden-onset disasters, the empirical data points to a spike in longterm regular migration to the U.S. from Central America and the Caribbean in the
year after a sudden-onset disaster hits one of those countries.163 For slow-onset
disasters, the documented increase in migration to the U.S. from parts of Mexico
affected by such phenomena provides a similar indication.164 In tandem, shortterm ordinary migration categories have also provided a legal basis for entry by
inhabitants of border regions fleeing the impact of an oncoming sudden
hazardous event on their side of the border.165 In the Americas, the use of such
ordinary migration categories has particular salience. Not only is this a region with
significant intra-regional diaspora populations,166 but in this region international
mobility linked to environmental threats tends to follow existing migration routes
and pathways where possible.167 As a result, in the Americas, the prospect that
people from a disaster-affected country might have family or other links to a
destination country in this region is not remote, especially among those sectors of
society that possess the resources to migrate internationally.
The fact that ordinary migration categories are capable of accommodating a
proportion of international movement linked to environmental push factors has
far-reaching implications for debate about the legal gap in relation to such mobility
and its resolution. On the one hand, it suggests that less of a gap in the law exists
in reality than may be assumed in the abstract. This also implies that “solutions”
must not focus exclusively on creating special new legal regimes for affected
162

163
164
165
166

167

This is the case even for categories, such as those relating to seasonal labor migration, that aim also
to provide a secondary benefit to countries of origin, such as development gains through
remittances, skills acquisition and knowledge transfer, alongside the principal benefit of temporarily
linking foreign workers to gaps in the labor market of the receiving country.
See supra notes 116–119 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text.
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
Organization of American States, International Migration in the Americas: Fourth Report of the
Continuous Reporting System on International Migration in the Americas, OEA/Ser.D/XXVI.2.4
(Dec. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/U436-V9YY.
See examples supra Section III.
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persons but more generally must also seek to ensure that states fairly apply these
ordinary migration categories, especially in relation to disaster-affected
countries.168 The imposition of undue restrictions on such migration categories
might well have a greater negative impact on prospects for the entry and stay of
persons affected by environmental threats than the absence of a dedicated
protection regime. On the other hand, in principle, the fact of the disaster is legally
irrelevant to the application of the ordinary migration categories, which turn
instead on links to the destination country. Indeed, in the Americas, states clearly
treat that criterion as the principal basis for determining the entry or stay of nonnationals, rather than any particular kind of push factor that may exist in the
country of origin.
Secondly, for applicants affected by a disaster, some states in this region
apply the formal criteria of these ordinary migration categories in a flexible
manner. For instance, in Canada, immigration law allows the authorities to
expedite applications under the ordinary migration categories or waive one or
more formal criteria, if justified by “humanitarian and compassionate
considerations.”169 This is applied in response to disaster situations, and, for some
serious disasters, “special measures” policies are adopted by the government that
instruct officials to exercise these powers in order to expedite applications or
waive formal criteria where requested by applicants “seriously and directly
affected” by the disaster.170 Meanwhile, the U.S. standing policy of “temporary
relief measures” encourages immigration officials to exercise their innate
discretion to expedite applications or waive the formal criteria for certain ordinary
migration categories at the request of an individual applicant.171 Based on the
periodic announcements reminding migrants of this policy, these relief measures

168

The use of visa regimes, which are often imposed on poorer countries that are more vulnerable to
the impact of hazards, is a particular cause for concern. In the Americas, the countries whose
nationals are most frequently required to secure a visa for lawful travel to another country within
this region are Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, although many other poor countries in
this region that are regularly affected by disasters do not experience such extensive visa
requirements for travel in the Americas. See CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note
11, at 36, 47, 59.

169

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c 27, s 25 (Can.), https://perma.cc/EYW7M5EY.
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These “special measures” policies have been adopted, inter alia, for the 1998 Turkey earthquake,
the 2004 Asian tsunami, the 2010 Haiti earthquake and the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines.
See CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 33–34.
See Immigration Help Available to Those Affected by Natural Disasters, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS., https://perma.cc/8P8L-J8ZH (Oct. 6, 2017); see also CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE,
supra note 11, at 34–35.
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seem to be applied mainly to those affected by natural disasters, not only overseas
but also in the U.S. itself.172
This flexible approach to the criteria for entry or stay under the ordinary
migration categories is particularly codified in the law and policy of these Global
North states. However, as a legal practice in the Americas, the approach is also
evident among states in the Global South. In Central America, for example, Costa
Rica has applied a broader understanding of the “family” category than normally
permitted by law so that Nicaraguans present irregularly but personally affected
by a sudden-onset disaster in Nicaragua could stay lawfully as family members,
with all the benefits of that regular status.173 Likewise, in South America, Colombia
regularized some Haitians arriving after the 2010 earthquake by flexibly applying
work and student categories.174 In the Caribbean, Dominica and Antigua and
Barbuda relaxed certain eligibility requirements of the ordinary migration
categories for Haitians in 2010.175 In the 2017 hurricane season, territories such as
Montserrat and the British Virgin Islands also lifted immigration restrictions or
waived visa requirements to facilitate entry by affected persons.176 Overall,
assimilating disaster-affected persons to ordinary migration categories has the
advantage of access to ensuing regular status and rights. The states’ flexibility in
this respect contrasts sharply with their rigid application of refugee law,
supporting a view that they see mobility in this context principally as a matter of
immigration law rather than international protection.
Thirdly, these migration pathways are also beginning to be shaped by free
movement accords. At present, citizens of certain subregional integration
mechanisms in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean benefit from
specific forms of treaty-based free movement across borders within the respective

172
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Situational “temporary relief measures” have been announced, inter alia, for such disasters overseas
as: tropical storms in the Caribbean in 2008; the 2010 Icelandic volcano eruption; the 2010 Chile
earthquakes; Tropical Storm Agatha in Guatemala in 2010; the 2011 earthquakes and tsunami in
Japan; extreme flooding in Central America in 2011; Hurricane Sandy in the Caribbean in 2012;
Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013; Hurricane Harvey in the U.S. in 2017; California
Wildfires in 2007 and 2018; Hurricane Florence in the U.S. in 2018; and the 2018 Typhoon
Mangkhut in the Philippines. See Previous Special Situations, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://perma.cc/VMM3-HHQ9 (Nov. 26, 2018) (listing existing announcements of “temporary
relief measures”).
CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 32.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 35.
CARIBBEAN MIGRATION CONSULTATIONS, CONSULTATION TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR
REGIONAL COOPERATION ON HUMAN MOBILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF DISASTERS AND THE
ADVERSE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE CARIBBEAN 15 (2019), https://perma.cc/F9JCKGPW.

Winter 2021

301

Chicago Journal of International Law

bloc.177 Some scholars have already argued in favor of extending free movement
arrangements as a means of facilitating migration in the context of environmental
threats.178 Yet states in the Americas have already begun to use such free
movement provisions specifically to facilitate entry and stay by nationals of a
disaster-affected country in their subregional bloc. For instance, after Hurricane
Maria devastated Dominica in 2017, the authorities in Trinidad and Tobago used
the Caribbean Community, or CARICOM, short-term visa-free stay provision to
shelter affected Dominicans.179 In tandem, Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, St.
Lucia, and St. Vincent also welcomed Dominicans under the OECS provision for
entry and short-term stay, expediting those cases and waiving documentary
requirements where documents had been lost in the disaster.180 Lacking disasterspecific provisions, these accords now seem to offer additional useful ordinary
migration categories for states to apply in disasters.

B. “Exceptional” Migration Categories
National law also often provides for what we might call “exceptional”
migration categories. These categories usually take the form of general legal
provisions, or powers conferred on immigration officials, created to regulate
special or exceptional situations that fall outside the ordinary migration categories.
They are squarely concerned with areas of immigration law where states enjoy a
wide sovereign discretion, such as where an applicant lacks a substantive
connection to the destination state or where a claim falls under binding rules of
international protection, but other countervailing factors still exist. In the
Americas, pertinent legal practice makes it clear that many states view disasters as
precisely one such factor where special consideration may be required in relation
to the application not only of ordinary migration categories but also these
exceptional migration categories. Given the diversity of legal systems and juridical
perspectives across this region, it is appropriate to analyze exceptional migration
categories, and their application to disaster situations, along a spectrum of
“codification” that reflects the different degrees to which they are expressly
codified by national immigration law.

177

Relevant mechanisms include, respectively, the System for Central-American Integration (SICA),
the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and, for the Caribbean, the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). See CANTOR,
CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11, at 36–37, 47–48 and 59.

178

See, e.g., AMA FRANCIS, COLUM. L. SCH. SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., FREE MOVEMENT
AGREEMENTS & CLIMATE-INDUCED MIGRATION: A CARIBBEAN CASE STUDY 1, 2 (2019),
https://perma.cc/ZF6K-MB88; Wood, supra note 84; Black et al., supra note 58, at 449.
FRANCIS, supra note 178, at 18.
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Id.; Antigua Prepares for Influx of Dominicans, ST. LUCIA TIMES (Sept. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/7J6SL89A.
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At one end of this spectrum, the discretionary power to resolve exceptional
immigration cases takes the form of an inherent faculty not specifically codified
by immigration legislation, as is apparently the case in Venezuela.181 A little further
along are states where the existence of this power is confirmed by immigration
law but its scope is left open to the discretion of the national authorities, as in
Colombia and Paraguay.182 Similarly, in the Caribbean, the law in British overseas
territories and former colonies often gives officials the discretion to postpone, or
overlook, deciding whether a non-national falls into one of the categories of
“prohibited” immigrants who must be denied entry and instead granted leave to
stay.183 Crucially, across the Americas, states have exercised this kind of broad
discretionary power to grant entry or stay to disaster-affected persons on a caseby-case basis. In 2010, the Dominican Republic used apparently innate
discretionary powers to grant entry to certain categories of Haitians affected by
the earthquake on a humanitarian basis.184 After Hurricane Irma in 2017, the U.S.
unincorporated territory of Puerto Rico used inherent discretion to grant entry to
thousands of people evacuated from the British Virgin Islands, Dutch Sint
Maarten, and French Saint Martin.185 In Chilean law, a discretionary power to grant
stay in cases outside the ordinary migration categories was applied to benefit a
small number of Haitians after the earthquake.186
However, these broad discretionary powers are also used to facilitate stay on
a group basis. In some cases, this involves creating special regularization programs
to which nationals of the disaster-affected country who are already present
181

See CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 37–39.

182

For example, Colombian law provides for a power to authorize entry and stay on extraordinary
grounds where this is necessary, see Decreto No. 1067, mayo 26, 2015, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.],
art. 2.2.1.11.2.5 (Colom.), as modified by Decreto No. 1325, agosto, 12, 2016,
https://perma.cc/3SG6-99AP. In Paraguay, the law gives the Director General a general
discretionary power to “carry out other acts” necessary with complying with the objectives of the
immigration authorities. See Ley No. 978/96, art. 146(g), June 27, 1996, (Para.),
https://perma.cc/9BDQ-USAJ.
In the Caribbean, this is the case for Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica,
Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago, as well as the
British Overseas Territories of Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and Montserrat. See
CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11, at 60. On the mainland, the same is true
for the former British colonies of Belize and Guyana. Id. at 37, 48. In Canada, officials can grant
temporary resident status to persons who do not meet the requirements of the regular migration
rules where they are “of the opinion that it is justified in the circumstances.” Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, supra note 169, s 24(1) (Can.).
CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 61.
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184
185
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Alvin Baez, Puerto Rico Opens Arms to Refugee from Irma’s Caribbean Chaos, REUTERS (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://perma.cc/8LSS-2VGA; Joanna Walters, US Virgin Islands Refusing Entry to Non-American
Irma Evacuees, Survivors Say, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/WHP7-7MFJ.
Decree No. 597 art. 49–50, Aprueba Nuevo Reglamento de Extranjeria, junio 14, 1984, DIARIO
OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), https://perma.cc/GL7W-3GBA; see CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND
PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 43.
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irregularly in the destination country can apply. In 1998, Central American states
created such regularization programs for migrants from countries affected by
Hurricane Mitch.187 In 2010, similar one-off regularization programs were created
for Haitians present in Ecuador and Venezuela, using broad immigration
discretion based on, respectively, statutory and innate powers.188 Such powers
have also been invoked to create legal measures that fall short of formal stay but
which still temporarily suspend removals to a disaster-affected country on a group
basis. For instance, many states in the Americas drew on broad innate
discretionary powers to temporarily suspend the removal of Haitians after the
2010 earthquake.189 Overall, the breadth of such powers gives states considerable
latitude in fixing the criteria for their application, as well as excluding individuals
in relation to whom security or crime related concerns exist.190 In practice, though,
these broad powers of immigration discretion are exercised by states in the
Americas to the benefit of nationals of a country devastated by a serious suddenonset disaster.
Toward the other end of the codification spectrum are those national laws
that codify when this immigration discretion should be exercised positively. In the
Americas, this usually turns on the existence of “humanitarian” considerations in
the individual case. Although the specific wording varies among countries,191 the
law of at least fifteen states in this region include an exceptional migration category
based on some variation of the concept of “humanitarian considerations.”192 In
187
188

189

See supra notes 158–159and accompanying text.
Decreto No. 248, Feb. 9, 2010 (Ecuador), https://perma.cc/C8VB-8DFP; see also CANTOR, LAW,
POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 37–39.
They include the U.S., Mexico, Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, as well as the British Turks
and Caicos Islands and the French Antilles territories of Martinique and Guadeloupe. See Michel
Forst, Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, Michel Forst, Addendum:
Forced Returns of Haitians from Third States, at 6–7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/35/Add.1 (June 4, 2012);
CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11, at 38, 61, 63.

190

Nonetheless, certain profiles of person, such as those whose cases involve a national security or
serious criminal element, are often deemed ineligible to benefit from these measures. See CANTOR,
LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 40–41 (providing a discussion of how this played out
for Haitians in Canada).

191

Examples from Central America include “exceptional humanitarian reasons” (Panama – entry and
stay); “humanitarian cause” (Mexico – entry and stay); “humanitarian motives” (Honduras – entry);
“humanitarian reason” (Costa Rica – entry); “humanitarian reasons” (Guatemala – entry and stay;
Honduras – stay; Mexico – travel and stay; Nicaragua – stay);”humanitarian visa” (Mexico – travel;
Nicaragua – entry and stay);”reasons of humanity” (Costa Rica – stay). See CANTOR, LAW, POLICY
AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 38 n.207, 49 n.306, 60, 63 (concerning South America and the
Caribbean).
By sub-region, those countries include: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Panama (Central America); Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay (South America);
Trinidad and Tobago, the Dutch Antilles islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba (Caribbean);
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some countries, this concept is not defined further by national immigration law,
leaving the potential for inclusion of disaster victims open to official discretion in
individual cases. This is true of the special residence permit that may be granted
for “humanitarian reasons” in Honduras and the extension of stay category for
“humanitarian reasons” in Nicaragua.193 Likewise, the law in Uruguay allows entry
as a temporary resident to be granted for “exceptional reasons . . . of a
humanitarian character” but does not define what that means.194 In the Caribbean,
the law in Trinidad and Tobago allows leave to remain to be granted if
“humanitarian considerations” that warrant the granting of special relief from
deportation exist,195 similar to the law in the Dutch Antilles.196 In addition, this
immigration law concept is articulated in several national refugee laws.197 None of
these laws further define the “humanitarian considerations” concept but, in
practice, such broad provisions have sometimes been applied by officials to
persons affected by a disaster in their country of origin.198
More commonly, though, and particularly in Latin American countries,
national immigration law more closely defines the scope of “humanitarian
considerations” concept. This is usually done by reference to three general sets of
circumstances, although it is important to point out that not all three are always
codified in the law of any particular state. The circumstances are that the applicant
is: (1) the “victim” of serious adversity, such as grave crimes or human rights

193

194

195

196

197
198

and Mexico (North America). For references to most relevant laws (except El Salvador and
Canada), see CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11, at Annex D. In Canada, the
authorities have the power to grant permanent resident status if “justified by humanitarian and
compassionate considerations relating to the foreign national.” Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, supra note 169, s 25(1) (Can.). In the new Salvadorian migration law, temporary
resident status can be granted to persons who “for humanitarian reasons . . . justify a special
treatment.” Decreto No. 286, Ley Especial de Migración y de Extranjería, art. 109(20), DIARIO
OFICIAL [D.O.], Apr. 25, 2019 (El Sal.), https://perma.cc/2KRL-2CGG (author translation).
Decreto No. 208-2003, Ley de Migración y Extranjería, art. 39(13), LA GACETA [L.G.], Mar. 3, 2004
(Hond.), https://perma.cc/R7FU-2DDD (author translation); Decreto No. 31-2012, 20 Sept.
2012, Ley General de Migración y Extranjería, art. 50, LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.], 27 Sept.
2012 (Nicar.), https://perma.cc/T26U-ZNMA (author translation).
Ley No. 18.250, Ley de Migraciones, art. 44, 34(b), Dec. 27, 2008 (Uru.), https://perma.cc/X96PX454 (author translation).
Immigration Regulations, ch. 18:01, § 28(1)(b)–(2), Dec. 31, 2016 (Trin. & Tobago),
https://perma.cc/T99Z-KJKU.
For the Dutch Antilles islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba, an official who has doubts
about refusing entry may refer the case to the immigration authorities in the Netherlands who can
decide to grant entry due to, inter alia, “compelling humanitarian reasons,” although this concept is
not further defined. Circulaire toelating en uitzetting Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba oktober 2010,
Stcrt. 2010, § 2.3.6 (Neth.), https://perma.cc/4H6C-QZG5 (translation by author’s colleague).
See supra notes 149–151, 151 and accompanying text.
For instance, in Honduras, the authorities were preparing to receive Haitians in the aftermath of
the 2010 earthquake using these provisions, although none actually arrived. See CANTOR, LAW,
POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 46.

Winter 2021

305

Chicago Journal of International Law

violations; or (2) “vulnerable” in the destination country, due to factors such as
age, gender, disability or ill health; or (3) “facing serious danger” to life or integrity
in the country of origin.199 Although this last scenario may resemble a rule of
international protection, its application is usually discretionary. Disaster-affected
persons are sometimes accommodated within such broad renderings of the
“humanitarian considerations” concept. For instance, in 2017, Haitians present
irregularly in Argentina were granted stay under a general provision of this kind,
which was interpreted as applying to natural disasters and their effects.200 Likewise,
the “humanitarian and compassionate” considerations provision of Canadian law
is interpreted as a test of “unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship,”
to be determined by reference to factors that include conditions in the country of
origin, particularly those that have “a direct negative impact on the applicant such
as . . . natural disasters.”201
However, the opposite end of this codification spectrum actually consists of
the growing number of immigration law provisions in the region that specify
disasters as a “humanitarian consideration” or otherwise as the basis for an
exceptional migration category. Ten states across the Americas take this
approach,202 with the tendency particularly accentuated in South America and
North America but also becoming increasingly common in Central America. 203
The ubiquity of these provisions supports the analysis that states in the Americas
view international mobility linked to environmental factors not through the lens
of international protection, but principally through the lens of immigration law as
an integral expression of their asserted sovereign right to determine who is allowed
entry and stay in the territory of the state, treating the humanitarian impact of
disasters as a legal basis for exercising state discretion in favor of affected persons.
Starting with South America, national immigration law in Argentina
stipulates that transitory residence for “humanitarian reasons” can be granted to
those who “temporarily cannot return to their countries of origin . . . due to

199

For examples of these factors the national law of countries in Central America and South America,
see CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11, at 38–39, 49–51. For Canada, the
applicable provision is the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, s 25(1.21). Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, supra note 169, s 25 (Can.).

200

Disposition No. E 1143/2017, preamble, Mar. 15, 2017, [33588] B.O. 23 (Arg.),
https://perma.cc/N2BD-HALH.

201

CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, The Humanitarian and Compassionate Assessment: Hardship
and the H&C Assessment (Mar. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/85QQ-KJ84.

202

They are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and
the U.S.

203

Currently, in the Caribbean, states are also reported to be considering how to make legal provision.
See CARIBBEAN MIGRATION CONSULTATIONS, supra note 176, at 15.

306

Vol. 21 No. 2

Environment, Mobility, and International Law

Cantor

consequences generated by natural or man-made environmental disasters.”204
Brazil authorizes “humanitarian reception” for a person from “any country in a
situation of . . . major calamity [or] environmental disaster.”205 Ecuador gives stay
for “humanitarian reasons,” including being “a victim of natural or environmental
disasters.”206 Peru authorizes “humanitarian residence” where migration is due to
“natural and environmental disasters.”207 Meanwhile, Bolivian law makes
provision for the admission of persons at risk due to climate effects or disasters.208
Similarly, in North America, for the purpose of granting a humanitarian visa to a
non-national outside the country, Mexico defines “humanitarian reasons” as
meaning that the person seeking to travel to Mexico “finds herself in a situation
of danger to her life or integrity owing to . . . a duly accredited natural disaster”209
or that she is “victim of a natural catastrophe.”210 Albeit not expressly based on
the concept of “humanitarian considerations,” immigration law in the U.S., as
already mentioned, gives authorities the discretion to designate TPS for, inter alia,
an “environmental disaster.”211 In Canada, national law likewise allows temporary

204

Law No. 25871, art. 24(h), Dec. 17, 2003, [30322] B.O. 2 (Arg.) (author translation); Decree No.
616/2010, art. 24(h), May 3, 2010, [31898] B.O. 6 (Arg.), https://perma.cc/492W-PDAH.
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Lei No. 13.445, de 24 de maio de 2017, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.]: art. 30 de 25.05.2017
(Braz.), https://perma.cc/L9J3-ACTZ (author translation); Decreto No. 9.199, de 20 de novembro
de 2017, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.]: art. 145 de 21.11.2017 (Braz.), https://perma.cc/2T363NB3 (author translation).

206

Ley Orgánica de Movilidad Humana, art. 58, 66(5), 2017 (Ecuador), https://perma.cc/K46AFZ3N, translated in Organic Law on Human Mobility: Supplement Official Registry 938, REFWORLD (Feb.
6, 2017), https://perma.cc/D5TJ-V4S7; Decreto Ejecutivo No. 111, Reglamento a la Ley Orgánica
de Movilidad Humana, art. 55, 2017 (Ecuador), https://perma.cc/2ALL-DQBY (author
translation).
Decreto Legislativo No. 1350, Ley y Reglamento de Migraciones, art. 29(2)(k), Jan. 1, 2017 (Peru),
https://perma.cc/3S69-BRGB (author translation).
The law charges the Bolivian migration authorities to “make viable, as necessary, the admission of
populations displaced by climate effects, when a risk or threat to their lives may exist, where those
are due to natural causes or environmental, nuclear [or] chemical disasters or hunger.” Ley No. 370,
Ley de Migración, art. 65, May 8, 2013 (Bol.), perma.cc/P2EV-ECD7 (author translation). The law
in Bolivia provides a unique definition of “Climate Migrants” as “[g]roups of persons who are
forced to displaced from one State to another due to climate effects, when a risk or threat to their
life may exist, whether due to natural causes, environmental, nuclear [or] chemical disasters or
hunger.” Id. art. 4(16).
Ley de Migración [LM], art. 41, 116(I)(b), Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 25-5-2011, últimas
reformas DOF 03-07-2019 (Mex.) (author translation).
Lineamientos Generales para la Expedición de Visas que Emiten las Secretarías de Gobernación y
de Relaciones Exteriores, Del Procedimiento para Solicitar Visa, Trámite 9, Criterios de Resolución
a.ii., Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 10-10-2014 (Mex.) (author translation) [hereinafter
General Guidelines for the Issuance of Visas].
See supra notes 142–146 and accompanying text.
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suspension of removals, inter alia, due to an “environmental disaster resulting in
a substantial temporary disruption of living conditions” in the country of origin.212
More recently, in Central America, some states have adopted new
immigration laws that also refer to disasters in exceptional migration categories
based on humanitarian considerations. For example, in Guatemala, the existence
of a “natural catastrophe in neighboring countries, which obliges the persons or
group of persons to flee for their lives” is listed among the “humanitarian reasons”
for legal entry and stay.213 In El Salvador, factors to be taken into account by
immigration officials in deciding temporary resident applications based on
“humanitarian reasons” specifically include, inter alia, the existence of an
“internationally-recognized crisis” or that any non-national who does not meet
the criteria for an ordinary migration category is in “a situation of vulnerability or
danger to life owing to … natural disasters [or] environmental [disasters].”214
Overall, legal practice in the Americas shows that surprisingly few states have
not applied such exceptional migration categories as a matter of national
immigration law to accommodate disaster-affected persons whose legal situation
cannot be resolved via ordinary migration categories. Indeed, there is no real
absence of legal tools to resolve the challenge of entry and stay in light of
prevailing humanitarian considerations in this mobility context, and these tools
are applied in practice. Yet, while some ordinary migration categories may provide
permanent stay, exceptional migration categories mostly give temporary stay. The
initial period varies between one year (for example, Costa Rica) and six years (for
example, Panama), although this is normally renewable and can offer a pathway
to longer forms of stay under ordinary migration categories. Such stay also usually
affords the entitlements to work and access services specified by immigration law
in that country. Indeed, in many countries, these immigration categories provide
a defined regular status, a period of stay and a range of rights no less favorable
than those conferred by refugee status.215

212

213

214

215

Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s 230 (Can.). For details of how
this was applied in the Haitian case, see CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 40–
41.
Decreto No. 44, Código de Migración, art. 68, Oct. 23, 2016 (Guat.), https://perma.cc/7FUBZFL5 (author translation).
Decreto No. 35, Reglamento de la Ley Especial de Migración y de Extranjería, art. 181(2), 181(7),
May 24, 2019, 2019 (El Sal) (author translation).
Although they do not benefit from any specific guarantee against refoulement, such issues do not
easily arise in the disaster context. Indeed, most disaster migrants in the Americas do not strictly
require “protection” from their own state by another state. Likewise, the mere fact of a disaster
does not automatically turn removal into refoulement, only where disaster conditions are so serious
that human rights standards will anyway temporarily prohibit removals. Finally, disaster migrants
already established in the destination country may also be protected indirectly from any return or
potential refoulement by due process guarantees in law against the arbitrary expulsion of aliens.
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Finally, the legal practice in the Americas raises a question about the kinds
of environmental threats that such measures accommodate. Here, the empirical
evidence shows that people who move in the context of both sudden- and slowonset disasters have both been accommodated under ordinary migration
categories. However, where the disaster is expressly contemplated as a basis for
entry or stay, whether in the flexible application of ordinary migration categories
or via exceptional migration categories, the legal practice in the Americas suggests
that such provisions are mostly applied by national immigration authorities to
resolve the situation of persons affected by major sudden-onset disasters. On its
face, this seems to confirm the preoccupation of scholars that persons who
migrate as a result of the impact of slow-onset disasters will be denied access to
such special measures because the link to mobility is easier to establish in the
context of sudden-onset disasters.216 The implicit requirement of most states as a
matter of law or practice is that a person must be directly and seriously affected
by the disaster in order to benefit from the application of such special measures
might seem to further reinforce this risk, since that link seems more
straightforward to evidence in situations of sudden-onset disasters as compared
to slow-onset processes.
At the same time, many of the national law provisions underpinning these
special measures—under both ordinary and exceptional migration categories—do
not refer expressly to a “disaster” but rather to broader “humanitarian
considerations.”217 In principle, then, they do not rule out the application of these
special measures to persons affected, on the one hand, by slow-onset disasters, or,
on the other, by sudden- or slow-onset hazards or hazardous events that have not
resulted in a disaster at the societal level. Moreover, not one of the provisions that
refer to disaster situations as a basis for special measures gives any reason to think
that slow-onset disasters fall outside their scope.218 It is also the case that several
of these provisions refer to “calamities” or “catastrophes” alongside, or instead
of, “disasters,”219 suggesting concepts which could equally include hazardous
events more generally. Further, as to the origins of the events, these provisions

216

See supra note 50 and accompanying text.

217

See supra notes 190–214 and accompanying text. The same is true for similar provisions in national
legislation on international protection. See supra notes 148–150 and accompanying text.

218

Indeed, the provision in Bolivian law specifically includes wider “climate effects.” See Ley No. 370,
supra note 208, art. 65 (Bol.).

219

Alongside the “disaster” concept, the provision in Brazilian law refers to “major calamity.” See Lei
No. 13.445, supra 205, art. 30. That in Mexican law refers to “catastrophe.” See General Guidelines
for the Issuance of Visas, supra note 210. The provision in Guatemalan law refers to a “catastrophe”
rather than a disaster. See Decreto No. 44, supra note 213, art. 68.
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often refer to “natural” disasters or catastrophes,220 although many refer also,221 or
instead,222 to “environmental” disasters or catastrophes. The latter concept
appears to include events that are “man-made” in origin.223 In short, although the
current practice may be to apply special measures mainly to persons who are
seriously and directly affected by major sudden-onset disasters linked to natural
hazards, relevant national law provisions suggest that a broader set of scenarios
may ultimately be contemplated.

VI. I NTERNATIONAL C OOPERATION AND F RAMEWORKS IN
THE A MERICAS
In the Americas, state practice in relation to the challenge posed by
international mobility linked to environmental adversity also takes the form of
joint action at the international level.224 This practice plays out principally in
forums concerned with migration rather than international protection and at the
level of subregional initiatives rather than regional or global forums. Crucially, the
main focus of such joint action is on promoting appropriate legal responses to the
challenge by participating states at the level of national law rather than creating
new treaty law. However, the scope of cooperative ambition has increased over
time. Thus, while early forms of collective action represented ad hoc responses to
the devastation wrought by certain very serious disasters, since the mid-2010s,
several subregional forums have been engaged in developing normative
frameworks that promote more predictable responses at the level of national law.
As yet, states appear to be content with this form of international action and no
serious efforts have been made to “harden” the legal character of these
frameworks through creating treaties. Even so, the existence and scope of these
frameworks raise important questions about the future development of
international law in this field.
220

221

222

223

224

The law in Mexico refers to natural disasters or catastrophes. See Ley de Migración, supra note 209,
art. 41. While the law in Guatemala refers only to natural catastrophes. See Decreto No. 44, supra
note 213, art. 68).
For the respective legal provisions in Ecuador, see Ley Orgánica de Movilidad Humana, supra 206,
art. 58; Peru, see Decreto Legislativo No. 1350, supra 207, art. 29(2)(k); Bolivia, see Ley No. 370,
supra note 208, art. 65; and El Salvador, see Decreto No. 35, supra note 214, art. 181, which refers
to natural and environmental disasters.
For the respective legal provisions in the U.S., see supra notes 143–147 and accompanying text; and
for Canada’s reference to “environmental” disasters, see Immigration and Refugee Protection
Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s. 230.
For instance, the legal provision in Argentina refers to “natural or man-made environmental
disasters.” See Law No. 25871, supra note 204, art. 24(h). The Bolivian provision adds “nuclear [or]
chemical disasters or hunger” too. See Ley No. 370, supra note 208, art. 65.
Other legal studies appear to overlook the extent of such existing practice on precisely this issue at
the international level in the Americas. See, e.g., Pires Ramos & de Salles Cavdeon-Capdeville, supra
note 11.
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A. Early Ad Hoc Actions
State practice at the subregional level is relatively well-established in the
Americas. Certainly, state cooperation regarding the challenges of the
international mobility posed by sudden-onset disasters is not new in this region.
However, the early instances of state practice at the subregional level tend to
involve the collective recognition of the international mobility consequences of
certain extremely serious sudden-onset disasters and the promotion of suitable
responses at the level of national law. This is evident in the way that states in such
subregional forums responded to the devastation wrought by Hurricane Mitch. In
1998, for instance, the Meeting of Central American Presidents appealed for:
. . . the understanding of the International Community [sic] in order that a
general amnesty be conceded to undocumented Central American
immigrants who currently reside in different countries, with the objective of
avoiding their deportation and, consequentially, greater aggravation of the
current situation of our countries.225

At the national level, this declaration by the four most affected states facilitated
the designation of TPS for Hondurans and Nicaraguans by the U.S. as well as the
adoption of special measures for affected persons in national immigration law by
various Central American states.226
The mobility impact of Hurricane Mitch was also addressed by other
subregional forums, albeit also in an ad hoc or responsive manner. Thus, in early
1999, the matter was raised by states participating in the Regional Conference on
Migration (RCM), a specialized regular subregional forum for facilitating joint
discussion and action on shared migration challenges among a wider constituency
of eleven member states, mostly from North and Central America. In the resulting
Communication, the RCM member states “made special mention of the adoption,
by Costa Rica and the United States of America, of migration measures benefiting
nationals of the countries affected by Hurricane Mitch.”227 Both subregional
forums, then, called not only for a common response on the part of states to the
international challenges posed by this particularly serious disaster but also for the
use of national immigration law by relevant states to resolve those challenges.
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Reunión Extraordinaria de Presidentes Centroamericanos: Declaración Conjunta, Comalapa, El
Salvador, ¶ 16, Nov. 9, 1998, perma.cc/9MLH-AK66, translated in U.N. General Assembly, Letter
dated 10 November 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Honduras to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/53/656 (Nov. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Meeting of
Central American Presidents].

226

For Central American examples, see supra notes 159–160 and accompanying text. A copy of the
declaration that was sent to the U.S. with a letter drawing attention to this plea appears to have
influenced the granting of TPS. See Meeting of Central American Presidents, supra note 225, at 8.
Communicado Conjunto: IV Conferencia Regional sobre Migración, ¶ 4, Jan. 26–29, 1999,
https://perma.cc/CVF6-KCZT, translated in Joint Communique IV Regional Conference, INT’L ORG. FOR
MIGRATION U.N. MIGRATION (1999), https://perma.cc/Y27G-ELLM.
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Yet Hurricane Mitch is not the only disaster where such responsive collective
action manifested itself. Indeed, subregional forums across the Americas also
promoted these kinds of special immigration law measures as a form of collective
response to the overwhelming impact of the 2010 Haiti earthquake. For instance,
in 2010, the twelve states which at that time comprised the subregional Union of
South American Nations (UNASUR) adopted a collective decision to promote
“joint actions.” That UNASUR decision specifically exhorted “those Member
States that still have not applied special processes of migratory regularisation for
the benefit of Haitian citizens to do so.”228 Likewise, the subregional Bolivarian
Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA), comprised at that time of nine
mostly left-leaning governments, called on member states to “decree a migratory
amnesty that regularizes the migratory status of Haitian citizens resident in ALBA
countries.”229 As a result, several states that were involved in one or both forums
went on to adopt special migratory measures into national law for the benefit of
Haitians present irregularly on their territories.230
These examples demonstrate that, from the 1990s to the early 2010s, many
states in the Americas participated in subregional forums that took joint action on
international mobility linked to environmental adversity. The responsive and ad
hoc nature of such action is immediately apparent. It manifested only following
the occurrence of extremely serious sudden-onset disasters that posed
humanitarian challenges suddenly across the pertinent subregion on a significant
scale. On the mobility aspect of these challenges, they were clearly seen through
the prism of immigration law rather than international protection. In particular,
these subregional forums sought to promote, on a humanitarian basis, the
immigration regularization of nationals of the affected state who were present
irregularly elsewhere. As such, the joint action taken by states during this period
was thus oriented toward encouraging a common response at the national law
level, in the form of special migratory measures, rather than creating new
international frameworks for the future.

B. Promoting Frameworks for Cooperation
Since the mid-2010s, states in several subregional forums in the Americas
have been working to develop normative frameworks for promoting a more
predictable response at the national level to future disaster displacement and
cooperation between states at the subregional level. In this process, the influence
228

Solidaridad de UNASUR con Haití: Decisión de Quito, ¶ 6, 2010, https://perma.cc/DM7Y-HETF
(author translation).
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Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, Plan para la Contribución Solidaria de los
Países del ALBA al Esfuerzo del Reconstrucción de Haití, proposal 6 (Jan. 25, 2010),
https://perma.cc/GKL9-6ZYZ (author translation).
See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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of external actors has been central to encouraging states to build in this way on
past practice at national and subregional levels. That work was led initially by the
Nansen Initiative (2012–2015)—a global intergovernmental process focused on
disaster displacement—and is being continued by its successor initiative, the
Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD) (2016).231 Even so, states in each
subregion have clearly drawn on the expertise and other resources offered by this
external actor to shape normative tools that they view as useful in responding to
the challenges posed by potentially increasing levels of international mobility
linked to disasters.
The development of the pertinent subregional frameworks in the Americas
has taken place mainly in interstate forums concerned with cooperation on
migration issues rather than international protection. Nonetheless, in 2014,
engagement by the Nansen Initiative at the regional level resulted in Latin
American and Caribbean states recognizing the “challenges posed by climate
change and natural disasters, as well as by the displacement of persons across
borders that these phenomena may cause in the region” in the Brazil Declaration
on Refugees.232 The accompanying Brazil Plan of Action of 2014 called on the
office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to
prepare a study on this theme in order to facilitate “regional cooperation.”233 That
study, commissioned by UNHCR and the PDD (as successor to the Nansen
Initiative), was published in 2018; it fed into the South American and Caribbean
subregional processes described below. However, it seems that no further
measures were taken at the regional level.234
In tandem, the Nansen Initiative had been working with states at the
subregional level. In 2013, a Central America consultation recommended that a
set of guidelines drawing on national practice be developed through the
subregional RCM forum.235 On the proposal of Costa Rica, this was approved by
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For a description of the approach, see Platform on Disaster Displacement, supra note 63, at 126,
141. See generally Jane McAdam, From the Nansen Initiative to the Platform on Disaster Displacement: Shaping
International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement, 39 UNIV. NEW S. WALES L.J. 1518
(2016).
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CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, supra note 11.
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the RCM.236 In 2016, based on a study commissioned by the Nansen Initiative,237
the RCM adopted nonbinding guidance on “Protection for Persons moving across
Borders in the Context of Disasters.”238 A similar process in South America,
initiated in 2015, led to a proposal by Chile to develop guidelines through the
South American Conference on Migration (SCM), a subregional forum of twelve
South American states.239 In 2018, with support from the PDD, the SCM in turn
adopted its own nonbinding “Regional Guidelines on Protection and Assistance
for Persons Displaced across Borders and Migrants in Countries affected by
Disasters of Natural Origin.”240
Since 2019, the PDD (as successor to the Nansen Initiative) has sought to
build on this engagement elsewhere in the Americas by supporting a similar
process of consultation in the Caribbean through the subregional migration forum
of the Caribbean Migration Consultations (CMC).241 In 2019, at the first Caribbean
consultation, the 2018 UNHCR study requested by Latin American and Caribbean
states in the 2014 Brazil Plan of Action was presented to participants. The
participating states framed the new challenges at regional and national levels as a
priority “in a context of increased migration and displacement linked with climate
change and disasters.”242 As a next step, those same states agreed on the need to
“systematize approaches, harmonize them, and come up with consolidated
policies through collaboration.”243 In the coming years, the creation of a similar
subregional framework in the Caribbean, thus, looks like a possibility.
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XIX Conferencia Regional Sobre Migración: Declaración [XIX Regional Migration Conference:
Declaration], decision 6, June 26–27, 2014, perma.cc/J62D-U5EZ, translated in XIX Regional
Conference on Migration (RCM), INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION (2014), https://perma.cc/R9YS-C7MP.
See generally CANTOR, LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 11.
NANSEN INITIATIVE, A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE PRACTICES FOR RCM MEMBER COUNTRIES:
PROTECTION FOR PERSONS MOVING ACROSS BORDERS IN THE CONTEXT OF DISASTERS (2016),
https://perma.cc/G7PC-968R [hereinafter RCM GUIDE].
The process within the SCM was initiated in 2016. However, this built on a regional workshop with
South American states that was convened in Quito during 2015 by the government of Ecuador, the
Nansen Initiative, and the Refugee Law Initiative of the School of Advanced Study, University of
London.
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EN PAÍSES AFECTADOS POR DESASTRES DE ORIGEN NATURAL (2018), https://perma.cc/3PHHWE5Z [hereinafter SCM GUIDELINES].
See generally CARIBBEAN MIGRATION CONSULTATIONS, supra note 176.
Id. at 10.
Id.
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C. Subregional Frameworks: Approach and Scope
The guidelines adopted by the RCM and the SCM represent a significant
addition to state practice. They reflect the views and approval of the large number
of participating states in the subregions of North and Central America (through
the RCM) and South America (through the SCM). Equally, as a result, their
guidance extends to that same range of member states across the Americas.
Moreover, as the first international instruments expressly oriented toward
regulation of international mobility in the context of disasters, they provide a
crucial indication of how states in this region legally frame these aspects of the
environment-mobility nexus. The approaches taken in the RCM Guide and the
SCM Guidelines thus offer useful insight into how, in the future, international law
may come to relate to the challenges posed by international mobility in the context
of environmental adversity.
There is considerable consistency in the approaches adopted by both the
RCM Guide and the SCM Guidelines. Those points of convergence give an
important indication of how states frame the key issues. At the outset, though,
certain drafting differences between the two instruments must be acknowledged.
Most crucially, they differ in how the guidance is presented. The RCM Guide
describes its normative framework as “effective practices” and gives significant
detail on each, while the SCM sets out broader “general guidelines” on purported
“minimum standards.”244 Yet, in reality, any difference lies merely in the greater
or lesser degree of detail that each instrument provides on the norms affirmed.
The scope of intervention that each instrument envisages differs somewhat too.
The RCM Guide mainly addresses immigration and consular authorities on
measure for the benefit of affected persons post-disaster. That scenario is covered
by the SCM Guidelines, but they also promote a “whole of government” approach
to avoid the risk of displacement from the outset.245 In this sense, the SCM
Guidelines have broader scope.
Nonetheless, on the key question of how host states should regulate
international mobility in the context of disasters, the instruments are highly
consistent in their approach. Firstly, they evidence a view by states that new
international law norms are not required. They do not “create a new set of state
obligations, extend existing state obligations, or require that new laws be
passed.”246 Rather, the instruments are intended only to “support the more
effective and consistent use of existing law, policy and practice” by states.247 The
244

See SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 15–16.
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Id. at 28. Indeed, alongside the many examples throughout the text, this is one the orienting
principles of the SCM Guidelines.
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RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 8; see also SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 15, 25.
RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 8; see also SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 15.
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body of existing national law in member states is thus seen as sufficient to respond
to the challenges of this scenario. In tandem, such national law is also affirmed as
the main basis for the resulting normative frameworks, which merely provide
guidance on how to apply it.248 This approach of building from existing national
law and practice is distinct from other soft law instruments which either express
aspirational norms lacking a firm basis in existing law or interpret hard rules of
international law in their application to a particular group or theme.
Secondly, both the RCM Guide and the SCM Guidelines treat this area as
principally a matter of immigration law. The frameworks are primarily built upon
the national practice of states in each subregion of favorably exercising their
discretion in immigration matters where “humanitarian grounds,” such as a
disaster exist.249 Accordingly, each instrument also acknowledges that states retain
the inherent discretion to adopt more generous approaches than those described
in the subregional norms.250 International obligations are acknowledged but are
incorporated mainly as a set of parameters that may limit the extent to which states
can decline to favorably exercise discretion in some situations, rather than the core
legal basis for resulting measures.251 Moreover, both instruments address the legal
challenges not only for people arriving due to a disaster in their own country, but
also for people already outside their own country who are affected by a disaster
there or by a disaster in the country in which they are living or through which they
are transiting.252
Thirdly, the norms in both instruments are rooted principally in the use of
ordinary and exceptional migration categories.253 Both guides distinguish the
(humanitarian) protection afforded by these categories from international
protection,254 which each highlights as relevant to disaster displacement only in
rare cases. Moreover, each instrument promotes active forms of cooperation
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See RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 9; SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 14–15.
See RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 13; SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 20–25, 33.
See RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 9; SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 15.
See RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 13–15; SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 34.
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See RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 10–11; SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 16. Indeed, each
instrument sets out a range of relevant principles and norms relating to protection and assistance
for migrants in a disaster-affected country. See RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 24–36; SCM
GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 39–42. These norms correlate with those described by another
migration-oriented set of guidelines, on migrants in countries in crisis, prepared at the global level
by the International Organization for Migration with input from states. See, e.g., MIGRANTS IN
COUNTRIES IN CRISIS INITIATIVE, GUIDELINES TO PROTECT MIGRANTS IN COUNTRIES
EXPERIENCING CONFLICT OR NATURAL DISASTER (2016), https://perma.cc/9ZG5-FTV9.
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See RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 11–12; SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 34.
See SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 24–25 (providing a broad definition of “protection” in
Part 3.2, as compared with the emphasis on lack of protection in the definition of “international
protection” and indeed “complementary protection” at Part 3.2).
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between the host state and state of origin,255 including: bilateral measures to
further cooperation and mutual assistance, especially where they share a border,256
and, in solidarity with a country of origin that lacks capacity to receive returns,
granting entry or stay to persons only tangentially affected by a disaster.257 The
SCM framework is expressly based on coordination between these two states,258
and it even posits a principle of “shared responsibility” between them, especially
if both are SCM members.259 Thus, in each subregional forum, it seems that states
do not generally view the situation of disaster-affected persons through an
“international protection” lens.
Finally, neither the RCM Guide nor the SCM Guidelines attempt to create a
new legal status. Rather, they simply distill from the legal practice of states in each
subregion a consensus approach to when the discretion to allow entry or stay on
humanitarian grounds should usually be positively exercised in disaster contexts.
This is when the person is “directly and seriously affected by the disaster.”260 Some
interpretation of this concept is provided by the RCM Guide.261 The emphasis is
squarely on the proximity and severity of the disaster’s impact on the individual,
in light of any pre-existing vulnerabilities. In other words, unlike the established
concepts of international protection, it is not based on a rupture in the political
link between an individual and their state of origin or a risk of their fundamental
human rights standards being violated there.
The interpretation in the RCM Guide of a disaster’s direct impact as a
“sudden and severe change” suggests slow-onset disasters are not included.262 This
is confirmed by the guide’s affirmation that it applies only to disasters “caused in
part or in whole by a sudden and serious natural hazard.”263 By contrast, the SCM
Guidelines expressly include other slow-onset disasters and events “that may be
associated with adverse effects of climate change” when they contribute in
255

For instance, the RCM Guide describes the elements of the “cooperative humanitarian response”
among RCM member states as including the exchange of information, requests to apply
humanitarian protection measures to affected nationals and other forms of bilateral cooperation.
See RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 27–28. The SCM Guidelines describe a range of cooperative
measures between affected SCM member states based on the principles of “international
cooperation” and “co-responsibility.” See SCM GUIDELINES, supra note 240, at 20, 22–23.
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See RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 16.
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Id. at 9–10. At the same time, it extends the concept of “directly and seriously affected by the
disaster” to situations where “in rare cases an imminent [disaster] creates a substantial risk to [the
person’s] life or safety in the country of origin.” RCM GUIDE, supra note 238, at 16.
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fundamental ways to the affected person’s decision to cross an international
border.264 Otherwise, though, the terms of each instrument strongly suggest that
the principal concern is with “disasters,” a concept defined by reference to the
extant U.N. policy.265 As such, it seems that hazards or hazardous events that do
not reach the implicit threshold for societal impact will fall generally outside the
scope of the guidance and be left purely to the discretion of national state
authorities.
Despite their recent adoption, these two subregional instruments have
already begun to shape state practice in the Americas. For example, in the RCM
Guide, the principles on bilateral cooperation have been acted upon by some
states. Costa Rica and Panama have broken new ground in the subregion of
Central America by developing from earlier drafts of the RCM Guide shared by
PDD a set of bilateral mechanisms and policies to manage displacement and
disaster risks.266 These include a set of draft Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs) for their respective disaster response systems to address cross-border
displacement in disaster contexts.267 The structure, principles, and rules in the
SOPs are based directly on the RCM Guide. Simulation exercises to put the SOPs
into practice have been carried out jointly by the two countries, again with the
involvement of PDD.268 Similarly, the RCM Guide facilitated coordination
between Costa Rica and Nicaragua to allow 150 Nicaraguans to cross the border
and shelter in Costa Rica from the effects of Hurricane Otto in 2016.269
The two subregional instruments, and the processes that led to their
adoption, also seem to have encouraged states in Central and South America to
incorporate national law provisions to specifically regulate the entry and stay of
persons affected by a disaster when revising their immigration laws. Since the
Nansen Initiative started work on its consultations in those regions in 2013, at
least five states in these subregions have adopted significant new provisions of
national law specific to the situation of disaster-affected non-nationals when
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Government of Costa Rica/Government of Panama, Procedimientos Operativos para la atención
de personas desplazadas a través de fronteras en contextos de desastre [Operating procedures for
the care of cross-border refugees in the case of disaster] (May 2017) (copy on file with author).
Int’l Org. for Migration, Costa Rica and Panama Effectuate First Border Crossing Simulation, PLATFORM
ON DISASTER DISPLACEMENT (Aug. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/T8Q8-8FCA.
See Platform on Disaster Displacement, supra note 63, at 126, 141.
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overhauling their immigration legislation. They are Guatemala (2016),270 Brazil
(2017),271 Ecuador (2017),272 Peru (2017),273 and El Salvador (2019).274 Paraguay is
also reported to be considering such provisions as it debates adoption of a new
immigration law.275
Finally, the legal practice of states in the Americas has also had an impact on
policy development at the global level. In 2015, the Nansen Initiative presented
an Agenda for the Protection of Cross-border Displaced Persons in the context
of Disasters and Climate Change (Protection Agenda), which—based on seven
regional consultations with states and other actors—sets out norms for
responding to cross-border disaster displacement.276 At that conference, over 100
states from different regions endorsed these global guidelines.277 However, on
closer study, it is evident that the approach and many of the more novel norms
described by the Protection Agenda for “protecting cross-border disasterdisplaced persons” are derived principally from state practice in the Americas. 278
Even so, in 2018, the approach in the Protection Agenda was endorsed by the
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration as a basis for developing
“coherent approaches to address the challenges of migration movements in the
context of sudden-onset and slow-onset natural disasters.”279
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VII. C ONCLUSION
This Article contributes to the debate on how international law should
address international mobility in the context of environmental threats. As a whole,
this Article illustrates how greater engagement with different kinds of evidence on
the empirical dynamics of movement and existing legal practice by states in one
region may shed light on broader questions about the current and future role of
international law in shaping this response. The contention that legal scholars
working on this aspect of the law should reflect more carefully on the empirical
framing of the assumed underlying problem is not new. In this regard, the present
Article merely adds new elements to existing scholarship on the implications of
the empirical data on environmental threats and human mobility. However, it also
makes a more ambitious claim, namely that discussion of the role of international
law in this field cannot be divorced entirely from proper consideration of existing
legal practice at the national level. In other words, legal scholars interested in how,
in cross-border contexts, international law could or should address
environmentally displaced persons, climate refugees, or the disaster-displaced—
to use only a few contemporary terms—cannot continue to discount national legal
practice as if it were irrelevant. What, then, are the principal implications of this
Article for our understanding of international law development in response to this
perceived legal problem?
On the underlying empirical dynamics, beyond the much-cited risk posed by
rising sea levels in the Pacific, the growing evidence base from the Americas
confirms that international mobility in this region is already being shaped by
sudden-onset events, such as hurricanes, storms, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions
and flooding, as well as slow-onset processes, such as desertification and droughts.
It has been argued here that, although the concept of disasters is a useful starting
point for understanding how these events contribute to the movement of persons,
a broader focus on the underlying hazards and hazardous events may better
capture the wider ways in which these phenomena can shape mobility, even where
a disaster does not result at societal level. In tandem, contrary to assumptions in
the legal literature that the resulting movement is an issue only for the Global
North, data from this region show that some of this movement also extends to
countries in the Global South. As such, this Article contends that the legal practice
and perspectives of Global South states need to be incorporated alongside those
of states in the Global North in considering the development of law in this field.
Moreover, beyond a narrow focus on movement “pushed” by hazards, this Article
demonstrates how such hazards, in countries of destination and transit as well as
countries of origin, impinge on international mobility issues in other legallyrelevant ways. Indeed, the risk is that if we continue to frame the issue as one of
extending international protection to persons fleeing disaster-affected countries,
we lose sight of the fact that similar legal gaps in relation to travel, entry, and stay
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also exist for non-nationals whose mobility is affected by hazards in countries of
destination and transit. We also risk stretching refugee law, and wider concepts of
international protection, to its breaking point.
On the framing of the legal problem, it is true that international law only
tangentially regulates the international mobility related challenges of travel, entry,
and stay of non-nationals in the context of environmental threats. However, the
existence of a gap in international law does not mean that no law exists, nor does
it imply that proposed solutions to the problem can start from a blank canvas.
Instead, this Article shows that many states in this region have long recognized
the challenges involved and also developed legal responses at the national level to
accommodate affected persons. At least for the Americas, this body of legal
practice robustly challenges the contention in much of the legal literature that
national law can simply be dismissed as irrelevant or as comprised merely of
isolated protection provisions in the national law of states in the Global North.
Rather, a broadly similar legal approach to these mobility challenges is evident in
national laws across this region, including among states in the Global South. On
the one hand, this existing practice raises a question about the role of international
law, and its added value to the existing response in this region, especially in light
of international efforts in some subregions to develop harmonized guidance on
such legal practice. On the other hand, given that it is states that are the creators
of international law, a better understanding of the ways in which they already see
the pertinent challenges, and respond to them in law, offers an insight into how
those existing views and practice might influence the development of international
law in the future.
In this respect, this Article establishes that most states in the Americas treat
the challenges principally as a matter of immigration law rather than international
protection. This is not to say that the latter body of law is not applied where
environmental events unleash persecution or violence, but simply that it is done
by reference to the latter phenomena, rather than the disasters themselves. In
general, though, the travel, entry, and stay of persons affected by environmental
threats is resolved not by application of the law on international protection—nor
that on the environment—but by immigration law and cooperation with the state
of origin. For persons with a link to the destination country, ordinary migration
categories offer a pathway for mobility and a criterion for differentiation among
the wider universe of migrants, the importance of which is often overlooked in
the legal literature. The fact that states have been prepared to flexibly apply these
categories to disaster-affected persons, in contrast to the rigid application of
refugee law, indicates how strongly states see immigration law as the appropriate
medium of response. Even for those who lack such a link with the destination
country, a surprisingly wide range of states have used exceptional migration
categories in immigration law, and similar provisions for humanitarian discretion
in national refugee law, to facilitate entry and stay for affected persons. In both
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cases, the pertinent criterion is usually that the individual is “seriously and directly
affected” by the disaster. Immigration law may be largely overlooked by the legal
literature, since it is not well-established in international law, but, in practice, it
represents the main framework for response by states in the Americas.
What, then, of international law? As this Article demonstrates, at least in the
Americas, the problem is not an absence of legal tools. Indeed, in this region, the
basic elements of the approach in national law have quite a high degree of
consistency. This raises the important question of whether similar legal practice
can be discerned in other regions of the world. Yet, for the development of
international law, even this discrete body of national legal practice in the Americas
raises the prospect that these provisions provide evidence of emerging norms of
“regional” custom,280 and they are already influencing policy at the global level.
That consistency is seen also in how the existing national practice has been
distilled and elaborated in soft law frameworks at the subregional level as a means
to harmonize the approach in participating states. Looking to the future, this
suggests that grand proposals for new global treaties on international protection
or environmental law to address the legal implications of such mobility are less
likely to gain traction with states in this region than efforts to develop the existing
approach in international immigration law at the regional or subregional levels. In
some forums, incorporating elements of the current approach into free movement
arrangements looks like a distinct possibility.281 Overall, then, it seems that
international law may still have a role to play in shaping the response to
international mobility linked to environmental factors. However, for better or
worse, in the Americas and elsewhere, its future development seems more likely
to build on existing state practice than on the flights of fancy of us international
law scholars. The law offers few truly blank canvases.
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The fact that these provisions are rooted in the discretion of states to regulate their immigration
affairs may raise a question about whether such legal practice truly reflects opinio juris, as an element
of international custom. However, the codification in national law of a power to favorably resolve
these types of cases, and its exercise in practice by the state concerned according to the terms of its
law, may suggest that states perceive the creation of such powers as a matter of legal obligation. For
discussion of the concept of “regional” or “particular,” as opposed to “general” international
custom, see Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, at 154–56, U.N. Doc. A/73/10 (2018).
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This analysis is bolstered by a recent example of practice from outside the Americas region. In
February 2020, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an African subregional
interstate forum took precisely this step, endorsing a free movement agreement that integrates
specific immigration-based provisions that require states parties to allow citizens of fellow IGAD
member states to enter their territory “in anticipation of, during or in the aftermath of disaster,”
and to facilitate the extension of stay for such disaster-affected persons while return to their country
of origin “is not possible or reasonable.” See Protocol on Free Movement of Persons in the IGAD
Region, Feb. 25, 2020, art. 16 (awaiting entry into force).
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Abstract
The proliferation of human rights disclosure and due diligence laws around the globe is a
welcome development in the area of business and human rights. Corresponding improvement in
conditions for workers and communities in global supply chains whose human rights are impacted
by businesses has not materialized, however. In this Article, we focus on the oversight and
enforcement features of human rights disclosure and due diligence laws as one of the missing links
to achieving the accountability objectives envisaged by such legislation. Drawing on our analysis
of key legislative developments, we observe and critique that the state has almost completely
withdrawn itself from the oversight and enforcement roles and assigned these crucial accountability
functions solely to consumers, civil society, and investors. Without a regulatory mechanism to
ensure quality of human rights disclosures and due diligence processes and to impose sanctions for
failing to comply with the laws, not only may the disclosures and processes be inadequate, but
there is a danger that misleading disclosures and flawed processes may mask harmful impacts
and be detrimental to any hopes of vindicating the rights of workers and communities in global
supply chains. We offer a new perspective on a more effective approach to oversight and enforcement
in which the state should function as a key actor through which consumers, civil society, and
investors can hold businesses accountable.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
In response to intense civil society pressure and increasing public awareness
of appalling human rights impacts of businesses, including working conditions
amounting to slavery and forced labor,1 several governments have committed
themselves to take action to prevent human rights abuses by businesses and to
eradicate modern slavery in global supply chains.2 State efforts to date have
primarily concentrated on increasing transparency in parent or lead companies.3
The United States and some countries in Europe have adopted legislation that
requires companies to make annual public disclosures containing information
about their human rights impacts.4 While transparency can fulfill complementary
prevention and accountability functions alongside other measures, such as
strengthening local trade union involvement and setting clear liability standards to
eradicate adverse human rights impacts by business, it can only do so if designed
diligently and implemented robustly. The design of existing human rights
transparency rules has allowed highly ineffective reporting practices to emerge.5
For instance, a large number of businesses covered under the California
Transparency in Supply Chains Act fail to disclose all the required information,
and many do not have a disclosure statement at all.6 Human rights disclosures
under existing legislation are at best minimal in their reporting of risks and at worst

1
2

3

4
5

6

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN SUPPLY CHAINS 5–8 (2016).
See, e.g., Theresa May, My Government Will Lead the Way in Defeating Modern Slavery, THE TELEGRAPH
(July 30, 2016, 10:01 PM), https://perma.cc/37ZE-DW8T. “Modern slavery” is not used as a legal
term of art, but rather to encompass exploitative practices including forced labor, bonded labor,
human trafficking, and child labor. Justine Nolan & Gregory Bott, Global Supply Chains and Human
Rights: Spotlight on Forced Labour and Modern Slavery Practices, 24 AUSTRALIAN J. HUM. RTS. 44, 47
(2018).
See, e.g., Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30 §§ 1–62, § 54 sched. 1–5 (U.K.) [hereinafter MSA]. There
are, in addition, legal provisions to address domestic instances of modern slavery. See Trafficking
Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–14 [hereinafter TVPA].
See, e.g., TVPA, supra note 3; MSA, supra note 3.
See Genevieve LeBaron & Andreas Rühmkorf, Steering CSR Through Home State Regulation: A
Comparison of the Impact of the UK Bribery Act and Modern Slavery Act on Global Supply Chain Governance,
8 GLOB. POL’Y 15 (2017); CORE COAL., RISK AVERSE: COMPANY REPORTING ON RAW MATERIAL
AND SECTOR-SPECIFIC RISKS UNDER THE TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY CHAINS CLAUSE IN THE UK
MODERN SLAVERY ACT 2015 3 (2017); Justine Nolan, Hardening Soft Law: Are the Emerging Corporate
Social Disclosure Laws Capable of Generating Substantive Compliance with Human Rights?, 15 BRAZ. J. INT’L
L. 65 (2018); see also U.K. HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT JOINT COMM. ON HUM. RTS., HUMAN RIGHTS
AND BUSINESS 2017: PROMOTING RESPONSIBILITY AND ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY, 2016–17, HL
153, HC 443.
See California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, 2010 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 556 (West) [hereinafter
CTSCA]; Andrew G. Barna, The Early Eight and the Future of Consumer Legal Activism to Fight ModernDay Slavery in Corporate Supply Chains, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1449, 1463 (2018) (citing the statistic
that only 62 percent of covered companies disclosed).
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misleading about human rights impacts across global supply chains and
subsidiaries.7
There have been various efforts to address the shortcomings of
transparency-focused laws, including the adoption of the French Law on
Corporate Duty of Vigilance,8 German businesses’ push for new human rights
due diligence laws,9 and the European Union’s announcement that it will likely
enact a due diligence law in 2021.10 The process of human rights due diligence
(HRDD) requires companies to identify, prevent, mitigate, and communicate risks
to human rights.11 If done properly, it can transform corporate behavior and
prevent harms.12 Company reports of human rights impacts and due diligence
provide information to stakeholders to enable them to make informed choices
about their interactions with the corporation. As such, they act as an important
component of an overall corporate accountability framework for human rights
impacts. Push for transformation can come from external or internal sources—
information found in reports might trigger external stakeholder pressure to
transform corporate behavior, or the information gathering and disclosing process
might influence internal decision making.13 If such a transformation materializes,
disclosures and HRDD can achieve prevention and mitigation of adverse human
rights impacts. But to be able to fulfill these transformation and prevention
functions, HRDD must be done properly, and reporting must contain
information that is accurate and provides a complete and meaningful picture of
the disclosed issues. The current designs of transparency and HRDD laws do not
contain adequate safeguards to ensure duties are carried out properly and in
accordance with the relevant legislation.

7

See, e.g., CORE COAL., supra note 5.

8

See Loi 2017-399 du 27 Mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des
entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-399 of Mar. 27, 2017 on the Duty of Vigilance of Parent
Companies and Ordering Companies], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[Official Gazette Of France], Mar. 28, 2017.

9

Business and Human Rights: German Companies Push for Mandatory Due Diligence Law, INT’L BAR ASSOC.
(Mar. 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/PQB3-X3TU.

10

See CORE COAL., 25 NGOS AND TRADE UNIONS CALL FOR A UK LAW ON MANDATORY HUMAN
RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE (2019); EU to Legislate for Human Rights and Environment Due Diligence,
HAUSFELD LLP (2020), https://perma.cc/5T89-V7DE.
See John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General), Guiding Principles of Business
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework,
¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter UNGPs].

11

12

13

See generally Robert G. Eccles & George Serafeim, Corporate and Integrated Reporting: A Functional
Perspective, in CORPORATE STEWARDSHIP: ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE EFFECTIVENESS (Susan A.
Mohrman et al. eds., 2015); Karin Buhmann, Neglecting the Proactive Aspect of Human Rights Due
Diligence? A Critical Appraisal of the EU's Non-Financial Reporting Directive as a Pillar One Avenue for
Promoting Pillar Two Action, 3 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 23, 35 (2018).
See Buhmann, supra note 12.
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Most worryingly, the transparency and due diligence rules discussed in this
Article typically require minimal substantive disclosure and largely adopt only
“non-coercive enforcement,”14 which leaves the watchdog role almost exclusively
to consumers, investors, and NGOs.15 Without a regulatory oversight mechanism
to ensure the quality of disclosures and to impose sanctions for misleading
information, not only may the reporting be inadequate, but also the disclosures
may present false realities and be detrimental to any hopes of improving rights of
workers and communities in the global supply chain. The question of oversight
and enforcement, however, remains underexplored in the literature.
This Article makes a novel contribution to the ongoing discussions about
how to improve human rights disclosure and due diligence laws to achieve the
stated legislative aims. It has been observed and critiqued that the oversight and
enforcement features of these laws remain weak or nonexistent.16 Taking this as
our starting point, we first offer a new framing of the problem by analyzing how
these laws assign oversight and enforcement roles between the state and the
market. We critique that the state has almost completely withdrawn itself from the
oversight and enforcement roles and assigned these crucial accountability
functions primarily to consumers, civil society, and investors. As discussed below,
even in the case of the French Law, civil society acts as the main driver of
oversight. We argue in favor of greater state involvement in transnational business
regulation as it concerns the human rights impacts of businesses. We argue that
state-based enforcement and oversight constitute necessary ingredients for public
disclosures and HRDD to contribute to the improvement of human rights
conditions in supply chains and to achieve accountability for adverse business
impacts on human rights. We offer a new perspective on a more effective
approach to oversight and enforcement that distinguishes human rights
disclosures and due diligence from traditional corporate reporting and due
diligence. Our approach assigns these functions primarily to a public authority that
should have expertise in both corporate governance and human rights and would
also function as an enabler for consumers, civil society, and investors to hold
businesses accountable.
The Article begins in Section II by unpacking the concept of accountability
in the context of business impacts on human rights. Next, Section III outlines and
compares the HRDD and reporting requirements under key examples of the
relevant legislation: the E.U. Non-Financial Reporting Directive (enacted 2014);
14

Adam S. Chilton & Galit A. Sarfaty, The Limitation of Supply Chain Disclosure Regimes, 53 STAN. J. INT’L
L. 1, 12 (2017).

15

See TIM BARTLEY, RULES WITHOUT RIGHTS: LANDS, LABOR, AND PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 7, 12, 40 (Oxford, 2018) (noting that corporate codes of conduct and private
social or ethical audits are the prime examples of this mode of governance).
See, e.g., Nolan, supra note 5, at 68–71; LeBaron & Rühmkorf, supra note 5.

16
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the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance of 2017; the California
Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 (CTSCA); the U.K. Modern Slavery
Act 2015 (MSA); the Australian Modern Slavery Act 2018 (AMSA); the U.S.
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 § 1502; the E.U. Conflict Minerals Regulation (enacted
2017); and the Dutch Child Labor Law (enacted 2019). In doing so, the Article
briefly addresses the reasons behind the enactment of the laws, the transparency
and HRDD requirements they contain, and the institutional arrangements
supporting these requirements, in order to give the reader context for the
discussion that follows.
Building on the existing scholarship,17 the analysis in Sections IV and V
frames the approach of the existing legislation to oversight and enforcement as
market-led and critiques this model of oversight and enforcement. In Section VI,
we argue that enforcement of these laws via regulatory oversight, alongside market
oversight, is essential for achieving their accountability objectives. We then
evaluate the options for regulatory oversight of HRDD and reporting. Here, we
analyze the distinguishing features of human rights reporting from financial and
other types of non-financial reporting.18 We urge policymakers to move away from
placing HRDD and reporting within the realm of traditional corporate reporting
and instead to adopt a sui generis model of oversight that marries corporate
reporting expertise with human rights expertise.

II. W HAT I S A CCOUNTABILITY IN T HIS C O NTEXT AND W HAT
A RE THE V ARIOUS T OOLS FOR A CCOUNTABILITY ?
Corporate accountability represents a movement away from the voluntarism
and self-regulation that characterize contemporary corporate social responsibility
(CSR).19 For Peter Newell, “the term [accountability] implies both a measure of
answerability (providing an account for actions undertaken) and enforceability
(punishment or sanctions for poor performance or illegal conduct).”20 In the
context of business impacts on human rights, we conceive of accountability as a
wider concept than liability, encompassing the idea that companies should be held
responsible for the consequences of their actions via non-legal accountability (risk
of loss of reputation, denial of access to foreign markets, fall in share price, and
17

See, e.g., Justine Nolan, Human Rights and Global Corporate Supply Chains: Is Effective Supply Chain
Accountability Possible?, in BUILDING A TREATY ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: CONTEXT AND
CONTOURS 248 (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2017); Chilton & Sarfaty, supra note 14.

18

Other types of non-financial reporting include diversity, governance, and environmental
performance.

19

See generally Renginee G. Pillay, The Limits to Self-Regulation and Voluntarism: From Corporate Social
Responsibility to Corporate Accountability, 99 AMICUS CURAE 10 (2014).

20

Peter Newell, From Responsibility to Citizenship: Corporate Accountability for Development, INST. DEV.
STUD., Apr. 2002, at 1–2.
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shareholder dissent) as well as legal accountability through regulators or courts of
law.21 We concur with Simon Zadek’s common-sense opinion that for
accountability to work, there must be “capability to do something about [a given
action and] . . . some level of consensus about the action that needs to be
accounted for and the penalties for failure . . . [Additionally, there needs to be] a
reasonably well-defined ‘community’ that can reach such decisions.”22
In following Zadek’s criteria, one must first determine what needs to be
accounted for in the context of transparency and due diligence for human rights
abuses in a company’s supply chains and subsidiaries. Second, one must determine
what consequences and penalties may attach to performance that falls below the
expected or required standard and what processes are needed to assess compliance
and impose sanctions.
Determining the scope of accountability can be a complex task where the
disclosure obligations are placed on parent or lead companies even though the
presence of human rights abuses in those companies’ subsidiaries or supply chains
may not be contrary to any legal requirement or obligation placed on the parent
or lead company. The corporate law concepts of corporate personality, limited
liability, and the contractual nature of relationships with suppliers insulate parent
or lead companies from liability for harm caused by subsidiaries and suppliers.23
Therefore, at least in theory, legal liability falls on the subsidiary, supplier, or subsupplier that is directly linked to the human rights harm rather than the lead
company that sells the end product.24 For instance, the MSA imposes criminal
liability only for slavery and human trafficking that take place within the U.K.25
Accountability arises from the presence of slavery within a business organization.
By contrast, supply chain accountability for slavery and human trafficking
overseas through the Act is achieved through disclosure of the steps taken to
identify and eliminate these practices.26 Unlike the former type of criminal
accountability that applies in the domestic context, the latter obligation is neither

21

22

23

24

25
26

David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of Corporate Liability
Under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L. 334, 335 (2011).
Simon Zadek, The Meaning of Accountability, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM PRINCIPLES TO
PRACTICE 240, 241 (Dorothée Baumann-Pauly & Justine Nolan eds., 2016).
See generally KATHARINA PISTOR, CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND
INEQUALITY (2019).
However, it is still possible for a parent or lead company to be directly liable for the harms suffered
as a result of a subsidiary’s acts or omissions. See Vendanta Resources v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20
(appeal taken from Eng.); Chandler v. Cape [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 (appeal taken from Eng.). The
French Law places a legal requirement on the parent company to conduct due diligence in its supply
chain. See Loi 2017-399, supra note 8.
See MSA, supra note 3, §§ 1–2.
Id. § 54.
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an obligation of result nor an obligation of due diligence to eliminate slavery
within supply chains. Instead, it is an obligation to report the steps, if any, taken
to eliminate slavery. The presence of human rights abuses and modern slavery
practices legally distant from the parent or lead company renders it difficult to
define what action needs to be accounted for in modern slavery or human rights
disclosures, particularly if a legally-mandated due diligence obligation is lacking.
At the outset, the conduct that needs to be accounted for is the failure on a
parent or lead company’s part to make diligent efforts to identify, prevent,
mitigate, and eliminate human rights abuses in its subsidiaries and supply chains
and to disclose adequately the steps taken.27 This is just one piece of the wider
puzzle of accountability. We are not looking at other pieces of the puzzle such as
the role of state oversight and enforcement through civil or criminal liability for
human rights harms. Relatedly, we are not looking at this from the perspective of
access to remedy. Our concern is whether the current disclosure and HRDD
frameworks improve accountability: (1) to victims of business human rights
impacts and (2) to those affected indirectly as consumers, customers, or investors
who buy from and/or invest in the company on the understanding that it is doing
all that can be reasonably expected to prevent and remediate human rights abuses
and modern slavery in its global supply chains.
There is a spectrum of regulatory approaches to bringing about corporate
accountability in terms of the consequences that will attach to poor performance,
ranging from light-touch (private-led regulation) to stringent regulation with
binding standards enforced by public authorities.28 Genevieve LeBaron and
Andreas Rühmkorf observe that home state regulation on business and human
rights has been “enacted through a range of different institutional designs that
combine elements and instruments of public and private governance.”29 That said,
as will be seen in Section III, a heavy emphasis has thus far been placed on various
degrees of transparency accompanied by market-centered accountability
mechanisms at the light-touch end of the spectrum. This mode of regulation is a
move away from traditional “command and control” regulation, in which
governments adopt “legal rules backed by [civil or criminal] sanctions,”30 toward

27

This accords with the due diligence requirements of the U.N. See UNGPs, supra note 11, at 21–22.

28

See LeBaron & Rühmkorf, supra note 5, at 17–19, 26. Compare Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, §§ 1–20,
sched. 1–2 (U.K.), with MSA, supra note 3 (highlighting that, under these categories, the former
produced significant changes in corporate practice while the latter has not).
See LeBaron & Rühmkorf, supra note 5, at 17.

29
30

See David J. Doorey, Who Made That? Influencing Foreign Labor Practices Through Reflexive Domestic
Disclosure Legislation, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353, 366 (2005).
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what is termed “reflexive” regulation,31 or “New Governance.”32 Through this
mechanism, the government acts as “the orchestrator of private actors to
encourage compliance”33 and attempts to “influence normative practices indirectly
by shaping the context in which society’s various actors and subsystems interact
and bargain with one another.”34 This model has been widely supported by the
CSR literature due to its promise of effecting organizational and lasting change,35
whereas command-and-control type regulation has been viewed with skepticism
due to its potential to produce a tick-box approach to human rights issues.36
Human rights disclosure laws discussed in this Article largely adopt this lighttouch regulation model based on a market-led model of accountability. Recent
developments suggest a slow, gradual movement toward more stringent
regulation, with a new legislative approach featuring a legal duty to conduct
HRDD and to publish HRDD information backed by certain penalties and civil
liability for failure to comply.37 Karin Buhmann has argued that for the light-touch
approach to be successful, it needs to properly encourage organizational learning
and not merely focus on penalties for non-disclosure.38 While the organizational
learning focus is crucial, decades of voluntarism and soft regulation in this field
have not produced successful outcomes when the bottom line of business remains
profit oriented.39 One reason for this lack of meaningful progress is the lack of
stringent legal accountability mechanisms to push businesses to take disclosure
31

32

33
34
35
36

37

38
39

Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 L. & SOC’Y REV. 239, 242
(1983). In the context of the nature of social disclosure rules, see generally Barnali Choudhury, Social
Disclosure, 13 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 207 (2016).
David Hess, Social Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospects of Achieving Corporate
Accountability Through Transparency, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 453, 454–55 (2007) (describing New
Governance as “process-oriented, flexible, participatory, and experimental”).
See Nolan, supra note 5, at 70.
See Doorey, supra note 30, at 357.
See Hess, supra note 32.
See Pillay, supra note 19 (providing an overview and critique of the voluntary and light-touch
approaches to regulation of corporate human rights impacts). See generally Responding to Modern Slavery
– New UK Benchmarking Report, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (Oct. 24, 2017),
https://perma.cc/8E9S-6RPV.
See Loi 2017-399, supra note 8; The Netherlands Takes an Historic Step by Adopting Child Labor Due
Diligence Law, MVO PLATFORM (May 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/UW7H-W9BP; Frequently Asked
Questions About the New Dutch Child Labor Due Diligence Law, MVO PLATFORM (Apr. 14, 2017),
https://perma.cc/W8LM-SPPT; see also Saskia Wilks & Johannes Blankenbach, Will Germany Become
a Leader in the Drive for Corporate Due Diligence on Human Rights?, BUS. AND HUM. RTS. RES. CTR. (Feb.
20, 2019), https://perma.cc/SD2U-25PA; Details about the Initiative, SWISS COAL. FOR CORP. JUST.,
https://perma.cc/4TBM-585Z.
See Buhmann, supra note 12, at 39.
See Pillay, supra note 19. On the voluntary approach of multi-stakeholder initiatives, see Not Fit-forPurpose: The Grand Experiment of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives in Corporate Accountability, Human Rights and
Global Governance, MSINTEGRITY (July 2020), https://perma.cc/MCW4-WHLL.
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and HRDD obligations seriously. It has been argued by critics of the current
transparency rules that without, as a minimum, an accompanying HRDD
obligation and civil, administrative, or criminal liability for failure to comply, these
rules cannot effectively contribute to corporate accountability.40 The analysis in
the latter parts of this Article discusses the necessity for state-based oversight and
enforcement supported by stakeholders as an essential ingredient for the efficacy
of any laws, whether they comprise transparency obligations only or they include
the additional requirement of HRDD. This is crucial to ensure the avoidance of a
disconnect between what is reported in corporate disclosures and the actual
human rights situation on the ground.41
Both transparency and HRDD are requirements of the U.N. Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).42 The UNGPs, which were
adopted unanimously by the U.N. Human Rights Council in 2011, represent a
consensus of opinion among a number of states, companies, and nongovernmental organizations, about the human rights responsibilities of
corporations. The UNGPs expect business actors to “operationalize” their
responsibility to respect human rights through HRDD and reporting processes.43
Businesses are expected to communicate the steps they take to address human
rights impacts by publishing sufficiently-detailed information on the impacts and
steps taken to prevent, mitigate, and remediate these in appropriate form and
frequency.44
The commentary on reporting explains “showing” that businesses respect
human rights involves companies communicating and “providing a measure of
transparency and accountability to individuals or groups who may be impacted
and to other relevant stakeholders, including investors.”45 Thus, reporting under
the UNGPs is not an end in itself but, theoretically at least, is an exercise that will
provide a measure of accountability.46 Reporting alone is not sufficient, however,
and the reporting provisions in the UNGPs are supplemented by a requirement
that companies conduct HRDD. This process entails identifying whether they
40

41

42
43

44

45
46

See LeBaron and Rühmkorf, supra note 5; Nolan, supra note 5; U.K. HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT JOINT
COMM. ON HUM. RTS., supra note 5.
For an analysis of such a disconnect, see Madhura Rao & Nadia Bernaz, Corporate Responsibility for
Human Rights in Assam Tea Plantations - A Business and Human Rights Approach, SUSTAINABILITY 2020,
12, 7409.
See UNGPs, supra note 11.
See id. (noting that UNGPs 16–24 are the “operational principles” in relation to the corporate
responsibility to respect pillar).
Id. For an exploration of reporting under the UNGPs, see UN Guiding Principles Reporting
Framework, SHIFT & MAZARS (2015), https://perma.cc/XZV8-R7MB.
UNGPs, supra note 11, at 20.
But see, e.g., Jena Martin, Hiding in the Light: The Misuse of Disclosure to Advance the Business and Human
Rights Agenda, 56 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 530 (2018) (challenging this viewpoint).
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have caused or contributed to adverse human rights impacts, integrating and
acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and remediating the harm if an
adverse impact has occurred.47 The enactment of transparency and HRDD laws
are illustrative of the polycentric governance described in the UNGPs.
The knowing-and-showing approach of the UNGPs has been a welcome
shift from the naming-and-shaming approach.48 We argue here that for the
“showing” to be reliable and not misleading, there needs to be a reliable system
of oversight. While the UNGPs acknowledge the role of transparency in achieving
corporate accountability, Principle 3 and its commentary leave it up to each state
to determine the type of transparency measures to be introduced. According to
Principle 3, the states should encourage or require businesses to be transparent on
how they address their human rights impacts.49 As far as transparency measures
go, the expectations of the UNGPs could be fulfilled by states introducing or
maintaining the “light-touch” regulations and mandating reporting without any
follow-up measures. The UNGPs place no clear expectations on states to
introduce robust measures of oversight and enforcement for transparency
requirements. We argue in this Article that such measures are a crucial element of
transparency and HRDD laws to ensure corporate accountability.

III. K EY F EATURES OF H UMAN R IGHTS D ISCLOSURE AND D UE
D ILIGENCE L AWS
We divide the legislation mandating disclosure and/or HRDD into two main
categories: (1) general HRDD and disclosure laws and (2) laws that target a specific
human rights issue.50 The key features of the different laws are outlined below,
with particular focus on two distinct elements: the type of disclosure required and
the processes in place (or the lack thereof) to ensure accessibility and accuracy of
the disclosures.

47

48
49
50

UNGPs, supra note 11, at 20–21. On human rights due diligence under the UNGPs; see generally
Björn Fasterling, Human Rights Due Diligence as Risk Management: Social Risk Versus Human Rights Risk,
2 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 225 (2017); see also Buhmann, supra note 12; Kendyl Salcito & Mark Wielga,
What Does Human Rights Due Diligence for Business Relationships Really Look Like on the Ground?, 3 BUS.
& HUM. RTS. J. 113 (2018).
Buhmann, supra note 12, at 39.
See UNGPs, supra note 11, at 8–9.
See generally Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate Strategy, 35 NW. J. INT’L
L. & BUS. 87 (2014); David Hess, The Transparency Trap: Non-Financial Disclosure and the Responsibility
of Business to Respect Human Rights, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 5 (2019).
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A. General Human Rights Due Diligence and Disclosure
In this section, we focus on the E.U. Non-Financial Reporting Directive
(E.U. NFRD) and the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance.51 The
E.U. NFRD applies to all companies of a certain size governed by laws of
individual E.U. Member States.52 These companies are required to report on
human rights and related matters “to the extent necessary for an understanding of
the undertaking’s development, performance and position and of the impact of
its activity.”53 Companies must additionally disclose HRDD processes
implemented by the company in pursuing policies related to non-financial matters,
the corresponding outcome, and the principal risks arising in connection with the
company’s operations, including how the company manages these risks.54 The
provision adopts a “comply or explain” approach, meaning that companies can
elect to comply with it either by making the required disclosures or by providing
an explanation for why they have elected not to do so.55 The E.U. NFRD leaves
it up to each E.U. member state to determine whether to require verification of
reports by an independent assurance service provider and whether to have a
sanctions regime for companies that fail to report adequately. At a minimum, each
member state is to require checks by an auditor for the existence of a report. 56
Some member states have implemented legislation requiring these disclosures to
be made in the management report,57 and some have imposed additional checks.58
Thus, member states vary in the checks they have in place, but it has largely fallen
to the “market” to oversee reporting.

51

52

53
54
55

56

57

58

Directive No. 2014/95 of the European Parliament and of Council of 22 October 2014 amending
Directive No. 2013/34 as Regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information by
Certain Large Undertakings and Groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 57 (EU); Loi 2017-399, supra note 8.
Directive No. 2014/95, supra note 51. These are certain large companies and qualifying partnerships
with more than 500 employees.
Id.
Id.
Virginia E. Harper Ho, Comply or Explain and the Future of Nonfinancial Reporting, 21 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 317, 321 (2017).
According to a study reviewing how member states have transposed the directive into their national
law, twenty member states only require the existence of the reports to be verified and not the
content. The states are Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, and Norway. See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, MEMBER STATE
IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE 2014/95/EU: A COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW OF HOW MEMBER
STATES ARE IMPLEMENTING THE EU DIRECTIVE ON NON-FINANCIAL AND DIVERSITY
INFORMATION 1, 16–31 (2017).
See id. Eight states require consistency checks with the management report: Belgium, Bulgaria,
Denmark, Latvia, Netherlands, Romania, U.K., and Iceland.
For instance, Denmark. This subject is taken up in Section VI below.
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In France, the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance requires
companies meeting the threshold requirements for size59 to create and implement
an annual “vigilance plan” aimed at identifying and preventing human rights
violations in both their domestic and their international operations, including
those associated with their subsidiaries and supply chain.60 The first plans were
published in 2018. The development and the publication of the plan and a report
on its implementation are among the substantive obligations prescribed by the
“duty of vigilance.”61 The plan must set out the steps that the company will take
to detect risks and prevent serious violations with respect to human rights and
fundamental freedoms, health and safety, and the environment.62 This includes
mapping out and analyzing the risks and putting measures in place to mitigate risks
and address negative impacts, including an alert mechanism and a monitoring
scheme to follow up on the plan’s implementation.63 Unlike most of the other
laws discussed in this Article, the French law’s transparency requirement can only
be fulfilled by complying. There is no room for compliance by explaining why no
steps have been taken because taking the prescribed steps is a fundamental
obligation placed on companies covered under the law. Since the development,
implementation, and communication of the plan together constitute the vigilance
duty, the French law brings together the HRDD and transparency elements of the
UNGPs’ second pillar previously discussed in Section II.
Compliance with the law is established through a court process whereby
companies can be legally compelled—at the request of a party with standing,
including an NGO or a trade union—to create and implement an adequate
vigilance plan.64 Prior to the initiation of a court process, companies will be given
a three-month period to comply with the requirements of the law. Periodic
penalties may be imposed by the court if companies are found to be failing their
vigilance obligations. To date, a small number of notices have been served to
companies, at the initiative of civil society organizations (CSOs), on the basis of
59

60

61

62
63
64

The law applies to any company registered in France that has (a) 5,000 or more employees, including
employees of its direct or indirect French-registered subsidiaries; or (b) 10,000 or more employees,
including employees of its direct or indirect French-registered or foreign subsidiaries. See Loi 2017399, supra note 8, art. 1. It is estimated that the law applies to about 150 companies. See Anna
Triponel & John Sherman, Legislating Human Rights Due Diligence: Opportunities and Potential Pitfalls to
the French Duty of Vigilance Law, INT’L BAR ASS’N (2017), https://perma.cc/SX59-5N5K.
See Loi 2017-399, supra note 8, art. 1, ¶ 3 (covering the companies that the company controls directly
or indirectly and, moving down the supply chain, the activities of its subcontractors and suppliers
“with which [it] maintains an established commercial relationship”).
Stéphane Brabant & Elsa Savourey, France’s Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law: A Closer Look at the
Penalties Faced by Companies, in REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE LA COMPLIANCE ET DE L’ÉTHIQUE DES
AFFAIRES 1–7 (Dec. 2017).
Loi 2017-399, supra note 8.
Id. ¶¶ 4–9.
Id. ¶¶ 7–9; Brabant & Savourey, supra note 61, at 4.
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inadequate vigilance plans, and two of these incidents have proceeded to the
courts at the end of the three-month notice period.65 Accountability also takes
place through a process by which victims who have been harmed by a company
covered by the legislation can claim damages for negligence through an ordinary
civil lawsuit, using the company’s noncompliance with the vigilance obligation as
evidence of its wrongdoing.66
Combining HRDD and transparency backed up with sanctions, the French
law is the most promising piece of legislation presently in force to advance
corporate accountability. It moves away from exclusively relying on market-led
oversight and enforcement of the law. It is not without shortcomings, however.
It has been highlighted that the law’s threshold for coverage is very high,67 the
sanctions available are weak in terms of remediating harms,68 and, most
importantly for the purposes of this Article, there is a lack of governmental
monitoring and oversight for compliance by covered companies.69 While the
French law takes a crucial step by attaching sanctions to the vigilance obligations,
in the absence of a state-initiated oversight mechanism it is left to the “market,”
typically CSOs, to monitor companies’ compliance and initiate the complaints
procedures available under the law. The lack of an official list and repository for
vigilance plans render it challenging for CSOs, trade unions, and other
stakeholders to identify shortcomings and take part in the enforcement of the
obligations.70 A preliminary proposal has been put forward to address this by
designating certain individuals within the French administration to look into
which companies are within the scope of the law, how the law is implemented,
and whether some provisions of the law need to be clarified.71 A need for formal
oversight and more robust enforcement constitutes the main focus of the analysis
presented in the later sections of this Article.
65

Decisions on the substance of the complaints are pending at the time of writing. See Stéphane
Brabant & Elsa Savourey, All Eyes on France – France Vigilance Law First Enforcement Cases: Current
Cases and Trends, Cambridge Core Blog (Jan. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/QZ2L-3HZU; Elsa
Savourey, All Eyes on France – France Vigilance Law First Enforcement Cases: The Challenges Ahead,
CAMBRIDGE CORE BLOG (Jan. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/ENZ3-9R9N.

66

Companies would incur civil liability under the French Civil Code Articles 1240 and 1241. See
generally Sandra Cossart et al., The French Law on Duty of Care: A Historic Step Towards Making
Globalization Work for All, 2 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 317 (2017).
FORUM CITOYEN POUR LA RSE, LAW ON DUTY OF VIGILANCE OF PARENT AND OUTSOURCING
COMPANIES YEAR ONE: COMPANIES MUST DO BETTER 1, 8 (Juliette Renaud et al. eds., 2019).
Brabant & Savourey, supra note 61, at 2–4.

67

68
69

See Duty of Vigilance Radar, VIGILANCE-PLAN, https://perma.cc/H9GM-EV8V (highlighting the
civil society initiative attempting to rectify the lack of formal monitoring and oversight).

70

Brabant & Savourey, supra note 61.
ANNE DUTHILLEUL & MATTHIAS DE JOUVENEL, EVALUATION DE LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DE LA LOI
N° 2017-399 DU 27 MARS 2017 RELATIVE AU DEVOIR DE VIGILANCE DES SOCIÉTÉS MÈRES ET DES
ENTREPRISES DONNEUSES D’ORDRE (2020).

71
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B. Targeted Human Right Due Diligence and Disclosure
Targeted HRDD and transparency legislation focuses on specific issues such
as modern slavery, child labor, or conflict minerals. In this Section, we will first
examine laws mandating disclosure on modern slavery. The design of the three
statutes dealing directly with modern slavery is similar, although each legislative
scheme has slight variation. We will then examine a law mandating transparency
on conflict mineral due diligence, and lastly a law mandating due diligence on child
labor. A common theme relevant for the purposes of this Article is that these laws
rely on market-led oversight to ensure compliance with the law, to a greater or a
lesser extent.
The CTSCA, which came into force in January 2012, requires certain large
retail sellers and manufacturers doing business in the state of California to disclose
their efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from their direct supply
chain for tangible goods offered for sale.72 The disclosed information should be
posted on the retail seller or manufacturer’s website. Specifically, a company to
which the legislation applies must disclose to what extent, if any, it: verifies
product supply chains to evaluate and address risks of human trafficking and
slavery; conducts audits of suppliers to evaluate supplier compliance with
company standards for trafficking and slavery in supply chains; requires direct
suppliers to certify that materials incorporated into the product comply with the
laws regarding slavery and human trafficking of the country or countries in which
they are doing business; maintains internal accountability standards and
procedures for employees or contractors failing to meet company standards
regarding slavery and trafficking; and provides relevant training.73 There is no
requirement to update the report on a periodic basis. The California Franchise
Tax Board produces an annual list of companies covered by its provisions based
on information from tax returns.74 There is, however, no official repository where
these reports must be deposited for public access. While the presence of an official
list is crucially important for stakeholders to identify the companies covered by
the law, the lack of a central repository for accessing the reports renders it
challenging for stakeholders to identify companies failing to comply with the law.
A large number of covered businesses fail to disclose information on all the
required areas of activity, and many do not have a disclosure statement.75 The only

72
73
74

75

CTSCA, supra note 6.
Id. § 3(b).
KAMALA HARRIS, THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY CHAINS ACT: A RESOURCE GUIDE 3
(2015). Note, however, that the CTSCA does not require companies to report on an annual basis,
meaning that companies can comply with the law by reporting just once.
See Barna, supra note 6, at 1463 (noting that only sixty-two percent of covered companies disclosed).
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state-based relief under the CTSCA for failure to report is injunctive.76 Following
a compliance review in 2015, the California Department of Justice took steps to
improve compliance with the Act by writing to companies and asking them to
provide either an explanation of why the legislation does not apply to them or a
link to a compliant disclosure.77 To date, the Attorney General of California has
not yet brought an action against a corporation for nondisclosure under the Act.78
From the foregoing, it is not possible to conclude that the CTSCA provides robust
oversight and enforcement of the transparency obligations, leaving the “market”
to exercise checks and hold businesses accountable.
In the U.K., Section 54 of the MSA introduced a modern slavery and human
trafficking transparency requirement for certain “commercial organizations” with
a turnover of at least £36 million that “carry on” business in the U.K.79 The law
adopts a comply-or-explain approach by requiring companies to publish either a
statement of the steps the organization has taken to ensure slavery and human
trafficking is not taking place in any of its supply chains or in any part of its
business, or a statement that the organization has taken no such steps.80 The MSA
does not prescribe specific content for the disclosures, but provides a
nonexhaustive list of items that may be included in the “slavery and human
trafficking statement.” These items include information about a commercial
organization’s81 policies and due diligence processes in relation to slavery and
human trafficking in its business and supply chain; the parts of its business most
at risk of slavery; and human trafficking and steps put in place to assess and
manage that risk, including performance indicators for the success of these steps.82
The statement must be approved by the board of directors of a limited company
or all members of a limited liability partnership.83 The MSA covers steps taken in
“any of [a corporation's] supply chains,” a broader requirement than that in the

76

CTSCA, supra note 6, § 3(d).

77

Sarah Altschuller, The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act: New Guidance and Increased
Enforcement Efforts, FOLEY HOAG (May 10, 2015), https://perma.cc/L3ZM-XFV8.

78

Memorandum from Jena Martin on Policy Options for Addressing and Preventing Forced Labor,
Modern Slavery, and Human Trafficking in Supply Chains (May 2020).

79

MSA, supra note 3, § 54; COMM. OF PUB. ACCT., Reducing Modern Slavery, 2017–19, HC 886, at 10
(U.K.).

80

CORE COAL., supra note 5, at 3 (estimating that Section 54 covers between 12,000 and 17,000
companies).

81

See MSA, supra note 3, § 54(12) (defining a commercial organization as it as a body corporate or
partnership “which carries on a business, or part of a business, in the United Kingdom”).

82

Id. § 54(5).
Id. § 54(6).

83
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CTSCA, which covers the direct supply chain only.84 The MSA also requires yearly
updates, in contrast to the CTSCA’s one-off approach.85 There is no official list,86
however, of companies that are required to report, meaning that stakeholders are
not able to verify if a company is covered by the law or not, although the U.K.
Home Office has written to 10,000 companies to which it believes the law may be
applicable.87 Nor is there an official database where such reports are deposited. 88
If a business falling under section 54 fails to report, the Secretary of State may
bring court proceedings for injunctive relief.89 As of yet, there has been no
instance of this happening in practice. There is no other means of enforcement or
oversight in the Act. Furthermore, there are no mechanisms to ensure the
accuracy of the report contents (though the report contents can be so vague under
this law that there seems little need for assurance). Thus, oversight and
enforcement are left to the “market.”
There have already been four reporting cycles under the MSA. Generally,
however, disclosure has been of a low standard, not always meeting even the
minimum requirements of the Act including approval of the statement by senior
management90 and visibility on the company website.91 Many companies have not
reported at all.92 Acknowledging deficiencies of the MSA, an independent review
of the Act published in 2019 recommended to the U.K. Government to: abandon
the comply-or-explain approach; adopt a comply approach with prescribed
minimum content for the report; create a repository for statements; establish a
monitoring and enforcement mechanism; and strengthen sanctions for failure to
comply.93
84

85
86
87
88
89

Id. § 54(4)(a)(i). Commercial organizations caught within the definition are not, however, required
to report on all the supply chains in their groups overseas, such as those of wholly owned foreign
subsidiaries. See Parosha Chandran, A Loophole in the Slavery Bill Could Allow Companies to Hide Supply
Chain Abuses, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2015), https://perma.cc/R2WL-J8EY.
MSA, supra note 3, § 54(4)(a).
See Section VI.A.1 for a discussion on the importance of a formal list.
COMM. OF PUB. ACCT., supra note 79, at 10.
See About Us, MODERN SLAVERY REGISTRY, https://perma.cc/YA5W-56KU.
MSA, supra note 3, § 54(11).

90

MSA, § 54(6). Depending on the type of entity, senior management could consist of the board of
directors, members, partners, or a general partner.

91

See BUS. AND HUM. RTS. RES. CTR., FTSE 100 AT THE STARTING LINE: AN ANALYSIS OF COMPANY
STATEMENTS UNDER THE UK MODERN SLAVERY ACT (2016); CORE COAL., supra note 5; BUS. &
HUM. RTS. RES. CTR., FIRST YEAR OF FTSE 100 REPORTS UNDER THE MODERN SLAVERY ACT:
TOWARDS ELIMINATION? (2017).

92

CORE COAL., WRITTEN EVIDENCE SUBMITTED FROM CORE ¶ 8 (2018) (noting that sixty percent
of companies that are covered by section 54 have failed to produce a report).

93

SEC’Y OF ST. FOR THE HOME DEP’T, INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE MODERN SLAVERY ACT 2015:
FINAL REPORT, 2019, Cp. 100, ¶ 17 (U.K.); see also COMM. OF PUB. ACCT., supra note 79, at 6
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Like the CTSCA and the MSA, the Australian Modern Slavery Act 2018
(AMSA) requires companies that meet a prescribed size threshold to report on the
risks of modern slavery in their operations and supply chains and actions taken to
assess and address those risks.94 This law abandons the comply-or-explain
approach adopted in the U.K. MSA. It is mandatory for companies to provide the
particular information on policies and processes to detect and address modern
slavery listed in the Act, meaning that companies cannot be selective about what
to report. The AMSA also makes provision for a government-funded central
repository for slavery and human trafficking statements,95 but it does not penalize
companies for noncompliance, though the Minister for Home Affairs can make
an inquiry if a company has not complied. If a company fails to respond, the
minister may publicly disclose information about the company’s failure to
comply.96 The law was passed in November 2018, and the first disclosure under
the Act was made in 2019. In terms of “enforcement,” the AMSA creates a
mechanism through which noncompliant entities can be asked to explain and
remedy their failure to report, or they risk being named on the governmentmaintained register. The relevant minister reports to Parliament annually on
compliance trends, enabling oversight of overall compliance patterns by
Parliamentarians. Otherwise, as with the other modern slavery reporting laws,
oversight and enforcement is left to the “market.”
Outside the arena of modern slavery, in the U.S., the Conflict Minerals Rule,
adopted in 201297—with the first reports filed in 2014—requires companies
reporting to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to conduct due
diligence and to report on the sourcing of certain minerals (tin, tungsten, tantalum,
and gold). These companies must make reasonable and good faith efforts to
determine whether the specified minerals used in the manufacture of their
products originated in the Democratic Republic of Congo or its neighboring
countries. The companies must also disclose their determinations and describe
their country of origin inquiries to the SEC and on their company websites. Where
(recommending that the government should consider publishing a list of companies that have
complied and not complied with the legislation, rather than falling back on civil society to
undertake this work). The government has responded to the report, agreeing to this
recommendation. See HM TREASURY, TREASURY MINUTES: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE
COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS ON THE THIRTY FIRST TO THE THIRTY SEVENTH REPORTS FROM
SESSION 2017–19, 2018, Cm. 9634, 23 (U.K.).
94

See Modern Slavery Act 2018 (Cth) s 5 (Austl.) (requiring companies to report if they carry on
business in Australia with a minimum annual consolidated revenue of AU$100 million).

95

Id. ss 18–20.
Id. s 16A.

96
97

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (amending Securities Exchange Act of
1934, ch. 404, § 13, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)). The Final Rule for the
implementation of § 1502 was approved by the SEC in August 2012. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249b.400.
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this inquiry reveals that the minerals did originate in these countries, the company
must exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of the mineral, in
accordance with a nationally or internationally recognized due diligence
framework.98 Where the due diligence confirms the company’s determination, it
must file a Conflict Minerals Report with the SEC and post the same on its
website. There is no list of companies that must comply with the Conflict Minerals
Rule, but an annual Government Audit Office report to congressional committees
examines how companies responded to the Conflict Minerals Rule in the previous
calendar year and analyzes a generalized random sample of company reports.99 In
terms of enforcement and sanctions, the Conflict Minerals Rule imposes penalties
on companies for not reporting or complying in good faith. Form SD (the form
used for submitting the disclosure) is deemed filed under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and subject to § 18 of the Exchange Act, which attaches liability for
any false or misleading statements. There has, however, been no SEC enforcement
action against companies for failure to comply with the Conflict Mineral Rule, 100
despite the mixed record of engagement and compliance among companies.101 In
the absence of enforcement by the regulator, the oversight and enforcement
functions are left to the “market.”
The E.U. has also passed a disclosure law aimed at supply chain due diligence
for the use of conflict minerals.102 This is company law, not securities law, “laying
down supply chain due diligence obligations for [E.U.] importers of tin, tantalum,
and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk
areas.”103 The Regulation will enter into force in 2021. The geographical scope of
the E.U. Regulation is broader than § 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, targeting
imports not only from conflict zones and areas where a risk of armed
confrontation exists but also from failed states and areas where widespread and
98

See 15 U.S.C. § 78(m); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249b.400. For more detail of what is required, see Olga
Ortega-Martin, Human Rights Due Diligence for Corporations: From Voluntary Standards to Hard Law at
Last?, 32 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 44, 64–65 (2014).

99

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-607, Conflict Minerals (2019).
See Public Statement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Updated Statement on the Effect
of the Court of Appeals Decision on the Conflict Minerals Rule (Apr. 17, 2017),
https://perma.cc/FZ67-VK3B (indicating that the staff of the SEC would not recommend
enforcement action if companies only file a Form SD, and not a Conflict Minerals Report).
Companies are being encouraged to continue to file Conflict Minerals Reports, and many continue
to do so. See id.
See Mining the Disclosures 2019: An Investor Guide to Conflict Minerals and Cobalt Reporting in Year Six,
RESPONSIBLE SOURCING NETWORK (2019), https://perma.cc/SZ5H-4H8Z.
Regulation 2017/821, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017, Laying
Down Supply Chain Due Diligence Obligations for Union Importers of Tin, Tantalum and
Tungsten, Their Ores, and Gold Originating from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, art. 6,
2017 O.J. (L 130) 1 (EU) [hereinafter Regulation 2017/821].
Id.

100

101

102

103
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systematic violations of international law, including human rights abuses, occur.104
Nationally, implementing the Regulation depends on the responsible authorities
designated by E.U. member states.105 These authorities should conduct ex-post
checks on how E.U. importers comply with the Regulation.106 This includes audits
of records as well as on-the-spot inspections.107 The Regulation has been criticized
for its lack of sanctions.108 Member states set the rules that apply to infringements
of the Regulation. When an infringement occurs, the competent authorities issue
a notice of remedial action to be undertaken by the company.109 Whether
compliance will be achieved without penalties for failure to take remedial action
remains to be seen.
The only example of a targeted HRDD law is the Dutch Child Labor Due
Diligence Act, which was approved by the Dutch Senate in 2019, and is yet to go
into effect.110 Like the French law, the Act brings together the HRDD and
transparency elements of the UNGP’s second pillar by pushing companies to
examine their supply chains for child labor, act upon their findings, and report
that they have done so. Specifically, the Act requires all companies that supply
goods or services to Dutch end-users to issue a declaration that HRDD is
conducted to prevent child labor from being used in the production of goods and
services.111 In order to make the requisite declaration, it is implicit that the
company must conduct the necessary HRDD. Should the HRDD give the
company a reasonable suspicion of child labor in the production of the company’s
goods or services, it must adopt and implement a plan of action to address this.
Once the obligation is in place, a new regulator [toezichthouder] will be created
that will publish the corporate human rights due diligence statements in an online

104

No definitive list of “conflict-affected” or “high-risk” countries has been published yet, and E.U.
importers are encouraged to make this assessment themselves based on non-binding guidelines
issued by the European Commission. See Commission Recommendation (EU) No. 2018/1149 of
10 Aug. 2018, 2018 O.J. (L 208) 94.

105

EUR. COMM’N, Conflict Minerals: List of Member State Competent Authorities Designated Under
Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/821 (Jan. 9, 2020).

106

See Regulation 2017/821, supra note 102, art. 10–11.
Sascha Arnold, The EU Conflict Minerals Regulation – New Due Diligence Requirements for Importers,
FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP (June 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/44FH-VTPM.
John Williams, The Battle for Stronger EU Conflict Minerals Legislation, GLOBAL MINING REVIEW (Feb.
4, 2020, 11:25 AM), https://perma.cc/JDB2-KHBL.
See Regulation 2017/821, supra note 102, art. 16.

107

108

109
110

111

The expectation is that the Act will become effective sometime in 2022. The three-year period
between the Act’s approval and it going into effect would give the government time to prepare a
General Administrative Order that appoints the regulator and fleshes out the obligations of
companies under the Act in more detail, see Dutch Child Labor Due Diligence Act Approved by Senate –
Implications for Global Companies, ROPES & GRAY (June 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/NS4E-BZZB.
Id.
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public registry.112 There will not be a formal list of companies that must comply
with the law, however, meaning that third parties cannot check if a company is
covered or not. Affected third parties such as victims cannot sue companies under
the Act, but they can submit complaints that may trigger enforcement by the
regulator.113 Any individual or entity wishing to submit a complaint must first
submit the complaint to the company itself. If the company’s reaction is
“inadequate” according to the complainant, and on the basis of concrete evidence
of non-compliance with the Act, a complaint can be filed with the regulator.114 A
company can be fined up to €8,200 for failing to submit a statement declaring that
it exercises due diligence.115 If a company fails to carry out due diligence in
accordance with the Act or to draw up a plan of action, or to comply with any
further requirements that are established pertaining to due diligence and the plan
of action, a fine of up to €870,000 or 10% of the worldwide annual turnover of
the company can be imposed.116 Thus, in terms of regulatory oversight, the Act
provides the most comprehensive oversight among the laws discussed. However,
the scheme still has gaps: in particular, the Dutch authorities will not actively
enforce the law except in response to a third-party complaint, meaning the law
relies on the watchdog role of civil society to ensure its effectiveness.117 We discuss
the problems with this approach in Section V.
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Wet Zorgplicht Kinderarbeid 24 Oktober 2019 [Child Labor Duty of Care Act], Stb. 2019, 401
(2019) (Neth.); see Anneloes Hoff, Dutch Child Labor Due Diligence Law: A Step Towards Mandatory
Human Rights Due Diligence, OXFORD HUMAN RIGHTS HUB (June 10, 2019),
https://perma.cc/TLY5-34GW.

113

See Anneloes Hoff, Dutch Child Labor Due Diligence Law: A Step Towards Mandatory Human Rights Due
Diligence, OXFORD HUMAN RIGHTS HUB (June 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/TLY5-34GW. Plaintiffs
under general Dutch tort law, nevertheless, would still be able to rely indirectly on the Act if the
violation of the Act by the company could be construed as an indication of an act contrary to a
duty of care to society. Where the compliance officer breaches their obligations, such as by a
violation of the implementation of a due diligence process that causes serious bodily harm, the
compliance officer themselves incur personal criminal liability. This can be punishment of a
maximum of two years’ imprisonment and a €20,500 fine. LISE SMIT ET AL., STUDY ON DUE
DILIGENCE REQUIREMENTS THROUGH THE SUPPLY CHAIN 211 (2020).
Child Labor Duty of Care Act, Stb. 2019, 401.
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116
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ROPES & GRAY, supra note 110.
Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence Laws: The Netherlands Led the Way in Addressing Child Labour and
Contemplates Broader Action, ALLEN & OVERY (Sept. 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/49ME-QLU9.
Chiara Macchi & Claire Bright, Hardening Soft Law: The Implementation of Human Rights Due Diligence
Requirements in Domestic Legislation, in LEGAL SOURCES IN BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: EVOLVING
DYNAMICS IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW 12 (M. Buscemi et al. eds., forthcoming 2020).
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IV. B ENEFITS OF T RANSPARENCY AND HRDD R EQUIREMENTS
TO C ORPORATE A CCOUNTABILITY FOR H UMAN R IGHTS
I MPACTS
Despite their shortcomings, which are discussed in later sections, the current
transparency and HRDD requirements do move the legal framework closer
toward bringing human rights standards to bear on corporate activities. The most
obvious positive impact is that these laws place human rights on the corporate
agenda at the highest levels of management for the covered businesses.118 Placing
an expectation on companies to consider at the board level and, ideally, engage in
the issues that external reporting and HRDD raise119 may influence internal
business decisions which produce adverse human rights impacts.120
Corporations may be prompted to monitor and change their own behavior,
as well as to push for change in supplier practices. The different degrees of
expectations placed on companies by different types of legislation will influence
the extent of the positive changes (if any) that may occur. Whereas a mandatory
HRDD law such as the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance may
achieve a greater commitment from the businesses covered and more substantial
change on the ground for those adversely impacted, a light-touch disclosure law,
such as the U.K. MSA, is less likely to bring a substantial change for the workers
and communities affected. 121
Human rights disclosures may reveal information that stakeholders could
not previously access, if at a minimum the disclosures include a description of
policies and processes. In other words, reporting on human rights impacts can
contribute to legal and non-legal accountability by providing shareholders and
other stakeholders with formal acknowledgement by the company of its human
rights risks, policies, and processes.122 In terms of enhancing legal accountability,
HRDD laws play a crucial role by expressly placing a legal duty on businesses to
prevent, mitigate, and remediate human rights impacts. Various enforcement and
liability measures reinforce these duties. As for disclosures, information disclosed
118

119

Equality and Human Rights Commission, Submission to the Joint Human Rights Committee of
the U.K. Houses of Parliament, reported that in their consultations with businesses on the
transparency in supply chains clause “businesses told [them] that the Modern Slavery Act had
prompted their boards to discuss human rights issues.” WRITTEN EVIDENCE FROM THE EQUALITY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, HRB 0030 ¶ 7.1 (July 2016), https://perma.cc/K72T-VWW7.
CHARLOTTE VILLIERS, CORPORATE REPORTING AND COMPANY LAW 51 (2006).

120

Eccles & Serafeim, supra note 12, at 3. For a discussion of how social disclosure can catalyze
internally driven changes in corporate behavior, see Park, supra note 50. For an analysis of the
shortcomings of the EU NFRD on affecting organizational change, see Buhmann, supra note 12, at
36–39.
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CORE COAL, supra note 5, at 6–7.
See generally Written Evidence Submitted From CORE, supra note 92, ¶ 6.
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in human rights reports can be relied on as evidence in litigation brought against
parent or lead companies by individuals harmed at subsidiary and supplier sites123
or by consumers misled by the company’s disclosures.124 Most recently, corporatesustainability reports have been relied on by the plaintiffs in Lungowe v. Vedanta in
England and Jabir v. KiK in Germany to demonstrate the existence of a prima facie
duty of care assumed by the parent or the lead company toward the communities
or workers harmed by the subsidiary or supplier’s activities.125
On the non-legal accountability side, the approach of a company to its
HRDD and reporting can inform stakeholder decisions in relation to the
company, including investment decisions, purchasing decisions of consumers and
customers, and employment decisions.126 It is expected that the stakeholders
informed by the human rights disclosures will put pressure on businesses to
improve their policies and practices. External agencies, such as international
finance institutions or government agencies, may scrutinize these reports if they
require evidence that companies have identified and managed human rights risks
as a condition of providing support to them. Such support could be the provision
of export credit, the granting of a procurement contract, or the loan of finance.127
CSOs have made use of the information in various ways that help the public and
policymakers see the shortcomings of the legislation but also highlight the
contrasts between a company’s statements on human rights and its actual
performance. The value of these developments should not be overstated,
however. The next Section discusses the inadequacies of the existing legal
frameworks for improving corporate accountability for adverse human rights
impacts.
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For more on this, see Rachel Chambers & Anil Yilmaz-Vastardis, The New EU Rules on Non-financial
Reporting: Potential Impacts on Access to Remedy?, 10 HUM. RTS. & INT’L LEGAL DISCOURSE 18 (2016).
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Id.
See Vedanta Resources v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20 (appeal taken from Eng.); Sheldon Leader et
al., LEGAL OPINION ON ENGLISH COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES ON TORT - JABIR AND OTHERS V KIK
TEXTILIEN UND NON-FOOD GMBH (Dec. 7, 2015).
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Choudhury, supra note 31, at 207; see SHIFT & MAZARS LLP, supra note 44.
See SHIFT & MAZARS LLP, supra note 44. In the U.K., the MSA and other relevant legislation do not
require public procurement processes to consider company reports under the MSA, § 54. It has
been recommended by an independent review that the U.K. Government introduce standards to
exclude non-compliant companies from eligibility for public contracts. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF
THE MODERN SLAVERY ACT 2015, supra note 93, ¶ 2.6.4.
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V. W EAKNESSES AND P ITFALLS OF THIS M O DE OF M ARKET LED A CCOUNTABILITY
A. Overview
Our analysis of the existing disclosure and HRDD laws in Section III
demonstrates that, despite the variation in the obligations imposed, they rely
predominantly or exclusively on the “market” to exercise checks and hold
businesses accountable for human rights impacts.128 This is not unusual as, at least
for corporate disclosures, the main objective is to empower market actors with
information. But when the disclosure rules themselves are not designed
effectively, the empowerment and accountability functions are hindered by
businesses’ lack of disclosure, inadequate disclosures, and misleading disclosures.
While HRDD laws represent a crucial step for improving corporate accountability
by imposing substantive obligations on businesses to identify, prevent, mitigate,
and remediate human rights impacts and to communicate these steps, they still
heavily rely on initiatives from stakeholders for oversight and enforcement.
Communication of the HRDD processes and outcomes to stakeholders via
corporate disclosures is a key tool for those stakeholders to understand and react
to the human rights performance of businesses. To effectively and meaningfully
exercise this role, stakeholders need the support of regulatory tools to ensure
completeness and accuracy of HRDD disclosures.
Studies have shown that disclosure laws have had very limited success in
improving human rights conditions for affected groups and improving
accountability for impacts.129 This is unsurprising if these laws fail to elevate
human rights and environmental impact considerations on the priorities list of the
corporate world driven primarily by increasing profits.130 We argue here that to
improve the accountability function of HRDD and reporting obligations, two
main weaknesses in the current rules need to be overcome. The first one relates
to the content of the reports and the information that should be or is disclosed
under the relevant legislation. According to benchmarking reports analyzing these
disclosures, the content of the disclosures remains largely limited to disclosure of
128

129

130

See, e.g., HOME OFFICE, MODERN SLAVERY AND SUPPLY CHAINS CONSULTATION 1, 8, 13 (2015)
(“We believe that once it is made clear what activity major businesses are undertaking to ensure
slavery and human trafficking is not taking place in their supply chains or own business, pressure
from consumers, shareholders and campaigners and competition between businesses will
encourage those who have not taken effective steps to do so.” The document continues, “[i]nstead
of relying on heavy-handed regulation, this measure will encourage businesses to do the right thing,
by harnessing consumer and other stakeholder pressure, which will encourage and influence
businesses to do more.”).
See Rao & Bernaz, supra note 41; FOCUS ON LABOR EXPLOITATION (FLEX), SEEING THROUGH
TRANSPARENCY: MAKING CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY WORK FOR WORKERS (2018).
Bartley, supra note 15, at 49, n.56.
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information on commitments and policies rather than disclosing concrete risks to
workers and communities and also the substantive steps taken to address them.131
This is particularly problematic when the reporting requirements are not
accompanied by a due diligence obligation. We join scholars who have argued that
the lack of a due diligence obligation preceding the disclosure places serious
limitations on the law’s promise to increase corporate accountability and
contribute to eradicating human rights abuses.132 Most disclosures have been
largely limited to descriptions of the company’s commitments and processes in
addressing human rights and modern slavery issues in their supply chains.133 Little
space, if any, is dedicated to issues of substance, such as the specific risks to
employees and communities identified within the company’s own business and its
supply chain, as well as references to the concrete steps they have taken to
eliminate those risks and remediate the grievances.134 More advanced reports
typically present case studies, the company’s declared approach and commitment
to tackling modern slavery or human rights issues, expectations from its suppliers,
links to a list of first tier suppliers, identification of the most salient risks, and the
plans, policies, programs, and procedures it has established to assess and address
the risks.135 The pattern of focus on procedures and policies resembles the audit
and certification processes that are widely employed by lead firms to regulate
labor, human rights, and environmental performance in their supply chains and
which typically focus on process rather than substance.136 Since audits and
certification processes have so far been the central tool used to deal with human
rights impacts in supply chains, it is unsurprising that most disclosures are limited
to process as well.
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See, e.g., Michelle Langlois, Human Rights Reporting: Are Companies Telling Investors What They Need to
Know?, SHIFT (May 2017), https://perma.cc/DEY5-GC4R.
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Justine Nolan & Gregory Bott, Global Supply Chains and Human Rights: Spotlight on Forced Labor and
Modern Slavery Practices, 24 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 44, 56 (2018); see also Nolan, supra note 5; GENEVIEVE
LEBARON & ELLIE GORE, POLICY BRIEF #1: KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UK
POLICYMAKERS 4–5 (2018).
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An Ergon Associates study found that “most statements do not go further than general
commitments and broad indications of processes.” See ERGON, REPORTING ON MODERN SLAVERY:
THE CURRENT STATE OF DISCLOSURE—MAY 2016 1 (2016); ERGON, MODERN SLAVERY
REPORTING: IS THERE EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS? (2018). LeBaron and Rühmkorf’s study shows
that companies reporting on bribery under the U.K. Bribery Act are using much more firm and
clear language, while modern slavery reporting uses a weaker and aspirational language. LeBaron &
Rühmkorf, supra note 5, at 25; see also Langlois, supra note 131; CORE COAL., supra note 5, at 6.
ALLIANCE FOR CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY, 2018 RESEARCH REPORT 24 (2018).
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See, e.g., MARKS & SPENCER GROUP LLP, MODERN SLAVERY STATEMENT 2017/18 (May 2018).
BARTLEY, supra note 15, at 55. For a discussion of the duty of care of social auditors, see Tara Van
Ho & Carolijn Terwindt, Assessing the Duty of Care for Social Auditors, 27 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 379, 379–
401 (2019).
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The content of human rights disclosures can be strengthened by including a
HRDD obligation. As the HRDD framework proposed by the UNGPs clarifies,
the process should focus on the risks to the rights holders rather than focusing on
the risks to the business itself. The focus of the reports attached to the HRDD
processes should contain rights-holder oriented communication. But as we
discuss in the following sections of this Article, an HRDD obligation alone may
not enhance the usefulness of disclosures in terms of accountability. The analyses
of initial disclosures under the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance
demonstrate that, despite the improvements in disclosures, reporting remains
relatively immature.137 For those companies that have complied with the reporting
requirement, disclosures of policies and processes remains the key message. The
implementation of § 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act also suggests that even with a
due diligence requirement, more is needed to make these laws effective in
achieving their aims.138 Many HRDD disclosures focus on commitments and
processes in the abstract, which fails to provide the kind of meaningful
information that stakeholders may rely on in making investment, purchasing, and
campaigning decisions about a particular company. This type of disclosure can
also easily transform into a publicity tool, painting a misleading picture of a
company’s human rights performance.139 More dangerously, it can mask and
legitimize serious abuses, especially when they report successes based on audits
and certification.140
This takes us to the second weakness in these laws, which is our focus in the
rest of this Article. The lack or inadequacy of mechanisms for formal oversight
and enforcement renders the role of the stakeholders, as guardians of
accountability, extremely challenging and thus undermines the accountability
objectives of these laws. It is hoped that the market forces alone will assume the
oversight function and produce the desired accountability outcomes without
having the support of appropriate regulatory tools in exercising this function. We
137

138

139

140

SHIFT, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING IN FRANCE: A BASELINE FOR ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE
DUTY OF VIGILANCE LAW 44–45 (2018).
Galit A. Sarfaty, Shining a Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 431 (2015). In this
study Sarfaty finds that only about seven percent of companies report strong due diligence measures
in their 2014 reports prepared in order to comply with the regulation.
See ALLIANCE FOR CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY, 2019 RESEARCH REPORT 90 (2019). An analysis of
the sustainability reports of 1,000 companies pursuant to the E.U. NFRD Study found that “general
human rights reporting requirements are not an effective tool to ensure the disclosure of
information that can help to assess a company’s management of individual risks of human rights
impacts, and by extension of whether its business conduct is responsible.” Id.
Genevieve LeBaron & Jane Lister, Benchmarking Global Supply Chains: The Power of the ‘Ethical Audit’
Regime, 41 REV. INT’L STUD. 905, 906–07 (2015); GENEVIEVE LEBARON, THE GLOBAL BUSINESS
OF FORCED LABOR: REPORT OF FINDINGS 3 (2018) (“[C]ertification had little to no impact on labor
standards within the tea industry . . . [and] [s]ome of the worst cases of exploitation documented
within [their] research occurred on ethically certified plantations.”).
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argue here that even if the first weakness is overcome—as it has been in the
French law—without a formal verification, oversight, and enforcement process,
the utility of the disclosures to empower stakeholders to pressure for change will
be undermined. This results from: (1) the reliability of the disclosed information
remaining questionable; (2) stakeholders being left to search for a needle in a
haystack in the absence of formal lists of covered businesses and central public
repositories for reports; and (3) even where the inadequacy and the accuracy of
disclosures are well established, the lack of enforcement measures and sanctions
that can be triggered by stakeholders will weaken their leverage. The flaws of
content and oversight are closely linked, and for mandated disclosure to
contribute meaningfully to corporate accountability for adverse human rights
impacts, both must be addressed by the policy and law makers. In the remaining
sections of this Article, we engage in an in-depth discussion of oversight and
enforcement issues.

B. Market Oversight
Even when companies do fulfill their obligation to report on issues of
human rights and modern slavery, doubts remain as to the effectiveness of these
reports from an accountability point of view. Early empirical research indicates
that the legally mandated human rights and modern slavery disclosures are “quite
limited”141 and “more symbolic than substantive.”142 Some companies even appear
to copy each other’s explanations of their due diligence processes.143 These
practices of failing to comply or selective disclosures have reportedly been
unwelcome by certain businesses that want to see serious monitoring and
enforcement so as to level the playing field.144 The Ethical Trading Initiative, in a
submission to the U.K. Houses of Parliament Public Accounts Committee,
reported that a large majority of companies they have engaged with stated that it
is important for the Government to monitor compliance with section 54 of the

141

142

Rachel N. Birkey et al., Mandated Social Disclosure: An Analysis of the Response to the California Transparency
in Supply Chains Act of 2010, 152 J. BUS. ETHICS 827, 837 (2018).
Id.
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Steve Gibbons, What are Construction and Building Companies Reporting Under the Modern Slavery Act?,
LINKEDIN (Feb. 22 2017), https://perma.cc/33W6-WSY6; see also Hess, supra note 50, at 53
(examining human rights reporting and concluding that reports are “unbalanced, incomprehensive,
and inconsistent” and that reporting under CTSA and MSA “face[s] similar challenges”).

144

FLEX, supra note 129, at 20–22 (“One FLEX interview participant who is in favor of stronger
enforcement of the Act, said that he was concerned that penalties in isolation could result in
transparency reporting being a tick box exercise for many companies. He suggested that a penalty
for non-compliance should only be introduced in combination with expectations or requirements
on the content of statements as many statements otherwise are unlikely to provide meaningful
information.”).
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Modern Slavery Act and that the Act could not be effective without such
monitoring.145
We saw in Section III above that the reporting and HRDD laws analyzed in
this Article take varying approaches to the regulation of oversight and
enforcement. The common rationale behind each law is to empower key
stakeholders, such as investors, consumers, and civil society, with information that
will enable them to bring human rights standards to bear on corporate
misconduct. In this respect, these stakeholders can play a crucial role of oversight
and enforcement by making effective use of the information disclosed through
these reports. In other words, the stakeholders will take notice of businesses that
fail to report, or report inadequately, and will penalize them by not purchasing
products, divesting or not investing, or by running campaigns to raise awareness
about the businesses’ failure.146 These market interventions can, in their most
legalized form, include consumer suits for misleading disclosures or advertising.
The thinking is that these market pressures will result in companies improving
their practices and processes on human rights and modern slavery risks in their
supply chains.
There are a few overly optimistic assumptions here and this approach has
been challenged already from several angles, particularly with respect to the scale
of the desired transformative impact of human rights reports on consumer
behavior.147 Marcia Narine argues that company human rights disclosures,
including on modern slavery, are not always widely disseminated or known and
that stakeholders who do know about them do not use the information they
contain adequately to press for corporate reform.148 She concludes that evidence
of consumer behavior changing as a result of such disclosure is “inconsistent, at
best.”149 Narine’s reasoning would also apply to HRDD related disclosures. Her
viewpoint aligns with a study of human rights disclosure conducted by Adam
Chilton and Galit Sarfaty, which found that consumers perceived non-compliant
or inadequate supply chain disclosures in the same way as they did detailed
disclosures showing a high level of due diligence.150 Their study suggests that
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Cindy Berman, Written Evidence From the Ethical Trading Initiative (2018), https://perma.cc/75GRGQKJ.
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Responding to Modern Slavery – New UK Benchmarking Report, supra note 36.
See Marcia Narine, Disclosing Disclosure’s Defects: Addressing Corporate Irresponsibility for Human Rights
Impacts, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 84 (2015); Chilton & Sarfaty, supra note 14.
See Narine, supra note 147.
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Id. at 137.
Chilton & Sarfaty, supra note 14, at 6.
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“supply chain disclosures are unlikely to be understood and used by consumers
making purchasing decisions.”151
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of the impact HRDD and
disclosure will have on the transformation of corporate behavior if they heavily or
solely rely on a market-based enforcement model. Consumer and investor
perceptions might change the longer these rules are in force, or as the ability of
CSOs to raise public awareness of HRDD and reports increases, thus elevating
their impact.152 But we advance two arguments as to why this will not overcome
the limitations of the impact HRDD and disclosure laws can have on improving
business behavior. First, the passage of time alone will not overcome the
weaknesses relating to the content of the reports discussed in the previous Section.
Second, as we argue in this Article, improving content requirements alone will also
not suffice to achieve the optimal accountability and transformation objectives
envisaged by these disclosure laws. Chilton and Sarfaty identify the limitations of
reliance on consumers as influencers in this area. They note that corporate
disclosures are generally not sufficiently effective, but that they are less likely to
produce meaningful outcomes in this particular area. This is because the
information communicated to the consumer relates to processes used in the
making of the product and not to its characteristics. They argue that consumers
might not be willing to change their purchasing decisions based merely on process
if all other qualities of the product are the same.153 Their reasoning here would
also apply to HRDD disclosures. The other obstacle they observe is the difficulty
in interpreting the contents of the disclosure. For instance, MSA reports merely
present the processes a company is using to try to tackle modern slavery in their
supply chain, but do not report the incidences of modern slavery and how the
company has responded to them. Also, companies will face different risks
depending on variables like sector, business model, or location of sourcing. It is
very unlikely that consumers will be able to interpret the contribution of these
factors to eradicate modern slavery.
Another important reality to note is that even where awareness is high and
there is a sustained reaction against a business because of its performance in this
area, this can only cover businesses and brands that are consumer facing.154 This
leaves many large businesses operating in industries, such as mining, construction,
shipping, or defense, outside one of the main radars of the transparency
151

Id. Chilton and Sarfaty do note that the study had several limitations, like the fact that these
reporting requirements are new.
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Narine, supra note 147, at 40.
Chilton & Sarfaty, supra note 14, at 23; FLEX, supra note 129, at 20–21 (“[O]ne company
representative [interviewed] suggested the idea that consumers are going to challenge companies
for failure to comply with the Act or for publishing statements of poor quality is flawed, saying
‘we’re so far away from this being the reality.’”).
Berman, supra note 145.
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legislation. These businesses may still be on the CSO or investor radar, but it may
be harder for CSOs to garner public interest to a campaign against a nonconsumer facing company, and some investors might place less importance on
reputational risk posed to a business that is non-consumer facing.
In view of these hurdles for consumers, it is more likely that the greatest
pressure on businesses to improve their human rights performance will come
from CSOs and investors rather than from consumers. Interested CSOs and
investors scrutinize human rights and modern slavery disclosures actively.155 CSOs
publish their analyses of these reports, highlighting the levels of compliance as
well as the weak and notable practices.156 They also invite companies to respond
to allegations of human rights abuses in their supply chains, informally or as part
of a process established in law—such as the process available under the French
Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance.157 The information contained, or the
lack of information, in a human rights or modern slavery statement can shine the
spotlight on the policies and performance of the reporting companies. Similarly,
investors can raise concerns and questions with businesses in which they are
investing during annual meetings or directly with management.158 Investors might
also take into consideration the human rights record of a business or its efforts to
eliminate modern slavery in its supply chain when making their investment or
divestment decisions.159 Both groups of stakeholders can also engage with policy
makers to increase efforts to eliminate modern slavery, if they find the legislative
framework inadequate. Recently, the CEO and two senior executives resigned
from Rio Tinto after reported investor pressure prompted by the company’s
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In fact, it has been observed that “due to insufficient regulation, a large burden lies with the
international civil society which, in various ways, monitors the functionality of transnational
corporations.” Jernej Letnar Černič, Moving Towards Protecting Human Rights in Global Business Supply
Chains, 36 B.U. INT’L L.J. 101, 109 (2018); see also, Join the Alliance, INVESTOR ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS: AN INITIATIVE OF ICCR, https://perma.cc/BMD5-6DJR.
See, e.g., CORE ET AL., MODERN SLAVERY REPORTING: WEAK AND NOTABLE PRACTICE (2017);
CORE COAL., supra note 5.
See Brabant & Savourey, supra note 61; Savourey, supra note 65; Cossart et al., supra note 66; CHLOE
STEVENSON ET AL., THE LAW ON DUTY OF VIGILANCE OF PARENTS AND OUTSOURCING
COMPANIES (Juliette Renauld et al. eds., 2019). NGOs make allegations to the company in the first
instance and may elevate their concerns to the court if the company does not respond adequately.
See CORE ET AL., ENGAGING WITH COMPANIES ON MODERN SLAVERY – A BRIEFING FOR
INVESTORS (2017).
For instance, investment fund BlackRock divested from Nevsun Resources Ltd. because of the
allegations that the latter uses forced labor in its Eritrean mining operations, after receiving pressure
from NGOs. See Campaigners Welcome Blackrock’s Divestment from Nevsun Following Campaign Over Alleged
Use of Forced Labor in Eritrea, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE,
https://perma.cc/4PPX-APFQ.
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decision to blow up a 46,000-year-old aboriginal site in Australia.160 It is yet to be
seen how far the company will go to affect structural change in preventing adverse
human rights impacts caused by its business. While public relations scandals, such
as this recent one involving Rio Tinto, can lead to short-term positive changes
within certain parts of a company’s business, it is important to continue keeping
companies accountable beyond large scandals to trigger structural
improvements.161 Regulatory oversight and enforcement of disclosures and
HRDD are among the essential ingredients of such a structural change.
The amount, accuracy, and type of information presented in the reports or,
in many cases, the lack of reporting, place a substantial limit on the contribution
of investors and CSOs to improving corporate accountability in this area.162
Businesses are required to disclose very little to comply with the reporting
requirements, and under some of the laws, this includes the option of disclosing
lack of action in this area. The disclosures, even the most detailed ones available,
mainly focus on process and contain little information on concrete problems. It
is difficult for an investor or a CSO to extract actionable information from these
disclosures on a company’s actual human rights performance. These factors
significantly limit these stakeholders’ ability to use the disclosures to hold
businesses accountable for human rights violations in their supply chains. With
only a very small number of CSOs monitoring the legislation, it is unreasonable
for policy makers to expect civil society actors with limited resources to drive the
push toward business compliance with the transparency laws without any serious
regulatory support.163
One of the only means of private legal action challenging the accuracy of
human rights disclosure is consumer litigation. When activist consumers sue
companies, this has the potential to send a powerful message.164 The cause of
action could be a suit under consumer protection law or some other statutory
prohibition on misrepresentation, unfair competition, or false advertising, thereby
challenging the accuracy or adequacy of the disclosure and arguing that consumers
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See Ben Butler, Lorena Allam & Calla Wahlquist, Rio Tinto CEO and Senior Executives Resign From
Company After Juukan Gorge Debacle, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/X8UDEQRG.
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For an analysis of how corporations can act as crucial actors for advancement and enforcement of
international human rights standards even in the absence of home or host state willingness to do
so and the limitations of this approach, see Jay Butler, The Corporate Keepers of International Law, 114
AM. J. INT’L L. 189–220 (2020).
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See ALLIANCE FOR CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY, supra note 134.
Berman, supra note 145.
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164

Ryan J. Turner, Transnational Supply Chain Regulation: Extraterritorial Regulation as Corporate Law's New
Frontier, 17 MELB. J. INT’L L. 188, 197 (2016).
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were ill informed or misled when purchasing products, causing them harm.165 The
disclosure that is challenged through this litigation has in some instances been
made pursuant to one of the laws discussed in this Article, but many of these cases
concern product information from labels or other product literature.166 On the
whole, the impact of these lawsuits has been quite limited so far. A series of cases
brought against companies in California alleging inadequate and/or misleading
disclosure of documented modern slavery in their supply chains were rejected by
the courts.167 There is a concern that, even if these cases were successful,
companies would make changes to their labels and product literature, rather than
seek to improve conditions for workers in their supply chains.168 Damages are
complicated to calculate in this type of case because it is hard to value the loss to
the plaintiffs, when the harm they have suffered is that they would not have
bought the products if they had known about the use of child and forced labor in
the supply chain. The lack of success in claims to date has not prevented new

165

For a full list of cases, see note 167. There have been similar cases outside the U.S. In Germany, a
successful complaint was filed against German retailer Lidl in 2010 for false advertising and unfair
competition arising from the retailer’s claims of fair working conditions in its supply chain.
Following the complaint, Lidl agreed to retract the claims made in its marketing material on working
conditions in its supply chain. Although this was a successful outcome of the litigation, and it had
an impact on the company’s public statements on these issues, it is not possible to determine
whether it had any substantive impact on the company’s sourcing policies or practices. See Complaint
re Fair Working Conditions in Bangladesh: Lidl Forced to Back Down, ECCHR, https://perma.cc/RX3GVPUZ. This complaint did not relate to disclosure made under modern slavery legislation but rather
to statements on its supply chain that the company made voluntarily.

166

One of the early cases in this line, Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939 (2002), concerned
representations that Nike had made about working conditions in its supply chain. A settlement was
agreed for $1.5 million and involved investments by Nike to strengthen workplace monitoring and
factory worker programs.

167

See Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 15-CV-03783-JSW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5524 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 15, 2016) (dismissing case for lack of standing); Barber v. Nestle, 154 F. Supp. 3d 954 (9th Cir.
2018) (dismissing plaintiffs’ false advertising and unfair competition claims on the grounds that the
CTSCA creates a safe harbor from liability by defining what a company is required to disclose
regarding the use of forced labor in its supply chain, and dismissing plaintiffs’ misrepresentation
claim, finding that the statements about supplier adherence to law and industry standards were
“aspirational”); Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 891 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2018) (dismissing the case and finding
that Mars does not have a duty to disclose forced labor in its supply chain because it is not a physical
defect that affects the central function of the chocolate products); see also Tomasella v. Nestlé USA,
Inc., 962 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2020); Tomasella v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 3d 26 (D. Mass. 2019),
aff’d, 962 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2020); Tomasella v. Hershey Co., No. 18-CV-10360-ADB, 2019 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14488 (D. Mass. Jan. 30, 2019) (dismissing the case because the consumers’ claims
were not actionable under Massachusetts law and they failed to show that the companies deceived
them).
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See Complaint re Fair Working Conditions in Bangladesh: Lidl Forced to Back Down, supra note 165. The
consumer complaint against the retailer Lidl regarding its advertising campaign claiming fair
working conditions in its supply chain led to the company withdrawing the advertisements, rather
than the company being compelled to take steps to ensure fair working conditions.
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cases being brought, however.169 Thus, consumer litigation has the potential to
provide enforcement of reporting accuracy and adequacy but in an ancillary role
compared to other types of enforcement.

VI. T HE I MPORTANCE OF R EGULATORY O VERSIGHT AND THE
I NSTITUTIONAL O PTIONS
We argue in this Article that to achieve their stated accountability goals,
human rights due diligence and disclosure requirements should be accompanied
by rules establishing: (1) a formal list of businesses covered by the requirements
and a publicly accessible repository for storing annual disclosures; (2) an
institutional structure to exercise oversight; and (3) enforcement functions. The
institutional structure should have subject matter expertise, in order to provide
training and guidelines to ensure accuracy and completeness of disclosures.170
Without these features accompanying the disclosure requirements, stakeholders’
ability to make effective use of the information disclosed becomes significantly
diminished. The presence of an oversight body with the powers to check accuracy
and completeness and impose sanctions for misleading and incomplete
disclosures will allow the stakeholders targeted by the transparency rules to
exercise their leverage more systematically and effectively.
Admittedly, it may be a huge task for a regulatory body to scrutinize all
submitted reports, especially as the number of covered companies grows, but the
body could routinely review a random sample each financial year and be prompted
by investors, consumers, and civil society to carry out additional reviews or
investigations. Stakeholders should have standing to initiate complaints regarding
suspected discrepancies and inaccuracies in reports to an expert body, equipped
with legal authority and sufficient resources, that can investigate the accuracy or
adequacy of the information; if needed, compel the business to correct and
complement the disclosure; and impose penalties for failure to comply. In this
approach, stakeholders—equipped with and empowered by the regulatory tools
and the institutional infrastructure to exercise their watchdog role more
effectively—continue to play a key role in holding businesses accountable. This
169

Walker v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-723-L-BGS, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106858 (S.D. Cal.
June 17, 2020); Myers v. Starbucks Corp., 5:20-CV-00335-CBM-SHK (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2020).
Both cases allege affirmative misrepresentation by the defendant companies in relation to
statements made on product labels and literature that cocoa is “sustainably sourced,” “certified,”
and “supports” or “helps” farmers. They rely on allegations of child and forced labor in the cocoa
farms and of environmental destruction, as part of clearing the land for farms, to evidence that
these statements are misrepresentations.

170

We are not alone in concluding that verification and oversight are needed. Doorey, for instance, in
an article on using domestic disclosure to influence foreign labor practices, argues that the
information needs to be verified by the state (and/or a credible outside auditor). See Doorey, supra
note 30.
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way, the role of oversight is not entirely or largely left to the voluntary efforts of
investors and CSOs whose abilities to push for compliance can be limited by
several factors, such as scarce financial and human resources, lack of authority to
compel further disclosures, and inability to impose financial penalties. At the same
time, the oversight role would not be left exclusively to the regulatory authorities.
Stakeholders would continue to play a crucial role in the accountability framework
from a strengthened position both by having access to a centralized list and a
repository and, more importantly, by having standing to bring complaints before
a body with powers to investigate and impose penalties.

A. Key Functions of Meaningful Regulatory Oversight
Among the HRDD and transparency laws discussed in this Article, the
regulatory oversight feature remains either inadequate or non-existent. Even the
French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance—with its advanced
accountability features providing legal standing for civil society before courts to
bring actions to enforce the duty to publish an adequate vigilance plan—lacks a
regulatory body to exercise oversight over the law’s implementation and to hold a
central list and repository, thus leaving the challenging and resource-intensive
monitoring function almost exclusively to stakeholders. Taking stock of the initial
experiences with the transparency laws discussed in the earlier sections of this
Article and most recently with the French Law on the Corporate Duty of
Vigilance, we argue that all of the elements elaborated below are needed to achieve
greater level of accountability via transparency and HRDD laws.

1. List and Repository
CSOs have expressed concern about the lack of information regarding
companies covered by various HRDD and reporting laws currently in force.171 It
is often left to their investigative skills to identify which companies may be
covered by disclosure requirements and confirm whether covered companies have
published disclosures. Having an annually-updated, formal list of companies
covered by human rights disclosure requirements provides the stakeholders and
the regulator with an essential tool for identifying which companies have complied
with the most basic obligation under these laws. A central repository accessible by
the public to store annual disclosures will allow stakeholders more efficient access
both to the most recent reports and all the other years since the introduction of
the relevant laws.
As discussed in Section III, some disclosure laws already provide for a list
and/or a repository, such as the Australian MSA. For the disclosure laws that fail
to provide for the establishment of a formal list and a central repository for
171

See, e.g., Savourey, supra note 65.
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reports, there have been calls for governments to introduce these safeguards (for
example, the U.K. MSA) to improve the effectiveness of these laws.172 In
agreement with these calls, we argue that the establishment of a formal list and a
repository to be an essential ingredient for improving the accountability mission
of HRDD and disclosure laws.

2. Monitoring Function and the Content of Reports
The added value brought by having a regulator with monitoring
responsibility is in ensuring submissions are made in a timely fashion and in
exercising checks on the content of an appropriate size sample each year. These
sample checks can ensure coverage of all required elements and accuracy
disclosures. As we discussed above in Section V, the existing HRDD and
disclosure laws rely primarily on stakeholders to monitor business performance
and compliance with the applicable law’s requirements. Even the most evolved
statutory regime, the French Law on Corporate Duty of Vigilance, does not
establish regulatory oversight and relies on stakeholders to monitor whether
covered businesses have developed and published an adequate vigilance plan. The
enforcement and sanctions mechanisms of the French law (discussed in Section
III) depend solely on the stakeholders identifying the lack of compliance with the
law or the misleading statements within published plans and triggering the relevant
court processes stipulated in the law. We will return to the subject of stakeholders
raising complaints as a trigger for regulator action below, but first we address the
primary source of monitoring currently in place in this legislative field, namely the
monitoring of non-financial disclosure.173 Auditors usually monitor non-financial
disclosure, as the complement to financial disclosure, in the first instance, with
financial regulators holding a further oversight function. The level of monitoring
provided by the financial regulator varies from state to state.
In some countries, limited oversight of human rights disclosures is exercised
by accounting or securities regulators such as the U.K. Financial Reporting
Council (FRC) and the U.S. SEC. For instance, the SEC enforces liability for any
false or misleading statements under Dodd Frank § 1502. The Trump
Administration opposed § 1502 and made a proposal to repeal it.174 Verification
and enforcement were stepped down.175 Whether coincidentally or as a result of
these developments, there is very little verification and enforcement of this law
172
173

174

175

Independent Review of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, supra note 93.
The other potential source of monitoring under existing legal regimes is the US securities regulator,
the SEC. In theory at least, the SEC enforces liability for any false or misleading statements under
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 1502, 111 P.L. 203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
Ed Pilkington, Proposed Trump Executive Order Would Allow US Firms to Sell ‘Conflict Minerals’, THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/CF63-C6YL.
RESPONSIBLE SOURCING NETWORK, supra note 101, at 4, 9.
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that has occurred in practice. The appropriateness of the SEC as a regulator on
corporate social impacts is debated.176 The current civil society effort in the U.S.
to push for a new corporate transparency law on social and environmental impacts
is focused on publicly listed companies—its press statement arguing that “the
SEC is the right agency, given its expertise in corporate disclosures, and broad
mandate to protect investors and the public interest.”177 On the other hand, the
ability of the SEC to be a “humanitarian watchdog” has been questioned, due to
the organization’s lack of specialist knowledge.178
The E.U. NFRD, which has been transposed into the law of E.U. Member
States, provides a sample of instances on the monitoring of human rights
disclosures. Eight states require that disclosure under the NFRD forms part of
the company’s management report.179 The allocation of the human rights report
within the management report allows for a basic level of auditor scrutiny over the
content of the report, as the E.U. Accounting Directive requires that an auditor
check the entire management report to verify its consistency with the financial
statements and its compliance with legal requirements and also to check for the
presence of material misstatements.180
For a verification of a human rights report, there is not much to be gained
by consistency checks with financial statements. Compliance with legal
requirements is also easily verifiable as the legal requirements for human rights
reporting are minimal and relatively vague. Only the checks for material
misstatements could prove useful in the human rights reporting context, but such
checks will require expertise and access to information that may exist either within
the company as well as beyond the company, and often beyond the country. Four
states require verification of information beyond checks for consistency with the
management report.181 In Denmark, for instance, the implementing legislation
envisages a regulatory review of ten to twenty percent of listed companies that are
selected for full scope enforcement each year, checking presence and content of

176

See generally Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as Diplomatic and
Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1325 (2012).

177

International Corporate Accountability Roundtable, Corporate Human Rights Risk Assessment,
Prevention, and Mitigation Act of 2019 2 (June 10, 2019). On the SEC as a regulatory of human
rights issues, see Galit A. Sarfaty, Human Rights Meets Securities Regulation, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 97 (2013).
See Woody supra note 176.

178
179

GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 56, at 16, 17, 19, 24, 26, 27, 30, 31. (Belgium, Bulgaria,
Denmark, Latvia, Netherlands, Romania, U.K., and Iceland).

180

Council Directive 2013/34/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 182) 19, art. 53 (mandating that Member States
implement the new directive by July 20, 2015).

181

GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 56, at 19, 20, 23, 26 (Denmark, France, Italy, and the
Netherlands).
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statements.182 The enforcement approach is based on the materiality of the
disclosed information. Material misstatements may result in the imposition of
fines in accordance with the Danish Financial Statements Act.183
The experience with the human rights transparency laws to date shows that
the unique features of human rights reporting call for a sui generis approach to
oversight and enforcement. As with financial reporting, the rules on the required
information and the oversight and enforcement related to the completeness and
accuracy of the content disclosed may be designed around the concept of
“materiality,” but the meaning of “materiality” in a human rights context is unclear
in the existing reporting regulations.184 Materiality has been viewed as a misleading
concept in the human rights context, and instead the use of “salient risks” has
been proposed by the UNGP Reporting Framework.185 Companies are typically
required to disclose material information in non-financial reports including human
rights disclosures. The E.U. Accounting Directive, for instance, describes material
information as “the status of information where its omission or misstatement
could reasonably be expected to influence decisions that users make on the basis
of the financial statements of the undertaking. The materiality of individual items
shall be assessed in the context of other similar items.”186 For non-financial
statements, the E.U. NFRD adds that the required disclosures shall contain
information “to the extent necessary for an understanding of the . . . impact of
[the company’s] activity.”187 The NFRD recognizes that in determining materiality,
the context in which the business is operating needs to be taken into account.
Recital 8 of the Directive states that the information disclosed should cover
“principal risks of severe impacts,” which will be assessed by the scale and gravity
of impact. One study points out that this standard introduces a different approach
to materiality by focusing on the “scale and gravity of the materialization of the
risk, rather than whether knowledge of a principal risk would influence readers’

182

See generally Forslag Til Lov om Ændring af Årsregnskabsloven og Forskellige Andre Love [Act
Amending the Danish Financial Statements Act], LOV nr 738 af 01/06/2015 (2015); GLOBAL
REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 56, at 19.

183

See generally Bekendtgørelse af Årsregnskabsloven [Danish Financial Statements Act] LBK nr 838 af
08/08/2019 (2019).

184

Note the difference here between due diligence and reporting obligations. The due diligence laws
are not framed in terms of materiality, but for instance, the French Law requires companies to
detect risks and prevent serious violations with respect to human rights (the threshold is “serious”).
See SHIFT & MAZARS LLP, supra note 44.

185
186
187

Council Directive 2013/34/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 182) 19, art. 2(16).
Council Directive 2014/95/EU, 2014 O.J. (L. 330) 1, art. 1(1).
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economic decisions.”188 The approach fleshed out in the Recital 8 does align with
the conception of “salient risk” embedded in the Pillar Two of the UNGPs.189
In a shift away from the usual investor-risk rationale for non-financial
reporting, UNGP Pillar Two focuses on risks to rights-holders, and the
importance of taking into account the perspectives of those who may be directly
affected by companies’ actions. One study notes that this aspect of the
“materiality” concept has not been reflected in the Member State implementing
legislation covered in the study, however.190 A guidance published by the U.K.’s
FRC on the non-financial reporting, for instance, emphasizes materiality for
investors, thus following the classic shareholder-centric understanding of
materiality in the reporting context.191 But such an understanding of materiality
for human rights reports does not align with the understanding of risk under the
UNGPs, which are instead centered around the affected individuals and
communities. We argue here that human rights disclosure laws should impose
mandatory minimum content, covering salient human rights risks posed to
individuals and communities affected by the activity of the business and the steps
taken to prevent, mitigate, and remediate impacts.192
In assessing the completeness of human rights disclosures, auditors and
regulatory bodies will have to determine which human rights issues relating to a
company’s business can be categorized as salient. The size and geographical
spread of a covered company’s business is likely to render checking the
completeness of the disclosure challenging due to external information covering
each overseas or domestic subsidiary or supplier’s human rights impact not being
readily available to the external auditors and the regulatory bodies.193 The
distinction between this type of reporting and reporting on diversity and
governance is apparent here: diversity and governance reports are more amenable
to verification by domestic regulatory bodies because they are driven by
quantitative data, meaning they are more easily fact checked. Local and
international CSOs and inter-governmental bodies, such as the International
Labor Organization, can play a supportive role here. They are aware of businessrelated human rights impacts on the ground, and their documentation of impacts
188

189
190
191

192
193

CLAIRE JEFFREY ET AL., COMPARING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU NON-FINANCIAL
REPORTING DIRECTIVE IN THE UK, GERMANY, FRANCE, AND ITALY 5 (2017).
SHIFT & MAZARS LLP, supra note 44, at 48–51 (explaining salient risk).
JEFFREY ET AL., supra note 188, at 4.
FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, GUIDANCE ON THE STRATEGIC REPORT
https://perma.cc/5E4K-W338.
See SHIFT & MAZARS LLP, supra note 44, at 48–51 (explaining salience in this context).

(2018),

There are also restrictions under international law on extraterritorial verification and enforcement.
As Doorey reminds us, “Canada obviously cannot send inspectors to examine workplaces in
Bangladesh to verify the accuracy of the information provided by MNCs.” Doorey, supra note 30,
at 385.
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can at least help regulators raise red flags for problematic areas that may prompt
a more detailed investigation. The dichotomy in approaches to human rights
reporting identified in this Section highlights the need for a state-based approach
to monitoring and enforcement for human rights disclosures that marries human
rights with business and accounting expertise.
Civil society and investor groups can alert the regulators and other relevant
authorities of suspected false or misleading statements or to omissions of salient
risks from reports. The effectiveness of the existing procedures is variable. As
noted above, the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance allows any
person with legitimate interest to give official notice to the company to comply
with the law. If the company does not comply within three months of the notice,
a judge could oblige the company to publish a plan, under financial penalty if
necessary. The judge would also rule on whether a vigilance plan is complete and
appropriately fulfills the obligations described in the law. But much of the heavy
work of identifying and locating vigilance plans and identifying and investigating
their inadequacies falls to the civil society actors. Under the Dutch Child Labor
Law, any stakeholder with concrete evidence that a company’s goods or services
were produced with child labor will be able to submit a complaint to that
company. If the issue is not resolved, the stakeholder will be able to submit the
complaint to a regulator. Once a complaint is filed, the regulator may issue a legally
binding instruction ordering the company to conduct the required due diligence
and make the appropriate declaration. Again, the process of monitoring is very
much stakeholder led. Even without specific power contained within the
disclosure law, a regulator can invite and welcome complaints from external
parties such as CSOs, as the Attorney General of California has with respect to
CTSCA. As discussed above in Section III, this has not proven an effective means
of oversight and enforcement. Reports from external parties are also used as part
of the operating procedure for regulators reviewing companies’ non-financial
reports, such as the FRC in the U.K., which accepts complaints and reviews
reports on the basis of these.194 The FRC’s procedures are fairly limited in their
effectiveness, however, as the discussion that follows in next Section illustrates.

194

FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE CONDUCT COMMITTEE: OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR
REVIEWING CORPORATE REPORTING (2017). For information about making a complaint to the
FRC or raising a whistleblowing concern, see Whistleblowing, FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL
https://perma.cc/Y2GF-WK9Q. The U.K. implemented the E.U. NFRD in the Companies,
Partnerships and Groups (Accounts and Non-Financial Reporting) Regulations 2016, which added
§ 414CB to the Companies Act 2006. On March 11, 2019, the Business Secretary announced that
the FRC will be abolished and replaced by a new regulator, the Audit, Reporting and Governance
Authority. Audit Regime in the UK to Be Transformed with New Regulator, GOV.UK (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://perma.cc/R8DG-8UBX.
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3. Enforcement Function
The added value brought by having a regulator with enforcement
responsibility is the investigation of instances of alleged noncompliance and the
imposition of sanctions and penalties when noncompliance is found. On the other
hand, sanctions for noncompliance are not the hallmark of transparency
provisions but do feature in the two due diligence laws.195 Although the French
Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance is relatively new, the enforcement
mechanism was triggered for the first time in 2019 and has now been used in five
instances, with two cases so far having reached a court.196 There is yet to be a
substantive judgment on whether a company has breached its duty of vigilance,
however, because the question of which court is competent is still being litigated;
this nonetheless represents a significant departure from the status quo of minimal,
if any, enforcement under the other laws discussed.197
Most transparency laws discussed in this Article lack an effective
enforcement mechanism for noncompliance. Efforts have been made to seek
sanctions for noncompliance with human rights reporting requirements placed on
certain large or listed companies under U.K. law. In one instance, CSO
ClientEarth referred mining company, Rio Tinto, to the relevant regulator, the
FRC, for failing to report the reality of the company’s environmental and social
impacts.198 The regulator found that Rio Tinto had failed to make material
disclosures about serious environmental, employee, social, and community issues
at a mine site in Indonesia.199 Following this finding, Rio Tinto’s directors included
more information, as advised by the FRC, in their report and accounts for the
following year, and the regulator closed its inquiry. No other sanction was

195

Loi 2017-399 du 27 Mars 2017 Relative au Devoir de Vigilance des Sociétés Mères et des
Entreprises Donneuses D’Ordre (1) [LAW No. 2017-399 of March 27, 2017 on the Duty of
Vigilance of Parent Companies and Ordering Companies] Journal Officiel de la République
Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 28, 2017; Child Labor Duty of Care Act, Stb.
2019, 401.

196

The two cases are against oil company Total. See Total Lawsuit (re Failure to Respect French Duty of
Vigilance Law in Operations in Uganda), BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE,
https://perma.cc/2XFJ-L2ZG.
Id.

197
198

199

The complaint concerned, in particular, the group’s non-managed Grasberg mine in Indonesia. The
Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund had divested from Rio Tinto on account of “severe
environmental damage” at Grasberg. The mine had been subject to bombings and other attacks
from local resistance groups, and the mine operators continued to pay for mine security provided
by the Indonesian military, despite the military’s history of human rights violations in Papua New
Guinea. See CLIENTEARTH, REFERRAL TO THE FINANCIAL REPORTING REVIEW PANEL, RE: THE RIO
TINTO GROUP ANNUAL REPORT 2008 (2010); see also Charlotte Villiers, Narrative Reporting and
Shareholder Value, in DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION IN THE WAKE OF THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS 120–126 (Joan Loughrey ed., 2012).
CLIENTEARTH, supra note 198.
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applied.200 There is power under the Companies Act 2006 for the regulator to
apply to court for a declaration that the annual reports of a company do not
comply with the relevant requirements and for an order requiring directors of the
company to prepare revised accounts. However, this power has never been
used.201 This case is illustrative of the role adopted by regulators thus far with
respect to human rights reporting: accepting complaints, reviewing reports, but
using sanctions as very much a last resort. To avoid situations of ineffective
enforcement, we envisage the introduction of sanctions and penalties prescribed
by the transparency or HRDD regulations that have to be imposed by the
regulator in accordance with established law and not on a discretionary basis. A
further added value of having a regulator with the power to impose sanctions and
penalties for noncompliance is the possibility of channeling financial penalties
applied to a fund that can be used as a contribution to reparations to individuals
or communities affected adversely by the acts and omissions of the penalized
corporation.202

B. Institutional Options and Subject Matter Exp ertise
With political will and support, a regulator can be empowered and resourced
to acquire subject matter expertise on human rights and also business and
accounting. A regulator staffed with appropriate experts and supported by
sufficient resources would develop greater expertise over time to establish
indicators on human rights risks on a sectoral and geographical basis. This
knowledge would enable the regulator to evaluate corporate disclosure and due
diligence to determine whether it reflects the salient risks to human rights from
the company’s operations.203 In this respect, the regulatory body is not expected
to penalize companies for human rights violations in their supply chains directly.
Rather, it would focus on the company’s compliance with the HRDD and
disclosure standards. The regulator would not evaluate the substance of a human
rights claim against the company, nor apply international human rights standards
to determine a violation of such standards. For instance, the regulator would have
200

Statement by the Financial Reporting Review Panel in Respect of the Report and Accounts of Rio
Tinto Plc, FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL (Mar. 15, 2011), https://perma.cc/VFE5-DP3Z.

201

Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 456 (U.K.); FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, ANNUAL REVIEW OF
CORPORATE REPORTING 2018/2019 6 (2019).

202

The fund envisaged here is different than the reparation orders made by U.K. courts under the
MSA §§ 8–9. In a similar vein, in June 2018 the relevant U.K. authorities established the “General
Principles to compensate overseas victims (including affected States) in bribery, corruption and
economic crime cases,” a common framework set up “to identify cases where compensation is
appropriate and act swiftly in those cases to return funds to the affected countries, companies or
people.” See New Joint Principles Published to Compensate Victims of Economic Crime Overseas, SERIOUS
FRAUD OFFICE (June 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/BQ4X-Y5JD.
JOINT COMM. ON HUM. RTS., supra note 5.
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the power to inspect whether a lead company has adequately disclosed the human
rights risks that are present in its supplier factories and the HRDD steps it has
taken to prevent, mitigate, and remediate any impacts. The regulator can sanction
the lead company, if it is satisfied that either the disclosed information does not
adequately capture the risks present and the steps taken or that the information is
misleading or inaccurate.
In terms of understanding risk, the U.S. Department of Labor commissions
an annual child labor report known as “Sweat and Toil.”204 These are detailed
reports of instances of child labor around the world and the gravity of each case.
This subject matter expertise, if held by regulators of corporate HRDD and
disclosure, would serve to enhance the ability of stakeholders to verify the content
of company reports and would also provide information for companies to
consider when they assess human rights and modern slavery risks. An additional
function of the regulator could be disseminating this information and developing
guidelines for businesses and other stakeholders.
We see slow movement in this direction. For instance, proposals made so
far to improve the MSA disclosures from an oversight perspective include
provision for a government funded central repository for published statements;205
for the government to publish a list of companies that must report under the
Transparency in Supply Chains clause of the Act;206 and for the establishment of
an independent review of modern slavery statements made by companies.207 The
last of these is the crucial piece, according to our argument for regulatory
oversight. Whether through an enhanced role for the Anti-Slavery Commissioner,
or through the creation of the sui generis body we recommend, independent review
is a necessary step toward the accountability goal of the legislation. As noted
above, there is a proposal currently under consideration in France for additional
state oversight for the Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance. Rather than taking
the form of a regulator, this would entail designated individuals within the relevant
ministry providing guidance to companies on implementation and checking on
compliance.208
Commentary to the UNGPs Principle 3 acknowledges the role which can be
played by national human rights institutions (NHRIs) “in helping states identify

204

The series began as actual published reports in the 1990s and today is in mobile application form.
Sweat and Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.,
https://perma.cc/967Y-TULN.

205

As noted above, a government funded central repository was set up by the Australian Act; it was
also recommended by the U.K. Houses of Parliament Joint Committee on Human Rights in its
2017 report on the MSA. JOINT COMM. ON HUM. RTS., supra note 5.
FLEX, supra note 129, at 20.

206
207
208

JOINT COMM. ON HUM. RTS., supra note 5.
Duthilleul & de Jouvenel, supra note 71.

364

Vol. 21 No. 2

Human Rights Disclosure and Due Diligence Laws

Chambers & Vastardis

whether relevant laws are aligned with their human rights obligations and are being
effectively enforced, and in providing guidance on human rights also to business
enterprises and other non-state actors.”209 To move the business and human rights
agenda forward meaningfully at the domestic level, there are multiple benefits to
be gained from a specialized regulator in this area, as acknowledged in the UNGPs
regarding the role that can be played by NHRIs for guidance and enforcement.
While we do not envisage the role of the regulator proposed here to be carried
out by a NHRI,210 close cooperation between NHRIs and the regulator overseeing
human rights reporting would be beneficial for the latter to establish and develop
human rights expertise.
We recommend the establishment of a sui generis body, or a specialized
department within an existing body, to tackle both corporate and human rights
aspects of the reporting. This independent oversight mechanism should have
responsibility for reviewing reports and providing feedback to a sample of
companies on an annual basis, similar to the process established through the
Danish implementation of the E.U. NFRD. We take the view that there should
be provision for external parties to alert the oversight body, which can then
investigate the accuracy or adequacy of the information, and, if needed, compel
the company to correct and complement the disclosure. The oversight body
should be able to impose meaningful penalties for failure to comply akin to those
in the Dutch Child Labor Due Diligence Law. We stress the need for the oversight
body to have specialist subject matter knowledge that goes beyond that of a
corporate regulator to include the complexities of the human rights and modern
slavery issues which are the subject of the reports. Such specialist knowledge
could, for instance, come from the commission of “Sweat and Toil” type reports
or from close cooperation with NHRIs. The oversight body should analyze trends
in reporting and company practice, and also develop training and guidance in
relation to human rights, modern slavery, cases of forced labor, and human
trafficking, including their drivers and outcomes.211

209
210

211

UNGPs, supra note 11, at 6.
Though this does not mean that NHRIs cannot be tasked with such a role. In the U.K., the Equality
and Human Rights Commission oversees and enforces gender pay gap reporting regulations that
place obligations on the public and private sector. See EQUALITY & HUM. RTS. COMM’N, CLOSING
THE GENDER PAY GAP (2018).
The SEC Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Resource Guide is an example of the kind of guidance that
can be offered to companies by a regulator. CRIM. DIV. OF U.S. DOJ & ENF’T DIV. OF U.S. SEC,
FCPA: A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2020). The lack of
equivalent state-sponsored guidance for the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance is
conspicuous.
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VII. C ONCLUSION
We began this Article by acknowledging that HRDD and transparency can
contribute to improving human rights and labor conditions in global production
networks. But for due diligence and transparency to make a genuine contribution
to improving corporate accountability and to avoid potentially masking and
legitimating abuses, legislation should move away from heavily relying on a
market-based model of accountability. Numerous studies and reports show that
the existing frameworks have been inadequate. One obvious area of improvement
concerns the content of the disclosures.
There have also been calls for more regulatory involvement and a move away
from the market-led model of oversight, such as the establishment of a registry of
MSA reports in the U.K., or the introduction of effective sanctions for
noncompliance with the reporting standards. In this Article, we argued that statebased oversight and enforcement is an essential element for human rights
reporting to be effective. Without this element, even where mandatory HRDD is
introduced, there remain serious limitations on ensuring accuracy and
completeness of reports.
Our contribution to this reform agenda is twofold. First, we argue that there
is a need to support HRDD and transparency frameworks with a state-based
oversight mechanism that can also be supported by stakeholders. Second, we
emphasize that oversight for human rights reporting requires a fundamentally
different approach to institutional expertise and to risks and materiality than
financial or governance reporting. So far, oversight of a limited number of
reporting frameworks were entrusted to bodies specializing in traditional
corporate reporting without staffing these bodies adequately with human rights
expertise. We urged policymakers to move away from this one-size-fits-all model
and adopt a sui generis model of oversight marrying knowledge of corporate
reporting with human rights expertise to verify and enforce human rights and
modern slavery transparency regulations.
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Abstract
A handful of nations spearhead the global anti-corruption regime through the transnational
enforcement of foreign bribery laws. These laws prohibit corporations with a connection to the
enforcing nation from paying or offering bribes to the officials of a foreign nation. Enforcement
agencies construe the extraterritorial application of these laws broadly, establishing their global
prominence. The most notable example is the United States Department of Justice’s enforcement
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA). Enforcement agencies typically resolve
investigations against corporations through deferred prosecution agreements and other consensual
settlement mechanisms known generally as non-trial resolutions. Fines and penalties paid
pursuant to these agreements can extend beyond the billion-dollar mark. In most cases, money
paid in fines and penalties goes to the treasury of the enforcing nation. However, a movement has
emerged that advocates for the sharing of proceeds of non-trial resolutions with the victims of
foreign bribery, namely, citizens and governments in the developing world. This movement is
complemented by a small number of instances in which non-trial resolutions have been used to
provide remediation in this manner. However, these cases do not reveal a coherent approach to
remediation, and enforcement agencies do not have the benefit of any kind of conceptual or
practical framework to guide the provision of remediation. The extant literature also fails to
consider the many political and practical difficulties of coupling transnational foreign bribery
enforcement with a remedial agenda. The purpose of this Article is to address the practicalities of
when and how remediation might be written into the terms of non-trial resolutions. To achieve


LLB (Hons I) (Queensland), LLM (Harvard). I am grateful to Professor Matthew Stephenson, Phil
Mason OBE, Branislav Hock, William Thomas, Jordan English, Ashrutha Rai, Sagnik Das, and the
participants of Harvard Law School’s 2019 Global Anti-Corruption Lab for their thoughts and
feedback on this Article. I am indebted to Zach Heater, Jared Mayer, Neema Hakim, Daniel Sung,
Keila Mayberry, Maria O’Keeffe, and the editorial team of the Chicago Journal of International Law for
their assistance in the preparation of this Article. An earlier version of this Article was presented at
the OECD 2019 Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum, and I am grateful to those attendees who
provided comments and suggestions, including the prosecutors from anti-corruption enforcement
agencies in the U.S. and U.K. who provided insight, counterargument, and criticism. The views and
opinions expressed in this Article are mine alone, as are any errors.
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this goal, this Article assumes two functions. First, it offers a conceptual framework to underpin
remediation by defining elusive notions such as harm, victimhood, and remediation itself. Second,
it presents a list of factors to guide the provision of remediation in foreign bribery cases. The
shared benefit of these conceptual and practical frameworks is that they allow remediation in
foreign bribery settlements to be approached with newfound precision. These frameworks are
ultimately geared toward moving practice forward in this fledging field by improving the consistency
of outcomes and developing a body of precedent and best practices.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
Corruption can have corrosive economic consequences within the
developing world. A veritable mass of literature demonstrates how both the
governments and populaces of developing nations are harmed when foreign
corporate actors bribe government officials.1 The anti-corruption efforts of
Western nations focus on policing and punishing those under their jurisdiction
who commit the criminal offense of foreign bribery by offering or paying either
bribes or things of value to influence the acts or decisions of public officials in
foreign nations.2 This regulatory activity, known as supply-side foreign bribery
enforcement,3 often involves schemes in which corporate actors from developed
nations offer or pay bribes to the public officials of developing nations in order
to procure lucrative public infrastructure contracts.4 Controversially, anticorruption enforcement agencies like the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the United Kingdom Serious Fraud Office (SFO) broadly construe the
extraterritorial application of their national foreign bribery laws, such that
enforcement actions are often initiated against foreign corporations with only
tenuous connections to the enforcing nation.5 This regulatory market is
remarkably robust; enforcement agencies levy substantial fines, while entities
subject to regulation dedicate significant resources to foreign bribery compliance.6
Since 1999, prosecutors around the globe have collected in excess of US$15 billion

1

See Elizabeth Dávid-Barrett, Are Some Bribes More Harmful than Others? Exploring the Ethics behind AntiBribery Laws, 26 J. INTERDISC. ECON. 119 (2014) (providing an overview of this literature); see also
Philip M. Nichols, Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable Policy Goal Under the Global
Conditions of the Late Twentieth Century? Increasing Global Security by Controlling Transnational Bribery, 20
MICH. J. INT’L L. 451, 463–471 (1999) (providing an overview of how transnational bribery corrodes
governments, distorts economies, undermines support for democratic institutions, and degrades
transnational relationships).

2

GILLIAN DELL & ANDREW MCDEVITT, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, EXPORTING CORRUPTION –
PROGRESS REPORT OF 2018: ASSESSING ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION 10 (2018).
OECD, FOREIGN BRIBERY ENFORCEMENT: WHAT HAPPENS TO THE PUBLIC OFFICIALS ON THE
RECEIVING END? 3 (2018) (defining supply-side foreign bribery as “relat[ing] to what bribers do—
it involves offering, promising or giving a bribe to a foreign public official to obtain an improper
advantage in international business. In contrast, the demand side of foreign bribery refers to the
offence committed by public officials who are bribed by foreign persons.”).

3

4

KEVIN E. DAVIS, BETWEEN IMPUNITY AND IMPERIALISM 41–54 (2019) (setting out the hallmarks
of foreign bribery practice, labelling the modern enforcement landscape as “the OECD paradigm”).

5

Id.; see also Section II.A.2.
See generally Mike Koehler, A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Narrative, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 961,
1006 (2013) (discussing the phenomenon of “FCPA Inc.”); Rachel Brewster & Samuel W. Buell,
The Market for Global Anticorruption Enforcement, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193 (2017) (describing the
modern FCPA enforcement landscape as “one of the largest and busiest fields of corporate crime
practice in the world”).

6
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through foreign bribery enforcement.7 Unsurprisingly, enforcement is sometimes
justified with reference to the harmfulness of bribery in the developing world.8
However, the money extracted through foreign bribery enforcement is typically
retained by the treasury of the enforcing nation.9 These proceeds, extracted almost
exclusively through criminal settlement agreements made between prosecutors
and corporations, are rarely used to remedy, or to attempt to remedy, the harm
caused by corruption.10 Several scholars and commentators have proposed that
the money extracted through foreign bribery settlement agreements should go
toward more constructive ends that would assist the victims of corruption11 or the
global anti-corruption efforts generally.12 However, the academic literature to date
has yet to reveal satisfactorily how this proposal might be operationalized on a
practical level. These proposals are nonetheless buttressed by a small handful of
instances in which either the DOJ or the SFO has negotiated settlement
agreements that include terms providing some type of remediation to the victims
of corruption.13 However, neither the DOJ nor the SFO has adopted any sort of
comprehensive criteria to determine whether remediation should be pursued in a
given case, which victims should receive it, or how they should receive it. As such,
seeking remediation through foreign bribery settlement agreements has proven
unprincipled and inconsistent in practice. The purpose of this Article is to provide
a coherent framework to support the use of foreign bribery settlement agreements
to assist the victims of corruption. The term “remedial settlement distribution”
has been coined to describe this practice.
This Article offers three contributions to the extant literature. First, it
explains how remedial settlement distribution has thus far functioned in practice
and situates such distribution within the modern foreign bribery enforcement
landscape. Second, it supplies working definitions for important concepts—such
as harm, victimhood, and remediation—in the context of foreign bribery
settlement agreements that have not been meaningfully addressed elsewhere.
These definitions are broad and flexible to ease both their adoption and use by
7

OECD, RESOLVING FOREIGN BRIBERY CASES WITH NON-TRIAL RESOLUTIONS 14–15 (2019).

8

Both senior personnel from the U.S. and U.K. governments have expressed this view. See, e.g., Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Transcript of Press Conference Announcing Siemens AG and Three
Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations (Dec. 15, 2008),
https://perma.cc/6WSF-9NRK; Elizabeth Baker, All Economic Crime Has Victims, SFO (Sept. 6,
2018), https://perma.cc/A87V-K7BM.
See also JANCINTA ANYANGO ODOUR ET AL., LEFT OUT OF THE BARGAIN: SETTLEMENTS IN
FOREIGN BRIBERY CASES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSET RECOVERY 71 (2014).
Id.

9

10
11
12

13

Andrew B. Spalding, Corruption, Corporations, and the New Human Right, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1365 (2014).
Matthew C. Turk, A Political Economy Approach to Reforming the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 325 (2013).
See Section II.C.1–2.
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enforcement agencies seeking to pursue remediation in a more precise and
principled manner. Third, this Article provides a multifactorial framework for the
provision of remediation in settlement agreements. The factors comprising the
framework have been derived from a study of enforcement actions and analogous
areas of the law spanning multiple jurisdictions. They have also been tailored to
account for the complicated practical nature of foreign bribery enforcement
actions.
This Article proceeds as follows: Section II provides a high-level overview
of the practical backdrop to remedial settlement distribution. It begins with an
explanation of the modern foreign bribery enforcement landscape before
addressing the numerous facets of foreign bribery practice that render remediation
through settlement agreements resolutions inherently difficult. In doing so,
Section II shows that any framework to guide remediation must be flexible
enough to accommodate the importance of enforcement agencies’ prosecutorial
discretion, as well as other vicissitudes of this area of practice. Section II concludes
with an overview of current approaches to remedial settlement distributions in the
U.S., U.K., and Canada. The U.S. and the U.K. are analyzed as they are particularly
active in this space compared to other nations. Canada has also been selected,
even though it is not an active enforcer of the foreign bribery offense, as it is the
only jurisdiction of which the author is aware that has passed legislation
specifically addressing remedial settlement distribution. Section II also establishes
the relatively narrow scope of this Article. This Article does not consider the
victims of securities fraud linked to foreign bribery or civil foreign bribery
enforcement.14 Neither does this Article consider whether or how legislatures
might approach remedial settlement distribution,15 or the provision of legal
remedies to the victims of corruption through a legally enforceable right of
action.16 Instead, it focuses solely on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by
enforcement agencies negotiating settlement agreements in foreign bribery cases.
Section III introduces key terminology and concepts. It provides working
definitions of harm and victimhood that enforcement agencies can easily adopt
14

It should be noted, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the importance of
remediation within the context of the civil enforcement of U.S. foreign bribery laws by the U.S.
Securities & Exchange Commission. See Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (2020).

15

Legislation has been introduced in the U.S. Congress that would apportion a percentage of all
criminal FCPA fines and penalties to anti-corruption initiatives. See Countering Russian and Other
Overseas Kleptocracy Act, H.R. 3843, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Abigail Bellows, Guest Post: Why
the U.S. Congress Should Pass the CROOK Act, GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (July 7, 2020),
https://perma.cc/67VM-ESW3. There is also legislation pending in the U.S. Senate that would
mandate the transfer of certain FCPA civil settlements to pediatric research. See Gabriella Miller
Kids First Research Act 2.0, H.R. 6556, 116th Cong. (2020).
Arguments have been made in favor of reforms to create a private right of action under the FCPA.
See, e.g., Gideon Mark, Private FCPA Enforcement, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 419 (2012). However, these
proposed reforms have never appeared likely to be passed in either legislative house.

16
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and adapt. Section III then proffers a conceptual breakdown of remediation,
demarcating three distinct types: first, compensation, a loss-based remedy
applicable to identifiable victims who have suffered ascertainable loss; second,
reparations, which respond to the widespread and diffuse harms suffered by
populaces en masse; and third, restitution, a gain-based form of remediation that
strips ill-gotten gains from corrupt actors and awards them to victims. This Article
focuses on compensation and reparations because these are the forms of
remediation surfacing most often in practice. Sections IV and V then provide the
guiding frameworks.17 These frameworks assume the form of multifactorial
approaches, like those employed by the DOJ and SFO when determining whether
to prosecute corporations that have breached foreign bribery prohibitions.18 The
factors comprising the framework for compensation include: (i) whether a victim
can be identified; (ii) whether a victim has suffered direct harm; (iii) whether that
harm is ascertainable; (iv) whether there is a risk of repeat corruption; and (v)
whether compensation is appropriate in the circumstances. The factors
comprising the framework for reparations include: (i) whether victims have
suffered indirect harm; (ii) whether there is a nexus between the act of bribery and
the victims’ harm; (iii) whether there is a risk of repeat corruption; and (iv) whether
reparations are appropriate in the circumstances.

II. B ACKGROUND , C HALLENGES , AND C URRENT A PPROACHES
A. Fundamental Aspects of Foreign Bribery Enforcement
1. The FCPA and the Foundations of the Global Foreign Bribery
Regime
The global foreign bribery regime originated from the enactment of the
Foreign Corrupt Practice Act of 1977 (FCPA). The FCPA was passed following
a string of corruption scandals that came to light in the 1970s. Relevantly,
numerous U.S. companies were found to have paid bribes to foreign public
officials so as to rig the procurement process for government-awarded contracts
in developing nations.19 The FCPA accordingly prohibited the offering and
17

It would be redundant to present a framework on both compensation and restitution. The only
substantial difference would be that “the need to ascertain a victim’s loss” would be replaced by
“the need to ascertain a corrupt actor’s gains.”

18

Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Heads of Dep’t
Components and U.S. Attorneys 3–4 (Aug. 28, 2008); SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, DEFERRED
PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS CODE OF PRACTICE, 2013, at 4 (UK).
For a more comprehensive overview of the historical backdrop to the FCPA, see Mike Koehler,
The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929 (2012); Kevin Davis, Why Does the
United States Regulate Foreign Bribery: Moralism, Self-Interest, or Altruism?, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
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payment of bribes to influence the acts or decisions of foreign public officials.20
Foreign public officials who demanded or accepted bribes remained beyond the
statute’s reach. Hence, the FCPA regulated the “supply-side” of foreign bribery.21
The FCPA also required companies to make and keep accurate books and records
and to devise and implement adequate accounting systems.22 The statute was
policed weakly until the early 2000s.23 The U.S. government then began to devote
significant resources to its enforcement. In punishing FCPA breaches, the DOJ
has since levied eighty-two fines ranging from US$10 million to US$100 million,
twenty-five fines ranging from US$100 million to US$1 billion, and four fines
exceeding US$1 billion.24 Businesses accordingly devote substantial resources to
anti-corruption compliance policies and programs to avoid liability under the
FCPA and the similar statutes that other nations have passed in its image.25
The FCPA is buttressed by an international regime, centralized by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) AntiBribery Convention.26 The Convention, which became effective in 1999, requires
parties to criminalize supply-side foreign bribery. Forty-three nations have
acceded to or ratified it. The FCPA served as a blueprint for the OECD
Convention, and it set the contours of foreign bribery enforcement generally.
Therefore, understanding the provisions of the FCPA is key to understanding how
the global foreign bribery practice functions. However, not every foreign bribery
statute follows the FCPA’s structure. The U.K. Bribery Act 2010, for example,

20

21

22

497 (2012). For a recount of the most notable corporate scandals, see H. Lowell Brown, The
Extraterritorial Reach of the U.S. Government’s Campaign against International Bribery, 22 HASTINGS INT’L
L.J. 407, 423–29 (1999). For an account of how the revelations of bribery were perceived at the
time, see Charles R. McManis, Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad: An Antitrust Approach, 86 YALE
L.J. 215 (1976) (noting that corruption scandals had “shaken foreign governments, rocked
American corporate management, and tarnished the image of American private enterprise both at
home and abroad”).
More specifically, the FCPA prohibits the payment or offer of payment either directly, indirectly,
or through a third party, of money or “anything of value” to an official of a foreign government or
political party, with corrupt intent, to obtain or retain business. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–2 (2020).
An ad hoc committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York authored a report that
was particularly influential in the drafting of the FCPA and, in fact, warned against this sort of
“reaching out” by Congress. See ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., REPORT ON
QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS BY CORPORATIONS: THE PROBLEM AND APPROACHES TO A
SOLUTION 5–6 (1977).
15 U.S.C.S. § 78m(a)–(b).

23

Barbara Black, The SEC and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Fighting Global Corruption Is Not Part of the
SEC’s Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1093, 1096–1105 (2012).

24

Key Statistics from 1977 to Present, STANFORD LAW SCH. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRAC. ACT
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://perma.cc/9844-TF8R.

25

See Joe Palazzolo, FCPA Inc.: The Business of Bribery, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2012),
https://perma.cc/89HC-UECR.

26

OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43 (1998).
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casts an even broader net by simply criminalizing all failures by corporations to
prevent bribery.27
Despite widespread ratification of the Convention, foreign bribery
enforcement remains concentrated in a small number of nations. Transparency
International classifies just six countries, other than the U.S., as “active enforcers”
of foreign bribery laws: Germany, Israel, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, and the
U.K.28

2. The Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Bribery Laws
The FCPA has assumed global prominence due to its extraterritorial
application.29 In addition to covering “any person” who acts while in the U.S., the
statute also applies to “issuers” and “domestic concerns” (as well the agents of
issuers and domestic concerns) who make “use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce” in relation to an act of foreign bribery,
regardless of where they are situated.30 “Issuers” are entities with securities
registered in the U.S.31 or that are otherwise required to file reports with the U.S.
Securities & Exchange Commission.32 An entity can meet the definition of
“issuer” even if it is incorporated in a nation other than the U.S.33 “Domestic
concerns” include U.S. citizens, nationals, and residents, as well as businesses
organized in or with their principal place of business in the U.S., regardless of
where they act.34
The DOJ has interpreted these terms broadly. Liability can attach to foreign
nationals and foreign entities for conduct that has only a slight U.S. nexus. For
example, the DOJ has asserted jurisdiction simply because a transaction
connected to a foreign bribery scheme resulted in money momentarily passing
through a U.S. bank account or because a foreign bribery scheme involved
electronic communication (such as an email) that passed through an internet
server located in the U.S.35
27

Bribery Act 2010, (2010) c. 23, § 7 (U.K.).

28

DELL & MCDEVITT, supra note 2.
See, e.g., BRANISLAV HOCK, EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY: A COLLECTIVE
ACTION PERSPECTIVE (2019); DAVIS, supra note 4.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a).

29

30
31

Id. § 78c(a)(8). Furthermore, foreign issuers whose American Depository Receipts are listed on a
U.S. exchange are “issuers” for purposes of the FCPA.

32

Id. § 78o(d).
See Michael S. Diamant, Christopher W. Sullivan & Jason H. Smith, FCPA Enforcement against U.S.
and Non-U.S. Companies, 8 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 353, 359 (2019).
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.

33

34
35

CRIMINAL DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & ENFORCEMENT DIV. OF THE U.S. SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 10 (2012)
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, the extraterritorial application of the FCPA and
foreign bribery statutes in other jurisdictions has invited allegations of
imperialism.36 These allegations are naturally exacerbated by both the fact that
corrupt malefactors often have minimal links to the enforcing nation, as well as
the failure of enforcing nations to distribute the proceeds of foreign bribery
settlements among the victims of foreign bribery. One U.K. civil society
organization has identified a “growing realisation that it is unjustifiable for the
U.K. government to financially benefit from fines levied against U.K. companies
or individuals found guilty of corruption overseas, while not having suffered the
damages of these acts, and with very little allocated to compensating the real
victims.”37 Another U.S. commentator has remarked, “I am not sure where
criminal fines should go when a French company bribes Costa Rican ‘foreign
officials,’ but I am pretty sure that the answer should not be 100% to the U.S.
Treasury.”38

3. The Reliance on Non-Trial Resolutions and Prosecutorial Common
Law
The vast majority of foreign bribery enforcement actions are resolved
through settlement agreements. The most prominent type of agreement wielded
by the U.S. and the U.K. is the deferred prosecution agreement (DPA).
Enforcement agencies like the DOJ and the SFO use DPAs to resolve criminal
investigations against corporate entities without trial provided the corporation
cooperates with the agency. The terms of these agreements impose certain
obligations upon the corporation. If the corporation does not comply, the
enforcement agency may commence prosecution. Hence, the prosecution is
“deferred” for a period of time set by the DPA, rather than obviated altogether as
is the case when an enforcement action is resolved by a non-prosecution

36

37

38

(“[P]lacing a telephone call or sending an e-mail, text message, or fax from, to, or through the
United States involves interstate commerce—as does sending a wire transfer from or to a U.S. bank
or otherwise using the U.S. banking system, or traveling across state borders or internationally to
or from the United States.”). For an example of a DOJ enforcement action in which jurisdiction
was asserted where only minimal contact with the U.S. existed, see Deferred Prosecution
Agreement at Attachment A ¶ 25(c), United States v. Magyar Telekom, Plc., No. 1:11CR00597
(E.D. Va. Dec. 29, 2011) (finding that it was enough to justify jurisdiction that an “email . . . passed
through, was stored on, and transmitted to servers located in the United States”).
DAVIS, supra note 4; Elizabeth Spahn, International Bribery: The Moral Imperialism Critique, 18 MINN. J.
INT’L L. 155 (2009).
RAID & AFREWATCH, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: CONGO’S VICTIMS OF CORRUPTION
13 (2020) [hereinafter RAID].
Is ICE a Victim? And an Open Question!, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 25, 2011), https://perma.cc/N3XCZWXN. Professor Koehler’s comment is useful insofar as it prompts us to consider where the
proceeds of foreign bribery cases ought to go. However, Professor Koehler has emerged as
opposing remedial settlement distribution generally, decrying the practice as providing “feel good
measures.” See Am I a Victim?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 15, 2015), https://perma.cc/32GA-KRGS.
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agreement. The conditions imposed by DPAs typically require the corporation to
agree to a specific set of facts, to pay a financial penalty, and to implement a
program to achieve compliance in the future.39 To describe settlement agreements,
this Article employs the broader term “non-trial resolution.” The term “non-trial
resolution” was coined in a 2019 report by the OECD. A non-trial resolution is
“any agreement between a legal or natural person and an enforcement authority
to resolve foreign bribery cases without a full trial on the merits of the allegations
either before or after indictment with sanctions and/or confiscation, irrespective
of whether it is a conviction or a non-conviction mechanism.”40
Corporate entities and enforcement agencies enter into non-trial resolutions
to resolve allegations of foreign bribery without the reputational and financial risks
of litigation. The U.S. has resolved 96% of its enforcement actions through nontrial resolutions, while the U.K. and Germany have each resolved 79% of their
enforcement actions in this manner.41 Collectively, these three nations account for
80% of all foreign bribery enforcement and nearly 90% of all non-trial resolutions
since the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention came into force.42 As of 2018,
signatories to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention had collectively levied
US$14.9 billion in fines enforcing foreign bribery offences. Of this sum, 95% had
been exacted through non-trial resolutions.43 This reliance on non-trial resolutions
is a crucial, yet controversial, feature of the global foreign bribery regime.44
A criticism often made is that to avoid the risk of trial, companies simply
acquiesce and accept enforcement agencies’ aggressive and broad interpretations
of foreign bribery laws, even if there is a strong liability defense.45 As a
consequence of this, foreign bribery laws are rarely interpreted by courts, and an
informal body of precedent has arisen based on the practices of enforcement
agencies.46 This body of informal precedent, also referred to as “prosecutorial
39

For a brief overview of DPAs in the U.S. and U.K., see OECD, supra note 7, at 52.

40

Id. at 11.
Id. at 13.

41
42
43

Id.
Id. at 14–15.

44

See NICHOLAS LORD & COLIN KING, Negotiating Non-Contention: Civil Recovery and Deferred Prosecution
in Response to Transnational Corporate Bribery, in CORRUPTION IN COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISE: LAW,
THEORY AND PRACTICE 234 (Routledge, 2018) (offering a U.K. perspective and an explanation of
how the increased use of DPAs can be likened to an “accommodation” of foreign bribery); David
M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 74 MD. L. REV. 1295 (2013) (presenting a U.S. perspective).

45

See Mike Koehler, The Facade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907 (2010).
See id. (“Against the backdrop of aggressive enforcement and the resulting multi-million-dollar fines
and penalties is the undeniable fact that, in most instances, there is no judicial scrutiny of the FCPA
enforcement theories. The end result is that the FCPA often means what the enforcement agencies
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common law,” has cyclically entrenched expansive interpretations of foreign
bribery laws, including their extraterritorial reach.47 Another feature of the global
regime relevant to this Article is the fact that almost all of the money raised
through foreign bribery enforcement is retained by the treasury of the enforcing
nation.48 This is so despite the fact that prominent enforcement agencies often
refer to the harm foreign bribery causes vulnerable persons in the developing
world as one of the justifications for enforcement.49 Remedial settlement
distribution, as shown below, is the exception and not the rule.

4. The United Nations Convention Against Corruption
The OECD Convention is complimented by another international
instrument: The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).50
The U.S. and the U.K. are both parties to this instrument. Chapter V of the
UNCAC generally provides that state parties must repatriate embezzled wealth
and property derived from corruption offences.51 However, this instrument has
say it means. Because of the ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ relevant to resolving a government enforcement
action, FCPA defendants are nudged to accept resolution vehicles notwithstanding the enforcement
agencies’ untested and dubious enforcement theories or the existence of valid and legitimate
defenses.”).
47

Bingham’s Michael Levy on the Rise of Prosecutorial Common Law, CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER (Feb. 7,
2011), https://perma.cc/CU5L-HWVF (“Companies don’t want to have to take a conviction. But
companies don’t particularly have a strong incentive to fight on complex legal theories around
jurisdiction and liability. What they care about is—what is going to be the dollar amount of the
fine? Is it going to affect key employees? What is going to be the reputational damage? . . . The
government on the other hand has a broader institutional interest. The government has consistently
used the common law of settlement to push more and more aggressive interpretations of some of
the laws it is interpreting, getting companies to agree to those aggressive interpretations, and then
using the fact that a large company agreed that this was a violation of law to bring a similar case
against other companies. . . . The fact that one company agreed that such and such was the law
doesn’t make such and such the law. Only judges and courts can decide what the law is—not
prosecutors and settling companies.”).

48

31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) is the statute responsible for the deposit of these funds into the U.S. Treasury.
See also ODUOR ET AL., supra note 9, at 71 (“[B]etween 1999 and July 2012, a total of about $4.2
billion was collected in criminal monetary sanctions. About 71 percent of the criminal sanctions
were imposed in the form of fines. Confiscations and forfeitures made up about 26.3 percent of
the total, with 2.4 percent from restitution or reparations and 0.3 percent imposed in legal or
procedural costs.”).

49

U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 8 (“For let there be no doubt that corruption is not a victimless
offense. Corruption is not a gentlemen's agreement where no one gets hurt. People do get hurt.
And the people who are hurt the worst are often residents of the poorest countries on the face of
the earth, especially where it occurs in the context of government infrastructure projects, contracts
in which crucial development decisions are made, in which a country will live by those decisions
for good or for bad for years down the road, and where those decisions are made using precious
and scarce national resources.”).
U.N. Convention against Corruption, adopted Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41 (entered into force
Dec. 14, 2005).
Id. arts. 53, 57.
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not prompted the majority of enforcing nations to use the proceeds of non-trial
resolutions negotiated in foreign bribery cases for remedial purposes. The money
that companies pay as punitive fines is not property derived from corruption
offences, and it is unlikely that the UNCAC has any bearing upon the way in which
enforcement agencies are obligated to deal with the proceeds of DPAs and other
non-trial resolutions.52 Even if the UNCAC could be construed in this manner,53
it is clear that this is not how the most prominent enforcer of the foreign bribery
offense, the U.S., has interpreted it.54 The practices of the DOJ reveal a distinction
drawn between, on one hand, the seized or forfeited proceeds of corruption, and,
on the other, the punitive fines paid out by corporate entities resolving foreign
bribery offences through non-trial resolutions.55 The fact that neither the UNCAC
nor the OECD Convention seemingly control remedial settlement distribution
reinforces the prosecutor-led nature of remedial settlement distribution.

B. Practical Barriers to Remedial Settlement Distribution
Numerous features of foreign bribery enforcement render remediation
difficult. At the outset, it is important to acknowledge the role of prosecutorial
discretion. Enforcement agencies must retain the discretion to deviate from the
framework proposed in this Article when the situation demands it. It would be a
mistake to base a framework on a set of mandatory rules and then contend that
enforcement agencies should adhere to those obligations without exception.
Without legislative backing, such an approach would come to nothing. Remedial
settlement distribution emerged from the practices of enforcement agencies, and
by and large it remains a fruit of prosecutorial discretion. A framework is,
therefore, useful only if enforcement agencies are able and willing to adopt it.
52

See CECILY ROSE, MICHAEL KUBICIEL & OLIVER LANDWEHR, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST CORRUPTION: A COMMENTARY 49 (Oxford University Press, 2019); Matthew Stephenson,
UNCAC Does not Require Sharing of Foreign Bribery Settlement Monies with Host Countries, GLOBAL
ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (Sept. 16, 2014), https://perma.cc/55P6-VCM8 (noting that fines paid
pursuant to a disgorgement rationale could arguably fall within Chapter V).

53

Professor Kevin Davis has argued that the “spirit” of the UNCAC leans toward the sharing of the
proceeds of foreign bribery non-trial resolutions. DAVIS, supra note 4, at 221. Davis does not,
however, substantiate this argument with meaningful analysis. A similar argument is raised in RAID,
supra note 37, at 15.

54

Jennifer Shasky, former supervisor of the DOJ’s Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative, has even
gone so far as to suggest that the DOJ’s asset repatriation efforts are not required under
international law. Shasky is reported to have said that “there is no legal requirement to return the
funds at all.” See Christopher M. Matthews, Fledging Kleptocracy Initiative Faces Challenges, Expectations,
JUST ANTI-CORRUPTION (Sept. 19, 2011), https://perma.cc/F8NT-NZX3.
See LARISSA GREY ET AL., FEW AND FAR: THE HARD FACTS ON STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY (2014)
(providing an overview of the difficulties in seeking the return of stolen wealth in accordance with
the terms of the UNCAC; see also Section II.C.2 (providing a high-level overview of the different
approaches taken by the Fraud Section and the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section of
the DOJ).
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Assuming that legislatures in prominent foreign bribery enforcing jurisdictions
will not adopt a comprehensive approach to remedial settlement distribution in
the foreseeable future, the most productive discussion that can be had is one that
is aimed towards enforcement agencies and that shows deference to the role of
prosecutorial discretion.
This Section pursues two lines of thought. First, it explains why prosecutorial
discretion in foreign bribery enforcement actions cannot always be expected to
accommodate a remedial agenda. Second, it shows that despite the difficulties in
constructing a framework for remedial settlement distribution, there is reason for
taking on this challenge and improving current practices.

1. The Demands and Implications of Prosecutorial Discretion
The futility of arguing for a framework based on mandatory rules that are
not statutorily entrenched stems from three interconnected features of foreign
bribery enforcement and the function of enforcement agencies. The first is that
the negotiation of non-trial resolutions is an inherently and necessarily
discretionary process. The negotiation of non-trial resolutions is subject to
considerations that are innumerable and case dependent.56 These might include
the strength of an enforcement agency’s evidence, the resources available to both
parties, the risk involved in litigating a particular point of law, the skill of the
negotiators representing each side, and so on. Second, the transnational character
of many financial crime offenses invites political influences to come into play.
Many anti-corruption agencies are politically accountable and cannot pursue a
foreign bribery investigation when the executive has forbidden it,57 while some
agencies are beholden to overarching political commands that are capable of
influencing, undermining, and determining their actions.58 The third feature of
foreign bribery practice complicating remediation is the limited competences and
resources of anti-corruption agencies. Enforcement agencies are not adjudicative
bodies equipped to calculate loss and formulate remedies for the harm caused by
foreign bribery schemes. Nor are they able to assume the mandate of foreign aid
agencies and administer complex systems that ameliorate the harms that
corruption can cause to societies at large.59
56

See Michael Bisgrove & Mark Weekes, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: A Practical Consideration, 6 CRIM.
L. REV., 416, 420–22 (2014) (providing a brief discussion of the negotiation of DPAs).

57

See R (on the Application of Corner House Research and Others) v. Director of the Serious Fraud
Office, [2008] UKHL 60 (appeal taken from Eng.) (illustrating an example of the U.K. government
exercising its power to halt a foreign bribery investigation initiated by the SFO on what arguably
were national security grounds); see also Susan Rose-Ackerman & Benjamin Billa, Treaties and National
Security, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 437 (2008).
See, e.g., Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers the Keynote Address at the Department of Justice’s China
Initiative Conference, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/NPV9-R7MA.
See Section IV.
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The corollary of these three factors is that agencies need to maintain a degree
of discretion to respond to factual peculiarities that arise case-by-case and to
operate within the confines of particular political agendas and their own resources
and capabilities. Enforcement agencies may therefore have to deviate from the
framework proposed below for the sake of resolving an investigation. The degree
and nature of possible deviations are not discussed further. This is because it is
impossible to anticipate what might warrant deviation in future cases. What is
important to note is that the framework proposed by this Article is intended to
operate subject to prosecutorial discretion.60

2. Justifications for Improving Extant Practice
The practical challenges of pursuing remedial settlement distribution
outlined above must be considered in light of the fact that enforcement agencies
have already begun to practice remedial settlement distribution, while numerous
governments have committed, at a policy level, to pursuing remediation in foreign
bribery cases. Consequently, the aforementioned challenges do not justify
neglecting to develop a framework to guide remedial settlement distribution.
This Article does not delve deeply into normative arguments for or against
remedial settlement distribution. Debating the merits of the practice is beyond its
scope. However, for the sake of providing broader context to the underlying
policy debates, it is worth at least canvassing some of the primary arguments for
and against remedial settlement distribution.
Those in favor of remedial settlement distribution typically rely on policy
and ethical considerations. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is a growing sentiment
among senior personnel of enforcement agencies,61 civil society organizations,62
and NGOs63 that some portion of the proceeds of foreign bribery non-trial
60

61

There are of course additional difficulties, such as the risk of remediation monies being repurposed
for corrupt ends, diplomatic and security risks associated with providing remediation monies to
certain countries, and difficulty in formulating remedies for the diffuse types of harm caused by
corrupt practices. These risks are considered below, as they are dealt with as considerations that
come into play when determining whether and how to pursue remedial settlement distribution. The
difficulties that have been raised here pertain to the general functions of enforcement agencies.
See, e.g., Richard Vanderford, Victims of Other Companies’ Foreign Bribery Should Come Forward to Seek
Cash, DOJ Says, MLEX GLOBAL ADVISORY (Dec. 3, 2019) (“On December 3, 2019, Daniel Kahn,
the Principal Deputy of the Criminal Fraud Section at DOJ, went a step further and invited
purported victims of FCPA cases to make a claim: ‘If there is a victim of a crime, [DOJ] of course
wants those victims to come forward. That is our primary objective, to ensure that victims are made
whole.’”); Baker, supra note 8 (“The ideal outcome, where-ever it is possible, is for the money
secured through asset recovery to be returned to victims, using that term in the widest sense.”).

62

RAID, supra note 37, at 15; Matthew C. Stephenson, Standing Doctrine and Anticorruption Litigation: A
Survey, in LEGAL REMEDIES FOR GRAND CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY 38 (2019).

63

ODUOR, ET AL., supra note 9. Note also the attempt of a Nigerian NGO to convince the Securities
and Exchange Commission to divest a portion of settlement proceeds to assist the citizens of
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resolutions should be diverted to victims in developing nations. The rationale
supporting this sentiment can be expressed in numerous ways. One view is that it
is ethical to remediate the harm caused by corruption in the developing world
because corruption is pervasive and citizens in developing nations are vulnerable
to its corrosive impact. Another position, which goes a step further, is that it is
unethical for Western nations to extract billions of dollars in fines and penalties
through non-trial resolutions for conduct that has occurred in developing nations,
and that has harmed governments and citizens in developing nations, only to
retain that money as public revenue.64 Another argument is that diverting the
proceeds of foreign bribery enforcement away from enforcement agencies and
their respective governments and toward developing nations in which bribery
occurs would reduce the incentive of enforcing nations to enforce these laws
overzealously in a rent-seeking fashion, and instead incentivize developing nations
to police foreign bribery.65
Buttressing these claims, it is clear that there are no other available methods
for addressing the harm caused by corruption. Foreign bribery non-trial
resolutions have emerged as practical mechanisms that are at least capable of
remediating some of the harm done to victims of corruption in the developing
world in certain circumstances.66 The global asset recovery regime has not
emerged as a completely effective means of repatriating stolen assets to
governments, let alone as a solution to the economic and social havoc to civilians
caused by corrupt practices.67 Further, private rights of action have proved largely
ineffective, for numerous reasons, at providing individual victims with remedies.68
These include a lack of access to courts for individuals in developing nations and
difficulties posed by legal standards that arise as preconditions to the
commencement of litigation, such as standing, venue, and jurisdiction. 69
Difficulties in pursuing remediation through courts are further intensified due to
the necessity of proving causation and of satisfying legislative definitions of

64
65
66

Nigeria. Alexander W. Sierck, African NGO Asks for Distribution of FCPA Recoveries, FCPA BLOG
(Mar. 16, 2012), https://perma.cc/3LT6-YQD9.
Spahn, supra note 36; RAID, supra note 37, at 13.
Turk, supra note 12.
ODUOR ET AL., supra note 9, at 2 (“The reality is that, in the majority of settlements, the countries
whose officials were allegedly bribed have not been involved in the settlements and have not found
any other means to obtain redress.”).

67

See generally GRAY ET AL., supra note 55, at 19; KEVIN STEPHENSON ET AL., BARRIERS TO ASSET
RECOVERY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE KEY BARRIERS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION (2011).

68

See Mark, supra note 16 (arguing in favor of including a private right of action in the FCPA and
pointing out numerous shortcomings in those few rights and remedies available to private
individuals harmed by foreign bribery).
See generally RICHARD E. MESSICK, LEGAL REMEDIES FOR VICTIMS OF BRIBERY UNDER U.S. LAW
(2016); Cheryl W. Gray, Reforming Legal Systems in Developing and Transition Countries, FIN. & DEV. 14
(1997).
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victimhood and standing that were not fashioned for the foreign victims of
corruption.70 Taking all these considerations into account, it is worthwhile to
consider less conventional avenues of redress.
There are, of course, strong ripostes to these views, including that
enforcement agencies are government-funded entities enforcing national laws and
their governments are entitled to retain whatever money is raised through
enforcement.71 Indeed, it was never the purpose of the FCPA to cater to the
victims of foreign bribery. In passing the FCPA, Congress was primarily
concerned with the economic and political effects of foreign bribery on U.S.
interests.72 Proponents of this view might also argue that the nations enforcing
foreign bribery prohibitions should not share the proceeds of their enforcement
efforts with other nations that have left them to act alone in these efforts. 73
Another argument is that enforcement agencies are already assisting developing
nations by fighting corruption on a transnational basis.74 Detractors might also
allege that funneling capital back into corruption-prone states is
counterproductive and provides corrupt governments with more resources to
support illicit activities (this particular issue is dealt with in depth below).
Additional arguments, both for and against distributing the proceeds of
foreign bribery non-trial resolutions, can be made. However, it is beyond the
scope of this Article to consider whether one nation might be obliged, legally or
morally, to share proceeds. What is ultimately important for the purposes of this
Article is that there is a growing sentiment among influential stakeholders that
remediation is an agenda worth pursuing and that enforcement agencies and
governments are beginning to recognize and support this agenda. As such, this
Article simply adopts the view that it is better to instill a degree of principle into
the practice than to leave the practice entirely unprincipled. The merits and
demerits of remedial settlement distribution itself present a distinct, and much
broader, issue that is beyond the scope of this Article.

70

Stephenson, supra note 62.

71

Luke Balleny, Foreign Bribery Fines and Settlements: Who Should Get the Money?, REUTERS (May 9, 2020),
https://perma.cc/E8ZR-VWR7 (“‘I think it’s unlikely that U.S. enforcement authorities would
share U.S. penalties with other countries, as U.S. penalties are intended to serve U.S. enforcement
objectives and arise under various U.S. statutory schemes,’ said Jay Holtmeier, an FCPA expert and
a partner at global law firm WilmerHale.”).
Koehler, supra note 19, at 929.

72
73

74

The Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Jay Clayton, has emerged as a
proponent of these views, noting that the U.S. is essentially alone in its enforcement efforts, while
some other nations attempt to game the system by paying bribes to gain an edge in foreign markets
over U.S. companies that do not pay bribes. Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Remarks to the Economic Club of New York (Sept. 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/K9BQ-MSHE.
Id.
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This Article has a narrow purpose: posing suggestions for the improvement
of enforcement agency techniques regarding remedial settlement distribution.
This Article proceeds upon the premise that, if remedial settlement distribution is
to occur, it should be subject to objective and palpable criteria to allow for the
development of a body of informal precedent and best practices over time. The
development of such a body of precedent will increase consistency of outcomes
in this space by allowing enforcement agencies to refer to past decisions for
guidance. Current practices are marred by uncertainty: there are no tools agencies
can refer to for the purpose of determining whether a particular non-trial
resolution should include remediation. Similarly, there exists no guidance on
identifying victims, ascertaining loss, or managing the risk that monies put toward
remediation might be repurposed for corrupt ends. The adoption of a guiding
framework will go a long way toward curing the inconsistency and lack of
transparency that has burdened remedial settlement distribution in its infancy.
Furthermore, the adoption of a framework to guide remediation in non-trial
resolutions is important for the sake of accountability. If adopted, the framework
set out below would prevent enforcement agencies from ignoring remediation
where it is warranted and from pursuing it where it is not. At the very least, it
would require them to justify their reasons for pursuing or refusing to pursue
remediation. The importance of accountability cannot be understated. Foreign
bribery non-trial resolutions involve substantial sums of money, and that money
should not be subject to disposal in a manner that is unprincipled and without
justification.
In sum, the creation of a clear yet flexible framework will improve
consistency of outcomes and deliver a degree of much needed principle and
accountability into an area of foreign bribery practice that implicates the interests
of those harmed by corruption.

C. Current Approaches to Remedial Settlement Distribution
The remainder of this section outlines the approaches of the U.K., U.S., and
Canada to remedial settlement distribution. The U.K. has been selected because it
has pursued remediation for corruption victims in the developing world through
foreign bribery non-trial resolutions more than any other jurisdiction. The U.S.,
on the other hand, is worth discussion because it is the most active enforcer of
the foreign bribery offense and has pursued a remedial agenda through non-trial
resolutions on several occasions. Meanwhile, Canada is neither an active enforcer
of the foreign bribery offense, nor does it have a history of pursuing remediation
in foreign bribery enforcement. However, Canada is the only jurisdiction the
author has encountered that has a dedicated statutory regime geared toward
remediation in foreign bribery settlements. While other prominent enforcers of
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the foreign bribery offense, such as Germany, have successfully obtained modest
forms of remediation, they are not discussed here due to language limitations.75

1. United Kingdom
U.K. government agencies, primarily the SFO, the Department for
International Development (DFID), and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(FCO), are largely responsible for pioneering remedial settlement distribution in
foreign bribery cases.76 The SFO investigates and prosecutes foreign bribery and
negotiates the terms of non-trial resolutions, while the DFID and occasionally the
FCO formulate and administer reparations programs in developing nations in
accordance with the terms of those agreements. The SFO entered into a string of
non-trial resolutions between 2010 and 2017 in which some form of remediation
was negotiated for the benefit of a government or populace harmed by either
foreign bribery or some other form of corrupt conduct.77 The DFID, the FCO,
the SFO, and various other instrumentalities of the U.K. government assisted in
accomplishing these remediation efforts. The SFO has also pursued remediation
in criminal prosecutions as well as criminal and civil forfeiture cases, which are
instructive insofar as they employ remedial techniques that can be adapted for
non-trial resolutions.78 The SFO practice in this area is particularly illuminating
because DPAs negotiated by the SFO are given legal force only if they are
judicially approved, and every DPA approval judgment published to date has
considered whether remediation ought to be awarded. Remedial settlement
distribution in the U.K. is unique in that it is accompanied by a small amount of
relevant judgments. The U.K DPA regime came into effect in February 2014 and
provides that judges should approve DPAs only if they are likely to be in the
interest of justice and their terms are fair, reasonable, and proportionate.79 That
regime also specifies that a DPA “may impose” a requirement to “compensate
75

76

77

78

79

See OECD, IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION: PHASE 4 REPORT:
GERMANY 34, 89–95 (2018). In bribery cases, German courts may suspend individual defendants’
prison sentences and instead impose various other conditions, including a requirement that the
defendant make specified contributions to charity. Id. at 34. While courts imposed a handful of such
conditions in the last decade, the amounts were relatively small. See id. at 89–95 (noting required
charitable contributions ranging from €22,000 to €175,000).
The cooperation of various U.K. government instrumentalities is reflected in the U.K.
compensation principles. SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO COMPENSATE
OVERSEAS VICTIMS (INCLUDING AFFECTED STATES) IN BRIBERY, CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC
CRIME CASES (2018).
A complete account of DPAs entered into by the SFO can be found on the SFO website. Deferred
Prosecution Agreements, SFO, https://perma.cc/2KT8-PXLK.
Civil recovery orders, which permit forfeiture of the proceeds of crime in the absence of a criminal
conviction, have also been a point of controversy in England and Wales. See Jennifer Hendry &
Colin King, How Far Is Too Far? Theorising Non-conviction-based Asset Forfeiture, 11 INT’L J.L. IN
CONTEXT 398 (2015).
Crime and Courts Act 2013, c. 22, § 45, sch. 17 (UK).
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victims of the alleged offence” or “donate money to a charity or other third
party.”80 Also in 2014, a prosecutorial manual and a sentencing guideline were
published, encouraging the SFO and U.K. courts to consider awarding
remediation wherever possible.81 To date, U.K. government agencies have sought
approximately £33 million in remediation and have obtained a total of
approximately £602 million through non-trial resolutions.82
Five cases exemplify the various ways that the U.K. has dealt with the
question of remediation in corruption cases. The first involved the corrupt
conduct of U.K. weapons manufacturer BAE Systems Plc.83 The SFO and BAE
entered into a settlement agreement in February 2010. The settlement agreement
pertained to accounting malpractice in the sale of a radar system to the Tanzanian
government.84 Clause 5 of the agreement is particularly relevant. It provided for
reparations to be paid by BAE. Specifically, BAE was to “make an ex gratia
payment for the benefit of the people of Tanzania in a manner to be agreed
between the SFO and [BAE]. The amount of the payment shall be £30 million
less any financial orders imposed by the court.”85 DFID played a key role in
orchestrating this scheme, brokering the arrangement and monitoring its
execution.86 Having a presence in Tanzania, DFID was able to play a monitoring
role to ensure that the funds were used for their intended purposes.87 Second, in
2014, U.K. print company Smith & Ouzman, along with four of its directors, was
found guilty at trial of bribery-related offenses involving public officials in Kenya,
Ghana, Mauritania, and Somaliland.88 The case did not involve a non-trial
resolution, as it proceeded to judgment, and Smith & Ouzman and key directors
80
81

82

83

84
85
86

87

88

Id. § 5(3)(b)–(c).
See SENTENCING COUNCIL, FRAUD, BRIBERY AND MONEY LAUNDERING OFFENSES: DEFINITIVE
GUIDELINE 45.
Genevieve Theriault-Lachance, When Will Prosecutors Identify and Compensate Overseas Victims of
Corruption?, THE FCPA BLOG (May 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/CW4N-JQZJ; RAID, supra note
37, at 12.
This case was accompanied by significant controversy that is beyond the scope of this Article. See
UK Wrong to Halt Saudi Arms Probe, BBC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2008), https://perma.cc/636Q-SCD6;
Lords Says SFO Saudi Move Lawful, BBC NEWS (July 30, 2008), https://perma.cc/FTA6-6RNA.
Settlement Agreement Between the Serious Fraud Office and BAE Systems, Feb. 2010.
Id.
BAE Systems Will Pay towards Educating Children in Tanzania after Signing an Agreement Brokered by the
Serious Fraud Office, SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE (Mar. 15, 2012), https://perma.cc/YPT8-TMT2.
See Fuime Nicholas et al., Effective Access to Compensation in Transnational Corruption: A Fortiori Question,
in ISSUES IN COMBATTING TRANSNATIONAL CORRUPTION 41 (2014) (citing HOUSE OF COMMONS,
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, FINANCIAL CRIME AND DEVELOPMENT: ELEVENTH REPORT OF
SESSION 2010-12: VOL. 1: REPORT, TOGETHER WITH FORMAL MINUTES, ORAL AND WRITTEN
EVIDENCE 10 (2011)).
Corporate Sentence and Confiscation Judgment, R v. Smith & Ouzman Ltd (Southwark Crown Ct.
Jan. 8, 2016).
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were convicted. In its sentencing remarks, the court found that neither
compensation nor reparations was appropriate because there was a risk that
money paid in compensation might be repurposed for corrupt ends.89 However,
though remediation was not ordered as part of the sentencing phase, the SFO,
the DFID, and the FCO later identified a method of delivering reparations to
Kenyan citizens: using part of the money extracted through fines and penalties to
purchase eleven ambulances for public hospitals in Kenya.90
Third, in 2015, Standard Bank Plc, a U.K. bank, self-reported that one of its
subsidiaries had paid bribes in connection with a public contract obtained in
Tanzania. The contract in question granted the subsidiaries the right to act as
underwriters for the Tanzanian government for purposes of a sovereign note
placement. After the subsidiaries won the right to act as underwriters, one of them
entered into a sham consulting agreement to provide a kickback to a consulting
company owned by Tanzanian public officials. This agreement stipulated that one
percent of all proceeds raised during the underwriting process would be advanced
to the shell company for nonexistent consulting services. The note placement
ultimately raised US$600 million, so US$6 million was advanced to the shell
consulting company. After the payment was discovered, Standard Bank entered
into a DPA with the SFO. Because the Tanzanian government would have
received the US$6 million paid to the shell consulting company but for the corrupt
scheme, it was ordered that this money would be paid in compensation to the
Tanzanian government (plus interest).91
Fourth, in July 2016, U.K.–based design and manufacturing company
Sarclad Ltd. entered into a DPA with the SFO after Sarclad’s management selfreported suspicious activities that it had identified in its operations in Asia. It
eventually came to light that Sarclad had entered into at least twenty-eight
contracts with foreign governments between 2004 and 2012 that had been
procured through bribery. The bribes had been paid throughout numerous Asian
countries via a complex web of third-party intermediaries. A total of £17.24
million was paid to Sarclad as a result of the twenty-eight contracts. Compensation
was deemed inappropriate. In a decision that has attracted criticism,92 the court
89
90

91
92

Id.
Max Golbart, £2m Smith & Ouzman Fine Funds African Development, PRINTWEEK (Mar. 21, 2017),
https://perma.cc/2QGE-TYEW.
Serious Fraud Office v. Standard Bank [2015] NICC, No. U20150854 (UK).
The facts of Sarclad and the reasons offered for denying remediation in that case were analogous to
another DPA concluded by the SFO with Rolls Royce Plc. The reasoning in Rolls Royce has been
criticized on the basis that it shows a failure to engage meaningfully with the complexities that need
to be addressed if remediation is to become a staple of anti-corruption enforcement. See Matthew
Stephenson, Guest Post: The UK’s Compensation Principles in Overseas Corruption Cases–a New Standard for
Aiding Victims of Corruption?, THE GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (July 5, 2018),
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found that the SFO had not been able to identify victims due to the complexity
of the bribe schemes. Moreover, the use of intermediaries had made it impossible
to identify victims or quantify loss.93 Criticism is warranted inasmuch as this case
shows that the same criminal restitution schemes used to remediate the harm to
victims of nonfinancial crimes are unlikely to be able to address the type of harm
suffered by the victims of corrupt practices. Finally, in March 2018, Canadian
energy company Griffiths Energy used a front company to bribe Chadian
diplomats by offering them significant discounts on its shares. The wife of a
former Chadian public official purchased 800,000 shares at less than CA$0.001
each and sold them for a significant profit. The sale of the shares generated £4.4
million, and the SFO obtained property-freezing and forfeiture orders against
those proceeds. The DFID then orchestrated the investment of these funds in
infrastructure and development projects in Chad.94
Each of these cases reflects the commitment of the SFO to achieving some
form of redress for the victims of corruption. In June 2018, the U.K. government
formally cemented this commitment by adopting a policy of remedial settlement
distribution with the publication of General Principles to Compensate Overseas Victims
(Including Affected States) in Bribery, Corruption and Economic Crime Cases (also known
as Compensation Principles). However, despite its title, this document does not set
out a principled approach to remediation. It reads as a list of overarching
instructions, couched in qualifying terms, that create a sense of low modality. 95
Compensation Principles provides, among other things, that various U.K.
enforcement agencies, including the SFO, “will consider the question of
compensation in all relevant cases.” In cases in which “compensation is
https://perma.cc/LMC9-SUUA (“The picture that emerges is that compensation is not
straightforward, even when the government commits to pursuing whatever legal means to achieve
it. While the Code of Practice for UK Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) states that it is
‘particularly desirable’ for compensation to be paid, and despite the fact that under a DPA it should
be easier for a prosecutor to get a company to agree to pay compensation, only one of the three
UK DPAs concluded so far for foreign bribery has included compensation to affected countries or
victims. In the other two (including one involving Rolls Royce), no compensation was provided,
for two related reasons: First, the cases were ‘too complex’ involving bribes paid across multiple
jurisdictions, and, second, it was not obvious who the victims were. . . . [T]he UK enforcement
bodies need to develop mechanisms that enable compensation determinations to be made even in
complex cases. The current legal landscape, whereby compensation can only be given in ‘simple’
cases, has left the UK in the somewhat bizarre situation whereby the more widely a company bribes,
the more global its wrongdoing, and the more it uses intermediaries to pay the bribes, the less likely
it is to have to pay out compensation to countries or individuals affected by its wrongdoing.
Complexity should not be an insurmountable obstacle to compensation.”) (emphasis added).
93

Preliminary Judgment ¶¶ 52–53, Serious Fraud Office v. Sarclad Ltd. No., U20150856 (Southwark
Crown Ct. July 11, 2015).

94

Saleh v. Dir. of the Serious Fraud Office [2017] EWCA (Civ) 18 (appeal taken from Eng.),
https://perma.cc/RY4R-TS94.

95

See RAID, supra note 37, at 15, for a list of recommendations to the SFO aiming to improve the
operation of the Compensation Principles.

Winter 2021

387

Chicago Journal of International Law

appropriate,” those agencies are to “use whatever legal means are available to
secure it.” The agencies are also to “work collaboratively” with other U.K.
government entities to
identify who should be regarded as potential victims overseas[,] . . . assess the
case for compensation, obtain evidence which may include statements in
support of compensation claims, ensure the process for payment of
compensation is transparent, accountable and fair, [and] identify a suitable
means by which compensation can be paid to avoid the risk of further
corruption.96

Unfortunately, the principles do not provide any guidance regarding which cases
will be “relevant” for the purposes of remediation, when remediation will be
“appropriate,” or the means that might be used to secure remediation. Further,
Compensation Principles does not significantly alter preexisting practices—it directs
the SFO, DFID, and FCO to do what they were already doing. Nevertheless, the
existence of Compensation Principles reflects a palpable commitment by the U.K.
government to remedial settlement distribution. Most importantly, they are proof
of the way in which the agencies’ practices gained traction and eventually led to a
shift in government policy.

2. United States
The FCPA Unit of the DOJ’s Fraud Section does not typically practice
remedial settlement distribution in its enforcement of the FCPA, but there have
been some exceptions. For example, in September 2018, the DOJ entered into a
non-prosecution agreement with Brazilian oil company Petrobas following
numerous breaches of the FCPA. The terms of the agreement required Petrobas
to pay a criminal penalty of approximately US$853 million. Of that sum,
approximately US$682 million would be paid to a Brazilian agency, Ministerio
Publico Federal.97 In a press release, Petrobas revealed that the money paid to this
agency would be “deposited by Petrobras into a special fund in Brazil to be used
in strict accordance with the terms and conditions of the consent agreement,
including for various social and educational programs to promote transparency,
citizenship and compliance in the public sector.”98 In contrast with the U.K.’s
96

97

98

SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, supra note 76; see also HM GOV’T, United Kingdom Anti-Corruption
Strategy 2017–2022: Year 1 Update 26 (2018).
See Letter from Sandra Moser, Acting Chief, Fraud Section, Crim. Div., Dep’t of Just., to F. Joseph
Warin, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Sept. 26, 2018).
Petrobras Reaches Coordinated Resolutions with Authorities in the United States and Agreement to Remit Bulk of
Associated Payments to Brazil, PETROBAS (Sept. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/N3H4-2C84. It must be
noted that this scheme was not executed as smoothly as had been planned. The highest appellate
court in Brazil at first found this attempt at remediation to be unconstitutional. Since then, the
money has been diverted away from general infrastructure projects and toward fighting the
COVID-19 pandemic. See Kevin Abikoff & Aline Osorio, Corruption Settlements, Coronavirus and the
Road Paved with Good Intentions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/33NL-SMY2.
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efforts in this area, the DOJ does not have the same institutional commitment to
remediation. Rather than orchestrate the method of payment itself, the DOJ
simply redirected enforcement proceeds to the anti-corruption agency of the state
in which bribes had been paid. This is unsurprising. Unlike the SFO, the DOJ has
no enshrined responsibility to consider the question of remediation in foreign
bribery cases. Nevertheless, the DOJ’s practice in the Petrobas enforcement
action reveals that the world’s most active and influential anti-corruption
enforcement agency is willing to pursue remediation in certain instances.
The DOJ’s relative inactivity in this field should also be understood in light
of the existence of a separate statutory regime that provides for the payment of
remediation through the judicial system. Those who allege they have sustained
losses due to a foreign bribery conspiracy have the option of seeking to recoup
their losses under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA). 99
Certain requirements under this statute (especially victimhood status) make
recovery difficult, such that only a small handful of foreign governments have
successfully claimed remediation.100 Indeed, the MVRA has been criticized as
imposing too high a bar for recovery by only a narrow class of claimants for it to
meaningfully contribute to efforts to remediate the harm to victims of
corruption.101 Moreover, the statute does not provide for those who seek to rectify
societal harm or harm suffered by citizens in developing nations.
It is important not to discredit the U.S.’s commitment to remediating harm
to victims of corruption. Under the novel Kleptocracy Asset Recovery
Initiative,102 the DOJ’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section works in
partnership with other U.S. enforcement agencies to forfeit the proceeds of
99

100

101

102

See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A). Although the remedy provided under this statute is termed
“restitution,” it calculates remediation using a loss-based formula, thereby likening it to the concept
of compensation discussed below. Note that this provision does not authorize restitution for a
substantive breach of the FCPA, but it can provide restitution for losses incurred over the course
of a conspiracy to violate the FCPA. Section 3663(a)(1)(A) provides restitution for breaches of
offenses contained under Title 18 of the U.S. Code, but the FCPA is an offense under Title 15.
However, the general conspiracy offense, 18 U.S.C. § 371, encompasses “any offense against the
United States,” including conspiracies to violate the FCPA, and thus opens the possibility of
obtaining restitution under the MVRA. Some corporate entities have tried unsuccessfully to attain
victim status under the MVRA and other related statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Alcatel-Lucent
France, SA, 688 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2012).
United States v. Diaz, No. 20346-CR-JEM (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2012); United States v. Green, No.
CR 08-00059(B)-GW (C.D. Cal. Sep. 10, 2010).
Stephenson, supra note 52; Spalding, supra note 11, at 1412; see also Shane Frick, “Ice” Capades:
Restitution Orders and the FCPA, 12 RICH. J. GLOB. L. & BUS. 433, 437 (2013) (noting that the statutory
regimes for victim compensation in the U.S. “fail to address FCPA victims’ needs in almost every
conceivable scenario”).
For an informative discussion of the initiative, including an assessment of its success, see Pablo J.
Davis, “To Return the Funds at All”: Global Anti-Corruption, Forfeiture, and Legal Frameworks for Asset
Return, 47 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 291 (2016).
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corruption offenses and, where appropriate, return those proceeds to benefit the
people harmed.103 Put another way, the DOJ repatriates assets after it has
successfully sought the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime through the U.S.
judicial system, even though it does not typically redistribute the proceeds of
FCPA settlements. The Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative was founded in
2010, and, as of 2016, had returned approximately US$63 million in bribery
proceeds and embezzled funds to the victims of corruption. 104 Asset recovery,
which focuses on the receipt or demand-side of foreign bribery rather than the
supply-side, often involves the use of non-trial resolutions and the payment of
reparations. The efforts of the DOJ in this field are therefore instructive with
regard to how FCPA settlements might be drafted for the purpose of remedial
settlement distribution in foreign bribery cases. Indeed, several cases concluded
as part of the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative are discussed in depth below.
Of course, the amount of money repatriated under the Kleptocracy Asset
Recovery Initiative pales in comparison to the fines and penalties that the DOJ
has levied in FCPA cases.105 But despite its relative inactivity in seeking
remediation through its enforcement of the FCPA, the U.S. remains a global
leader in the field of asset repatriation and remediation in corruption cases
generally.

3. Canada
Canada does not enforce foreign bribery prohibitions to the same extent as
either the U.S. or the U.K.106 However, unlike those two countries, Canada’s
federal legislature has adopted a statutory framework for non-trial resolutions that
explicitly contemplates remediation in certain cases involving economic crime,
including foreign bribery.107 In late 2018, Canada amended its federal Criminal
Code to introduce “remediation agreements.”108 Remediation agreements, like
other non-trial resolutions, allow corporations to report certain economic crimes

103
104

105
106

107
108

Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Rewards Act, HR 389, 116th Cong. (2019).
Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General, Remarks at the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development Anti-Bribery Ministerial Meeting, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 16, 2016),
https://perma.cc/3XU6-977C.
See generally ODUOR ET AL., supra note 9.
Whereas the U.S. had concluded 207 non-trial resolutions to impose sanctions on legal persons in
connection with a foreign bribery scheme and the U.K. had concluded 11, Canada had concluded
just 3 such resolutions. OECD, supra note 7, at 107 n.202.
For an overview of the procedure that preceded this development, see id. at 36–37.
The Criminal Code defines “remediation agreement” as “an agreement, between an organization
accused of having committed an offence and a prosecutor, to stay any proceedings related to that
offence if the organization complies with the terms of the agreement.” R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, § 715.3.
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and to enter into agreements to resolve cases without risking conviction.109
Canadian remediation agreements are similar to the U.K. DPA model in that they
require judicial approval before going into effect.110 Moreover, a remediation
agreement submitted for judicial approval must state what remediation the
corporation is required to make to victims, or alternatively, must contain a
statement by the prosecutor showing why remediation is not appropriate. 111 The
controlling legislation (the Criminal Code) provides that remediation agreements
are intended to denounce corporate wrongdoing, hold organizations accountable,
“contribute to respect for the law,” “encourage voluntary disclosure of [ ]
wrongdoing,” “provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the
community,” and “reduce the negative consequences of the wrongdoing” for
persons associated with a corporate offender who did no wrong, such as
employees, customers, and pensioners.112
Canada’s new remediation agreements will not necessarily pave the way for
a more principled approach to this practice. The legislation provides a list of
factors for prosecutors to take into account in deciding whether to enter into a
remediation agreement,113 but it does not give any guidance on how the recipients
of remediation should be determined, or how remediation should be distributed.
The conceptual framework proposed by the legislation is also unclear. In remedial
settlement distribution, a clear conceptual approach to notions of harm is essential
to achieve any degree of cogency. It is also noteworthy that the term “victim” has
not received any useful explanation in the legislation. “Victim” simply means
those who have “suffered physical or emotional harm, property damage or
economic loss,” including persons outside of Canada.114 One reading of the new
Canadian legislation is that it is deficient in laying the basis for any kind of
principled approach to remedial settlement distribution. Another view, however,
is that the Canadian federal legislature recognized that concepts of harm and
victimhood in the remedial settlement distribution context are particularly
amorphous and that it is best to leave it to enforcement agencies to construe these
notions on a case-by-case basis until the practice evolves. To date, no remediation
109

It should be noted that remediation agreements came into effect after entities within SNC-Lavalin
Group Inc. came under scrutiny for engaging in sophisticated foreign corruption schemes. SNCLavalin thereafter engaged in lobbying efforts to secure the introduction of a DPA regime. See
MARIO DION, OFF. OF THE CONFLICT OF INT. & ETHICS COMM’R, TRUDEAU II REPORT 21 (2019).

110

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, § 715.37(6). There are numerous features unique to the
Canadian regime, however. DPAs also require consent of the Attorney General and the prosecutor
must be satisfied that there is a reasonable prospect of conviction with respect to the offence. Id.
§ 715.32.
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Id. § 715.34(1)(g).
Id. § 715.31(a)–(f).

112
113
114

Id. § 715.32.
Id. § 715.3(1).
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agreements have been entered into, and so it is unclear how these non-trial
resolutions will be wielded in practice. Nonetheless, it is apparent that Canada has
emerged as a country that recognizes the importance of remedial settlement
distribution, and it is possible that Canada’s efforts on this front will continue to
develop.

III. T ERMINOLOGY AND C ONCEPTS
Because remedial settlement distribution developed from the practices of
enforcement agencies, it has never been supported by a comprehensively
articulated policy rationale or any kind of theoretical substructure. This is one of
the reasons that a review of cases involving remedial settlement distribution
reveals a disjointed and incoherent approach to remediation. Accordingly, this
Article considers several basic yet foundational concepts that can be used to
support future research and practice in this field. These include, first, a conception
of harm and victimhood, and second, an approach to conceptualizing the different
kinds of remedial responses in non-trial resolutions.

A. Direct and Indirect Harm
Foreign bribery in the developing world is capable of harming citizens and
governments.115 The explanation of harm provided here is intended only to
underlie working definitions for enforcement agencies considering whether to
include remediation in a non-trial resolution. The balance of this Section describes
how acts of foreign bribery can cause harm to citizens and governments and then
provides a simple taxonomy to describe this harm.116
Harm caused by foreign bribery can be classified as “direct” or “indirect,”
and those who suffer harm can accordingly be classified as either “first-order” or
115

It is not the purpose of this Article to provide a complete account of the manifestations of this
harm nor to distinguish which forms of bribery ought to be thought of as harmful. Neither does
this Article explore the ethicality of bribery, whether some bribes might in some cases achieve
utilitarian benefit or the role of subjectivity in characterizing bribes. That has been done elsewhere.
For a helpful overview of the literature detailing ways in which foreign bribery can cause harm to
individuals, companies, governments, public institutions, and societies at large, see Dávid-Barrett,
supra note 1. See also Jeffrey R. Boles, The Two Faces of Bribery: International Corruption Pathways Meet
Conflicting Legislative Regimes, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 673, 678–80 (2014) for an overview of the way in
which foreign bribery can cause harm, and David Kennedy, The International Anti-Corruption
Campaign, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 455 (1999), for a discussion of the role of subjectivity in the ethicality
of bribery.

116

This Article focuses only on the harm caused by bribes that fall within the purview of the foreign
bribery offence. This excludes most forms of petty corruption and embezzlement, as well as most
instances where the bribe-payer and recipient are of the same nationality and operate within the
same country. For an overview of the harm caused by corrupt practices more generally, see INT’L
COUNCIL ON HUM. RTS. POL’Y, CORRUPTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: MAKING THE CONNECTION
(2009), https://perma.cc/H8TN-M5CK.
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“second-order” victims.117 Direct harm is that which an enforcement agency is
satisfied would not have occurred but for the payment of a particular bribe or the
existence of a particular bribery scheme.118 When agencies are satisfied there exists
a sufficient link between foreign bribery and harm, harm can be classified as
“direct.” It is this type of harm that enforcement agencies are typically addressing
when an individual or an entity is made to pay compensation to a specific victim.
“Indirect harm” describes the “trickle-down” effects of foreign bribery that
manifest because economic conditions and institutional instability render acts of
corruption especially harmful.119 Typically, this is the harm suffered by citizens en
masse and societies at large.120 It is this harm that enforcement agencies are
attempting to address when non-trial resolutions provide for charitable donations,
the purchase of assets for public benefit, or the injection of capital into public
infrastructure. The recognition of each type of harm for purposes of remedial
settlement distribution is naturally contingent on prosecutorial discretion. In the
absence of a third-party decision-maker or court to assess harm and designate
victims, the prosecutor alone makes these determinations. Under these

117

In the absence of legislative guidance on or judicial analysis of victimhood, this Article has opted
for broad definitions of “victimhood” that enforcement agencies will be able to adapt to particular
cases. This approach has found favor in practice, with senior personnel at the SFO stating that the
broadest possible definition of “victimhood” is to be preferred. See Baker, supra note 8 (“All
economic crime has victims . . . . They may be the citizens of those states that fail to thrive due to
rampant corruption and theft by their leaders . . . . The ideal outcome, where-ever it is possible, is
for the money secured through asset recovery to be returned to victims, using that term in its widest
sense.”).

118

A but-for standard has been employed in the context of discerning whether compensation was
appropriate under a DPA negotiated by the SFO. See discussion supra Section II.C.

119

The literature on this topic has long recognized the concept of “social harm.” See Juanita Olaya,
Kodjo Attisso & Anja Roth, Repairing Social Damage Out of Corruption Cases: Opportunities and Challenges
As Illustrated in the Alcatel Case in Costa Rica (SSRN Working Paper, Dec. 6, 2010),
https://perma.cc/S9RN-YEKP (“Social damage is the loss experienced in aspects and dimensions
of the collective or the community relevant to the law.”).
Elizabeth Dávid-Barrett and Mihály Fazekas provide a recent overview discussing how both
corruption generally and bribery within public procurement can cause far-reaching harm.
Given that public procurement accounts for on average 29% of total general
government expenditure in OECD countries (2013 data), and closer to 50% of
public spending in developing countries, [corrupt] practices can cause serious
damage to the economy and to public confidence in institutions. Favoritism in
the allocation of public contracts can lead to higher prices, reduced value for
money, the provision of low-quality or unsafe works, goods and services, and
reduced competition. It is also likely to harm democracy since, by distributing
resources according to particularistic ties, partisan favoritism disadvantages
parties that lack connections and thus weakens political competition. Clientelism
may even reverse the conventional relationship of democratic accountability,
with politicians holding supporters to account for their behavior.
Elizabeth Dávid-Barrett & Mihály Fazekas, Grand Corruption and Government Change: An Analysis of
Partisan Favoritism in Public Procurement, EUR. J. CRIM. POL’Y RES., at 2 (2019), https://perma.cc/82JPKD8B (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
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circumstances, prosecutors are not bound by the narrower concepts of causation
that determine rights and duties under common law.121 Anti-corruption
enforcement agencies do not undertake detailed causal analysis in deciding
whether to pursue remediation, so causation in this context must be understood
as clothed in prosecutorial discretion.
Direct harm is often facially apparent and easily subject to quantification.
Cases involving direct harm are likely to involve compensation directed toward
the government of the nation whose public official requested or received a
bribe.122 For example, when a government agent or contractor pays a bribe using
money that belonged to the government or to which the government was entitled,
the government has sustained a loss equal to the value of that bribe.123
Alternatively, when a bribe is paid to a government employee to avoid paying
import duties or some other form of taxation, then that government has been
deprived of whatever capital it would have received had the tax been paid.124 A
third example arises when a service provider wins a government contract by
paying a bribe to a rogue government official, and it can be shown that the bribepayer ultimately provided defective or overpriced services.125 In these examples,
harm can be classified as direct because there is a self-evident connection between
the bribe being paid and the government being deprived of capital that an
enforcement agency may well recognize.126 As evinced below, cases involving
direct harm present fewer practical hurdles.

121

122

123
124
125
126

It should be noted that while some countries do involve the judiciary in the approval of DPAs,
those countries’ courts do not afford sustained analysis to questions of remediation. For example,
see supra Section II.C for a discussion of Standard Bank, in which Lord Leveson found that harm
would not have occurred “but for” the relevant acts of bribery but did not undertake the kind of
causal analysis typical of decisions addressing whether a particular act caused damage or loss and
rights under the common law.
While corporations might also suffer direct harm, they are not the focus of this Article because
non-trial resolutions have not been used to ameliorate harm to corporations. The fact that the
corporate competitors of bribe-paying companies might suffer harm through FCPA violations is a
longstanding observation. The original Senate Bill of the FCPA provided a right of action to harmed
competitors. International Contributions, Payments, and Gifts Disclosure Act, S. 3379, 94th Cong.
§ 10, 122 Cong. Rec. 12,607 (1976), https://perma.cc/Z8MF-25AN (“Any person who can
establish actual damage to his business resulting from illegal . . . contributions, payments, or gifts,
made by a competitor and who has not made such illegal payments himself in a relevant time period,
may maintain a cause of action against that competitor.”).
See supra Section II.C (discussing Standard Bank).
See, e.g., United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004).
See supra Section II.C (discussing Sarclad).
Although non-trial resolutions have not yet been used to award compensation to individual citizens
for direct harm, it is possible that citizens might also suffer direct harm if an enforcement agency is
satisfied that a specific act of foreign bribery caused them harm that was not “trickle-down.”
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It is more difficult to articulate the nature and extent of indirect harm
sustained by citizens, governments, and societies at large.127 This is because
indirect harm is diffuse.128 It is typically expressed in terms of its intangible impact,
such as the inefficiencies that result from public spending being distorted by
bribes, and the more abstract harm that results as a byproduct of diminished
institutions.129 Put another way, citizens suffer and the public interest is
compromised when public spending decisions are influenced by the interests of
bribe-payers and bribe-taking public officials. For example, individual citizens of
developing nations might suffer indirect harm when an act of foreign bribery
causes a misdirection or depletion of public resources that otherwise could have
been made available for areas of public outlay that contribute to human
development (healthcare, education, social welfare, etc.).130 This misallocation of
public resources might occur when bribe-paying service providers ingratiate
themselves to public officials over time, monopolizing a particular area of
government spending and overpricing their services.131 Citizens might also sustain
indirect harm because inefficient redirection of resources results in inferior public
services. This occurs when an entity that bids for a public infrastructure contract
pays a bribe, is successful in its bid, and then provides services inferior to those
that would have been provided by an unsuccessful bidder that did not pay a
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For an overview of the fraught nature of attempting to calculate the harm caused by corruption on
a macro scale, see Matthew Stephenson, It’s Time to Abandon the “$2.6 Trillion/5% of Global GDP”
Corruption-Cost Estimate, THE GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (Jan. 5, 2016),
https://perma.cc/6HUV-QEPU.
In his opening statement in Liu v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n before the U.S. Supreme Court earlier this
year, Deputy Solicitor General Malcolm Stewart stated that there is “no obvious universe of
individual victims from an FCPA violation.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Liu v. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (2020) (No. 18-1501). While Stewart was speaking in the context of
investors, his comments are arguably relevant to FCPA violations generally.
See generally SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES,
AND REFORM (1999); Vito Tanzi & Hamid Davoodi, Corruption, Public Investment and Growth 1–26
(IMF, Working Paper No. 97/139, 1997). See also Dávid-Barrett, supra note 1, for a general theory
of how bribery’s distortion of public decision-making causes harm. The OECD reported in 2014
that the purpose of fifty-seven percent of all instances of foreign bribery involved the public
procurement process. OECD, PREVENTING CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT (2016),
https://perma.cc/FM6E-M5FQ.
See Dávid-Barrett, supra note 1, at 128 n.13. See OECD, CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION AT THE
SECTOR LEVEL AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT (2015),
https://perma.cc/4545-473U (providing a discussion of how corruption in the procurement
process can lead to misallocated resources, higher expenses, and lower quality goods and services).
See Dávid-Barrett & Fazekas, supra note 120, at 2; cf. Sanjeev Gupta, Luiz R. de Mello & Raju Sharan,
Corruption and Military Spending 4–6 (IMF, Working Paper No. 00/23, 2006) (discussing the
mechanism of corruption in the military spending context).
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bribe.132 Finally, citizens can also sustain indirect harm from worsened economic
outcomes associated with pervasive levels of corruption. This harm can be
expressed in terms of its trickle-down effects on society at large. These trickledown effects manifest by diminishing foreign investment,133 undermining the
legitimacy of government institutions,134 contributing to fiscal deficits, and
increasing income inequality.135
Populations might also sustain harm in ways unrelated to inefficiencies that
result from the redirection of public spending. This is evidenced by the Och-Ziff
Capital Management Group bribery scandal.136 Between 2008 and 2012, American
investment and hedge fund manager Och-Ziff Capital Management and related
entities paid bribes to the Congolese government to procure a mining license. 137
Before the license could be awarded, the Congolese government initially had to
strip Canadian mining company First Quantum Minerals Ltd. of the license it held.
The abrupt closure of the mine had a devastating economic impact on local
communities that were suddenly deprived of income.138 Before the mine’s closure,
the World Bank had invested in First Quantum’s mining activity through the
International Finance Corporation.139 In return for the World Bank’s investment,
First Quantum was obligated to provide social and environmental benefits to local
communities, including the delivery of clean water, the provision of healthcare
and education, and the alleviation of air pollution.140 After First Quantum was
stripped of its mining license, World Bank involvement and all related
infrastructure and social programs ceased.141 Tens of thousands of citizens in local
communities were affected.142 Och-Ziff Capital Management and one subsidiary
132
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134

135
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137
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See WIM WENSINK & JAN MAARTEN DE VET, IDENTIFYING AND REDUCING CORRUPTION IN
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN THE EU (2013), for a discussion of case studies showing how corruption
leads to suboptimal decision-making and cost overruns in the procurement process.
Mary Hallward Driemeier, Who Survives? The Impact of Corruption, Competition and Property Rights Across
Firms 27–28 (World Bank Dev. Rsch. Grp., Working Paper No. 5084, 2009).
See Johann Graf Lambsdorff, How Corruption Affects Economic Development, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION
REPORT 310 (Robin Hodess et al. eds., 2004).
Vito Tanzi, Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures 26–27 (IMF, Working
Paper No. 98/63, 1998), https://perma.cc/B76R-8VUL.
See generally RAID, supra note 37.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Och-Ziff Capital Management Admits to Role in Africa Bribery
Conspiracies and Agrees to Pay $213 Million Criminal Fine (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://perma.cc/6H97-KF4R.
RAID, supra note 37, at 11–12.
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See IFC, Kingamyambo Musonoi Tailings SARL, IFC PROJECT INFORMATION & DATA PORTAL,
https://perma.cc/PFT8-CM5F.
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RAID, supra note 37, at 11.
Id. at 7–8.
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See id. at 11–38, for a description of how the closure of the mine and withdrawal of the World Bank
aggravated conditions that led to the impoverishment and in some instances death of citizens.
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were found to have breached the FCPA and entered into a DPA with the DOJ, 143
but no remediation was provided to Congolese citizens. Shareholders of one of
Och-Ziff’s related entities, however, were able to claim victimhood status and seek
remediation under the MVRA.144 The SFO is still investigating this matter, and
Congolese citizens have come forward and identified themselves to the SFO as
victims.145 The Och-Ziff Capital Management bribe scheme is just one example
of how foreign bribery can cause widespread harm.
It is not only citizens who sustain indirect harm from the distortion of public
spending. Governments might, for example, sustain either direct or indirect harm
when their resource allocation has been diverted or influenced by a foreign entity
paying a bribe to a rogue public official through the procurement process. In this
situation, the government has been deprived of a degree of autonomy—which
naturally varies based on the extent to which corruption pervades the national
government and economy. The government might also sustain harm in the form
of inefficient resource expenditure or reputational loss. This harm can, of course,
be contrasted with the harm that flows from entities paying bribes to influence
lawmaking and policy formulation. The phrase “state capture” describes the
practice of bribes being paid to influence the lawmaking process.146 A government
may sustain harm if the bribe-payer redirects an entire government agenda that is
ultimately against the national interest.147
Admittedly, this description of the harm suffered by governments is
simplistic, and the distinction between direct and indirect harm resulting from
resource misallocation is difficult to draw without sustained and detailed
economic analysis. Indeed, several factors might complicate the nature of the
harm suffered by governments. For instance, it is difficult to argue that a
government is a victim when the bribe-seeking public official is not rogue and the
corrupt behavior is a common or expected practice in a particular
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145

146

147

Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Och-Ziff Cap. Mgmt. Grp., No. 16-CR-00516NGG (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2016); Plea Agreement, United States v. Oz Afr. Mgmt. Grp., No. 16CR-00515-NGG (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2016).
United States v. OZ Afr. Mgmt. GP, LLC, No. 16-CR-515-NGG, 2019 WL 4199904 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 29, 2019).
DR Congo Residents Come Forward As Potential Victims in SFO Corruption Investigation into ENRC, RAID
(Jan. 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/C9AG-XG6F.
Joel S. Hellman, Geraint Jones, & Daniel Kaufmann, Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture,
Corruption, and Influence in Transition 3 (World Bank, Working Paper, No. 2444, 2000).
For a discussion of the role of state capture in creating social harm in the Philippines, see Hannah
Isabella Chan et al., Civil Action Against Corruption: Empowering the Filipino People in a Captured State
Situation, in ISSUES IN COMBATTING TRANSNATIONAL CORRUPTION, supra note 87. See also DávidBarrett & Fazekas, supra note 120, for a discussion of how corruption can derail democratic public
spending by hijacking policy at its formulation, implementation, or monitoring.
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administration.148 Moreover, the extent to which it is appropriate to distinguish
between the harm sustained by citizens and the harm sustained by their
governments can also be disputed. It is entirely arguable, if not facially apparent,
that citizens also sustain harm when their government’s agenda has been
influenced or completely commandeered by bribe-payers.
The harm described here as indirect is not only diffuse, but also vague and
involves conceptions of loss that are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify.149
This is because conceptions of societal harm that rely on a trickle-down analysis
cannot be applied to isolate the harm caused by a specific bribe or bribery scheme.
Put another way, the above descriptions of indirect harm conflate the harm caused
by a given act of foreign bribery with the harm caused by other forms of
corruption and institutional instability generally. Foreign bribery typically causes
harm in developing nations when it contributes to a broader culture of corruption
permeating the state. This is why a singular bribery scheme within a developing
country may cause more harm than an identical bribery scheme in a developed
country. It is therefore difficult in developing economies to delineate the harm
that has been caused by one form of corruption from the harm that has been
caused by another. This may be problematic if one takes the view that
enforcement agencies purporting to pursue remediation against individual bribeofferors should seek only to remediate the exact harm caused by particular acts of
bribery.
Notwithstanding the difficulty (or impossibility) of separating harm caused
by specific acts of foreign bribery from harm caused by other more general and
pervasive forms of corruption, the remedial practices of enforcement agencies
reveal a willingness to conflate these different types of harm and to pursue
remediation for social harm generally. The prevailing thinking, as evinced by the
cases discussed above, is that it is better to pursue remediation for the benefit of
those harmed by bribery than it is to forgo remediation because it is sometimes
impossible to calculate the harm caused by a specific bribe.150 This approach can
be easily praised or decried. On one hand, it necessarily attributes a degree of
social or economic harm to singular acts of bribery when that harm was actually
caused by the amalgamation of many past acts of corruption. In this sense, the
148

149

150

See, e.g., Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 768 F.3d 145, 163 (2d Cir. 2014) (refusing to order restitution
in favour of the Iraqi government for harm that flowed from the corrupt practices of that
government).
Similar issues have caused consternation and controversy in the field of international criminal law.
See L. Moffett, Reparations for Victims at the International Criminal Court: A New Way Forward?, 21 INT’L
J. HUM. RTS. 1204 (2017) (noting how some of those involved with the drafting of the Rome Statute
considered it impractical to deliver legal remedies to large numbers of individuals); see also INT’L
LAW COMM’N, Report. of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 44th Session 4 May–24 July
1992, ¶¶ 88–92, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/47/10 (1992).
See supra Section II.C.1 (discussing SFO enforcement actions).
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remedial response can be criticized as being disproportionate to the harm. On the
other hand, it might be argued that bribe-payers operating within the developing
world know or should know that their corrupt conduct compounds with prior
corrupt acts and institutional instability and is all the more harmful as a result. In
support of this view, there are simple and strong policy reasons for extracting
capital from corrupt actors for remedial purposes and providing remediation to
citizens harmed by bribery in the developing world. This reasoning has found
favor with enforcement agencies in the exercise of their discretion.151
Another complication of accepting that remedial settlement distribution is
an appropriate response to indirect harm is that questions naturally arise as to
when harm will be too remote to be considered to have been indirectly caused by
a particular act of foreign bribery. An extremely expansive reading would posit
that every act of foreign bribery undermines the rule of law, diminishes the
institutional integrity of government, and subverts public policy to some degree.152
On this view, every single act should sound in some form of remediation, and
every state in which bribery has occurred and every citizen of that state would be
a victim. This Article does not support this kind of expansive approach to
remediation and acknowledges that the term “indirect harm” implies a degree of
ambiguity and requires enforcement agencies to choose what harm is too remote
and what harm is not. For as long as remedial settlement distribution is practiced
pursuant to prosecutorial discretion rather than statutory mandate, enforcement
agencies will make that choice for themselves on the basis of the factual matrix at
hand.

B. Categories of Remediation
The bulk of commentary in this field employs the term “compensation” to
describe all transfers of capital to victims.153 This term is unhelpful. It conflates
the provision of remediation in instances where distinct entities have suffered
direct harm with the provision of remediation in instances where large groups of
people have suffered indirect harm. Practice shows that the appropriate remedy
for direct harm in most cases is the advancement of capital equivalent to the loss
occasioned by the bribery. To describe this form of remediation, this Article uses
151
152

153

See discussion of U.S. and U.K. enforcement actions, supra Section II.C.
See, e.g., Dávid-Barrett, supra note 1, at 132 (“Every bribe paid to influence a public official to divert
from following the rules associated with her office demonstrates that the rules are not consistently
applied in line with the law. This is true whether the bribe is paid by Oxfam or by an arms dealer,
whether the bribe is big or small, and whether the bribe secures a place at the front of the customs
queue or a million-dollar contract. The fact that the public official decides to violate the rules in
order to secure some private advantage is unjust.”).
See supra Section II.C.1 (discussing the U.K. government’s Compensation Principles); see also Spalding,
supra note 11; Delphia Lim et al., Access to Remedies for Transnational Public Bribery: A Governance Gap,
in ISSUES IN COMBATTING TRANSNATIONAL CORRUPTION, supra note 87, at 3–23.
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the term “compensation.”154 The appropriate remedy for indirect harm in most
cases is the advancement of capital through charitable endeavors, infrastructure
investment, the purchase of public assets, or some other publicly accessible
means. To describe this type of remediation, this Article uses the term
“reparations.” A third kind of remediation that is not typically pursued through
non-trial resolutions, but that could be adopted with relative ease, involves the
advancement of capital equivalent to the profit made by the bribe-payer. To
describe this form of remediation, this Article uses the term “restitution.”
“Remediation” is an umbrella term that encapsulates compensation, reparations,
and restitution. The balance of this Section explains the nature of each of these
forms of remediation. Because restitution has not been employed in practice, the
focus is on compensation and reparations.
Compensation in this context is informed by the same concept of corrective
justice that underlies compensatory damages in tort law. The defining feature of
such damages is duality.155 That is, damages pair the wrongdoer with the victim.
The contours of the remedy are determined by the relationship between the
wrongdoer and the victim, to the exclusion of all other considerations. In this
sense, the remedy aims to restore the normative equilibrium that existed between
wrongdoer and victim before the wrong took place.156 Compensation, therefore,
should theoretically aim to correct the harm occasioned by foreign bribery by
placing victims in their pre-wrong state, thus restoring whatever degree of
normative equality existed between the relevant parties before the wrong
occurred.157 Compensation in this context is a loss-based form of remediation. It
is not to be calculated with regard to the value of the bribe, the benefit derived by
the bribe-offeror, or the need to punish the bribe-offeror. Of course, this notion
of compensation is a creature of private law theory, and its applicability here is
limited for numerous reasons. In negotiating remediation terms in foreign bribery
settlements, it is unlikely that it will always be feasible to place the victims in the
position they were in before the wrong was committed, whether due to the
insolvency of the bribe-offeror, the fact that the exact amount of loss sustained
cannot be ascertained or even quantified, or the dynamics at play in the negotiation
process. Prosecutorial discretion remains the only arbiter for determining the
value, form, and recipient of compensation in foreign bribery enforcement
154

155
156
157

Some texts employ the word “restitution” instead of “compensation.” This paper does not adopt
this approach. Remedies that operate pursuant to a compensatory rationale are loss-focused,
meaning that they respond to the loss of a plaintiff or a victim and attempt to undo that loss. See
Jeff Berryman, The Compensation Principle in Private Law, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 91, 103 (2008).
Restitution, on the other hand, also takes into account the gain of the wrongdoer and describes
those remedies whereby the wrongdoer is compelled to “give up” their ill-gotten gain.
ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 63 (2012).
Id. at 70.
Id.
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actions. Nevertheless, this notion of compensation has value insofar as it provides
a benchmark: a loss-based concept to guide compensation in remedial settlement
distribution.158
The distribution of reparations to the victims of indirect harm is best
understood in light of traditional notions of distributive justice. Distributive
justice provides that an appropriate response to a particular wrong with
widespread consequences is to divide the remedy among the populace that was
wronged.159 In situations where citizens have sustained harm due to acts of
bribery, the remedy does not take the form of a direct transfer of wealth from the
wrongdoer to the wronged but rather a distribution of wealth through publicly
available means (a practice explored in greater detail below).160 Finally, restitution
in this context refers to a gain-based method for determining remediation. It is
measured with reference to the bribe-offeror’s ill-gotten gains. The adaptability of
restitution to remedial settlement distribution is entirely possible, as enforcement
agencies often extract fines and penalties on a disgorgement basis—meaning that
the fine or penalty is equivalent to the wrongdoer’s ill-gotten gains.
The terms “compensation,” “restitution,” and “reparations”—while
considered appropriate by the author—need not necessarily attach to the concepts
articulated above. What is important to appreciate is that remediation can be
conceived as being either loss-based, gain-based, or responsive to trickle-down
societal harm. This demarcates the ways in which a non-trial resolution can
remediate the harm to victims of foreign bribery: first, by advancing compensation
to identifiable victims; second, by using public means to disburse reparations to
victims who have suffered indirect harm;161 and third, by requiring an entity that
has entered into a non-trial resolution to give up ill-gotten gains to victims.

158

Id. at 60–61.

159

Id.
See supra notes 75–105 and accompanying text.
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The pairing of direct harm with compensation and indirect harm with reparations may not always
be practical. An enforcement agency may find it necessary to advocate for a term in a non-trial
resolution that provides victims with reparations, notwithstanding the fact that those victims
suffered direct harm. This would likely be the case when the provision of compensation would be
unfeasible from an administrative standpoint due to the sheer number of victims harmed.
Reparations may be the appropriate or the only practical vehicle for remediation simply because an
enforcement agency cannot calculate the loss of each specific victim or organize a transparent and
efficient way of providing compensation. In this instance, the enforcement agency might decide
that it is better to provide reparations—such as infrastructure investment, donation to a charity to
which victims have access, etc.. The concepts here provide the foundation for a cogent and cohesive
approach to remedial settlement distribution, but in the absence of being entrenched in statute, they
must remain malleable so that enforcement agencies will be willing to apply them.
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IV. A F RAMEWORK FOR C OMPENSATION
The balance of this Article outlines a framework for the provision of
compensation and reparations in foreign bribery non-trial resolutions. The
relevant factors that enforcement agencies should take into account in considering
whether to seek compensation in a non-trial resolution are as follows (direct harm
is not addressed below, as it has already been discussed):
• Whether there is an identifiable victim;
• Whether that victim has suffered direct harm;
• The extent to which that harm is ascertainable;
• Whether there is a risk of repeat corruption and, if so, whether that risk
can be managed; and
• Whether compensation is appropriate in the circumstances.
It should be noted that these factors could also be applied to support a
framework for restitution. Indeed, it would be redundant to present separate
frames for restitution and compensation because the only distinction would be in
the third factor: for restitution, “the extent to which illicit gains are ascertainable”
would be substituted for “the extent to which that harm is ascertainable.”

A. The Identifiability of the Victim
A non-trial resolution can provide for compensation only when a specific
victim can be identified.162 This is the necessary corollary of compensation being
measured against the loss of discrete individuals or entities. Indeed, the case law
that has emerged from DPA approvals in the U.K. confirms that whether a victim
can be identified is a necessary precondition to the provision of compensation.
Two cases mentioned above serve as illustrative examples: Standard Bank and
Sarclad.
In Standard Bank, Standard Bank’s Tanzanian subsidiaries were successful in
their bid for a contract that permitted them to act as underwriters on behalf of the
Tanzanian government for a sovereign note placement. After the subsidiaries won
that contract, one of them entered into a consultancy agreement with a shell
company directed by public officials. The agreement stipulated that the Tanzanian
subsidiary would pay one percent of all funds raised as part of the note placement
to the consulting company.163 This one percent commission, which under the
circumstances was revealed to be a bribe, diverted money that would otherwise

162
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The international asset recovery community has long recognized the importance (and difficulty) of
identifying the victims of corruption as a precondition to providing remedies. See U.N. Secretariat,
Good Practices in Identifying the Victims of Corruption and Parameters for their Compensation:
Note by the Secretariat for the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Asset Recovery
(Aug. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/9SN6-XMBD.
Serious Fraud Office v. Standard Bank Plc [2015] EWHC (QB) U20150854 [7] (UK).
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have been paid to the Tanzanian government to the consulting company.164 The
note placement raised US$600 million, so US$6 million was paid to the consulting
company.165 Thus, the bribe resulted in the Tanzanian government being deprived
of US$6 million. There was no room for doubt about the identity of the victim.
The DPA approval judgment unsurprisingly reflects minimal deliberation on this
front. The presiding judge and president of the Queen’s Bench Division, Lord
Justice Leveson, simply found that the Tanzanian government would not have
incurred the loss “but for” the bribes paid by the Tanzanian subsidiary.166 This
was enough to justify compensation in the circumstances.167 Indeed, Standard Bank
might be termed an “easy case” with regard to discerning the identity of a victim
to be paid compensation.
Sarclad falls at the opposite end of the spectrum. As noted above, the DPA
in that case pertained to a web of sophisticated bribe schemes spanning multiple
jurisdictions over a long time. Lord Leveson, who had again been tasked with
presiding over the SFO’s DPA approval application, provided the following
analysis of why compensation was not appropriate:
[Seventeen] of the [twenty-eight] implicated contracts were with entities based
in a country in Asia with which there is neither a request for mutual legal
assistance nor an established mechanism or practice in place for payments of
compensation orders to the authorities. Other bribes . . . involved agents
based in or working in relation to other countries in Asia and elsewhere in
respect of which the same difficulties arise. Further, the amounts of the bribe
payment are not always confirmed in the evidence and neither is any rise in
the contract price to accommodate it (which would generate the loss). Finally,
the SFO is not able to demonstrate whether and, if so, in what sum, the
various Sarclad agents actually paid bribes to named or unknown individuals.
Taken together, these factors amount to it not being possible to positively
identify any entities as victims who may be compensated.168

This excerpt illuminates more than the obvious fact that unidentifiable victims
cannot be compensated. The reasoning highlights four considerations that
indicate whether a victim can be identified: (i) whether there had been a request
for mutual legal assistance;169 (ii) whether the victim(s) resided in a state with
established mechanisms or practices for payments of remediation; (iii) whether
the amounts of the bribes paid were confirmed in evidence and whether any other
164

Id. [10].
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Id. [8].
Id. [40], [51].
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Id. [41].
Serious Fraud Office v. Sarclad Ltd [2016] EWHC (QB) U20150856, [53] (UK).
OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, art. 9, ¶ 1, Nov. 21, 1997, https://perma.cc/U9K4-LWZA (providing that mutual
legal assistance entails the provision of “prompt and effective legal assistance . . . for the purpose
of criminal investigations and proceedings”).
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evidence indicated loss; and (iv) whether it could be shown that bribes of a specific
amount had been paid by particular agents to particular individuals. These
considerations are not presented as creating a mandatory threshold for the
payment of compensation, but as factors that might make identifying a victim
more practicable on a given set of facts. These are worth discussing further.
The first two considerations are relatively straightforward. In certain cases,
a victim might be identified only if the victim’s identity is put forward by a foreign
enforcement authority. The existence of established mechanisms for payments of
compensation orders would doubtlessly facilitate such payment. It should be
noted, however, that the existence of such mechanisms bears on the practicality
of delivering compensation rather than the antecedent issue of whether a victim
can be identified.
The third consideration focuses on whether there is evidence to prove a
victim’s loss, such as evidence showing the value of bribes or a decline in the value
of services provided under an agreement tainted by foreign bribery.170 Naturally,
evidence of a specific victim’s loss indicates the existence of that victim. However,
Lord Leveson’s suggestion that the value of bribes or a decline in the value of
services indicates a victim’s identity is misplaced, as neither of these pieces of
evidence speaks to the identifiability of victims in a precise sense. These two
indications are better taken into account when determining whether a loss is
ascertainable. Furthermore, there is no reason why the value of the bribe should
have any bearing on the amount given to a victim. Indeed, if the point of
compensation is to respond to harm sustained by a victim, then the value of the
bribe is irrelevant unless the bribe correlates to the loss in some way. Finally, Lord
Leveson indicated that victims could not be identified because there was a sparsity
of evidence showing whether specific bribes had been paid to specific foreign
officials.171 Put another way, while the SFO’s investigation had revealed a broad
and pervasive culture of bribery, Sarclad’s lack of internal records and
documentation ultimately made it impossible to show that a particular entity had
sustained direct harm and would be due compensation. This finding provides
further support for the assertions made above that the payment of compensation
for direct harm requires some kind of connection between an act of bribery and a
particular victim’s loss.
At bottom, Lord Leveson’s comments indicate that when considering
whether to award compensation, the first point of inquiry is whether a victim can
be identified. In some instances, the identity of the victim will be apparent because
170
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Lord Leveson of course uses the term “compensation,” but that term as used in Sarclad and Standard
Bank is cognate with the term “remediation” as used in this article. Lord Leveson does not
distinguish between remediating individuals for ascertainable loss and remediating the public at
large.
Sarclad, EWHC (QB) U20150856, [53].

404

Vol. 21 No. 2

Remediation in Foreign Bribery Settlements

Hickey

of the nature of the bribe scheme, as in Standard Bank. In more difficult cases,
enforcement agencies might refer to any one of numerous case-dependent
considerations in attempting to discern the identity of a victim.

B. Whether Harm is Ascertainable
Because compensation is a loss-based form of remediation, it is necessary to
be able to ascertain some degree of loss before compensation can be included in
a non-trial resolution. The case law supports this view. Standard Bank and Sarclad
again reflect opposite extremes. The extent of loss in Standard Bank was facially
evident. The Tanzanian government had been deprived of exactly the amount
given to Standard Bank’s bribe-paying subsidiary.172 In Sarclad, Lord Leveson
found that the degree of factual complexity meant that loss could not be
ascertained at all.173
There is little doubt that loss should be established before an award of
compensation is made. A more contentious issue is the extent to which loss needs
to be determined. This Article rejects the view that it will, in all cases, be necessary
to ascertain loss with absolute certainty. Enforcement authorities, at their
discretion, might be content to employ means of measuring approximate loss. For
example, an enforcement agency might decide that compensation should reflect
the devaluation in goods or services provided under a contract tainted by bribery.
In cases involving complex, prolonged bribery schemes, enforcement agencies
may elect to compensate whatever loss can be ascertained or accurately estimated.
Such is an advantage of the discretionary nature of the process of negotiating nontrial resolutions.
The proposition that loss need not be calculated with absolute certainty finds
support in relevant areas of U.S. and U.K. corporate criminal law. In R v. Alstom
Power, a case heard before the U.K.’s Southwark Crown Court, French energy
company Alstom Power pleaded guilty to several offenses in relation to a bribe
paid to Lithuanian public officials in the energy sector.174 The Lithuanian
government formally requested compensation so that it could reimburse the
accounts of Lithuanian banks defrauded as part of Alstom’s corrupt scheme. The
court ordered that £10,963,000 be paid in compensation to the Lithuanian
government, notwithstanding the fact that all parties agreed that loss could not be
calculated with absolute certainty.175 Similarly, in cases under the MVRA in which
victims seek remediation for the harm caused by financial crime, U.S. federal
courts need only make a “reasonable estimate of the [actual] loss” given the
172
173
174
175

Standard Bank, EWHC (QB) U20150854, [9]–[15].
Sarclad, EWHC (QB) U20150856, [53].
Transcript of Sentencing Remarks at 1, R v. Alstom Power, (June 8, 2016) (on file with author).
Id. at 6.
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information available.176 Enforcement agencies are of course not obligated to
borrow from the approaches of courts in corporate criminal cases, but the
willingness of courts to award compensation without being able to ascertain harm
with absolute certainty indicates that enforcement agencies could function with a
similar modus operandi when negotiating non-trial resolutions.
Ultimately, the extent to which loss can be ascertained may bear on the
appropriateness of awarding compensation, but it should not mandate that
compensation be paid or not paid—unless, of course, the relevant enforcement
agency is unsure of whether any loss was sustained. It is also worth noting that
some enforcement agencies might elect to bypass ascertaining a victim’s harm and
order compensation pursuant to some other calculus. U.S. lawmakers and
academics have considered the payment of remediation calculated with regard to
either the value of the bribe, the bribe-payer’s gain, or the value of business lost
by a victim.177 However, this Article takes the view that remediation should
respond to a victim’s loss so as to function as a kind of remedy. Other calculations
might be used as alternatives where necessary, depending on the practices of a
particular agency.

C. The Risk of Repeat Corruption
A standard objection to remedial settlement distribution is that the practice
is mired in the inherent risk that distributed capital might be repurposed for
corrupt ends.178 This Article suggests that neither compensation nor reparations
should be provided if an enforcement agency is satisfied that there is too great a
risk that remediation monies might be repurposed in this way. The risk of repeat
corruption should hold substantial weight in an enforcement agency’s decision to
pursue remedial settlement distribution. Anti-corruption enforcement agencies
generally vie to punish corrupt practices and deter would-be malefactors from
engaging in future corrupt acts. It is nonsensical to think that they might exercise
their discretion to empower corrupt governments or expend time and resources
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United States v. Gallant, 537 F.3d 1202, 1252 (10th Cir. 2008).
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For example, see the discussion of the Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act, H.R. 3531, 112th
Cong. (2011), in Spalding, supra note 11, at 1419.
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This view was articulated to the author by several current and former senior prosecutors with
relevant experience, and it can also be evidenced by scrutinizing the non-trial resolutions the DOJ
has entered in which the DOJ repatriated the proceeds of corruption to the citizens of developing
nations. See also Matthews, supra note 54(quoting the former head of the DOJ's Kleptocracy Asset
Recovery Initiative as saying, “We have to be flexible and nimble in finding ways to responsibly
repatriate . . . We don’t want to give funds back to a potential corrupt government, or to the people
who stole the money in the first place.”). Indeed, the need to manage the risk of corruption, through
audits and other means, in the dispersal of capital—in ways that are akin to reparations as described
in this Article—in developing nations is well noted. See, e.g., NORAD, JOINT EVALUATION OF
SUPPORT TO ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS: TANZANIAN COUNTRY REPORT (2011).
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to assist those who cannot reasonably be considered victims. Indeed, MVRA
precedent supports this view. Foreign governments seeking compensation under
the MVRA in the wake of foreign bribery enforcement actions have been rejected
on the basis that corruption was effectively rampant throughout the entire
administration.179 U.K. courts have shown a similar recalcitrance to award
compensation where there is a risk that it might fall into the wrong hands. 180
However, enforcement agencies should, if possible, go one step further than
identifying risk at face value and determine whether this risk can be managed or
reduced. Practice suggests that if the risk of repeat corruption can be reduced or
managed, remediation will still be appropriate.181
In some cases, enforcement agencies will not have to explore methods to
curb this risk because it will be minimal at the outset. For example, if an
enforcement agency is deciding whether to include compensation in a non-trial
resolution for the benefit of a foreign government and the bribe-receiving public
official in that case was not acting within a prevalent culture of public corruption,
and was thus a rogue public official, then the risk of repeat corruption will likely
be minimal.182 Assessing the risk of repeat corruption in cases where
compensation is being considered will be relatively straightforward compared to
cases involving reparations. In the former, enforcement agencies need only assess
the risk associated with a discrete and identifiable victim. The requisite due
diligence is therefore limited in scope. In addition, the enforcement agency may
be able to cooperate with the victim and come to terms regarding auditing and
transparency about the way in which the compensation money is used. Where
reparations are concerned, however, the task might be more difficult. The
enforcement agency has to assess the risk that repeat corruption remediation
179

180

181

182

See, e.g., Shane Frick, “Ice” Capades: Restitution Orders and the FCPA, 12 RICH. J. GLOB. L. & BUS. 433,
446, 449 (2013).
See Smith & Ouzman Ltd: First Corporate Convicted for Overseas Bribery to Pay £2.2m, CMS LAW NOW
(Jan. 11, 2016), https://perma.cc/Y28F-UJRD.
In practice, techniques for managing the risk of repeat corruption are drawn from reparations cases
and so they are addressed in greater detail below in Section IV.B. These techniques have been
employed in two cases involving the DOJ. The James Giffen prosecution eventually led to the
creation of the BOTA Foundation, a charitable body that operated within Kazakhstan, and a
settlement agreement involving then Vice President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea Teodoro
Nguema Obiang Mangue. For an overview of the BOTA Foundation and the circumstances leading
to its creation, see Michael Steen, Kazakh “Oil Bribe” Millions to Go to Poor Children, REUTERS (May 4,
2007), https://perma.cc/W9PL-6PQV; WORLD BANK, FINAL SUPERVISION REPORT OF THE
BOTA FOUNDATION (2015), https://perma.cc/E2AH-FZQU. For an overview of the Nguema
Obiang case, see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Second Vice President of Equatorial Guinea
Agrees to Relinquish More than $30 Million of Assets Purchased with Corruption Proceeds (Oct.
10, 2014), https://perma.cc/4P6C-NDEL.
This might be the case when a bribe scheme involves low-level government officials who lacked
influence at higher tiers of government, such as customs officials. See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d
738 (5th Cir. 2004).
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monies are dispersed through publicly accessible means, which is likely to involve
more intermediaries, more recipients, and an increased likelihood of repeat
corruption.183 The risk of repeat corruption in reparations cases is addressed
below.

D. The Appropriateness of Compensation
Finally, as remedial settlement distribution is a byproduct of prosecutorial
discretion, and its pursuit is a strain on the limited competences and resources of
enforcement agencies, it is realistic to expect that enforcement agencies might
decline to pursue compensation at the outset when doing so would be highly
impracticable or otherwise unnecessary. The most obvious example is when the
victim is a wealthy state or entity that has not indicated any interest in receiving
compensation or has refused to accept compensation.184 Another example is when
the victim is not barred by jurisdictional hurdles from pursuing compensation
through an established statutory framework. Lastly, an enforcement agency
negotiating a non-trial resolution might find that remediation is more or less
appropriate depending upon whether local enforcement agencies have been
cooperative. While this consideration may not have anything to do with the
questions of harm and victimhood that ought to guide remediation, it is possible
agencies enforcing foreign bribery laws will take this into account when deciding
how to exercise prosecutorial discretion; it is for that reason worth mentioning.
This final consideration is admittedly broad. If enforcement agencies were
to simply decline to pursue remediation on the basis that it is inappropriate,
without further justification, then any commitment to any kind of guiding
framework would be pointless. However, this consideration has been included
because, as remedial settlement distribution is a fledging practice, it is necessary
to include one open-ended consideration to allow enforcement agencies to take
the unique facts of each case into account. This is to say, until enforcement
agencies have developed experience in assessing the appropriateness of
compensation in foreign bribery non-trial resolutions, it would be unrealistic to
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Id. The terms of the non-trial resolutions in the James Giffen and Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue cases,
see supra note 181, regarding the way in which reparation monies could be spent reflect, first, that
enforcement agencies take the risk of repeat corruption very seriously and, second, that
enforcement agencies are capable of dealing with this risk in a variety of ways.
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A country may also deny remediation on the basis that accepting it would constitute an
acknowledgment of corruption. The SFO has experienced this in attempting to provide
compensation to the Ghanaian government. See INT’L DEV. COMM., FINANCIAL CRIME AND
DEVELOPMENT, 2010–12, HC 847, at 38 (UK); see also LINKLATERS, PUNISHING CORPORATE
OFFENDERS FOR BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION OFFENCES: THE SENTENCING GUIDELINE IN ACTION
4–5 (2016), https://perma.cc/R54F-AEEQ (noting that one of the reasons that compensation was
inappropriate in the Smith & Ouzman case discussed above was that neither the Kenyan nor
Mauritanian governments had requested compensation).
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expect them to commit to a narrow list of considerations without any express
justification to respond to factual oddities or political and social realities.

V. A F RAMEWORK FOR R EPARATIONS
Articulating a framework that can be applied consistently and cogently to
guide the provision of reparations is an inherently difficult task. As explained
above, indirect harm is diffuse and often intangible. In many cases, it may be
impossible to design or implement a remedial scheme that correlates to the harm
caused by a particular bribe scheme.185
Other than recognizing the need to manage the risk of repeat corruption,
enforcement agencies have not applied any palpable criteria to guide the provision
of reparations. The available materials do not suggest that enforcement agencies
have used any indicia to determine the value of reparations, how they are provided,
or to whom they should be provided. Enforcement agencies have seemingly taken
the view that, because bribery harms society generally, it is appropriate that
corrupt entities pay reparations to society generally, whether that be through
charitable donations, infrastructure investment, or some other means. The balance
of this Article contemplates how that approach might be improved, exploring
whether an open-ended multifactorial approach might provide a more principled
and consistent framework for providing reparations. These factors—the first of
which was discussed above—are the following:
• Whether an act of foreign bribery has caused indirect harm;
• Whether there is a nexus between the bribery and harm;
• Whether there is a risk of repeat corruption and, if so, whether that risk
can be managed; and
• Whether reparations are appropriate in the circumstances.

A. Nexus Connecting Foreign Bribery and Harm
An important issue for enforcement agencies to consider when determining
whether and how to include provision for reparations in a non-trial resolution is
the extent to which there needs to be some kind of nexus between the indirect
harm and the reparations scheme.186 For example, if bribes paid to secure a
185

Indeed, it has been argued that it would be impossible to formulate fair and effective legally
enforceable rights that would grant redress for indirect or societal harm. See, e.g., Sakshi Aravind &
Tanmay Dangi, Shades of Corruption: Thoughts on Why Compensation May Not be a Viable Solution, in
ISSUES IN COMBATTING TRANSNATIONAL CORRUPTION, supra note 87, at 82–83.
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This approach is derived from the DOJ’s former enforcement practices pertaining to U.S.
environmental regulations. The DOJ routinely used to enter into “supplemental environmental
projects” with companies that had been found to have caused tangible environmental harm. The
purpose of these projects was to ensure “that any harm or threatened harm to victims or the
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monopoly over a state’s public health sector lead to the provision of defective
services in that sector, recognizing a nexus requirement could mean that
reparations be put toward the benefit of hospitals, medical supplies, or the health
sector generally. It is beyond the scope of this Article to mount a comprehensive
argument regarding whether enforcement agencies should insist upon a nexus
requirement as a precondition for including reparations in non-trial resolutions.
Instead, this Article will outline reasons both for and against the adoption of a
nexus requirement and then suggest a middle ground as the best approach.
Insistence upon a nexus between indirect harm and reparations ensures a
degree of parity between harm and remediation. A nexus requirement assumes a
pivotal function: ensuring that reparations operate as a type of remedy, it links the
harm that is the subject of the non-trial resolution to the reparations.187 If
enforcement agencies do not insist upon a nexus, it is arguable that reparations
play a role that is more similar to foreign aid or charity.
However, there are legitimate reasons why an enforcement agency might
choose to exercise its discretion to ignore an obvious nexus between foreign
bribery and harm. One reason is that it might be counter to the interests of the
enforcement agency’s government to provide reparations in a particular way. For
example, if an act of foreign bribery caused harm to the military sector of a
developing nation with unstable institutions, the decision to focus reparations
elsewhere would be a logical one for that enforcement agency.188 Similarly, if an

187

188

environment is actually addressed.” See SAMUEL HICKEY, BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN SFO AND
DOJ PRACTICE IN REMEDIATING THE VICTIMS OF FOREIGN BRIBERY 11–12 (OECD 2019),
https://perma.cc/LLN5-57EV. The DOJ accordingly required that there be some kind of nexus,
or a “relationship between the violation and the proposed project.” Id. The DOJ relevantly provided
that such a nexus could be established when the proposed project had been designed to reduce the
likelihood of similar violations, the proposed project reduced the adverse impacts to which the
violation contributed, and finally, the proposed project reduced the overall risk potentially affected
by the violation at issue. Id.; see also Spalding, supra note 11, at 395.
International criminal law provides a loose analogy. Judges of the International Criminal Court have
ruled that reparations can be ordered only with respect to “harm suffered as a result of crimes if
such crimes have been found to have taken place and the person standing trial for his or her
participation in those crimes is found guilty.” Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-RedCorr, Public Redacted Version of Decision on Defence Applications for Judgments of Acquittal,
¶ 149 (Apr. 5, 2016). The analogy is loose because enforcement agencies are not bound by the same
constraints as judges (constraints such as the existence of a conviction, for example). Nonetheless,
the quoted reasoning shows that other bodies tasked with providing remediation to large groups
for incalculable harm have insisted upon there being some connection between harm and victims.
It is not enough that victims simply exist.
The BAE Systems settlement agreement negotiated by the SFO, discussed above, could be seen as
an example. In that case, the bribe scheme involved the military sector, and reparations were paid
to the education sector. See Joe Murphy, Let’s Pause Before We Dole Out Dollars, FCPA PROFESSOR
(May 14, 2015), https://perma.cc/TS4A-HYF5 (warning that funneling capital into failing or
unstable states could be perilous and warning of “unelected enforcement officials making policy
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act of foreign bribery caused detriment to a portion of society or an area of outlay
that was not as in need of immediate capital injection as other portions of society
or areas of outlay, then it again may make sense to ignore any nexus.189 One can
of course argue that such considerations are unrelated to remediation and that
remedial settlement distribution should focus on identifying and alleviating harm,
but that position ignores the fact that enforcement agencies are highly unlikely to
ignore political and practical realities.
The prevailing approach in anti-corruption cases is to disregard whether any
nexus exists. To date, non-trial resolutions have simply mandated that the bribepayer funnel capital into the country in which the bribes were paid. This may
involve purchasing assets for the public benefit,190 supporting public infrastructure
initiatives,191 donating money to charities,192 or creating a foundation.193 However,
a point of stark contrast and a potential alternative method is found in the DOJ’s
past approach to negotiating non-trial resolutions for breaches of environmental
regulations.194 Professor Spalding noted that the DOJ often negotiated
remediation schemes as part of non-trial resolutions involving corporate
offenders that breached environmental regulations. These remediation schemes
were “closely connected” to whatever environmental damage formed the basis of
the non-trial resolution.195 Environmental breaches are, of course, an inapposite
point of analogy because environmental harm is necessarily physical, so
remediation can be tied to the geographic area in which the harm occurred. The

189

190

191

192

decisions about how to spend large pools of funds” before noting that determining victimhood “is
not simply an administrative task; there will be important policy decisions to be made, including
matters of foreign policy”).
The SFO followed this approach in the Chad Oil case discussed above. There, the SFO transferred
the recovered money to DFID to “identify key projects to invest in that will benefit the poorest in
Chad.” See SFO Recovers £4.4m from Corrupt Diplomats in ‘Chad Oil’ Share Deal, SFO: NEWS RELEASE
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://perma.cc/B2JV-RYPH. Furthermore, where the DOJ has opted to pursue
infrastructure investment as part of the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative, the DOJ has opted
to identify areas in which infrastructure investment is most needed.
Max Goldbart, £2m Smith & Ouzman Fine Funds African Development, PRINTWEEK (Mar. 21, 2017),
https://perma.cc/RR4S-EQTU.
DFID MEDIA TEAM, DFID Acquires £4.4 Million from Corruption Case to Tackle Poverty in
Chad, GOV.UK: DFID IN THE NEWS (Mar. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/B2K8-VWYG; DFID
MEDIA TEAM, DFID on Spending UK Aid on Infrastructure in Developing Countries, GOV.UK:
DFID IN THE NEWS (Oct. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/8DP4-9JRB (“The main thrust of DFID’s
work in [developing countries] centers around improving transportation services and
infrastructure.”).
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 181.
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See generally IREX, THE BOTA FOUNDATION: FINAL SUMMATIVE REPORT
https://perma.cc/LJ3Z-9XZY.
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Hana Vizcarra & Laura Bloomer, DOJ Phases Out Supplemental Environmental Projects in Environmental
Enforcement, HARV. L. SCH. ENV’T. & ENERGY L. PROGRAM (Aug. 6, 2020),
https://perma.cc/3GTM-D62N.
Spalding, supra note 11, at 1417.
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same cannot always be said for indirect harm flowing from corrupt practices.
Nonetheless, this aspect of environmental regulation provides a useful and
insightful point of comparison.
There is precedent for a form of remediation that does not require monies
to be paid into the state in which bribery occurred. Instead, money can be paid to
general anti-corruption initiatives.196 For example, as part of the settlement
agreement entered into between the World Bank and Siemens AG, a German
manufacturing giant, for bribery paid in connection with a World Bank
development project in Russia, Siemens agreed to dedicate US$100 million over
fifteen years to support anti-corruption work.197 Siemens subsequently launched
the “Siemens Integrity Initiative,” inviting nongovernmental organizations and
international organizations, associations, and universities to apply to Siemens for
funding for projects that would “promote business integrity and fight
corruption.”198 There is also support for this type of approach in the literature.199
Matthew Turk has suggested that money paid as part of FCPA disgorgement fines
that cannot be transferred to the state in which the bribery occurred should instead
be given to the OECD to bolster its anti-bribery efforts.200 Professor Spalding has
similarly suggested that fines could be directed towards local organizations capable
of investigating corruption.201 Spalding makes the point that the DOJ could
determine the amount of money to dedicate to remediation in FCPA settlements
in the same way it calculates fines.202 In the U.S., there is even support for this
196

197

198

199

International criminal law may provide a degree of guidance. International criminal law scholars
and courts have dealt with the concept of “transformative reparations,” which are dedicated to
changing the societal structures that perpetuated a particular breach of international criminal law.
See Andrea Durbach & Louise Chappell, Leaving Behind the Age of Impunity: Victims of Gender Violence
and the Promise of Reparations, 16 INT’L FEMINIST J. POL. 543 (2014). However, it must be kept in mind
that reparations of this nature can carry the potential to further neocolonial agendas and usurp
democratic mandates in the state in which they are carried out. See Leila Ullrich, Faculty of Law,
University of Oxford, Can Reparations Transform Societies? The Practice of “Transformative
Justice” at the International Criminal Court, Presentation at Oxford Transitional Justice Research
Seminar (Mar. 17, 2016), https://perma.cc/K9DE-MK6K.
Press Release, World Bank, Siemens to Pay $100 Million to Fight Fraud and Corruption as Part of
World Bank Group Settlement (July 2, 2009), https://perma.cc/D8UU-MUWQ.
Press Release, World Bank, Siemens Launches US$100 Million Initiative for Anti-Corruption (Dec.
9, 2009), https://perma.cc/9J97-AKMH.
See, e.g., Lim et al., supra note 153, at 17 (“Rather than regarding FCPA fines as national revenue, an
institutional mechanism could be established to channel the monies collected towards public
purposes, pursuant to a broad conception of ‘remedy.’”).
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Matthew C. Turk, A Political Economy Approach to Reforming the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 325 (2013).
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Spalding, supra note 11, at 1417.
Andrew B. Spalding, Restorative Justice for Multinational Corporations, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 357, 397–402
(2015). See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C1.1–4.11 (2018),
https://perma.cc/DJR2-7ERA, for an overview of how fines are calculated.
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type of approach at a legislative level. Legislation has been introduced in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate that would see a portion of FCPA
settlements placed into an “anti-corruption fund.”203 That fund would then be
used to assist developing nations in their respective fights against corruption. 204
The proposed legislation would not remediate the harm to victims of corruption,
but it is an example of the U.S. political system showing its readiness to repurpose
the proceeds of FCPA settlements for relatively benign and constructive purposes.
Ignoring a nexus requirement has one distinct advantage: enforcement agencies
are not left to attempt to put a number on how much money should be paid in
reparations or to identify a portion of society most impacted by an act of foreign
bribery. Conversely, there is nothing to tie these payments to the nation in which
bribery occurred, let alone to a specific act of bribery.205 Given the inherent
difficulties intertwined with the risk of repeat corruption in orchestrating the
payment of reparations, these types of payments could well find favor with
enforcement agencies and the other government agencies who take it upon
themselves to organize reparations schemes.
Ultimately, this Article expresses a preference for enforcement agencies to
first determine whether a nexus exists and only then consider whether reparations
can be provided to some other area of public outlay if either no nexus can be
identified or there is some other compelling reason to not provide reparations to
whichever segment of society was harmed. Alternatively, if it is impossible or
impracticable, for whatever reason, to pay reparations into the state in which the
bribery occurred, enforcement agencies might consider ordering payment to some
kind of general anti-corruption agenda, as occurred in the Siemens case, as a last
resort. This way, if adhering to a nexus requirement or paying reparations back
into the state in which bribery occurred is infeasible, enforcement agencies can at
least try to remedy indirect harm by seeking some other form of remediation.
What is most important, however, is that some conception of nexus be articulated,
including the circumstances in which that nexus requirement might be
disregarded, so that at the very least the provision of reparations is made
predictable, consistent, and coherent to the greatest extent possible.
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The legislation introduced in the House would apportion five percent of all FCPA fines and
penalties to anti-corruption initiatives, while the legislation introduced in the Senate would redirect
US$5 million from every case in which fines and penalties exceed US$50 million. See H.R. 3843,
supra note 15; S. 3026, 116 Cong. (2019).
For a more in-depth discussion, see Abigail Bellows, Revamping U.S. Anti-Corruption Assistance, AM.
INTEREST (June 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/JMC2-UKEH.
Margaret Urban Walker has argued that transformative reparations that do not respond to any
particular type of harm can substitute broader social goals for the need to remediate specific victims,
which in turn diminishes the victim-centric function of reparations. See Margaret Urban Walker,
Transformative Reparations? A Critical Look at a Current Trend in Thinking about Gender-Just Reparations,
10 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 108, 110 (2016).
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B. Risk of Repeat Corruption
Assessing the risk of repeat corruption may prove more complex in
reparations cases, as the agency administering reparations has to satisfy itself that
funds dispersed through a publicly accessible apparatus will not become
repurposed for corrupt ends.206 The U.S. and U.K. exhibit different approaches to
managing this risk. Non-trial resolutions negotiated by the DOJ tend to impose
positive and negative obligations on the parties to the agreement, stipulating how
reparations monies can and cannot be spent. The SFO, on the other hand, does
not include these details in non-trial resolutions, leaving reparations schemes to
be administered by other U.K. government agencies.
As part of its Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative, the DOJ has
implemented reparations schemes by donating money to charity, investing money
in infrastructure projects, and creating a charitable organization. One instance in
which the DOJ was involved in the creation of an independent foundation to
deliver reparations is particularly instructive, as it sets out how those charged with
managing the risk of repeat corruption might do so successfully.207 The settlement
agreement, negotiated in 2007 following the seizure and forfeiture of more than
US$115,000 over the course of investigating alleged breaches of the FCPA and
other federal crimes,208 contained the following relevant stipulations: the
foundation would be administered by a carefully selected multinational panel;
money could be withheld from the foundation if the foundation’s independence
became compromised; stringent procedural safeguards attached to the release of
funds from the foundation; the foundation was subject to extensive auditing and
reporting requirements; and the DOJ (and other organizations involved) retained
the right to demand the return of funds from the organization in the event that its
independence became compromised.209 The foundation supported three
programs: conditional cash transfers to increase access to health, education, and
206

This problem has arisen in the context of India’s policy of corporate social responsibility. In India,
the Companies Act of 2013 obligates high-earning and high-value companies to donate to charities.
The process of donation creates a risk of bribery, exposing companies to liability under both Indian
national bribery laws and foreign bribery laws such as the FCPA. Companies subject to India’s
Companies Act of 2013 are therefore essentially tasked with managing the risk of repeat corruption.
This is typically achieved through preemptive means, such as extensive due diligence. For more
information, see John E. Turlais & David W. Simon, Where India’s Companies Act Meets the FCPA,
FOLEY (May 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/XD4C-4CGZ.
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For further background on this case, see Spalding, supra note 11, at 1418.
See Elizabeth Spahn, Discovering Secrets: Act of State Defenses to Bribery Cases, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 163,
164–75 (2009) (providing a discussion of the convoluted and controversial James Giffen case); see
also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., DOJ Settlement Successfully Releases More Than $115
Million in Alleged Corruption Proceeds to People in Kazakhstan (Dec. 9, 2015),
https://perma.cc/FPA6-68JL.
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Mem. of Understanding, U.S.-Kaz.-Switz., May 2, 2007, https://perma.cc/QHT6-XVVC; see also
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 208. See generally IREX, supra note 193.
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social welfare for impoverished families; conditional grants to local and
international charities and nongovernmental organizations to promote children’s
health and the well-being of orphans; and a tuition-assistance program.210 In this
particular case, there were attempts to fraudulently extract money from the
foundation, but they all failed when they were detected as a result of the auditing
and transparency measures in place.211 And while substantial costs were incurred
in ensuring accountability and transparency, reparations were delivered
successfully.212 Similar techniques were also used by BAE Systems in
administering reparations to the Tanzanian education system. BAE Systems
insisted that reparations money would be paid out only in tranches, subject to the
approval of a supervisory committee that would review the way the money was
used.213
In another Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative case in 2014, the DOJ
entered into a settlement agreement stipulating that the assets of a corrupt
politician from a developing nation would be auctioned, and the resultant
proceeds would be donated to a charity in that politician’s state.214 That settlement
agreement contained the following features to minimize the risk of repeat
corruption in dispersing reparations: the reparations monies could be spent only
“for the benefit of the people” of the relevant state; the reparations monies could
not be used to “make any payments or provide any form of consideration” to an
enumerated list of third parties associated with the corrupt politician; and, lastly,
the charitable body that received the reparations monies had to publish “an
accounting of its expenditures of the funds and the results of those expenditures
on an annual basis until such funds are fully expended.”215
The DOJ has not wavered from its approach of using the terms of non-trial
resolutions to solidify the contours of reparations schemes. In February 2020, the
DOJ orchestrated the return of approximately US$308 million to Nigeria through
the terms of a trilateral agreement with the governments of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria and the Bailiwick of Jersey.216 That agreement included measures to
ensure transparency and accountability, including administration of the funds and
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IREX, supra note 193.
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Id. at 54.
See Oxford Pol’y Mgmt, Evaluation of the BOTA Foundation’s Programmes, Kazakhstan:
Summary Note 4 (2014), https://perma.cc/GL2R-B8FJ.
See Nicholas et al., supra note 87, at 42.
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Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 181.
United States v. One Michael Jackson Signed Thriller Jacket, No. CV 13-9169-GW-SS, at 21, 23–
24 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2014).
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Enters into Trilateral Agreement with Nigeria and Jersey to
Repatriate Over $300 Million to Nigeria in Assets Stolen by Former Nigerian Dictator General Sani
Abacha (Feb. 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/HRS8-4WFJ.
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projects by a designated agency, independent audits, and monitoring.217 The
agreement also precluded the expenditure of funds to benefit alleged perpetrators
of corruption.218
In the U.K., the risk of repeat corruption has been managed primarily by the
DFID and the FCO. These agencies have, in the past, been tasked with exploring
opportunities to donate and invest monies exacted through non-trial resolutions.
This approach relies less on the drafting of the non-trial resolution because an
entity separate from the enforcement agency is able to dedicate its competences
to managing the risk of repeat corruption.219 An advantage of this approach can
be found in the Smith & Ouzman case mentioned previously. In that case, the
sentencing judge noted that the SFO had not been able to identify any safe
recipient of remediation monies, so remediation of any kind was inappropriate.220
However, U.K. government agencies, including the DFID, were able to
orchestrate a reparations scheme involving the purchase of ambulances. The
advantage of this approach to reparations is that dedicated government agencies
may be able to achieve outcomes not possible for an enforcement agency seeking
to curb the risk of repeat corruption through the terms of a non-trial resolution.
The disadvantage is obviously one of resources and funding.
An alternate approach to relying on the terms of the non-trial resolution or
involving other government instrumentalities may be to outsource certain work
to civil-society organizations. As noted in a report prepared by the University of
Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, for the purposes of evaluating reparations
administered in the BAE Systems case, “civil society is more likely to ensure that
the funds obtained through compensation for corruption benefit the victims. A
high number of civil society organizations work directly with people adversely
affected by corruption such as impoverished communities.”221 It is therefore
possible that enforcement agencies might consider whether there is a reliable civilsociety organization that might play some role in transparently administering
reparations.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discern which approach is superior.
Indeed, the appropriateness of either may be determined by external factors such
as the availability of funds to dedicate to managing risk. What is important is that
enforcement agencies consistently refer to the risk of repeat corruption as a
precondition for pursuing reparations, explain their reasoning regarding why that
risk could or could not be managed in a given case, and articulate their strategies
217
218

Id.
Id.

219

The DFID’s role in the BAE Systems case provides a useful example. See generally Nicholas et al.,
supra note 87.
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LINKLATERS, supra note 184, at 5.
See Nicholas et al., supra note 87, at 49.
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for managing repeat corruption.222 This will ensure that enforcement agencies
continue to develop competences in this field.

C. Whether Reparations are Appropriate in the Circumstances
As noted above, the rubrics to underscore remediation presented in this
Article are a first attempt at laying the groundwork for a fledging practice
entrenched in prosecutorial discretion, so the inclusion of an open-ended
consideration is necessary. By taking into account whether reparations are
appropriate, enforcement agencies can refer to peculiar circumstances that could
not be foreseen. As also noted above, the inherent vagueness of this consideration
should not undermine the internal coherence of remedial settlement distribution
as a practice if enforcement agencies clearly articulate why reparations are
appropriate or inappropriate. Indeed, if enforcement agencies consistently refer
to the same consideration as rendering remediation unnecessary, then that
particular consideration may find its way into later articulations of official
multifactorial approaches adopted by enforcement agencies. That is to say,
remedial settlement distribution is a developing practice, and the inclusion of this
final consideration will, if wielded correctly, aid in its development.
The most prominent example that may arise in the context of reparations is
whether the victim state has a need for the reparations. If the victim of a foreign
bribery scheme is a developed nation, it is highly likely that remediation would not
be considered by the victim state to be necessary. This is because the trickle-down
impact of a single foreign bribery scheme in the developed world is unlikely to
cause any harm, even diffuse or indirect harm, to citizens. Further, the willingness
of an international organization, foreign government, or a local civil society
organization to assist in administering or monitoring a reparations scheme might
also count toward the appropriateness of reparations.

VI. C ONCLUSION
The remediation of the harm suffered by the victims of foreign bribery, and
of corrupt practices more generally, is a conceptually dense and practically fraught
field that has received little attention in the literature to date despite its growing
prominence. This Article has limited its focus to foreign bribery non-trial
resolutions and attempted to reduce some of the more complex issues into a set
of working definitions and a framework that can be readily referred to by those
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The importance of enforcement agencies creating a body of informal precedent to develop the
competencies of agencies assessing the risk of repeat corruption cannot be overstated. Those
involved with administering reparations to the Tanzanian school system following the BAE System
cases discussed above complained of “a lack of precedents” to guide the process. See id. at 40 (citing
INT’L DEV. COMM., supra note 184, at 10).
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agencies involved with the remedial settlement distribution, in addition to
academics and policy-makers operating in this growing area.
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A Transnational Law of the Sea
Josh Martin

Abstract
It is widely accepted that we are presently struggling to govern the vast expanse of the ocean
effectively. This Article finally gets to the real cause of much of the failures of the law of the sea:
Westphalian sovereignty. In particular, it evidences that certain features of our obstinate model
of public international law—such as sovereign exclusivity, equality, and territoriality—can be
linked with a large majority of the governance “gaps” in the global ocean context. It thereby
exonerates the falsely accused Grotius’s mare liberum doctrine and flag state regulation, which
both still continue to receive an unmerited level of condemnation. This Article also argues that
worldwide searches for new integrated systems of ocean management are, in fact, a search for a
new paradigm of governance, well-known among lawyers, but yet to be thoroughly analyzed in
the law of the sea context, that of transnational law and governance. The study supports this
conclusion by showing that two principal features of a transnational law of the sea—in the form
of multi-stakeholder participation and multi-level governance—have already proven essential in
ameliorating many of the routine weaknesses in our present international system of ocean
governance.
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I. A DDRESSING THE L EGAL S YSTEM ; N OT J UST THE L EGAL
R ULES
The law of the sea is failing. Wherever one looks, whether it be ecosystem
damage and biodiversity decimation, overfishing, seabed trawling, coral
destruction, human rights abuses, human trafficking, piracy, smuggling, crime,
wreck looting, noise pollution, land-based pollution, vessel-source pollution,
health and safety failures, or major maritime disasters, one can witness recurring
deficiencies in regulatory oversight.1 In consideration of the ocean’s ecological,
social, economic, and cultural value, this increasing visibility of poor regulatory
management has led to a recent proliferation of research dedicated to improving
our protection of the seas. For example, in 2001, an expert international
committee submitted a report that at the turn of the twentieth century, “the state
of the world’s seas and oceans [was] deteriorating.”2 Furthermore, “most of the
problems identified decades ago have not been resolved, and many are
worsening.”3 Twenty years later, things still have not changed.
As James Harrison said in 2017:
[A]s the twentieth century progressed, the rapid industrialization of the
oceans has meant that any lingering belief that the seas were “inexhaustible”
gave way to a growing sense of crisis. This trend has continued to the extent
that, today, there are warning signs that the oceans are at tipping point, owing
to the impacts of pollution and other environmental stresses caused by
anthropogenic activity.4

This has led to calls from every corner of the international community to
transform our approach to ocean management away from the traditional “zonal”
system of ocean management toward a more integrated and inclusive system.5 The
development of such “Integrated Ocean Management” (IOM) processes, in
various forms, can be increasingly witnessed on local, national, regional, and global
1

2

3
4

5

See, e.g., IAN URBINA, THE OUTLAW OCEAN: CRIME AND SURVIVAL IN THE LAST UNTAMED
FRONTIER (2019); WILLIAM LANGEWIESCHE, THE OUTLAW SEA: A WORLD OF FREEDOM, CHAOS,
AND CRIME (2004); TED DANSON & MICHAEL D’ORSO, OCEANA: OUR ENDANGERED OCEANS
AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO SAVE THEM (2011); KRISTINA M. GJERDE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE, REGULATORY AND GOVERNANCE GAPS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF MARINE
BIODIVERSITY IN AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION (2008).
GROUP OF EXPERTS ON THE SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, A
SEA OF TROUBLES 1 (Geoffrey Lean et al. eds., 2001).
Id.
JAMES HARRISON, SAVING THE OCEANS THROUGH LAW: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 1 (2017) (citations omitted).
See also Karen N. Scott, Integrated Oceans Management: A New Frontier in Marine Environmental Protection,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 463, 463 (Donald R. Rothwell et al. eds.,
2015).
See Section V.
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scales.6 Additionally, many international, governmental, and non-governmental
organizations are increasingly exploring the need for a new IOM paradigm,
including the International Union for the Conservation of Nature,7 the U.N. Food
and Agricultural Organization,8 the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration,9 the World Wildlife Fund,10 the U.N. Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO),11 and the Conference of the Parties under the
1992 Convention on Biological Diversity.12 Research is also becoming more active
in the search for the precise meaning of such “integrated” systems of ocean
management, sporadically and fragmentedly spotting the need for ecosystemsbased approaches,13 stakeholder participation,14 regional governance,15 or
proposals for a more holistic system of regulation across ocean space.16
Despite these well-intended efforts, humankind is still failing to get a grip on
ocean governance. This Article demonstrates that the real root cause of this failure
is our devotion to a Westphalian system of international law. It suggests that it is
not—as has been previously suspected—the fault of Hugo Grotius’s 1609 thesis
propounding a supposed “Freedom of the Seas” or the widespread use of flag
state regulation per se. Instead, responsibility lies squarely with a dogmatic reliance
6

See generally Scott, supra note 4.

7

WORLD COMMISSION ON PROTECTED AREAS, INCORPORATING MARINE PROTECTED AREAS INTO
INTEGRATED COASTAL AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES (Charles Ehler
et al. eds., 2004).
Melanie Torrie, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Integrated Ocean Management Fisheries, Oil, Gas, and Seabed Mining, 122 GLOBEFISH RSCH. PROGRAMME 1 (2016).
U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NOS Helping NOAA Serve the Nation as a
Global Leader in Integrated Management of the Ocean, https://perma.cc/6929-DBM8; U.S. National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NATIONAL OCEAN SERVICE, https://perma.cc/A5LGZL82.
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, Integrated Ocean Management, https://perma.cc/X7HU-J28U.

8

9

10
11
12

13

One Planet, One Ocean, UNESCO, https://perma.cc/R9BV-FWVK.
Integrated Marine and Coastal Area Management (IMCAM), CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES ON THE
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (Dec. 4, 2007), https://perma.cc/LY4G-TYSV.
Elizabeth A. Kirk, Maritime Zones and the Ecosystem Approach: A Mismatch?, 8 REV. EUR. COMP. &
INT’L ENV’T L. 67, 72 (1999); Julia A. Ekstrom et al., A Tool to Navigate Overlaps in Fragmented Ocean
Governance, 33 MARINE POL’Y 532, 532–35 (2009).

14

Heather Ritchie & Geraint Ellis, ‘A System that Works for the Sea’? Exploring Stakeholder Engagement in
Marine Spatial Planning, 53 J. ENV’T PLAN. & MGMT. 701, 701–23 (2009); Morgan Gopnik et al.,
Coming to the Table: Early Stakeholder Engagement in Marine Spatial Planning, 36 MARINE POL’Y 1139,
1139–49 (2012).

15

See generally YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, A DUAL APPROACH TO OCEAN GOVERNANCE: THE CASES OF
ZONAL AND INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (2008);
GOVERNING EUROPE’S MARINE ENVIRONMENT: EUROPEANIZATION OF REGIONAL SEAS OF
REGIONALIZATION OF EU POLICIES? (Michael Gilek & Kristine Kern eds., Routledge 2015).

16

Gabriela A. Oanta, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment as a Goal for Achieving Sustainable
Development on the Rio+20 Agenda, 16 INT’L COMM. L. REV. 214, 219 (2014); see also Section V.
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on a horizontal and inter-state system of international law in the ocean context.
As will be evidenced, the failure of the legal system to effectively steward the
oceans can really be principally linked to three different traits of Westphalian
sovereignty: exclusivity, equality, and territoriality. This Article also provides a detailed
explanation and introduction to transnational law, including an account of the
dormant lex maritima, in order to (1) highlight the richness of this field and (2)
point to its lacking connection with the search for a new paradigm of ocean
governance. Finally, it concludes with the view that we should reduce our
emphasis on sovereign rights and duties and instead recognize the prevalent and
longstanding calls to legal plurality, multi-scalarity, multi-stakeholderism, and
post-nationalism.
Section II introduces the concept of transnational law as it stands in contrast
to the Westphalian system of public international law, highlighting the worldwide
movement to recognize and encourage law beyond the state, as well as the blurring
of “public” and “private” sources and systems of law. Section III then critically
examines the public international law system that has governed ocean
management up to now, illustrating the ways in which Westphalianism can be
linked to many failures of ocean stewardship. Section IV at last exonerates the
scapegoats for failed ocean governance over the past decades—Grotius’s Mare
Liberum and the notion of flag state regulation. In fact, this Article shows that
Westphalianism itself caused both well-meaning doctrines to fail in practice.
Section V connects the search for new “integrated” models of governance in the
marine environment with the need for a model that dispenses with strict notions
of national sovereignty and horizontal intergovernmental relations. This Section
demonstrates that two features of an effective transnational system of ocean
management are: (1) the expanded governance role for multiple and varied
stakeholders and (2) the arrangement of diverse normative frameworks across
multiple geographical scales. The Article concludes by calling for a greater
recognition of the need for a transnational law of the sea.

II. I NTRODUCING T RA NSNATIONAL L AW
A. Westphalianism
Westphalian sovereignty refers to our familiar system of inter-national law
resolved during thirty years of negotiations over the Münster and Osnabrück
treaties, concluded between numerous European nations in 1648, and effectively
ending the European wars of religion—a point in history known as the “Peace of
Westphalia.”17 But most recognize that Westphalianism was not necessarily created
17

See generally Derek Croxton, The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty, 21 INT’L HIST.
R. 569 (1999); DANIEL PHILPOTT, REVOLUTIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY: HOW IDEAS SHAPED MODERN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 73–150 (2001).
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at this moment, but rather organically developed over many centuries around the
world.18 The overall effect was the formal legitimation of the nation-state as the
exclusive legal authority for all territorially internal matters and the understanding
that all nation-states are equal and unitary for all external matters.19
A corollary to achieving temporary peace across Europe within this
emergent multi-state system was the widespread constitutionalization of polities
and quelling of competing internal claims to power.20 International governance
between the 17th and 20th centuries thus centered on both the strengthening of
zonal political boundaries and the demarcation of sovereignty within territories—
in which monolithic states possessed absolute independence to determine their
own internal laws free from outside influence and interference.21 The evermore
rigid political borders around states and the modeling of states as entirely unitary
and equal has, over the centuries, given birth to our modern system of inter-national
law—founded upon the principle of sovereign territorial independence, the
conclusion of positive international treaties, and the resolution of customary
norms between nations.22 Today, we remain firmly within this Westphalian system
of international law and thinking.23
National sovereignty has, therefore, been at the heart of our understanding
of law and jurisprudence for several centuries. Most legal philosophers in this time
have explicated law’s basis as being positively determined by a higher authority,
whether through the canon of natural law, or as achieved functionally through the
formal use of power.24 Even as recently as the 1960s, both H.L.A. Hart’s famous
primary and secondary rules and Hans Kelsen’s Grundnorm theories espoused that
law’s ultimate source of power is derived from its production through
18

19

20
21

Croxton, supra note 17, at 570; John Gerard Ruggie, Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity:
Toward a Neorealist Synthesis, 35 WORLD POL. 261, 275–76 (1983).
See generally FRANCIS HARRY HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY (2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1986); DIETER
GRIMM, SOVEREIGNTY: THE ORIGIN AND FUTURE OF A POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONCEPT (Belinda
Cooper trans., 2015).
Croxton, supra note 17; PHILPOTT supra note 17, at 73–150.
HENRY KISSINGER, WORLD ORDER, 11–48 (2014); Marie-Laure Djelic & Kerstin Sahlin, Reordering
the World: Transnational Regulatory Governance and Its Challenges, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
GOVERNANCE 745, 746 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012).

22

JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, SOVEREIGNTY: MORAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 91 (2014);
Croxton, supra note 17; KISSINGER, supra note 21; Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia 1648–1948, 42
AM. J. INT’L L. 20, 40–41 (1948). See generally A. Claire Cutler, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian
Assumptions of International Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 R. INT’L STUD. 133 (2001).

23

Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws, The United Nations: Continuity and Change, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED NATIONS 30–40 (Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws eds., 2018); John
H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 782–
802 (2003).

24

Expressed, for example, by early scholars such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jeremy Bentham,
John Austin, and Immanuel Kant.
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foundational law-making infrastructure, invariably found in the nation-state.25
Such positivist accounts of law remain or have become—unconsciously, at least—
widely subscribed to among people today; most of us do not believe that any law
is “law” unless a nation-state formally posits it through domestic legislative and
judicial processes.26 However, as discussed below, the multiple and everintensifying processes of globalization over the past half-century have triggered a
revisiting of the positivist and nationalist account. Indeed, as will be shown, in an
increasingly transnational world, there has been movement toward more
pluralistic and sociological accounts of law, taking a broader view of law’s
underlying quality as a norm.
Whether the identification of non-state law is achieved, for example, by
Brian Tamanaha’s Labelling System,27 Armin von Bogdandy’s Systems Theory,28
Gunther Teubner’s Autopoietic Theory,29 William Twining’s Levels Theory,30 or
Gralf-Peter Calliess’s Running Code Theory,31 the direction of recent thinking has
been predominantly consonant: not all law does, nor should, originate from the
nation-state. Law can be written or unwritten, and its sources can be local,
communal, religious, supranational, or global, as well as public, private, or hybrid,
and can possess normativity on a spectrum between the extremities of hard and
soft.32 In the globalization context, such accounts of global legal pluralism open the
possibility that we can be subject to multiple legal obligations, many of which can
originate within or without the domestic legal system of the nation-state.33
Naturally, there remain traditionalists who dispute this perspective. In some ways,
25

See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3d ed. 2012); Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law,
51 L.Q. REV. 517 (1935).

26

J. H. Dalhuisen, Legal Orders and Their Manifestation: The Operation of the International Commercial and
Financial Legal Order and Its Lex Mercatoria, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 129, 129–91 (2006); Thomas
Schultz, Some Critical Comments on the Juridicity of Lex Mercatoria, 10 Y.B. PRIV. INT’L L. 667, 667–711
(2008).

27

Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 296, 296–321 (2000).
See, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy & Sergio Dellavalle, The Lex Mercatoria of Systems Theory: Localisation,
Reconstruction and Criticism from a Public Law Perspective, 4 TRANSNAT’L L. THEORY 59, 59–82 (2012).
See generally GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).

28

29
30

WILLIAM TWINING, GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING LAW
PERSPECTIVE 362–75 (2009).

31

Gralf-Peter Calliess, Reflexive Transnational Law: The Privatisation of Civil Law and the Civilisation of Private
Law, 23 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 185, 185–216 (2002).

32

Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 869, 869–96 (1988); Franz von BendaBeckmann, Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism, 47 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 37, 37–82
(2002). See generally LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN
DIALOGUE (Brian Z. Tamanaha et al. eds., 2012).

33

NEGOTIATING STATE AND NON-STATE LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL AND LOCAL LEGAL
PLURALISM 2 (Michael A. Hefland ed., 2015) [hereinafter NEGOTIATING STATE AND NON-STATE
LAW]; NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF
POSTNATIONAL LAW 69–108 (2010).
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the battle lines are presently drawn between the legal positivists, who maintain an
account of law built upon “national” sovereignty, and legal pluralists, who
recognize and, in many cases, actively seek to expand additional laws “beyond the
state.”34 The pluralist account has certainly been welcomed in the globalized era.35

B. Transnational Law
Over the past half-century, the pluralist account of law has
contemporaneously led to the advancement of a new discourse in transnational
law.36 Transnational law, as widely understood, seeks to comprehend and even
encourage the complex configuration of legal rules and norms, both within and
without the state.37 Its appeal lies in its pluralist recognition that numerous actors
beyond the nation-state can be a source of legal norms or the principal shapers of
the legal system.38 Whether the law takes the form of supranational regulation,
global standards derived by non-state bodies, industry self-regulation, private
dispute settlement, or community norms, all trans-nationalists recognize that
individuals are often subject to rules through a variety of compliance-inducing
forces, such as positive, moral, communal, virtual, physical, internal, or natural. 39
Yet, it is important to recognize that international law and order still remains statecentric. The vast majority of legal objects obey the legal rules of a singular
domestic legal system, whether by territorial situation, contractual choice, or
imposition through private international law, and most actors rationalize
themselves as so subject.40 As such, transnational law is more of an emerging
34

35

36

37

See generally Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State—Europeanization, Globalization,
Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843, 870 (2006); Peer Zumbansen, Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial
Arbitration and Transnational Law, 8 EUR. L.J. 400, 428 (2002); A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER
AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY 60 (2003).
See, e.g., Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Private Regulatory Governance: Ambiguities of Public Authority and
Private Power, 76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117, 117–38 (2013); BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS,
TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC
TRANSITION (1995).
See, e.g., TRANSNATIONAL LAW: RETHINKING EUROPEAN LAW AND LEGAL THINKING (Miguel
Maduro et al. eds., 2014).
Id. See generally NEGOTIATING STATE AND NON-STATE LAW, supra note 33.

38

Paul Schiff Berman, The Evolution of Global Legal Pluralism, in AUTHORITY IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
THEORY: THEORISING ACROSS DISCIPLINES 151–90 (Roger Cotterrell & Maksymilian Del Mar eds.,
2016); Roger Cotterrell, What Is Transnational Law?, 37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 500, 500–24 (2012); Peer
Zumbansen, Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance, and Legal Pluralism,
21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305, 308 (2012). See generally DETLEF VON DANIELS, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW FROM A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2010).

39

Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. R. L. SOC. SCI. 225, 225–42 (2009); Paul Schiff
Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1157–58 (2007); Paul Schiff Berman, A
Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 301, 301–30 (2007).
See generally Dalhuisen, supra note 26.

40
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diversification and fragmentation in sources and subjects of law, rather than a
persuasive account of lex lata.41
In 1956, in his visionary introduction to transnational law, Philip Jessup
defined transnational law as “all law which regulates actions or events that
transcend national frontiers. Both public and private international law are
included, as well as other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard
categories.”42 This definition, though an early formulation, still commands an
impressive level of subscription among thinkers today.43 It also exemplifies the
potential vastness of the subject.44 Based on this idea, this Article defines
transnational law as the global legal system that recognizes and promotes all legal
norms of public, private, and hybrid origin, that vary between hard and soft and
that apply to the multiplicity of actors interacting across and between multiple
governance levels—local, national, regional, and global. In other words, both
transnational law and governance emphasize the multi-faceted, multi-level, and
multi-stakeholder nature of the global civil order and of the challenges facing it,
as well as seek to look beyond a state-based approach to law and accountability.
By contrast, the Westphalian account of international law has created an
unfortunately limited dualistic account of law: public international law, which
covers agreements between states, and municipal law, which encompasses national
law within states.45 This has resulted in the apparent neglect of a growing number
of legal norms—outside multilateral treaties and national law—which carry
normative force without sole reliance on state power, such as: (1) industry selfregulation and standards; (2) supranational law; (3) standards and rules developed
by international governmental, non-governmental or epistemic bodies; (4)
cooperation in law development and enforcement between public and private
partners; (5) other local, religious, or global standards; and (6) all forms and scales
of “governance,” between hard and soft.
Through internal enforcement mechanisms—such as peer pressure, media
scrutiny, economic sanctions, loss of trade access, diminution in consumer
demand, and loss of network access—transnational rules can drive high levels of
direct compliance by stakeholders, often being witnessed in the form of industry
41

Veerle Heyvaert, The Transnationalization of Law: Rethinking Law through Transnational Environmental
Regulation, 6 TRANSNAT’L ENV’T L. 205, 205–36 (2017). See generally SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING
CONTROL?: SOVEREIGNTY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996).

42

PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956) (emphasis added).
Daniel Kalderimis, Is Transnational Law Eclipsing International Law?, in MAKING TRANSNATIONAL LAW
WORK IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DETLEV VAGTS 93, 98 (Pieter Bekker et
al. eds., 2010).

43
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See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why and How to Study Transnational Law, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 97,
103–05 (2011); Cotterrell, supra note 38, at 501.

45

TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 3 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 2015); JAMES
CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 48–61 (9th ed. 2019).
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standards, certification schemes, internal adjudicative processes, community
agreed rules, or other non-state derived laws. To great effect, nation-states can
also loan their domestic enforcement architecture to external private, regional, or
global legal systems in co-regulatory processes which bolster the external
network’s internal power of enforcement.46
Transnational law thus grapples with the: transition from global
“government” to “governance”;47 ongoing fragmentation of international law;48
intensifying processes of globalization;49 increased role of non-state actors in the
administration of global public governance;50 blurring between private and public
stakeholders, and public and private law, in the transboundary context;51 growing
conceptual uncoupling of states from monolithic units into complex
administrative agents;52 expanded role of transboundary normative and policy
networks;53 postcolonial recognition of the incongruity between indigenous or
traditional laws with centralized state authority;54 increasing use of negotiation,
mediation, arbitration, expert opinion, and other private mechanisms of dispute

46

See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 243; André Nollkaemper, Compliance Control in International
Environmental Law: Traversing the Limits of the National Legal Order, 13 Y.B. INT’L ENV’T L. 165, 173–
75 (2003).

47

James N. Rosenau, Change, Complexity and Governance in a Globalizing Space, in DEBATING
GOVERNANCE: AUTHORITY, STEERING, AND DEMOCRACY 167, 167 (Jon Pierre ed., 2000); Maria
Bonnafous-Boucher, From Government to Governance, in STAKEHOLDER THEORY: A EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVE 1 (Maria Bonnafous-Boucher & Yvon Pesqueux eds., 2005).

48

Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (April 13, 2006).

49

TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 45, at 4; Eric C. Ip, Globalization and the Future of the
Law of Sovereign State, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 636, 636–55 (2010); Frank J. Garcia, Globalization’s Law:
Transnational, Global or Both?, in THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE 2015 31–46 (Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo ed., 2016). See generally JEAN-BERNARD
AUBY, GLOBALISATION, LAW AND THE STATE (2017).
See generally James Howley, The Non-State Actor and International Law: A Challenge to State Primacy?, 7
DIALOGUE 1 (2009); NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS (Anne Peters et al. ed., 2009).
See generally Lorenzo Casini, Down the Rabbit-Hole: The Projection of the Public/Private Distinction Beyond
the State, 12 INT’L J. CONST. L. 402 (2014).
Hari M. Osofsky, The Creation of the International Law of Climate Change: Complexities of Sub-State Actors,
in NON-STATE ACTORS, SOFT LAW AND PROTECTIVE REGIMES: FROM THE MARGINS 179, 190
(Cecilia M. Bailliet ed., 2012); Christoph Schreuer, The Warning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New
Paradigm for International Law, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 447, 450 (1993).
See generally Michele M. Betsill & Harriet Bulkeley, Transnational Networks and Global Environmental
Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program, 48 INT’L STUD. Q. 471; Diane Stone, Global Public
Policy, Transnational Policy Communities, and Their Networks, 36 POL’Y STUD. J. 19 (2008).
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John M. Hobson, The Other Side of the Westphalian Frontier, in POSTCOLONIAL THEORY AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 32–48 (Sanjay Seth ed., Routledge 2003).
See generally Roderic Pitty & Shannara Smith, The Indigenous Challenge to Westphalian Sovereignty, 46
AUSTRALIAN J. POL. SCI. 121 (2011).
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resolution in transnational settings; ongoing demands and uses for regulatory
harmonization;55 mounting interconnectedness of global society, enabling
decisions in one state to impact other states’ internal interests;56 and the generally
observed decline in the role of the nation-state, as traditionally understood, in
resolving cross-border challenges.57

C. Lex Maritima
Transnational law’s appeal lies particularly in the romantic notion of finding
overlapping international “communities” or networks who subject themselves to
a self-crafted legal system built around internal legal rules (self-defined or based
on community custom) and external legal rules (state, supranational, and global
laws), replete with their own dedicated machinery for internal norm resolution or
enforcement (including by negotiation, arbitration, or adjudication).58 The most
famous such global system is the supposed medieval lex mercatoria, or merchant
law. This system has arguably been revived in the modern context with
commercial customs and usages, state and non-state in origin, to which
transnational commercial actors subject themselves today.59 This is largely
supported by the almost unquestioning recognition of the legality of arbitration
awards and the very high level of internal compliance with them,60 as well as new
methods of internal coercion across the business community,61 with strong
reputational, mutual obligation, and internalization mechanisms occasioning

55

56

57

58

See generally THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HARMONISATION (Mads Andenas & Camilla Baasch
Andersen eds., 2011); Roy Goode, Reflections on the Harmonisation of Commercial Law, 1991 UNIF. L.
REV. 54 (1991).
Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods, 108 AM. J. INT’L
L. 1, 3 (2014); JOHN MCCORMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEAN UNION: A CONCISE
INTRODUCTION 3–4 (3rd ed. 2005). See generally MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK
SOCIETY (2d ed. 2010).
Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 50, 50–66 (1997). See generally STATES AGAINST
MARKETS: THE LIMITS OF GLOBALIZATION (Robert Boyer & Daniel Drache eds., 1996); SUSAN
STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY
(1996).
See generally TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 45.

59

See generally Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance, 13 J. EUR. PUB.
POL. 627 (2006); Klaus Peter Berger, The New Law Merchant and the Global Market Place, 3 INT’L ARB.
L. R. 91 (2000); Leon E. Trakman, The Evolution of the Law Merchant: Our Commercial Heritage - Part I:
Ancient and Medieval Law Merchant, 12 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1 (1980).
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Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 447, 455
(2007).
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Gillian K. Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law: Lessons from ICANN, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS.
L. 257, 287 (2002).
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compliance.62 Similarly, one can look at how the sovereign state has acquiesced its
role in deciding transnational commercial matters63 and readily recognizes and
enforces applications of non-state law.64 This picture of a transnational legal
system, most idealistically found in the commercial context, has also found
expression in numerous other visions of global legal communities,65 the most
interesting of which for present purposes is the lex maritima, or maritime law.66
The lex maritima envisages that, long before nation-states appropriated the
law of the sea and transcribed it into domestic legislation, much maritime activity
was self-governed by the maritime community themselves.67 The networking of
mariners across continental ports in previous centuries arguably necessitated the
development of mariners’ own systems of rules and customs. These customs and
rules were often enforced internally or via available town councils, merchant
courts, and guild consuls.68 Indeed, it seems well accepted that prior to the
embedding of the Westphalian ideology from the 17th century, many of the
maritime community’s rules had derived from widely shared codes and customary
principles, such as the Lex Rhodia, Rôles d’Oléron, Laws of Wisby, and the Consolata
del Mare.69 For example, one historian noted how maritime law was regarded as a
universal and “common system of law,” given that “[t]here was . . . in those days
nothing strange in laws that were not national.”70 Therefore, the extent to which
these maritime codes actually formed a unified common law, in preference to local
62

Dalhuisen, supra note 26, at 174; Ralf Michaels, The Re-Statement of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of
Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209, 1237 (2005).
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Stone Sweet, supra note 59, at 638; Michaels & Jansen, supra note 34, at 872; THOMAS E.
CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 293
(2005).
Gesa Baron, Do the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts Form a New Lex
Mercatoria?, 15 ARB. INT’L 115, 126 (1999); MARTIN M. SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW,
POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION 312 (2002). See generally David W. Rivkin, Enforceability of Arbitral
Awards Based on Lex Mercatoria, 9 ARB. INT’L 67 (1993).
Such as the lex sportiva (sports law), lex informatica (information law or cyber law), lex constructionis
(construction law), lex financiaria or argentaria (finance law), and lex petrolea (oil law).
See generally William Tetley, The General Maritime Law - The Lex Maritima, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. &
COM. 105 (1994); ANDREAS MAURER, LEX MARITIMA: GRUNDZÜGE EINES TRANSNATIONALEN
SEEHANDELSRECHTS (2012).
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ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF MARITIME TRADE AROUND EUROPE 1300–1600, 69–85 (Wim
Blockmans et al. eds., 2017).
William Senior, The History of Maritime Law, 38 THE MARINER’S MIRROR 260 (1952). See generally
Trakman, supra note 59; Tetley, supra note 66.
ROBERT M. HUGHES, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW 5–6 (1901). See generally Edda Frankot,
Medieval Maritime Law from Oléron to Wisby: Jurisdictions in the Law of the Sea, in COMMUNITIES IN
EUROPEAN HISTORY: REPRESENTATIONS, JURISDICTIONS, CONFLICTS 151 (Juan Pan-Montojo &
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custom and decentered regulation, has for some time been a question of academic
interest.
More recent and detailed historiographical scholarship on the matter,
however, has put considerable doubt on whether such a common maritime law ever
existed.71 Indeed, many have correctly pointed out that the dearth of social bonds
and interdependencies between regional actors in the pre-globalization age makes
it inevitable that divergent customs and interests would have undermined any
efforts at establishing unified laws across continents.72 A great deal of research
has, therefore, attempted to disprove the transnational account by disproving the
historical account.73 Yet, whether a common maritime law existed in the medieval
period does not detract from the essential hypothesis that unified systems carry
normative advantages in denationalized contexts. As Ralf Michaels has aptly
summarized, “whether there ever was a true lex mercatoria . . . [is] relatively
secondary.”74
Along this more precise line of inquiry, the commentary is far more
unanimous. For example, a system of maritime community-led law should carry
additional advantages of efficiency through the utilization of stakeholder
resources, lower transaction costs, and strong compliance incentivization.75 By
penalization, suspension, or ostracism of community members, it would also be
possible to effectively punish rule-breakers and to improve trade access by
utilizing reputational mechanisms, trust-building, and clearing houses.76
Furthermore, there is an argument that such communities of mariners would hold
greater esteem toward legal rules that were crafted and enforced by and among

71

See generally EDDA FRANKOT, OF LAWS OF SHIPS AND SHIPMEN: MEDIEVAL MARITIME LAW AND ITS
PRACTICE IN URBAN NORTHERN EUROPE (2012); Cordes, supra note 67; Emily Kadens, Myth of the
Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153 (2012); Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace:
The Modern Distortion of the Medieval Law Merchant, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 685 (2006).
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ARB. INT’L 86 (2014).
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Resolution and Enforcement without the State, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 269, 270–80 (2005); Filip De Ly, Lex
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TORONTO L.J. 265 (2003).
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themselves.77 In other words, by eschewing the strict role of the nation-state, a
transnational legal system has a greater capacity to handle the complex, reflexive,
and multi-level interactions in the globalized or transnational context.

III. W EAKNESSES OF THE I NTERNATIONAL L AW OF THE S EA
It is becoming increasingly clear that there is something wrong with the system
of the international law of the sea, rather than merely the content of the laws
themselves.78 However, while law of the sea scholars have made ad hoc or casual
references to issues such as zonality, territorial sovereignty, and state compliance,
commentary has rarely pointed at the Westphalian system of international law as
the root cause of failed ocean management.79 This section suggests that three
integral and interlinked manifestations of the Westphalian system—sovereign
exclusivity, sovereign equality, and territorial sovereignty—represent the fundamental
weaknesses in our international law of the sea.

A. Sovereign Exclusivity
Sovereign exclusivity refers to the unrestricted authority of states to assume
absolute rule over their own subjects. It regards nation-states as entirely unitary
systems, where everything that relates to regulatory governance of a nation’s
citizens is under the self-determination of a discrete and centralized authority.80 In
the maritime context, as elsewhere, this exclusive sovereignty manifests itself by
nation-states freely deciding whether to enter into international treaties.81
Negotiations, therefore, habitually lead to diluted, ambiguous, and hortatory
commitments between states.82 What is more, assuming that a recalcitrant state
even agrees to enter into a resulting treaty, it still possesses discretion as to the
77

78
79
80

81

82

See KIRK EMERSON & TINA NABATCHI, COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE REGIMES 64–68 (2015). See
generally Benjamin Cashore, Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental Governance: How Non-State
Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making Authority, 15 GOVERNANCE: INT’L J.
POL’Y, ADMIN. & INSTS. 503 (2002).
See Section V.
See Section III.A.
See, e.g., PERRY ANDERSON, LINEAGES OF THE ABSOLUTIST STATE (1974); Arthur L. Goodhart, Rule
of Law and Absolute Sovereignty, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 943 (1958); John Charvet, The Idea of State Sovereignty
and the Right of Humanitarian Intervention, 18 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 39 (1997).
A well-known example is the continued refusal of the U.S. to ratify the U.N. 1982 Convention on
the Law of the Sea. Mark A. Pollack, Who Supports International Law, and Why: The United States, the
European Union, and the International Legal Order, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 873, 878–79 (2015).
See MARGARET P. KARNS, KAREN A. MINGST & KENDALL W. STILES, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS: THE POLITICS AND PROCESSES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 27 (3d ed. 2015);
George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News about Compliance Good
News about Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 392–95 (1996); SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND
STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING 11 (2003).
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interpretation and implementation of the treaty against its own citizens in the
domestic realm.83 Further, for most global public goods—such as the protection
of the ocean environment—states often have more to gain individually and less
to lose by weak compliance.84
Although rarely linked, these manifestations of sovereign exclusivity are
important criticisms of the present model of ocean management. First, the
majority of international ocean management treaties suffer from the trade-off
between invoking strong commitments and the need for widespread ratification.85
A good example is the United Nations 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea
(LOSC).86 Although a remarkable achievement in terms of comprehensive and
consensus-based treaty making, the LOSC did not receive support and ratification
from most key maritime powers until an implementation agreement in 1994—in
effect, a rewrite of Part XI—neutered the original vision of fairly sharing the
resources of the deep seabed.87 Formal treaties, therefore, also end up with weak
and precatory language, such as requiring states to “cooperate”88 or that they
“should” follow a course of action.89 Often, the only way to get states to enter into
international commitments is by adopting hollow language or developing

83
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See JEAN L. COHEN, GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY: RETHINKING LEGALITY, LEGITIMACY,
AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 33 (2012); CARMEN E. PAVEL, DIVIDED SOVEREIGNTY: INTERNATIONAL
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Disorder in the Oceans, 27 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 813 (2012); Rosemary Rayluse, To Our
Children’s Children: From Promoting to Achieving Compliance in High Seas Fisheries, 20 INT’L J. MARINE &
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(James Cameron et al. eds., 1995).

85
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& Stephen C. Vasciannie, Deep Seabed Mining Under the Law of the Sea Convention and the Implementation
Agreement: Developing Country Perspectives, 51 SOC. & ECON. STUD. 63, 67–68 (2002).
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international “soft law.”90 Naturally, however, such rules have numerous
difficulties, including weaknesses in enforceability and the lack of vigor in
compliance.91 Even through a constructivist lens—that sees the gradual hardening
of norms by facilitated learning and coordination92—compliance can be
damagingly poor for extended time periods. This is often the case until a media
fallout from a catastrophic event that at last foments regulatory motivation and
action, which is all too frequently after the event.93
Second, states can hold treaty negotiations for ransom, driving forward the
hegemonic and politicized nature of ocean law. It is no coincidence that the most
powerful maritime nations tend to espouse legal rules that are most closely aligned
with international custom.94 Such multilaterally defined laws usually favor those
nations found higher in the pecking order of global power. The excessive reliance
upon flag state enforcement has suited the most powerful flag states95—just as a
“first-come, first-served” system of managing resources in the high seas has suited
the most industrialized nations.96 A driving factor in the sudden expansion of state
claims in the aftermath of World War II is perhaps that the U.S., U.K., Russia,
France, Japan, Canada, and Australia are each in the worldwide top ten of

90
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91

See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 90, at 426–34; Richard Barnes, The Convention on the Law of the Sea:
An Effective Framework for Domestic Fisheries Conservation?, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: PROGRESS AND
PROSPECTS 233, 254–55 (David Freestone et al. eds., 2006). See generally Antje Wiener, Enacting
Meaning-in-Use: Qualitive Research on Norms and International Relations, 35 REV. INT’L STUD. 175 (2009).
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Working Paper, No. 2016-21, 2016), https://perma.cc/M2BU-ST4U; Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic
International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 843 (2001).
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exclusive economic zone (EEZ) size.97 The subsequent conclusion of an
international convention that permits these states to exclusively extract the wealth
of resources hundreds of miles offshore, but with little meaningful legal
responsibility to steward the protection of their EEZ’s natural environment, is
perhaps unsurprising. As Gregory Shaffer says in another context, international
law has “failed to constrain power when power chose to belittle and ignore it, and
it served to legitimize power when power deigned to deploy it.”98 Seen in this light,
the burgeoning naval strength of China in the Southwest Pacific and its growing
friction with both the LOSC and the rule of law is as unsurprising as it is
predictable.99
An essential result of this politicization of the law of the sea and of the
freedom of states to reject or dilute international agreements is the inability to
compel or coerce states into assuming additional obligations or burdens.100 With
its flawed reliance upon states primarily agreeing to be bound by consent,
international law allows for commitments between states, which maximizes the
opportunity to externalize losses and minimize economic risks from ocean-based
activities.101 The most visible example is the continual reinvocation of the system
of flag state enforcement. This system for regulating ocean stakeholders—relying
on the exclusive enforcement of a flag state’s national legal rules within its
domestic courts—is widely felt to be a poor system of ocean supervision and
accountability.102 The deficient enforcement of the “genuine link” requirement—
97
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requiring that there be a “genuine link” between vessels and the states where they
are registered, which is discussed further below—and the fact that most flag states
are distant from and indifferent to the true activities of vessels bearing their flag
has led many to argue that sole reliance upon flag state enforcement is a formula
for failure.103 Indeed, many “flags-of-convenience” specialize in maximizing the
internalization of financial gains and the externalization of environmental or
health and safety harms.104
Another manifestation of sovereign exclusivity is the complete freedom of
states to interpret, implement, and enforce resulting treaties. Such commitments
between states are not only weak in compliance pull, but create international
agreements that are deliberately vague and ambiguous.105 Examples abound in the
maritime context, including phrases such as “maximum sustainable yield” in both
Article 119 of the LOSC106 and Article 5 of the 1995 U.N. Fish Stocks
Agreement,107 and also “purposes of scientific research” in the 1946 International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.108 Such equivocal phrases are
intentionally included to provide sufficient latitude in self-interpretation and selfdiscipline, so as to incentivize objecting or free-riding states to join the treaty
regimes.109 While this practice is often coined “constructive ambiguity,” an
alternative term could be “destructive ambiguity,” given how states often flout
such well-intentioned phrases and interpret them in a self-interested manner that
is destructive to the wider community.110
103

MANSELL, supra note 102; Dorota Englender et al., Cooperation and Compliance Control in Areas Beyond
National Jurisdiction, 49 MARINE POL’Y 186, 186 (2014). See generally Patricia Birnie, Reflagging of Fishing
Vessels on the High Seas, 2 REV. EUR. COMTY. INT’L ENV’T L. 270 (2006); Tamo Zwinge, Duties of Flag
States to Implement and Enforce International Standards and Regulations—And Measures to Counter Their
Failure to Do So, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 297 (2011).

104

See RAYFUSE, supra note 102, at 25. See generally Tina Shaughnessy & Ellen Tobi, Flags of Inconvenience:
Freedom and Insecurity on the High Seas, 5 J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (2007); Tony Alderton & Nik
Winchester, Globalisation and De-regulation in the Maritime Industry, 26 MARINE POL’Y 35 (2002); Tony
Alderton & Nik Winchester, Regulation, Representation and the Flag Market, 4 J. MAR. RES. 89 (2002).
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See generally supra notes 82, 88–91, 93 and accompanying text.
LOSC, supra note 86, art. 119(1)(a).
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Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, art. 5(b), opened for signature Dec. 4, 1995, 2167
U.N.T.S. 88, (entered into force Dec. 11, 2001).
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International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, art. 8, Dec. 2, 1946, 161 U.N.T.S. 72
(entered into force Nov. 10, 1948).
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See generally Dražen Pehar, Use of Ambiguities in Peace Agreements, in LANGUAGE AND DIPLOMACY 87
(Jovan Kurbalija & Hannah Slavik eds, 2001).
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See generally Italy Fischhendler, When Ambiguity in Treaty Design Becomes Destructive: A Study of
Transboundary Water, 8 GLOB. ENV’T POL. 111 (2008); Susanne Therese Hansen, Taking Ambiguity
Seriously: Explaining the Indeterminacy of the European Union Conventional Arms Export Control Regime, 22
EUR. J. INT’L REL. 192 (2016).
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This unrestricted freedom of states to interpret, implement, and enforce the
laws governing their citizens is at the heart of the struggling system of ocean
stewardship. Its weakness is perhaps most vividly manifested in the unconditional
freedom of states to self-interpret and enforce the genuine link requirement for
registering vessels under Article 91 of the LOSC.111 As flag states assume the
central responsibility for managing offshore operations, it is vital that those
operations possess a meaningful relationship with the supervising flag state and,
more so, that they are residents of or hold identifiable assets in that country against
which sanctions can be enforced. Unfortunately, open registry states—states
providing flags-of-convenience—are almost entirely free to self-interpret the
genuine link requirement according to their own standards.112 Ironically,
international efforts to close this critical loophole through the U.N. 1986
Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships113 failed because the intended
addressees—by ultimately using this very same freedom to act autonomously—
were free to reject the treaty.114 In 1999, the International Tribunal on the Law of
the Sea revisited this loophole in the M/V “Saiga” case.115 Unfortunately, the
Tribunal held that the strength of a genuine link between vessel and flag state is
not a matter that can be contested by others (outside the flag state itself) nor a
question of the quality of state regulatory oversight, but rather is purely an
administrative question of whether the flag state has been formally appointed as
the registered flag state.116
This failure of unencumbered internal sovereignty goes much further. For
example, it enables offshore tax havens, money laundering, asset moving, forumshopping, and the creation of impenetrably complex, multi-front company
111

See generally Gotthard Mark Gauci & Kevin Aquilina, The Legal Fiction of a Genuine Link As a
Requirement for the Grant of Nationality to Ships and Humans—the Triumph of Formality over Substance?, 17
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 167 (2017); Simon W. Tache, The Nationality of Ships: The Definitional
Controversy and Enforcement of Genuine Link, 16 INT’L L. 301 (1982).

112

See H.W. Wefers Bettink, Open Registry, the Genuine Link and the 1986 Convention on Registration
Conditions for Ships, 18 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 69, 86 (1987); DANIEL PATRICK O’CONNELL, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA: VOLUME II 760 (Ivan Anthony Shearer ed., 1984); Moira L.
McConnell, “. . . Darkening Confusion Mounted upon Darkening Confusion”: The Search for the Elusive
Genuine Link, 16 J. MAR. L. & COM. 365, 376 (1985).
Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, Feb. 7, 1986, U.N. Doc. TD/RS/CONF/23,
https://perma.cc/2FXX-JAYZ.
See generally Francisco J. Montero Llácer, Open Registers: Past, Present and Future, 27 MARINE POL’Y 513
(2003). On the need for the Convention, see Le T. Thuong, From Flags of Convenience to Captive Ship
Registries, 27 TRANSP. J. 22 (1987); George C. Kasoulides, The 1986 United Nations Convention on the
Conditions for Registration of Vessels and the Question of Open Registry, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 543
(1989).
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M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, Judgment of Jul. 1, 1999,
https://perma.cc/UDA5-8G3L.
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Id. ¶ 83; see also M/V Virginia G (Panama v. Guinea-Bissau), Case No. 19, Judgment of Apr. 14,
2014, ¶¶ 112–113, https://perma.cc/27GF-XWDY.
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structures across multiple jurisdictions.117 Thus, the freedom of states to craft their
own regulations fails in a system that allows ocean stakeholders—legal or natural
persons of a truly transnational quality—to freely select a jurisdiction to hide
assets, register front companies, hear foreign claims, align their environmental
standards, access markets, and pay taxes.118
What is more, each national legal system is free to interpret and implement
their commitments across all sectors in an endless variety of ways. One method is
to create a complex “horrendogram” of multiple overlapping and conflicting
policies that make it even more challenging to identify clear norms and ensure
their observance.119 This intensive fragmentation of law creates not only a great
uncertainty of ocean law, but also gives wide berth for different interpretations.
The further result of this lack of certainty is that state obligations are rarely
opaque, leaving room for despondency when it comes to implementation.120
Given that international commitments are arranged horizontally between
political sovereigns, their subsequent implementation relies on a complex, costly,
and arguably cumbersome system of interstate bilateral and diplomatic
enforcement. In other words, an “injured” state needs to invest valued political
resources—including civil service time, finance, and goodwill—to direct
enforcement against an evidently “culpable” state.121 All transnational ocean users

117

118

119

120

121

See Jade Lindley & Erika, J. Techera, Overcoming Complexity in Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing
to Achieve Effective Regulatory Pluralism, 81 MARINE POL’Y 71, 71–79 (2017). See generally
LANGEWIESCHE, supra note 1; ROSE GEORGE, DEEP SEA AND FOREIGN GOING: INSIDE SHIPPING,
THE INVISIBLE INDUSTRY THAT BRINGS YOU 90% OF EVERYTHING (2013); Anastasia Telesetsky,
Laundering Fish in the Global Undercurrents: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Transnational
Organized Crime, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 939 (2014).
See generally Victor Galaz et al., Tax Havens and Global Environmental Degradation, 2 NATURE ECOLOGY
& EVOLUTION 1352 (2018); Jane Marc Wells, Comment, Vessel Registration in Selected Open Registries,
6 MAR. L. 221 (1981); FINK LEON, SWEATSHOPS AT SEA: MERCHANT SEAMEN IN THE WORLD’S
FIRST GLOBALIZED INDUSTRY, FROM 1812 TO THE PRESENT (2011).
See generally Suzanne J. Boyes & Michael Elliott, Marine Legislation—The Ultimate ‘Horrendogram’:
International Law, European Directives & National Implementation, 86 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 39
(2014).
See generally Emeka Duruigbo, Multinational Corporations and Compliance with International Regulations
Relating to the Petroleum Industry, 7 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 101 (2001); Olav F. Knudsen &
Björn Hassler, IMO Legislation and its Implementation: Accident Risk, Vessel Deficiencies and National
Administrative Practices, 35 MARINE POL’Y 201 (2011); Marianna Cavallo et al., Benefits and Impediments
for the Integrated and Coordinated Management of European Seas, 86 MARINE POL’Y 206 (2017).
See Jan Klabbers, Compliance Procedures, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 995, 1002 (Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée & Ellen Hey eds., 2008);
Harrison, supra note 4, at 41; Christine Chinkin & Romana Sadurska, The Anatomy of International
Dispute Resolution, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 39, 54–55, 78–79 (1991). See generally Andrew T.
Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 303 (2002); Christina Voigt, State Responsibility for Climate Change Damages, 77 NORDIC
J. INT’L L. 1 (2008).
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must therefore petition their own nation-state to take on their litigative mantle,
creating a constrained and indirect route between two “foreign” stakeholders.122
Nollkaemper refers to an uncited case which perfectly illustrates this
quandary.123 Here, fishermen in the North Sea brought a claim against the German
government alleging that a permit authorizing a factory to dump acid in the North
Sea—which killed and deformed many of the fish stocks they relied on—was in
breach of the London Convention124 and the Convention for the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, ratified by Germany. 125
Despite clear evidence of contravention of these agreements, however, the
Federal Administrative Court of Hamburg rejected the claim on the basis that
these international agreements were between states and did not create private rights
for the ocean users themselves.126
The horizontal nature of sovereign equal-state relations also effectively
minimizes available sanctions and further neutralizes the effectiveness of the
adjudicatory process. This emphasis on state interests and state responsibility
provides states with the freedom to discount the external interests of the
international community or the internal interests of one’s national community. It
also leads to a problematic mismatch in the allocation of governance authority
and, often, to self-centered decision making in areas with transnational impacts.127
Certainly, there are movements in the right direction toward new,128 cosmopolitan,129

122
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This indirect relationship can be visualized, for example, Stakeholder A < > State A < > State B <
> Stakeholder B. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
HOW WE USE IT 51–52 (1994). See generally Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A
Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277 (1991); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies
of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082 (1992).
This case is referred to in Nollkaemper, supra note 46, at 177–78.
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1972, 932 UNTS 3 (entered into force Apr. 7, 1974).
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Nollkaemper, supra note 46, at 177–78.
See JAN AART SCHOLTE, GLOBALIZATION: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 348–81 (2000); David Held,
The Changing Contours of Political Community: Rethinking Democracy in the Context of Globalization, in
GLOBAL DEMOCRACY: KEY DEBATES 20, 21–25 (Barry Holden ed., 2000). See generally John S.
Dryzek, Transnational Democracy, 7 J. POL. PHIL. 30 (1999); Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of
Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 (2013).
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See generally CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 92; David A. Lake, The New Sovereignty in International
Relations, 5 INT’L STUD. REV. 303 (2003).
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Sam Adelman, Cosmopolitan Sovereignty, in COSMOPOLITAN JUSTICE AND ITS DISCONTENTS 11, 11
(Cecilia M. Bailliet & Katja Franko Aas eds., 2011). See generally David Held, Law of States, Law of
Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty, 8 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2002); ULRICH BECK, THE COSMOPOLITAN
VISION (Ciaran Cronin trans., 2006).
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interdependent,130 relational,131 responsible132 post-Westphalian,133 and contingent or
conditional forms of sovereignty.134 But these developments are a slowly emerging
byproduct of globalization and gradual universal integration.135 They do not,
therefore, excuse traditional norms of nonintervention and firm sovereign
boundaries as culprits for our presently failing global environmental stewardship.
What is more, at their core, these alternative forms of sovereignty are merely
idealized or aspirational concepts of international relations, rather than depictions
of the true allocation of legal authority that we rely on today. This is particularly
the case with international agreements to divide up the ocean’s wealth. Thus, they
only reflect the slow and tired process of states reacting to political crises that
routinely occur after the event, once disasters finally attract sufficient media
coverage to generate political currency. The Westphalian expectation of exclusivity
of national jurisdiction, along with its intense distrust of systems of shared
responsibility, therefore, forces the hand of the law of the sea and its arbiters
toward maintaining the status quo.136
Critically, this stringent doctrine of sovereign exclusivity promotes the
widespread norm of noninterference.137 Robert Jackson even described
nonintervention as a grundnorm of Westphalian sovereignty138 and, certainly, the

130
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131
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2008); Eric Allen Engle, The Transformation of the International Legal System: The Post-Westphalian Legal
Order, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 23 (2004).
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customary norm that flagrant rule-breakers can only be interdicted under narrow
circumstances is a feature that provides our oceans with an aura of lawlessness.139
In the EEZ, the number of circumstances under which a coastal state can
intercept or regulate nonstate vessels is somewhat greater than that of the High
Seas, but it is still limited to specific and discrete conflicts that center on the coastal
state’s economic interests.140 Consequently, many wider security issues are left out,
such as military operations, organized crime, and environmental crime. Regulation
is further restricted to prescriptive rules set at the international table, such as those
negotiated by the International Maritime Organization.141
This guarding of flagged vessels roaming the oceans from any interference
is not the underlying notion of the mare liberum, as is frequently misunderstood.142
Rather, it is a wholly Westphalian idea that national governments exclusively
govern their respective citizens with no other nation or institution permitted to
intervene or share supervision.143 This system results in flag states undertaking
regulatory “supervision” from jurisdictions with no practical connection to
activities and located thousands of miles away.144 It also permits flag states wide
latitude in the design and enforcement of the standards against which their fleet
are monitored, thereby bringing a vital source of income to that state.145 As a
result, there are countless reports of underenforcement and poor supervision by
flag states.146 These systems of flag state supervision are so defective that

139

See LOSC, supra note 86, arts. 92, 110; Angelos M. Syrigos, Development on the Interdiction of Vessels on
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(1989).

140
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STANDARDS: GLOBALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL, SAFETY, AND LABOR REGULATIONS AT SEA
(2006); H. Edwin Anderson, III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics, Politics, and
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oceangoing vessels have been referred to as “neglectful,”147 “outlaws,”148
“lawless,”149 “mobile pockets of sovereignty,”150 “sovereign islands,”151
“delinquent,”152 and “a law unto themselves.”153 Moreover, given strong links
between organized crime and poor flag state supervision, rogue vessels are
frequently synonymized with piracy.154

B. Sovereign Equality
Like sovereign exclusivity, sovereign equality holds that all states are selfgoverning and unitary. It is principally concerned, however, with the horizontal
nature of state relations.155 As an important principle for preventing a world
ordered by military or economic power, the equal treatment of states accords
identical legal rights and responsibilities to each state.156 In reality, however, the
strict interpretation of sovereign equality and the routine treatment of all states as
equals further propagate the consent-based order of international law. This is
because such an order removes the opportunity to create any over-arching
authority and, with it, any capacity to compel or coerce noncompliant states into
147
148
149

150
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Pollution, 35 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 203, 204 (2005); Rose George, Flying the Flag, Fleeing the State, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 24, 2011), https://perma.cc/49AN-MGV4.
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producing global public goods.157 Indeed, such a principle could secure for states
the equality of responsibility, opportunity, and rights to self-governance despite
actual asymmetries in these areas.158 Ironically, sovereign equality therefore arguably
derails distributive justice and sustains illiberal democracies by permitting all
nations to enjoy equal authority, even if their internal systems are corrupt or
harmful to social and environmental interests.159
Horizontalism—while intended to minimize anarchy and hegemony—still
results in ineffective enforcement powers, thus ensuring that international law
centers around the same power politics and is habitually undermined by its realist
limitations.160 Recent and notorious examples of this freedom of the system’s
intended subjects to reject unfavorable interpretations of the law include: Japan’s
continued refusal to follow the rulings of the International Whaling
Commission,161 the Russian Federation’s refusal to recognize the compulsory
jurisdiction and ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Arctic Sunrise
case in 2015,162 and China’s refusal to recognize the arbitration panel’s compulsory
jurisdiction and ruling 2016, which rejected China’s amassing territorial claims in
the South China Sea.163
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Horizontalism’s equality requirement also opens space for conflict over the
potential hierarchization of international norms,164 thus potentially bulwarking
defenses against anything beyond a narrow interpretation of peremptory or erga
omnes norms intended to provide for universal responsibility. In its external
manifestation, as with exclusivity, this equality requirement also gives states the
power to ritually contest the jurisdiction, or worse—the legitimacy of external
institutional processes.165 As a result, states also habitually prefer to avoid
politically transparent and expensive adjudicatory processes and, instead, resolve
matters through drawn out and obstacle-ridden diplomatic channels.166 This not
only breeds uncertainty and indecision, but also reduces the opportunities to
clarify or develop international legal jurisprudence.167 This lack of adjudication is
then compounded by the narrow focus of states upon economic or political
interests when justifying the pursuit of international claims, which further limits
the opportunity for hearing and advancing the rules of responsibility for
producing global goods, such as those protecting the international environment.168
A horizontal system of inter-national relations also promotes a system of
constant competition between states. One state’s inalienable right to undertake a
course of action free from interference permits that state to freely produce
externalities, which can only be absorbed by another state. Given the harmful
interoperation of free riding and the prisoner’s dilemma in addressing collective
action challenges, states operating as equal bargaining agents usually treat
international relations as a zero or negative-sum game. At the same time, selfish
decision making can still be rewarded, and altruism—causing short-term
socioeconomic loss to one’s own citizens—risks punishment.169 A system of international relations in which states can, consciously or unconsciously, externalize
losses and maximize gains provides the perfect environment for regulatory “races
164

165

166

167

168
169

Dinah Shelton, International Law and 'Relative Normativity’, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 137, 138 (Malcolm
D. Evans ed., 4th ed. 2014).
Jonathan I. Charney, Third Party Dispute Settlement and International Law, 36 COLUMB. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 65, 66–67 (1998). See generally sources cited supra note 160.
Cesare P. R. Romano, International Dispute Settlement, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1036, 1041 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2008). See generally
Stephen E. Gent, The Politics of International Arbitration and Adjudication, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF.
66 (2013).
Oanta, supra note 16, at 230. ELLEN HEY, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 122 (2016).
See sources cited supra note 163.
Shaffer, supra note 98, at 674; Valentina Vadi, Public Goods, Foreign Investments and the International
Protection of Cultural Heritage, in INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR COMMON GOODS: NORMATIVE
PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURE AND NATURE 231, 239 (Federico Lenzerini & Ana F.
Vrdoljak eds., 2014). See generally Inge Kaul, Global Public Goods: Explaining Their Underprovision, 15 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 729 (2012); Duncan Snidal, Coordination versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for
International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985).
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to the bottom,” where states are forced to compete for limited available
resources.170 It also locks states into zero-sum games where they fear that a strategy
of abatement, such as from the presently unsustainable subsidization of industrialscale fishing, will lead to considerable economic losses for them in exchange for
gains to free riders.171 In other words, the Westphalian system is built entirely
around a false belief of independence, while the shared use of a globalized and
transnational ocean can only ever be interdependent.
The drive to attract ship registrations, processing fees, company
registrations, and legal fees incentivizes competition among states to offer more
effective flags or ports of convenience.172 The more that a state can externalize
losses—such as ensuring that environmental degradation takes place overseas or
that foreign citizens are unable to pursue economic claims against its nationals—
the more it can profit.173 States locked in this competition for maritime business
are treated as equals, regardless of whether they actually possess the necessary
resources, expertise, or regulatory infrastructure to properly supervise their
flagged vessels or enforce legislation. In fact, in the majority of cases, they do
not.174
Underenforcement and turning a blind eye, therefore, become the norm for
popular ports and flag state regulators.175 As research has consistently shown,
states locked in such negatively-reinforcing spirals will find it immensely difficult
to break out of such patterns of behavior within a consent-based legal system.176
Only by hundreds of ongoing interactions can actors engage in “repeat games,”
thus building up the trust and goodwill that enables them to agree to more
meaningful rules or better systems of enforcement. Nevertheless, when each state
170

171

172

173
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has the equal and unrestricted freedom to externalize losses—particularly by
avoiding “unequal” regulatory oversight from a higher order or a collective of
foreign states—the temptation to free ride or withdraw from efforts at regulatory
integration can continue to undermine collaborative efforts. This is particularly
true where states lack true political or economic incentives to constrain their own
sovereign freedoms.177
These harmful effects of horizontalism are pervasive—even between
politically friendly nations. For example, regional fisheries management
organizations were specifically designed to remove comparative trade-offs
between states in a regional context and to ensure coordination and the collective
raising of regional standards. Yet, even here, there is strong international
competition and pathologies of free riding.178 Indeed, Donald Rothwell reports
how—even between regional neighbors—the achievement of effective
cooperation patterns is still entirely contingent on:
[the] overall political relationship between the States concerned, cultural and
socio-economic divergences, the presence or absence of pervasive territorial
or maritime disputes, the significance accorded to and prioritizing of oceans
management by individual States, the effective implementation of regional
instruments by individual States, the nature and extent of sea-based activities
and financial resources and capacity.179

Indeed, the rejection by U.K. voters of regionally integrated collective gains in the
2016 Brexit referendum demonstrates just how vividly much of society still
perceives their entitlement to self-government and self-advancement under the
veil of national sovereignty, even after evidence of sustained collective gains
between politically friendly nations.180

C. Sovereign Territoriality
Territorial sovereignty—the idea of segregated “zones” upon ocean space—
is another symptom of Westphalianism, which has already been recognized as a
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key regulatory weakness in ocean governance.181 It is also possible, as with the
other two characteristics of sovereignty, to see territoriality as overlapping and
interlinked with the other traits. For example, through sovereign equality, all states
demand reciprocal rights to any claimed resources in the ocean, which ultimately
leads to a global allocation of resource zones. Similarly, through sovereign
exclusivity, there is a necessary presumption that one state must be positioned to
assume regulatory jurisdiction over each subject matter, with the result that all
states have carved up the entirety of the ocean in pursuit of a fair allocation of
juridical responsibility for every factual circumstance. While this zonal approach
has grown predominantly by creeping unilateral claims to offshore resources, it
has also been viewed as a strategic opportunity to propertize all ocean space, with
the hope that coastal states will internalize environmental degradation and so
guard “their” environmental assets in offshore regions.182 This strategy, however,
ultimately failed given that states could now focus on exploiting their newly
acquired resources in these distant offshore spaces, while conveniently treating
the protection of the environment “out there” as an externality.183
The global patchwork of maritime zones, which results from this inter-state
territoriality, has created hundreds of diverse regulatory systems that are cut-off
and distinct from neighboring zones.184 Further, it results in interactions between
transnational actors that—moving casually and fluidly across the entire ocean
space—must necessarily take place through tired inter-national lines,185 which also
leads to forum-shopping between enforcement agencies and regulatory systems.186
Ocean ecosystems, humans included, therefore witness constant regulatory gaps
and overlaps, despite taking little practical notice of artificially-constructed
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political borders.187 Perhaps the biggest driving force behind the development of
transnational law in other fields has been the desire to avoid the cost, complexity,
unpredictability, apprehension, and inefficiency associated with private
international law.188 Unless a cross-border claim is particularly strong and carries
a significant payoff, it is rarely worth the risk and cost of pursuing. 189 This failure
of law between borders is further compounded by: (1) the near-phantom legal
nature of many maritime actors, who operate within multi-front and multinational companies;190 (2) the lack of transparency of national actors and agencies,
whose efforts to produce global goods can be safely shrouded in hortatory
language; and (3) the use of a complex system of multifarious national legal
systems, which are randomly allocated by technocratic and idiosyncratic conflict
of law rules.
Furthermore, given the absolute freedom of states to self-regulate and reject
foreign interference, the use of civil liability regimes—aiming to facilitate crossborder enforcement by harmonization and reciprocation—also fail on account of
their ritual rejection or wholesale dilution.191 Ocean stakeholders can, therefore,
avoid the force of private liability between overseas actors. Moreover, as
highlighted earlier, transnational stakeholders must also rely on foreign states to
implement effective public and private legislation and have no path to appeal to
foreign governments for deficient regulation and enforcement.192 The result could
be a sense of detachment and disassociation of regulatory actors from the
regulatory systems under which they find themselves, and the disassociation of
those regulatory systems from the actors.
These permitted cutoffs between regulatory systems in the ocean
environment propagates a “Not-In-My-Backyard” attitude in which regulators
naturally focus on investing in protection over internal or local interests and are
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tempted to disregard external matters.193 Perhaps most fundamentally, the artificial
fragmentation of ocean space into pockets of national interest prevents an
efficient integration of capacities. As such, the considerable security resources,
data, equipment, skills, and rules needed to achieve effective ocean management
and protection are habitually and inefficiently duplicated side-by-side—rather
than harmonized together in effective and coordinated regional systems between
all actors and agencies.194 Thus, even if states work together to achieve collective
action, the underlying belief system built around exclusive sovereign “rights” and
“ownership” in each maritime zone continues to undermine any sense of joint and
several responsibility. This is at the heart of demands for a more integrated,
regionally-coordinated, and ecosystems-oriented model of ocean governance.

D. Westphalian Ocean Management: A System of Recurrent
“Gaps”
Many of the findings surrounding the ocean’s reliance upon Westphalian
intergovernmentalism, therefore, highlight an endemic recurrence of “gaps.” First,
we witness recurrent knowledge gaps. This relates to the lack of communication
between stakeholders and regulators, meaning that local or private actors’
knowledge or interests have not been effectively incorporated into regulatory
decision making.195 It also refers to the lack of informed decision making by
market actors,196 the lack of data exchange, resource pooling, and surveillance
cooperation between regulators and enforcement agencies,197 the lack of accurate
scientific data,198 and the need for marine stakeholders to effectively cooperate
193
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and communicate regarding each other’s relative activities, resources, and
interests.199
Second, the geographical gaps inherent in ocean governance are widely known,
and—as discussed in the context of sovereign territoriality—the fragmented
nature of ocean management is a familiar opprobrium. Not only do these gaps
relate to the weakness and inefficiency of completely segregated regulation,200 but
also to the fluid movement of persons, species, and other objects between political
borders;201 the lack of regulatory regimes in many regions around the world;202 and
the failure of multilevel coordination and cooperation between regulatory
systems.203
Third, closely interrelated, but less obvious, are the prevalent regulatory,
incentive, normative, and compliance gaps in transnational ocean management.
Regulatory gaps occur where legislation or regulatory processes are lagging or suffer
from poor coordination. For example, there is a particular concern with divided
schemes of regulation where disconnected organizations and actors operate within
regulatory siloes.204 Critics also regularly point to the lack of coordination and
regulatory cooperation between international organizations, regulators, national
legislatures, and enforcement agencies.205 What is more, we witness a languid pace
of regulation, especially when it is negotiated through political inter-state

199

See generally Oran R. Young et al., Solving the Crisis in Ocean Governance: Place-Based Management of Marine
Ecosystems, Environment, 49 ENV’T 21 (2007); Beverley Clarke et al., Enhancing the Knowledge-Governance
Interface: Coasts, Climate and Collaboration, 86 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 88 (2013).

200

See generally supra notes 184–194 and accompanying text.
Ingvild U. Jakobsen, The Adequacy of the Law of the Sea and International Environmental Law to the Marine
Arctic: Integrated Ocean Management and Shipping, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 291, 301–02 (2013). See
generally supra notes 116, 117 and accompanying text.

201

202

Warner, supra note 152, at 761; Jeff A. Ardron et al., The Sustainable Use and Conservation of Biodiversity
in ABNJ: What Can Be Achieved Using Existing International Agreements?, 49 MARINE POL’Y 98, 101
(2014). See generally Erik Jaap Molenaar, Addressing Regulatory Gaps in High Seas Fisheries, 20 INT’L J.
MARINE & COASTAL L. 533 (2005).

203

Dire Tladi, Ocean Governance: A Fragmented Regulatory Framework, in OCEANS: THE NEW FRONTIER 99,
101 (Pierre Jacquet et al. eds., 2011); ROBIN WARNER, PROTECTING THE OCEANS BEYOND
NATIONAL JURISDICTION: STRENGTHENING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK 126 (2009).
See generally BILIANA CICIN-SAIN & ROBERT W. KNECHT, INTEGRATED COASTAL AND OCEAN
MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES (1998).
Ardron et al., supra note 202, at 99, 103; Scott, supra note 4, at 464; Warner, supra note 152, at 758;
Johnston, supra note 187; Guilfoyle, The High Seas, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
THE SEA 203, 215–16, 224 (Donald Rothwell et al. eds., 1st ed. 2015). See generally CICIN-SAIN &
KNECHT, supra note 203; Molenaar, supra note 202.
See, e.g., Elisabeth Druel & Kristina M. Gjerde, Sustaining Marine Life Beyond Boundaries: Options for an
Implementing Agreement for Marine Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction Under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 49 MARINE POL’Y 90, 92 (2014); High Seas Task Force, supra note
85, at 26–27; Tladi, supra note 203, at 105. See generally supra note 194, 203, and accompany text;
GJERDE ET AL., supra note 1; Ekstrom et al., supra note 13.

204

205

450

Vol. 21 No. 2

Transnational Law of the Sea

Martin

bargaining processes that fail to keep pace with constantly shifting and intensifying
human activities in the ocean or with new threats and opportunities.206
Fourth, and related, normative gaps describe deficiencies in accountability and
the widespread lack of mandatory compliance-inducing obligations, with a
recurring reliance upon ambiguous language or hortatory commitments, including
within unenforceable rules or industry self-regulation.207
Fifth, compliance gaps refer to the issue of compliance by states with their
international commitments and with the poor level of implementation and
enforcement by national regulators when dealing with externally valued public
goods.208 It also refers to the lack of compliance by stakeholders with national law,
as they freely select between, or distance themselves from, traditional regulatory
structures.209
Sixth, closely related to normative and compliance gaps are the incentive gaps,
which acknowledge the gap between a desired regulatory object and the incentive
on the part of political actors to comply. Only by enabling consensus-made law
to actually reign over consent-based self-enforcement, along with the eradication
of horizontalism by the building of more powerful enforcement mechanisms, can
regulators be incentivized to invest in much-needed cooperation and to break
down the harmful interoperation of the prisoner’s dilemma and free riding, as
discussed above.210
The consent-based, horizontal, and zonal system of public international law
has thus weakened the effectiveness of ocean management for so long that an
entirely new approach to ocean law and governance is needed. In order to bridge
all these “gaps,” such a new approach—which is discussed in Section V—must
operate as a truly multi-stakeholder system which is arranged with true power
reallocated across the global, regional, local, and transnational scales. In other
words, we need a true and real attainment of a transnational law of the sea.
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Despite all the evidence that Westphalianism is centrally to blame for our
struggling law of the sea, this has been hardly noticed or noted in existing academic
discussions. In 2006, Richard Barnes, David Freestone, and David Ong did tell us
that:
the underlying emphasis of prescriptive and enforcement authority [of the
law of the sea] is in the hands of individual States. This reflects the more
fundamental nature of international law as a horizontal legal system in which
States are sovereign equals under no higher authority than that of
international law.211

In 2010, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tanja Aalberts also observed that the
present-day conception of the ocean as a liberal free-for-all creates a space in
which “participating states may successfully barter off and deconstruct
responsibilities by reference to traditional norms of sovereignty and international
law. Thus . . . the Mare Liberum [sic] becomes the venue for a range of
competing . . . disclaims to sovereignty.”212 Similarly, Barnes only briefly noted in
2015 that while the flag state system, to him at least, has not failed, it “is far from
effective”213 and was “facilitated by the emergence of the modern political State
after the peace of Westphalia.”214
In 1992, Philip Allott provided a welcomed and perceptive criticism of both
the Mare Liberum and Mare Clausum doctrines. He proposed the need for a new
socially inclusive system: the Mare Nostrum, or “Our Sea.”215 Importantly for Allott,
the law of the sea had become a system which:
while still seeming to the uninitiated to be a process for the collective
formation of social objectives, turned itself in practice into a system
that gives effect neither to universal social objectives of all humanity
nor to the social objectives of all human individuals collectivized
through the state systems. It came to be dominated by an independent
dialectic at the median level between the two, the level of relations
between so-called states. Humanity had formed itself into a society
whose social process was interstate relations.216
Nevertheless, there appears to be a discernible lack of focus specifically on public
international law’s failures in the ocean’s transnational ecosystem. Instead, the vast
majority of literature and research in marine governance focuses on Grotius’s
doctrine of the “freedom of the seas” and the problems with relying upon flag
states to regulate global concerns.
211
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IV. T HE S CAPEGOATS OF O UR F AILING O CE AN L AW
A. Mare Liberum: Res Communis or Res Nullius ?
After four centuries of compressing Grotius’s 1609 Mare Liberum into a
dogma that propagates the interests of powerful flag states, this utopian vision for
ocean governance has become frequently misinterpreted. Grotius’s now-famous
monograph was originally written as a legal brief supporting the Dutch East India
Company’s capture and sale of the Portuguese vessel, Santa Catarina, in the
Malacca Strait.217 Its adept integration of wider literature from Ancient Rome and
Greece, and from the views of natural and canonical law, along with Grotius’s
posthumous fame as an international legal theorist, have caused it to have
considerable influence—in name, at least—on our view of ocean law in the
centuries that followed.218 Most commentators on the law of the sea today still
hold considerable disdain for the supposed concept it introduced: the so-called
and now infamous “Freedom of the Seas.”219 This concept allegedly sought to
view the ocean’s resources as res nullius and open to appropriation and
exploitation.220 Unfortunately, however, Grotius stands falsely accused. His
original “Free Sea” did not promote the systemic free-for-all that we can still
detect in global marine lore today but, as will be shown, was actually much more
progressive.
Primarily, this loss in translation has been caused by the convenient
simplification of ocean management into a binary system of competing
strategies—that between the Mare Liberum and the Mare Clausum. On the one hand,
there is the argument for increased territorialization, which would enable coastal
states to more successfully control and effectively regulate large swaths of the
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ocean.221 This argument is said to have arisen from John Selden’s equally famous
rejoinder to Grotius in 1635, titled Mare Clausum, or “Closed Sea.”222 On the other
hand, there is the argument that the ocean should not be territorially appropriated
by anybody but should be open for free and unrestricted access by all—
supposedly exemplified by the Mare Liberum.
These two doctrines have been contorted over the years to try and represent
two binary Westphalian approaches to solving ocean governance. The Mare
Clausum represents the view that coastal and port states should have more power,
given that flag states are often too disconnected from distant ocean activities.
Meanwhile, the Mare Liberum has been inappropriately reinterpreted by the most
powerful flag states of the day—such as the Netherlands, France, the U.K., and
the U.S.—to support the view that the ocean should be “free” from regulation as
far as possible and that, instead, states should primarily regulate their own fleets
through flag state law.223 In reality, as argued in Section IV.B, both are systems
prone to failure because both entail states acting in exclusive national interest and,
hence, externalization of losses to the international community.
Much of the misplaced blame upon the Mare Liberum seems to arise from
the word “freedom.” Grotius did indeed argue that the ocean’s vastness, fluidity,
and unsuitability to physical dominion should render it free from
territorialization.224 Crucially, however, he never posited that the ocean and its
resources should be “free” property to be appropriated or exploited. Rather, quite
oppositely, he argued that the ocean’s resources cannot be appropriated without
prior permission from the international community to which they belong.225 In
other words, he saw its resources as res communis—rather than res nullius—which
was to be shared among all humankind with “a common right [of usage] over
which no other right could be asserted.”226 It was, therefore, a rejection of our
contemporary understanding of private dominion over ocean property, in that
221

222
223

224

225
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such ownership means the ocean is “incapable of belonging to someone else as
well.”227 This common ownership model was premised on the fact that “there [is]
nothing to prevent a number of persons from being joint owners . . . of one and
the same thing.”228 He argued, thus, that the ocean was a gift from God and “not
to this or that individual, but to the human race,”229 and “that all that which has
been so constituted by nature that although serving some one person it still
suffices for the common use of all other persons, is today and ought in perpetuity
to remain in the same condition as when it was first created by nature.”230 As a
result, only those activities which can be done “without loss to anyone else” are
tacitly permitted by the global community.231
On this basis, Grotius was able to argue that certain “freedoms” should be
automatically available because they are not prima facie causing loss to humankind.
For example, his primary argument was actually that maritime navigation can only
be free and unrestricted because—at his time at least—ships leave “no more than
a ‘track in the sea,’”232 and the ocean “is not exhausted by that use.”233 This
unrestricted freedom of access was based on the tacit permission given by
humankind—as the ocean’s communal owners—given that (pollution-free)
navigation benefits wider community interests.234 In another example, he posited
that coastal development is permitted because “it is lawful to build upon the shore
if it may be without the hurt of the rest.”235 Therefore, he did not promote a
general “freedom” of high seas fishing under some kind of liberal system
permitting the private accumulation of unclaimed property, but rather that fishing
might be tacitly accepted by the international community as a free activity, given
that fish stocks were—at that time, at least—seen as essentially inexhaustible.236
Naturally, in the face of industrial-scale fishing and the decimation of global fish
227
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stocks four hundred years later, this tacit approval of unrestricted appropriation
of fisheries would patently no longer exist.
Recent reinterpretations of the Mare Liberum therefore suggest that pro-flag
state theorists have, over the years, considerably skewed the concept of the
freedom of the seas.237 As Vid Prislan and Nico Schrijver put it, Grotius’s
arguments “later digressed into ‘first come, first served’ advantages for
industrialized nations.”238 It is, therefore, not surprising that the two dominantmaritime nations, that have held hegemonic regulatory power over the oceans
since 1805, have promoted a distinctly Anglo-American model of liberal
regulation. This model relies on minimal state intervention and the promotion of
anarchic self-governance, thus permitting U.K. and U.S. interests to profit
considerably from this “free” maritime domination.239 This is the unfortunate
entrenchment of the “free-for-all” interpretation of ocean law, which will continue
to suit the dominant maritime powers in each regional ocean zone. It has also
been suggested that the misinterpreted “freedom of the seas” did not actually
come to dominate until the Industrial Revolution in the mid-19th century.240
Before this, it was actually John Selden’s argument in favor of territorial
appropriation and intensive national regulation that ruled international thinking.241
Unsurprisingly, this was throughout the era that witnessed the ascendency and
indoctrination of Westphalianism and the centering of all regulatory power in the
hands of nation-states. Wherein, as a necessary corollary, all law without national
territory was viewed as lex nullius.
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Story exemplified this liberal model of law in
1826, when he adjudged that “[u]pon the ocean, in time of peace, all possess an
entire equality. It is the common highway of all, appropriated to the use of all, and
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no one can vindicate to himself a superior or exclusive prerogative there.”242 And,
a century later, the Permanent Court of Justice, in the Lotus Case, still understood
that:
[v]essels on the high seas are subject to no authority except that of the State
whose flag they fly. In virtue of the principle of the freedom of the
seas, that is to say, the absence of any territorial sovereignty upon the
high seas, no State may exercise any kind of jurisdiction over foreign
vessels upon them.243
In other words, if there is no territorial or non-flag state that is permitted to
impose unilateral regulation in open ocean waters, then the only alternative under
an international system must be the state that is embodied in the vessel itself. This
understanding that either territorial states or flag states govern the seas continues
to the present day.244 As R.P. Anand states, over the past two centuries, it became
“accepted as an indisputable, almost sacred, dogma which was supposed to be in
the interest of all mankind and which nobody would dare challenge.”245 Its total
transmogrification can, for example, be witnessed in Bo Johnson Theutenberg’s
words, who understood it as meaning that the ocean is “open and free for the use
of all nations,” where “[n]o nation could prevent another from carrying on
traditional activities at sea”:246 a far cry from the system of common society and
pooled interests promoted by Grotius.
These accounts of the freedom of the seas became corrupted for one very
simple reason: if only nation-states have exclusive and unencumbered regulatory
power, but coastal states do not have territorial dominion, then only flag states are
left as the option for national legal control of the high seas. By its very design,
Westphalianism is innately antagonistic to any possible suggestions of “shared”
governance over a territorial space. Furthermore, given that states are “equals”
and free to act in self-interest, they cannot be compelled to accept shared ownership
of the ocean’s resources. Therefore, under the Westphalian “inter-state”
regulatory system, the only two choices for the “sovereign-free” high seas were
either lawlessness or regulation by distant flag states.
In sum, by promoting a system that sees the ocean as a gift to the global
community and shared by all, Grotius’s argument in favor of turning the ocean
into a global commons was in fact highly analogous to Arvid Pardo’s famous 1967
appeal to turn much of the seas into the “Common Heritage of Mankind” and to
foreclose the ocean from ever-increasing national territorialization and
242
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unilateralism.247 This engaging vision aimed to bring the entire community of
humankind within the frame of ocean governance and, out of necessity, sought to
redefine and mollify the territoriality of ocean space and the politically exclusive
nature of all the ocean’s interconnected zones, including the territorial sea.248 Such
a new and holistic global commons management model has thus been covered,
with some social scientists concurring that the failed understanding of Grotius
seems to come in failing to distinguish between “common access” and “common
property.”249 As a result, the nation-state should no longer be seen as the only
representative agent of humankind’s shared ocean and as the only source of
transnational legal power.

B. The Fault of “Flag” States or Flag “States”?
The political tug-of-war between states to resolve the exclusive sovereign
rights and freedoms inside hard borders in ocean space is primarily built on the
economic ambitions of sovereign states and often plays out through diplomacy,
political posturing, and displays of military power.250 As Daniel Cheever puts it,
“[n]owhere is the indissoluble relationship between politics and law demonstrated
more cogently than in the law of the sea.”251 The outmoded debate between the
two original competing systems of governance—between flag state regulation or
territorial state encroachment—is often couched in the language of a normative
debate over the more suitable, effective, and customary system for managing the
seas. A closer look at the contested negotiations, however, makes clear that the
debate has never been about which mode of governance is more effective, but about
which ultimately delivers the propounding state the greatest amount of wealth,
opportunity, and power. Indeed, the growing tension between the U.S. and China
in the South China Sea is really a defense of the right of states to navigate trade,
247
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conduct military operations, and prevent coastal exploitation of a resource-rich
region, rather than any justified defense of the quality of flag state regulation as
the most effective system of marine governance.252
The same can be seen in reverse, where arguments promoting the rightful
placement of coastal state “jurisdiction” are really a masked promotion of coastal
state power and ownership of distant resources, regardless of the environmental
protection challenges this entails. For example, negotiations over the UNESCO
2001 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage were
hopelessly distracted by this same contest between the flag states and the coastal
states.253 The negotiators hardly touched the subject of “which is more effective” in
terms of protecting the cultural heritage of the ocean. Instead, most of the time
and political energy was focused on suspicions about the underhanded
motivations and power aspirations of the “opposing” side.254 As a result, despite
increased coastal state jurisdiction for protecting underwater cultural heritage in
the EEZ being better on practical grounds, it was ultimately blocked by flag states
who were distrustful of the motivations of coastal states, referring to their
proposals disparagingly as “taking another bite at the jurisdictional apple.”255
In many senses, flag state regulation—built around the aforementioned
notion of liberalism and laissez-faire regulation of broad ocean space—has been the
preferred ocean governance model for the states who stand to gain the most.
Those powerful Western maritime nations—who accumulated considerable
wealth and opportunity through colonial expansion and domination of the world’s
transcontinental trade networks—are the same powerful nations who have
conveniently designed today’s liberal flag state-based model of ocean
management. The result is that, when levelling criticisms against the failing law of
the sea, the vast majority of international law scholars have, up to now, aimed
their cannons upon the over-reliance on “flag state jurisdiction” or upon the areas
where this flag state regulation needs tweaking. Consequently, in recent decades,
many theorists and policymakers have promoted a system with far greater
252
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prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction for coastal and port states in order to
overcome the weaknesses of distant flag state regulation.256
This approach—which increases coastal and port state regulation in the
international law of the sea framework—has certainly provided a number of
important improvements. For example, it has put much greater pressure upon the
dominant flag states or upon flags-of-convenience to raise their standards in order
to maintain access for their fleets to certain ports.257 The difficulty, however,
remains that coastal and port states also suffer from the same symptoms of
Westphalian sovereignty—such as inter-state competition, races to the bottom,
and the exclusive freedom to externalize global responsibility.258 In other words,
the risk of further territorialization and encroachment by coastal states is just as
undesirable as a laissez-faire model of distant and disinterested regulation by
disconnected flag states.
Indeed, the emphasis on internal interests rather than the collective interests
of humankind means that public laws governing port and coastguard authorities
usually emphasize criminal activities of national interest, such as inward
smuggling, market distortion, and migrant trafficking, above distant
environmental concerns.259 As the Task Force on Illegal, Unreported, and
Unregulated Fishing on the High Seas reported, not only are domestic
enforcement agencies unaware of the true global costs, but any public expenditure
by a state on criminal prosecution for activities having an impact beyond national
jurisdiction is not recouped.260 Other practical factors also make non-flag states
equally awkward as regulators, such as the physical challenges of interdiction and
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inspection, the difficulty with surveillance, and the pressure to avoid additional
delays and disruption in port.261
For the very same reasons, market and transit states also make
uncomfortable and ineffective regulators.262 What is more, particularly on account
of processing supply chain and transshipment practices, it is difficult to isolate
imports that breach environmental standards.263 They also have considerable
difficulty regulating grey or black markets and are at constant risk of falling foulof-trade protectionism rules.264 Home states, that have jurisdiction over their own
nationals when in home-state territory, are also too distanced from the specific
activities and are unsuitable prosecutorial enforcers or receptors of incriminating
evidence.265 Indeed, in recent unverified reports of looting from the Battle of
Jutland wrecks by converted trawlers in the North Sea, it appears that numerous
port, coastal, and flag states are implicated, but none have shown a willingness to
fully invest in the security of wrecks more strongly valued by Britain and
Germany.266 Even in their position as a home state, the British authorities did not
appear to have prosecuted a U.K. national reported to have been involved in the
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illicit activities,267 despite this state having recognized the need to proactively
protect such underwater cultural heritage.268
Critically, therefore, none of these states—whether flag, port, coastal,
market, transit, or national—can avoid the same weaknesses of national
sovereignty. They can commonly refuse consent to any international law which
does not provide them—and only them—with a political gain on balance. In other
words, they require considerable political or economic incentives before they
invest the political and economic resources in the punishment of offenders or in
restricting their own economic activity in deference to external interests.269
Furthermore, even if these states did accept maximal jurisdictional responsibility,
they would still stand to gain from competing in the provision of lax regulation
and apathetic enforcement.
Understood from this perspective, the sovereign freedom of deficient flag
state systems to profit from lax regulation, rather than the use of flag state systems,
lies at the heart of the law of the sea’s underlying weakness. Certainly, increased
regulation across all the governance nodes would significantly notch-up standards
in specific areas and force flag states to join collective standards’ arrangements.
The underlying fault, however, lies in the inability to coerce states, flag or
otherwise, to modify their behavior in a manner against their own interests, as well
as prohibiting states from externalizing global “losses” and not in the use of flag
state regulation per se.

V. A T RANSNATIONAL L AW OF THE S EA
The focus of this article has been to pinpoint the causes of the legal system’s
failure to manage the oceans, as opposed to introducing every element of a new
paradigm of governance. As such, it is beyond its purview to give a comprehensive
account of a needed transnational law of the sea. While a detailed global vision of
transnational ocean governance would be too large for the current discussion, this
Section provides an overview of some important elements within such a system,
exploring some of their advantages when productively eclipsing or interoperating
with existing inter-state legal systems. Subsection A highlights recent academic
efforts to explicate a model of Integrated Ocean Management (IOM), which many
have regarded as merely a search for an ecosystems-oriented model of governance.
It should, in fact, be largely understood, more simply, as a search for a post267
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Westphalian model of ocean management. Then, building on previous sections,
Subsection B suggests that multi-stakeholder inclusivity and multi-level
governance are two primary features of such a transnational law of the sea.

A. Understanding Integrated Ocean Management as a Demand
for a Transnational Law of the Sea
While the root causes are rarely examined, it in fact appears well-accepted
that the problem with ocean governance lies with the system itself, rather than with
the legal rules contained within. For example, during detailed studies between 2010
and 2015 by the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to Study Issues
Relating to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity
Beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Working Group), there was
consistent pessimism about the inevitably poor implementation or the likely
dilution of any resulting commitments between states, rather than the content of
any agreed rules.270 As a result, the BBNJ Working Group urged the need for
better cooperation and coordination between “all sectors and all levels,”
conceding that “a global universal governance structure remained the best way to
promote sustainable marine biodiversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction.”271
This gloomy allusion to the present system of law—highlighting concern for
compliance, implementation, and enforcement of international agreements, or
with pervasive regulatory, normative, or geographical gaps—has also become an
increasingly vocalized issue among academics more broadly. For example, David
Vousden says that “many leading experts on high seas and ocean governance are
now convinced that . . . there is now an urgent need for a transformation to a
more suitable legal regime which is more cross-sectoral and integrated in its
management approaches and strategies.”272 As Freestone summarizes, therefore,
“virtually all are in agreement . . . that we need far more effective means of
enforcing compliance with the norms and structures than we have.”273 In effect,
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A/69/780 (Feb. 13, 2015).
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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 385, 390 (Rosemary G. Rayfuse ed., 2015); Rosemary Rayfuse & Robin
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COASTAL L. 399 (2008).
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LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION AT 30: SUCCESSES, CHALLENGES AND NEW AGENDAS 1, 8 (David
Freestone ed., 2013).
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it appears to be almost unanimous that there is a need for better institutional
structures, systems, and processes in the governance model itself.274
In response to these widely reported systemic issues in the present model,
there has been increasingly widespread calls for an approach built around far
greater “integration” or, in other words, for IOM.275 It is not just global
institutions and accords that are relaying these calls for integration across the legal
landscape but also academics.276 For example, in 2008, Yoshifumi Tanaka wrote
how “international documents tend to stress the importance of a holistic approach
by referring to [IOM].”277 Many others have been equally clear on the need for a
new paradigm within IOM.278 As Wright and his colleagues recently reported,
“[m]any States, scientific experts and civil society groups have . . . repeatedly
highlighted the need for integrated ocean governance.”279 Yet, despite its undisputed
central placement on the global agenda, the actual meaning, content, and
envisioned structure of this new integrated approach to ocean management
remains remarkably undefined and under-examined.280
It certainly appears that IOM is at least concerned with the holistic
management of the ocean as one large interdependent—and, indeed,
transnational—ecosystem.281 By understanding the placement of humans as an
integral aspect of this interconnected ocean network, many see IOM as almost a

274
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See Andrew Jillions, Commanding the Commons: Constitutional Enforcement and the Law of the Sea, 1 GLOB.
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Martin Visbeck et al., A Sustainable Development Goal for the Ocean and Coasts: Global Ocean Challenges
Benefit from Regional Initiatives Supporting Globally Coordinated Solutions, 49 MARINE POL’Y 87 (2014).
Although various different phrases have been used over the years, often with different emphases,
the term “Integrated Ocean Management” has perhaps become most widely adopted. See, e.g.,
Jakobsen, supra note 201, at 297–98.
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Nations System Responds to Agenda 21.17: Oceans, 29 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 23 (1995); G.A. Res.
60/30, at 1 (Mar. 8, 2006).

277

See TANAKA, supra note 15, at 16.
See, e.g., Richard Barnes, The Law of the Sea Convention and the Integrated Regulation of the Oceans, 27 INT’L
J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 859, 859 (2012); Elisabeth Druel & Kristina M. Gjerde, Sustaining Marine
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Jurisdiction Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 49 MARINE POL’Y 90, 91 (2014);
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Sea: Report of the Secretary-General, ¶ 136, U.N. Doc. A/61/63 (Mar. 9, 2006).
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synonym for “ecosystems-based management.”282 This, in essence, demands that
all governance be founded upon a highly relational (interdependent), eco-centric,
and cumulative understanding of long-term impacts of marine activities upon all
stakeholders.283 Most also concur that IOM’s meaning is rarely fixed, but is actually
highly context-dependent.284 It is, therefore, better understood as an amassing
collection of principles and processes to be called upon depending on the specific
context, challenge, or circumstance in focus.285 Karen Scott, for example, draws
upon various environmental principles and marine planning processes being used
in various regions and nations across the world.286 Similarly, Elizabeth Kirk argues
that an approach is needed which “combines both principle and process.”287 A
brief review of the literature, however, suggests that IOM is likely to include many
of the general environmental principles, such as sustainable development,
intergenerational and intragenerational equity, ecosystem services, common but
differentiated responsibilities, access and benefit sharing, precautionary
management, and the polluter pays principle—as well as containing other more
general principles such as public participation, transparency, and accountability.
In addition to these principles, numerous governance processes can be utilized in
order to achieve better integration, such as marine spatial planning, marine
protected areas, environmental impact assessments, integrated coastal zone
management, co-management, and various collaborative models of governance.
Many authors also understand IOM’s purpose as ultimately bridging the
specific “gaps” in ocean governance which continuously appear. Barnes’s
approach, for example, classified IOM as providing normative, spatial, sectoral,
temporal, disciplinary, and user integration.288 Similarly, the BBNJ Working Group
viewed IOM as bridging regulation, implementation, governance, coordination,
and information sharing gaps.289 Further, although Tanaka broke IOM down into
ecological, normative, and implementation vectors, his definition narrowly
focused on institutional or agency coordination and, thus, largely excluded the
282

283
284
285
286
287
288
289

See Jakobsen, supra note 201, at 293–96; see also Scott, supra note 4, at 465; TANAKA, supra note 15,
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Understanding, 14 J. ENV’T POL’Y & PLAN. 81 (2012); cf. Oanta, supra note 16, at 226 (suggesting that
IOM necessitates end-to-end regulation, in order to improve cohesion and harmony across the
regulatory framework).
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See Scott, supra note 4, at 466–67.
See generally id.; Kirk, supra note 274.
See generally Scott, supra note 4.
Kirk, supra note 274, at 33.
See Barnes, supra note 278, at 860–62.
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various gaps that arise when looking more closely at the vital stakeholder level. 290
As demonstrated in Section III.D, however, most ocean governance gaps can, in
fact, be clearly linked back to the international system of law. Moreover, studies
into transnational law and governance are often seen as a means to improve upon
these same weaknesses of the international legal system itself.291 Ergo, in order to
address the gaps in ocean governance, a focus on achieving effective transnational
law and governance is needed.
Nevertheless, despite some commentators casually noting the transnational
characteristics of the oceans292 and calling for solutions that capture transboundary
activity from end-to-end,293 there has been a dearth of literature in the law of the
sea field making the crucial connection between transnational law, as a broad
discipline and field of study, with the coveted principles and processes of IOM.294
This is surprising and regretful given that the same weaknesses of the international
law of the sea that are universally lamented—such as the need for an expanded
role of supranational, private, and non-state laws, actors, and systems operating
more fluidly at transnational scales—are almost identical to those same
weaknesses that the transnational legal discipline seeks to address. More so, given
that, in its normative guise, transnational law seeks to achieve a multi-level,
holistic, and inclusive system of law in response to global regulatory challenges.
As a result, any proposed model of IOM should incorporate the theories,
processes, and approaches of transnational law and governance.

B. A Transnational Law of the Sea: Multi -Stakeholder
Inclusivity and Multi-Level Governance
At the very heart of the coveted “integrated” model of ocean governance is
the consistent desire for both greater stakeholder inclusivity and for increased multilevel regime-building. In other words, the desire to truly bring the global community
of persons beyond states—the unfortunately titled “non-state actors”—into
positions of governance authority, as well as to release some of the grip on legal
authority by national governments and displace it to governance networks found
at local, national, regional, and global scales. In fact, this ideal of post-national
290
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See Oanta, supra note 16, at 221, 226; Betrand Le Gallic, The Use of Trade Measures Against Illicit Fishing:
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“transnational environmental law” returns 42,600 results, “transnational criminal law” returns
95,000 results, and even “transnational family law” returns 26,500 results.
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governance accords neatly with Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s visionary 1998
monograph, The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource, which
promoted a new global approach to ocean governance.295 The same recognition
could perhaps also be attributed to Allott’s thesis on the Mare Nostrum in 1992,
which touched on the case for a human-centered and post-Westphalian approach
to ocean governance296—indeed, as well as Grotius’s Mare Liberum over four
centuries ago.

1. Multi-stakeholder inclusivity
In every case, one can locate stakeholder participation—and the capacity of
ocean users at all levels both within and without the state to effectively and
productively communicate, cooperate, coordinate, and collaborate—at the heart
of the IOM approach. For example, even under those headings that are discernibly
regulatory in focus, such as the need for normative frameworks which cross
political boundaries, the same underlying motive is to address the conflicting and
overlapping interests of fragmented and dissociated communities.297 Barnes,
therefore, rightly summarizes that a “truly integrated approach” would empower
stakeholders to be engaged in the regulation process.298 It is possible to detect
these same common themes throughout social scientific research that seeks to
improve upon the presently beleaguered model of Westphalian law.299 Research
and associated policies dedicated to expanding public participation have,
therefore, proliferated in recent years, with the principle of civil-society inclusivity
becoming something of a revolutionary movement.300
Environmental public participation can range from small-scale local resource
management to the representation of global communities and interest groups at

295
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298
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international fora.301 It can also come in many forms: from a simple requirement
to improve public information and transparency of decisionmakers to
consultations with affected individuals and communities in the development of
new legislation, to full-scale regulatory management of public goods by private
actors.302 There are also many representative forms of the global demos, such as:
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including charities, advocacy networks,
and interest groups all operating at the national, regional, and global levels;
corporations and other enterprises, also operating at or across the local, national,
regional, and global scales; epistemic (or “expert”) communities and standards
bodies, across all levels; and all communities and individual humans themselves.303
In all cases, there is clear evidence that an expanded demos has been effective
in enhancing the protection of the ocean. There are numerous examples where
the progress toward post-national representation in global governance is at last
providing solutions to the ocean’s paradigmatic transnational context. Such
examples include: the increased stakeholder participation in marine planning or
environmental protection systems;304 enhanced subsidiarity of biodiversity
management and protection;305 expansion of international legal standing to private
actors and NGOs;306 integration of stakeholder groups into governance networks;
public-private partnerships or advisory bodies;307 utilization of private
communities and NGOs within the governance mix;308 utilization of maritime
301

302

See C. Aloni et al., The Importance of Stakeholders Involvement in Environmental Impact Assessment, 5 RES.
& ENV’T 146, 148–49 (2015); TAMARA TSCHENTSCHER, PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
THROUGH MORE EFFECTIVE CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE:
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See supra notes 299–301 and accompanying text.
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communities in improving security measures;309 and the facilitation of
coordination and information exchange across epistemic communities310 or
private and subnational actor networks.311

2. Multi-level governance
It similarly becomes essential, therefore, that multi-level governance
(MLG)—governance that is intentionally arranged as interlinking and overlapping
regimes at different spatial levels or scales at the global, regional, national, and
local community level—should provide both the descriptive and normative frame
for understanding the coveted stakeholder-inclusive model. Not only does MLG
provide an appealing vision for a simple response to the complex challenges of
transnational governance and provide avenues toward greater stakeholder
inclusivity, but it also helps clarify the roles and functions of the state and of nonstate actors within the governance framework.312 In fact, a multi-stakeholder
approach naturally calls for a multi-level approach, given that most actors beyond
the state are characteristically found above or below the national level.313 It appears
clear that such a multi-level approach is sought in the attainment of integrated
governance. Indeed, the International Union on the Conservation of Nature Draft
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International Covenant,314 Rio Declaration,315 and Agenda 21316 each call
unequivocally for action at all levels—international, regional, national, and local—
in order to effectively achieve sustainable development. MLG thus becomes a
necessary byproduct of the worldwide search for governance beyond government.
Indeed, the interdependence of all stakeholders in the shared ocean
commons leads to a widespread tradition of externalities and spillover effects,
resulting in underproduction by nation-states in work toward global objectives.
MLG can therefore resolve these collective action failures by integrating states
into regimes or processes that delegate decision making authority and
accountability to more suitable levels, such as through local, regional, or global
regimes, where international law is failing to produce global public goods.317 It also
permits states to pass technical management and administrative responsibility for
global goods onto more appropriate external agents and non-state actors,318 or
even to pass on the blame for stringent social and environmental policies.319
Furthermore, the centralization of responsibility can actually enhance, rather than
diminish, the capacity of civil society to press for changes to policies, by creating
a clearer and more familiar target for political lobbying.320
The above can be evidenced in the ocean governance context. An illustrative
example is the sustainable management of global fish stocks. It is true that certain
epistemic communities (for example, the International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea or the International Union on the Conservation of

314
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Nature),321 standards bodies (for example, the Marine Stewardship Council or the
U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization),322 or advocacy NGOs (for example,
Oceana, Greenpeace or the World Wildlife Fund)323 are more efficiently organized
by providing data, technical rules, standards, schemes, and political pressure at a
global level. However, it is also necessary to leave sufficient latitude to local
communities to develop their own rules and systems for preventing or recycling
bycatch or allocating fishing zones between local stakeholders with the efficient
use of the guidance, tools, enforcement architecture, and resources which are
provided from higher levels.324 Thus, higher levels can be used to overcome the
accepted limitations of national enforcement, by encouraging or sidestepping
state-level implementation.325
In addition to having the global governance level bolstered by strategic
public-private partnerships expanded participative democracy,326 it is particularly
the regional level that has continuously proven itself to be indispensable within
effective ocean governance models. Regional-level governance carries many
advantages, by lowering the critical mass needed before significant commitments
can be made in cross-border negotiations, as well as providing for a more
harmonized and coherent system of management for a large body of water.327 As
such, there are countless success stories in the protection of the marine
environment driven by regional networks and organizations, such as through the
Barcelona Convention,328 Antarctic Treaty System,329 Baltic Marine Environment
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INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE , https://perma.cc/23SV-LEQ9.
MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://perma.cc/C7PZ-PHVE; FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, https://perma.cc/M2FS-N7WP.
OCEANA, https://perma.cc/ZA7G-F7M5; GREENPEACE, https://perma.cc/MWQ9-S8VW;
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, https://perma.cc/MNR9-8W3E.
See generally Fikret Berkes, Local-Level Management and the Commons Problem: A Comparative Study of
Turkish Coastal Fisheries, 10 MARINE POL’Y 215 (1986); Sebastian Linke & Karl Bruckmeier, CoManagement in Fisheries – Experiences and Changing Approaches in Europe, 104 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT.
170 (2015).
See Neil Gunningham, Confronting the Challenge of Energy Governance, 1 TRANSNAT’L ENV’T L. 119, 119–
21 (2012). See generally HAAS, supra note 310.
See supra notes 301–11 and accompanying text.

327

Julien Rochette & Lucien Chabason, A Regional Approach to Marine Environmental Protection: The
“Regional Seas” Experience, in OCEANS: THE NEW FRONTIER 111, 115 (2011).

328

See Our Oceans, Seas and Coasts: The Barcelona Convention, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (May 6, 2020),
https://perma.cc/PF33-BVHW.

329

See The Anarctic Treaty, SECRETARIAT
https://perma.cc/S72Z-84HE.

Winter 2021

OF

THE

471

ANTARCTIC TREATY (May 6 2020),

Chicago Journal of International Law

Protection Commission (or Helsinki Commission),330 the OSPAR Commission,331
and numerous other regimes, such as those under the U.N. Regional Seas
Programme.332 There is also the enhanced level of protection and stock
management derived by regional fisheries management organizations333 and global
improvements in general flag state compliance as a result of closed regional
systems of port state measures, such as the Paris Memorandum of
Understanding.334 Furthermore, based on the analyses above, the more that states
are willing to acquiesce national sovereignty across regional contexts, the more
effective and powerful the resulting regimes can become. For example, the highly
supranational European Union has made several noteworthy achievements in the
marine governance context and is regarded as a world-leader in this field, including
extensive improvements in pollution and waste management, fisheries,
transboundary spatial planning, maritime security, and biodiversity protection.335
This makes sense when one considers that the creation of an overarching system
of accountability above states will have the capacity to drive higher levels of state
compliance and a wider servitude to regional objectives.336
For all these reasons, it is understandable that the present negotiations over
an international legally-binding instrument to protect biodiversity beyond national
jurisdiction (BBNJ) have included discussions on a “hybrid” global-regional
approach.337 An efficient system of MLG would therefore handle the complexity
and polycentricity of different governance polities, with numerous public, private,
and hybrid actors operating at different levels and playing different roles
330
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depending on the precise issue in question.338 To be effective, MLG must also use
an appropriate mix of centralization and decentralization, to permit autonomous
and meaningful community self-governance at the right levels.339
MLG is thus understood as the vital provision of polycentric coordination
within Transnational Environmental Governance, given this field’s concern “with
the migration and impact of legal norms, rules and models across borders.”340 As
Campbell and her colleagues suggested in 2016, an
explanation for failed oceans governance is scalar mismatch; that is, a
governance intervention . . . not well matched to the ecological scale of the
feature or process being governed . . . . The concern for scalar mismatch fuels
support for governance at global or regional scales and coordination among
scales.341

However, rather than viewing MLG as merely the realignment of scalar mismatch
between eco-systems and governance systems, we must be clear that the marine
environment continues to suffer severe scalar mismatch across normative,
regulatory, jurisdictional, collaborative, and compliance systems as well.

VI. C ONCLUSION : L OOKING B EYOND THE H ORIZONTALISM
Ascending up the rigging to the crow’s nest atop our new globalized world
order and peering through the spyglass, it is clear that coming into view beyond
the horizon is a new paradigm of ocean governance. While sovereignty and
territoriality may continue to rule the waves for some time, any suggestion that
this system of global legal accountability is working for the protection of our
shared global ocean must at last be jettisoned. Instead, it is time to consciously
expand beyond the horizontalism and decentralism of the present inter-national law
of the sea, by focusing on building more forceful systems of legal accountability
above, below, within, and without the nation-state. The failure to govern the oceans
has less to do with Grotius’s res communis or flag state regulation per se, as it does
with our gripped obsession with legal positivism and the eternal truism of
sovereign exclusivity, equality, and territoriality. All three of these features of
national sovereignty—which remain resolute and ever-present in our global legal
order for the seas—have manifested a list of critical weaknesses in the
management of an incredibly complex, multi-leveled, prototypically transnational,
338

339
340

341

See generally Dunoff, supra note 320; R.A.W. Rhodes, The New Governance: Governing without Government,
44 POL. STUD. 652 (1996).
See Dunoff, supra note 320, at 88–100.
See Jolene Lin & Joane Scott, Looking Beyond the International: Key Themes and Approaches of Transnational
Environmental Law, 1 TRANSNAT’L ENV’T L. 23, 24 (2012). See generally Gregory Shaffer & Daniel
Bodansky, Transnationalism, Unilateralism and International Law, 1 TRANSNAT’L ENV’T L. 31 (2012).
See Lisa M. Campbell et al., Global Oceans Governance: New and Emerging Issues, 41 ANN. REV. ENV’T &
RESOURCES 517, 522 (2016); see also Fikret Berkes, From Community-Based Resource Management to
Complex Systems: The Scale Issue and Marine Commons, 11 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 45 (2006).
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intergenerational, fluid, interdependent, and reflexive global commons, that itself
remains accessible and open to rivalry from all directions.
There has been a distinct lack of criticism of our present international legal
system for governing the seas, despite the huge expanse of research which has
flourished in the fields of transnational law and governance, global legal pluralism,
global governance, and multi-level governance. Fortunately, the time is ripe to
adapt the principles, findings, and theories across these subject fields for use
within the marine environment. The time for reflecting on our presently
Westphalian “constitution for the oceans”—as epitomized by the 1982 LOSC—
therefore appears to have been upon us for some time. While some law of the sea
experts have dispassionately inferred that this may require a “new paradigm
beyond positivism,”342 there has been a lack of conviction and concerted research
towards this end.343 Perhaps the best effort thus far has been Tanaka’s 2008
monograph on a regionally oriented understanding of “integrated” management
for the oceans that, although appearing to have slipped past the radar of wider
academic discussions, did at last highlight the weaknesses of a sole reliance on the
LOSC.344
Yet, it is clear that ocean jurisprudence continues to proceed along the same
tired inter-national lines. For example, the current negotiations over an
internationally binding legal instrument on the protection of BBNJ appear to carry
the same weaknesses of inter-state consent-based bargaining and lowest common
denominator weaknesses which were lamented throughout this article.345 More
investment is needed in the mobilization and advancement of private and hybrid
actors, such as NGOs, transnational corporations, subnational actors, and
standards bodies, as well as effective supranational and regional institutions, which
are able to force meaningful consent and compliance across ocean space.
Far more can be discussed on the expansion of pluralistic, multi-stakeholder,
and multi-level systems of maritime law and governance, as well as the means of
achieving such a global system of regulation. Nevertheless, this article has focused
an early critical point in these discussions, by arguing that the worldwide search
among academics and experts over the past three decades for new “integrated”
modes of ocean governance has, in fact, been merely a calling for a new postWestphalian, multi-level, and stakeholder-inclusive governance regime. In other
words, the coveted search for an integrated ocean governance is a search for a new
transnational law of the sea. The principal feature of this new transnational
governance model is an advanced level of stakeholder participation in the
342

See, e.g., FREESTONE ET AL., supra note 211.

343

See generally Allott, supra note 207; Barnes, supra note 102; TANAKA, supra note 15; BORGESE, supra
note 295.

344

See generally TANAKA, supra note 15.
See generally G.A. Res. 72/249 (Dec. 24, 2017).
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governance framework, as well as the migration of normative regimes from a
stubbornly horizontal system toward a multi-layered and polycentric network of
legal rule-makers and takers.
The integration and coordination between the traditional inter-national
order of the oceans, as epitomized and constitutionalized through the LOSC, with
the emerging seaward migration of a new transnational understanding of global
governance, is a ripe area for future research. The first port of call would be to
finally identify our outmoded devotion to Westphalianism as being at the heart of
our failing system up to now. If we are ever to govern this blue planet effectively,
a transnational law of the sea is not just desirable—it is indispensable.
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The Legal Man in the Moon: Exploring Environmental
Personhood for Celestial Bodies
William B. Altabef

Abstract
The rise of the commercial space industry endangers the preservation of environments, such
as the lunar surface and other celestial bodies, with the threat of contamination and resource
exploitation. In the coming decades, flights to space will become commonplace—but at present,
there is no way to hold outer space polluters accountable. The existing international legal regime
is weak, with the United Nations’ space treaties offering limited enforcement mechanisms against
offenders. The increasingly popular concept of environmental personhood offers a solution by
rethinking the meaning of a juridical person within the text of the United Nations Outer Space,
Space Liability, and Moon treaties. Utilizing the International Court of Justice, outer space
environmentalists can seek to recognize celestial bodies as juridical persons and gain third-party
standing to protect the rights of the Moon and seek damages for environmental degradation.
Through the exploration of contentious and advisory avenues within the International Court of
Justice, this Comment advances a new way of thinking to save extraterrestrial environments.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
Humanity is on the eve of a new era of industry, during which natural
resources, manufacturing, and research will be conducted beyond terrestrial
boundaries. This will include the mining of asteroids and the transformation or
colonization of untouched celestial bodies for economic gain by human actors. 1
Presently, there is no effective way to enforce environmental regulation on
celestial bodies, leaving them vulnerable to contamination and exploitation
without repercussion.
This is an important issue as the vast mineral riches of outer space could
fundamentally alter Earth’s economy and existing geopolitical rivalries, extending
them to outer space like during the Cold War. While it is unknown when and
where the first human settlement on another celestial body will occur, the rising
number of national and commercial actors interested in achieving such a goal
make it seem probable.2 The success of the multinational effort to maintain a
human population on the International Space Station for nearly two decades
demonstrates the feasibility of this vision.3 Space entrepreneur Jeff Bezos sees the
utilization of space as critical to the resolution of global issues including hunger,
poverty, and pollution.4 These hopes will all be moot if contamination or rapid
exploitation of celestial bodies renders them unable to be used for a greater good.
From a pessimistic perspective, a failure to introduce a regime for regulating the
usage of celestial resources could lead to international conflict in space and on
Earth.5
In order to understand the scope of the problem, Parts A and B of Section
II of this Comment examine the threat posed by the contamination and
exploitation of outer space resources. Part C of Section II discusses how the
current international regime is lacking solutions and is unlikely to create a
legislative solution given the national incentives to develop space industries. Part
1

2

Brian Higginbotham, The Space Economy: An Industry Takes Off, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Oct.
11, 2018), https://perma.cc/9KCW-7UGN.
Mike Brown, SpaceX Here’s the Timeline for Getting to Mars and Starting a Colony, INVERSE (July 3, 2019),
https://perma.cc/JWN5-8JNN; Mars & Beyond: The Road to Making Humanity Multiplanetary,
SPACEX, https://perma.cc/8CCK-7NQG; see also The Space Race is Dominated by New Contenders, THE
ECONOMIST (Oct. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/J59A-BRWS (detailing the increasing frequency of
Chinese, Indian, and private space launches).

3

Press Release, The European Space Agency, First Crew Starts Living and Working on the
International Space Station, (Oct. 31, 2000), https://perma.cc/YX4Q-9GY4.

4

Soo Youn & Christine Theodorou, Blue Origin, Jeff Bezos Unveils Plans for Space Colonization, ABC
NEWS (May 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/WQ2T-B4Y8.

5

David A. Wemer, Can International Cooperation in Space Survive Geopolitical Competition on Earth?,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Nov. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/ML99-Y3EA; Stuart Clark, ‘It’s Going to
Happen’: Is the World Ready for War in Space?, THE GUARDIAN, (Apr. 15, 2018),
https://perma.cc/PRG7-DD43.
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D of Section II frames the Comment’s focus: solving the problem of standing for
international litigation over extraterrestrial environmental damage. Section III Part
A provides a more substantive legal background, first by detailing the relevant
U.N. treaties: the Outer Space Treaty, the Space Liability Convention, and the
Moon Treaty. Section III Part B introduces the legal concept of environmental
personhood, an idea quickly gaining traction as national and local governments
seek to preserve natural resources on Earth and protect against climate change.
Environmental personhood bestows juridical personhood upon natural features,
enabling them to have standing so that other entities or persons can bring claims
on their behalf. Finally, Section IV hypothesizes the application of environmental
personhood in the realm of outer space and how the existing legal framework can
provide a system of regulation and justice for celestial natural resources. The
proposed means of incorporating environmental personhood into the
international law of space would be a judgment by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), either through an advisory opinion or a contentious case. While there
are potential problems and alternative solutions, implementing environmental
personhood through a judicial decision represents a rapid solution requiring
limited consensus to a problem that could quickly grow beyond control.

II. T HE P ROBLEM
The introduction of new national space programs6 and commercial ventures7
has ensured that space will become even more crowded in the coming years.
Activity will not be limited to mere scientific exploration. Already, commercial
actors are planning to mine celestial bodies for profit.8 While the near-term future
for spacefaring consumers appears to be tourism,9 the goal of national space
programs and space entrepreneurs is resource extraction, lunar colonization, and
beyond.10 The Moon is proposed to be an abundant source of Helium-3, a few

6

7
8

9

10

Chandrayaan-2 Days Away from Moon’s Orbit. What Next, INDIA TODAY (Sept. 5, 2019),
https://perma.cc/ZP82-LKT5.
See Higginbotham, supra note 1.
Chloe Cornish, Interplanetary Players: A Who’s Who of Space Mining, FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 18, 2017),
https://perma.cc/KMR6-KEH3; Jeff Foust, A Trillion-Dollar Space Industry Will Require New
Markets, SPACE NEWS (July 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/JG8H-MRCW.
Alex Knapp, With Virgin Galactic’s Latest Flight, Has Space Tourism Finally Arrived?, FORBES (Dec. 14,
2018), https://perma.cc/CJ4T-HLWQ; Jonathan O’Callaghan, 2019 Is the Year That Space Tourism
Finally Becomes a Reality. No, Really, WIRED (Jan. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/WM96-3XTK.
Jackie Wattles, NASA Wants Astronauts to Go Back to the Moon in 2024. Is It Possible?, CNN BUSINESS
(June 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/2AC9-BMFM; NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
ADMINISTRATION, AMERICA TO THE MOON BY 2024, NASA’S FY 2020 BUDGET AMENDMENT
SUMMARY, https://perma.cc/9NWL-SSR3; Olivia Solon, Elon Musk: We Must Colonize Mars to
Preserve Our Species in a Third World War, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/8W5BBH7T; see Youn & Theodorou, supra note 4; Brown, supra note 2.
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hundred tons of which could meet Earth’s energy needs for an entire year.11 There
is an incentive in the space mining and colonization industries to build a track
record of success to lure investment in a capital-intensive field, making the nearby
Moon’s energy reserves an appealing target for early commercial missions. The
private space race will potentially create the first trillionaire, leaving little room for
the thought of the environmental effects on faraway places.12
First, this Section discusses the two main environmental threats associated
with new commercial enterprises: exploitation and contamination. Then, this
Section explains how the existing legal framework compounds the practical
problems, leaving a gap for the articulation and measurement of the
environmental harm in the commons of outer space.

A. The Practical Problems
Without actions causing direct harms, there is no need for a legal framework
to regulate activity and hold bad actors accountable. In order to understand the
problem that the legal solution of extraterrestrial environmental personhood is
attempting to solve, first this Comment will introduce the practical problems of
exploitation and contamination.

1. Exploitation
The risk of exploitation is exponentially rising as the prospect of harnessing
resources in outer space becomes commercially viable. Exploitation in this context
can be defined as the extraction and consumption of extraterrestrial resources for
non-scientific purposes, potentially without research on the long-term impact of
such activities. The global space economy currently produces revenues of $350
billion, a number conservatively expected to rise to $1 trillion by 2040. 13
Traditional aerospace companies such as Boeing and Airbus continue to focus
primarily on designing rockets for national program usage.14 Newer entrants such
as Planetary Resources are explicitly focusing on the private exploitation of

11

12

13

14

Niklas Reinke, No Helium-3 from Moon – Commentary on the Current Moon Debate, in DLR COUNTDOWN
#3 25 (2007); see also Fabio Tronchetti, Legal Aspects of Space Resource Utilization, in HANDBOOK OF
SPACE LAW (Frans von der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015).
Tiffany Terrell, Physicist Says Asteroid Mining Ventures Will Spawn First Trillionaire, GLOBAL NEWSWIRE
(Jan. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/J75M-87NA.
Foust, supra note 8; Space: Investing in the Final Frontier, MORGAN STANLEY (July 2, 2019),
https://perma.cc/9FUJ-432V.
Andrea Shalal, Airbus Seeks New Partners to Expand in U.S. Space Market, REUTERS (June 18, 2019),
https://perma.cc/5TMP-XC9Y; see also Joel Kowsky, From Take Off to Landing, NASA and Boeing
Work
Together
to
Launch
Commercial
Crew,
NASA
(Dec.
19,
2019),
https://www.nasa.gov/feature/from-take-off-to-landing-nasa-and-boeing-work-together-tolaunch-commercial-crew.

480

Vol. 21 No. 2

The Legal Man in the Moon

Altabef

asteroids through space mining,15 while others, such as SpaceX and Blue Origin,
have taken an ‘all of the above’ approach with broad goals to commercialize space
and support the eventual colonization of outer space.16
Commercial actors may be less likely to concern themselves with
implementing procedures to mitigate or prevent pollution, and they could perform
launch operations from jurisdictions with minimal requirements in order to
maximize profitability.17 Previous missions to space were conducted for scientific
purposes by governments, with American and Soviet space programs
implementing planetary protection precautions for landers to prevent forward
contamination.18 The growing commercial industry raises the potential for a much
more crowded outer space with less commitment to protocol. Already,
commercial space ventures are launching thousands of satellites, endangering the
low Earth orbit ecosystem, with little planning for the safe decommission of these
satellites.19 While sustainable usage and extraction of extraterrestrial resources
would be ideal, the risky nature of the space industry coupled with limited current
enforcement is likely to produce a tragedy of the commons.20

2. Contamination
Human exploration has a long history of contamination, and space is no
exception.21 For the purposes of this Comment, contamination specifically refers
to the introduction of foreign substances and lifeforms into extraterrestrial

15

Redefining Natural Resources: Why Asteroids, PLANETARY RECOURSES, https://perma.cc/363C-ZKKZ.

16

Meghan Bartels, SpaceX Wants to Send People to Mars. Here’s What the Trip Might Look Like., SPACE.COM
(May 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/5Y3P-BYCD; see also Youn & Theodorou, supra note 4; Erik
Sofge, The Most Innovative Space Companies of 2020, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://perma.cc/X8LS-JAYC.

17

See Caroline Delber, SpaceX Says There Are No Laws on Mars, So Maybe Elon Musk Will Be President,
POPULAR MECHANICS (Oct. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/338Z-TY6K (discussing SpaceX’s terms
of service which claim Mars is a free planet and that no Earth-based government has authority over
Mars).

18

LOTTA VIIKARI, THE ENVIRONMENTAL ELEMENT IN SPACE LAW: ASSESSING THE PRESENT AND
CHARTING THE FUTURE 51 (2008).

19

EUROPEAN SPACE POLICY INSTITUTE, TOWARDS A EUROPEAN APPROACH TO SPACE TRAFFIC
MANAGEMENT (2020), https://espi.or.at/publications/espi-public-reports/send/2-public-espireports/494-espi-report-71-stm.
See Jonathan O’Callaghan, The FCC’s Approval of SpaceX’s Starlink Mega Constellation May Have Been
Unlawful, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Jan. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/GVZ7-J87W (detailing the
launch of SpaceX’s Starlink satellite system around the Earth has already begun to brighten the sky,
inhibiting terrestrial stargazing).
See Megan Garber, The Trash We’ve Left on the Moon, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 19, 2012),
https://perma.cc/SCC5-YGPL (listing the many items left from the Apollo missions including
human waste). For information about the potential future of contamination, see MARGARET S.
RACE ET AL., NASA, PLANETARY PROTECTION KNOWLEDGE FOR HUMAN EXTRATERRESTRIAL
MISSIONS, WORKSHOP REPORT (2015), https://perma.cc/MF8N-C8GG.

20

21
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environments. Recent events further evidence the risks of contamination in an
unregulated field. In February 2019, a private rocket carrying a lunar lander
crashed on the surface of the Moon.22 The rocket was funded by the American
nonprofit Arch Mission Foundation and was launched from Florida by the Israeli
corporation SpaceIL.23 Unbeknownst to international regulators at the time of
launch, the rocket was carrying thousands of tardigrades, a terrestrial creature
known for its ability to survive nearly anywhere.24 Nova Spivack, the cofounder
of the Arch Mission Foundation, admitted to placing the tardigrades on the
SpaceIL lander at the last minute without disclosing the nature of the addition to
SpaceIL.25 Although there is no definitive analysis of the consequences of
introducing the tardigrades into the lunar environment, they are the only creature
known to survive the vacuum of space.26 There is limited immediate threat posed
by the tardigrades as they exist in a state of cryptobiosis in space, unable to
reproduce with their metabolism held to a minimum, but the concern is that the
next species sent to the Moon might not be as harmless.27
Regardless, the actions of the Arch Mission Foundation violate existing
planetary protection guidelines, practices set out by the international Committee
on Space Research (COSPAR) and national space agencies to prevent cross
contamination between planetary bodies.28 There has been no reported sanction
for the irresponsible private actors involved in the tardigrade launch, signaling a
low risk to subsequent commercial actors and increasing the chance of future
contamination or exploitation. National systems are disincentivized from
22

23

Loren Grush, Why Stowaway Creatures on the Moon Confound International Space Law, THE VERGE (Aug.
16, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/16/20804219/moon-tardigrades-lunar-landerspaceil-arch-mission-foundation-outer-space-treaty-law.
Id.

24

Hannah Osborne, Thousands of ‘Indestructible’ Tardigrades Could Be Living on the Moon After Crashing on
the Lunar Surface, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/8JDY-G8HU.

25

Chris Taylor, ‘I’m the First Space Pirate!’ How Tardigrades Were Secretly Smuggled to the Moon, MASHABLE
(Aug. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/98W5-JTVY (noting that Spivack considers himself to be the first
space pirate after his smuggling of the tardigrades).
Joseph Stromberg, How Does the Tiny Waterbear Survive in Outer Space, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Sept.
11, 2012), https://perma.cc/FNF2-74DT; Jason Daley, A Crashed Spacecraft Might Have Put Earth’s
Most Indestructible Organisms on the Moon, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Aug. 7, 2019),
https://perma.cc/KR99-TW6Z.
Ari Shapiro, Thousands of Tardigrades are Stranded on the Moon After a Failed Lunar Mission, NPR (Aug.
8, 2019), https://perma.cc/L4GB-J4CD.
COSPAR, The COSPAR Panel on Planetary Protection Role, Structure and Activities, 205 SPACE RSCH.
TODAY 14 (Aug. 2019) (providing an overview of the planetary protection framework and examples
of procedures, including the requirement that missions to other planetary bodies “adhere to
stringent planetary protection measures to abide the first rationale for planetary protection to not
interfere with ‘scientific investigations of possible extraterrestrial life forms, precursors, and
remnants’ and not to impose terrestrial biological contamination to these objects of high
astrobiological interest”).

26

27
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regulating harshly, as launches can happen across the globe and fledgling space
companies might take their businesses to friendlier jurisdictions.
While the Earth’s atmosphere has proven to be relatively durable in the face
of carbon emissions and other pollutants, the atmospheres of our neighbors are
far more fragile. The emissions of twenty Apollo mission landings would have
effectively doubled the lunar atmosphere; the Martian atmosphere is similarly
tenuous.29 When imagining the scale of a lunar mining operation or colony, it is
easy to predict the potential human-caused climate change on the lunar surface.
Introducing enough biological or chemical contaminants could produce carbon
emissions that start a dangerous process.
Various actors have proposed larger environmental offenses, particularly
terraforming, the process by which an Earthlike ecosystem is created on another
planet. Already, small steps have been taken to test our ability to bring Earth to
other surfaces, such as when China attempted to grow cotton on the Moon.30
There is concern that an effort to terraform will damage the natural ecosystem of
the targeted planet. Elon Musk, CEO of SpaceX, has suggested terraforming Mars
and potentially nuking ice deposits on its surface.31 Musk’s plan to bring life to
Mars through terraforming has numerous critics and doubters in the scientific
community, particularly astrobiologists.32 It could be that nuking Mars leads to the
degradation of natural features that humanity might wish to preserve for future
generations. Just as Americans have protected Yosemite and the Grand Canyon,
perhaps future Martian settlers will wish that Olympus Mons had been protected.
Some amount of extraterrestrial resource usage is permissible to satisfy
human needs for research and scientific gains, but there should be a
contamination threshold beyond which there is some sort of legal ramification.
The contamination threshold could be determined by considering the value of the
contaminated body and the severity of the contamination. The value of the
extraterrestrial body can be governed by the categories of planetary protection
priority already established by COSPAR based upon the probability that those
bodies have life on them.33 For example, the contamination threshold might be
29

See Manfred Hintz, Environmental Aspects of Settlements on the Moon and Mars Planetary Protection, 34
PROC. L. OUTER SPACE 59, 60 (1991).

30

Amy Held, China Tried to Grow Cotton on the Moon, but It Didn’t Work, NPR (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://perma.cc/R67A-BF2N.

31

Doyle Rice, NASA Says We Can’t Terraform Mars. Elon Musk Disagrees, USA TODAY (Aug. 1, 2018),
https://perma.cc/PB84-3THS; see also Sissi Cao, Elon Musk Wants to ‘Nuke Mars’ for Humans to
Live—But There is One Problem, OBSERVER (Aug. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/VSJ7-9NL6.
See, e.g., Lucianne Walkowicz, The Problem with Terraforming Mars: What Do We Lose If We Make the Red
Planet Hospitable to Humans?, SLATE (Sept. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/HM3Y-LV5R; Bruce M.
Jakosky & Christopher S. Edwards, Inventory of CO2 available for terraforming Mars, 2 NATURE
ASTRONOMY 634 (2018).
See COSPAR, supra note 28.
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higher for a barren asteroid and lower for Europa, which is believed to have a
subsurface ocean. There would be variation by the type of contaminant and the
amount of exposure. Leaving sealed bags of human waste on the Moon from the
Apollo missions might not be as harmful as releasing a school of fish into an
extraterrestrial ocean.

B. The Legal Problems
The potential damage from exploitation and contamination could be
mitigated if there was a sufficient regulatory regime or enforcement mechanism
to curb the activities of future polluters. As outlined below, the current national
and international regulatory regimes fail to control independent actors seeking a
profit. Although it may be possible to craft regulations capable of protecting
extraterrestrial environments through permitting and planetary protection
systems, political capital requirements and national incentives make regulation a
less likely solution. Instead, a few environmentally conscious actors can seek
judgments through international litigation, lowering the potential political costs
and providing a more immediate solution than the drafting of regulations. The
issue that this Comment focuses on is how to cure potential defects in standing
and causation in potential international litigation over environmental damage to
an extraterrestrial environment, such as the Moon.

1. Lacking Regulatory Regime
Despite decades of increasing usage and dependency on outer space as a
resource, the international regime governing outer space is weak. The United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Spaces (COPUOS) oversees
the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) and created the
five current U.N. treaties covering outer space.34 While the first space treaty from
1967 has 109 states parties,35 subsequent treaties offering more specific regulation
of space received much less support, with the Moon Treaty having only 18 states
parties.36 The five main space treaties were all introduced between 1967 and 1979,
with no substantive development of an international regulatory regime in the
subsequent years. This gap in regulation has increased along with the possibilities
and realities of human use of space.
Many nations have supplemented the international agreements with their
own space regulations. In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration
34
35

36

Roles and Responsibilities, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, https://perma.cc/536N-7FQU.
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5,
1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Treaty].
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oversees the space launch licensing process,37 and maritime jurisdiction extends to
spaceships.38 In the European Union,39 Norway,40 Sweden,41 Belgium,42 the
Netherlands,43 and France44 have all passed laws to regulate private space
enterprises. These laws, among many other examples at the national level, often
require private actors to secure permission or comply with a national registry
before launching objects into space. While these national regulations impose some
restrictions on commercial actors, the international regime never reached a
sufficient level of development to do so.
The development of independent national laws is not necessarily beneficial
to the protection of celestial environments. Given the vast amount of resources
and money at stake, it may be more likely that national legislation leads to a race
to the bottom to enable domestic space corporations to engage in riskier but more
profitable activities than their international competitors.45 Increasing values of
asteroid minerals in combination with lower barriers to entry as space technology
improves will encourage more commercial players to enter the industry. Without
an international regulatory regime in place, commercial actors will be incentivized
to lobby against regulations as revenues increase and they gain more influence
within national governments. National governments will also have limited
incentives to regulate their own space industries if it will hurt their competitiveness
in the broader market. Even if national governments were willing to create and
enforce a working environmental system, the lack of uniformity between national
standards still calls for an international approach.
Seabed mining provides a terrestrial example of this problem. After initial
proposals to collect minerals from the sea floor developed in the 1960s,46 the U.N.

37

Licensing Process, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE
TRANSPORTATION, https://perma.cc/RU2Z-W6Q2.

38

18 U.S.C. § 7(6).
Frans von der Dunk, The Legal Framework for Space Projects in Europe: Aspects of Applicable Law and
Dispute Resolution, in CONTRACTING FOR SPACE: CONTRACT PRACTICE IN THE EUROPEAN SPACE
SECTOR 357 (Lesley Jane Smith & Ingo Baumann eds., 2011).

39

OF

COMMERCIAL SPACE

40

Lov om oppskyting av gjenstander fra norsk territorium m.m. ut i verdensrommet, 13 juni 1969 nr.
38 (Nor.).

41

2 § LAG OM RYMDVERKSAMHET, (Svensk f-författningssamling [SFS] 1982:963) (Swed.).
Loi relative aux activités de lancement, d’opération de vol ou de guidage d'objets spatiaux of Sept.17,
2005, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Nov.4, 2008 (Belg.).
Wet rimtevaartactiviteiten, 24 januari 2007, Stb. 2007, 80 (Neth.).

42

43
44

Loi 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008 relative aux opérations spatiales, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.][OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 4, 2008, p. 9169 (Fr.).

45

See Tronchetti, supra note 11, at 810.
Julie Hunter, Pradeep Singh & Julian Aguon, Broadening Common Heritages, Addressing Gaps in the Deep
Sea Mining Regulatory Regime, HARV. ENV’T L. REV. BLOG (Apr. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/N6XE8K3H.
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enacted the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in
1982.47 UNCLOS established an international framework for several international
maritime legal issues, including the establishment of the International Seabed
Authority (ISA) under Part XI of the convention. Article 136 declares, “The
[seabed] Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind.”48 The
‘common heritage of mankind’ language mirrors language that was used to
describe the Moon in the Moon Treaty, which was being drafted
contemporaneously.49 The result of UNCLOS and the ISA has been far from
ideal. The ISA has operated with limited transparency,50 giving out twenty-seven
contracts for the mining of 1.4 million square kilometers with limited assurances
of the environmental controls desired by some conservationists.51 A small number
of contracts for mining in international waters come from closed sessions of the
ISA, while many larger contracts are given by national governments to mine the
seabed within their exclusive economic zones with limited research on the
ultimate environmental impact.52 The U.S. notably objected to parts of UNCLOS,
undermining its effectiveness and leading to competing national regulatory
systems.53 It is not unreasonable to imagine the same dual licensing system taking
hold in space, whereby some corporations are licensed by national launch
authorities and others by an international body. The danger is much the same, that
corporations will seek the nations willing to give early licenses in order to get ahead
in space.
The interaction of actors incentivized to be the first to make a large profit in
a risky industry with the lack of real regulation may lead to the contamination or
exploitation of celestial resources with potentially irreversible consequences. A
historical analogy would be that of the older oil wells in Texas, drilled without
long-term concern for environmental impact, which are now leaking
contaminants across the state.54 When starting a risky natural resources venture,
47
48
49

50

51

52
53

54

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
Id. art. 136.
See Frans G. von der Dunk, The Dark Side of The Moon: The Status of the Moon: Public Concepts and Private
Enterprise, 40 PROC. L. OUTER SPACE 119, 121–22 (1997) (discussing the application of the
“common heritage of mankind” principle to the Moon).
Kirsten F. Thompson et al., Seabed Mining and Approaches to Governance of the Deep Seabed, FRONTIERS
MARINE SCIENCE (Dec. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/8BGH-C78E,
Kathryn A. Miller et al., An Overview of Seabed Mining Including the Current State of Development,
Environmental Impacts, and Knowledge Gaps, FRONTIERS IN MARINE SCIENCE (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://perma.cc/P963-2GKQ.
Id. (detailing contracts given to mine off the coast of Africa and Oceania).
See James L. Malone, The United States and the Law of the Sea after UNCLOS III, 46 LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 30 (1983) and Roncevert Ganan Almond, U.S. Ratification of the Law of
the Sea Convention, THE DIPLOMAT (May 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/V66U-GE68.
Jim Malewitz, Abandoned Texas Oil Wells Seen as “Ticking Time Bombs” of Contamination, TEXAS
TRIBUNE (Dec. 21, 2016), https://perma.cc/6EW2-UGQM.
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the first goal is to make a substantial return, and the fear of environmental liability
is often an afterthought. If a wildcatter does not find oil or cannot get it out of
the ground, they will be just as insolvent as if they were hit with large amounts of
environmental liability. Additionally, there is a short-term bias to conducting many
ventures as the environmental impact and full consequences often are not
calculable until decades later, potentially long after the initial mining venture has
concluded.55 History cautions against the lack of regulation. A legal regime is
needed to hold offending actors accountable in a time horizon short enough to
create an incentivizing impact.

2. Unarticulated Basis for International Litigation
In the absence of either a working international regulatory framework or
comparable national systems, pursuing environmental damages claims under the
existing U.N. space treaties in the ICJ presents a viable path to create
accountability and promote extraterrestrial conservation. The language of the
treaties, detailed in the following Section, enables a nation to seek monetary
damages when space debris from a second nation strikes the territory or property
of the first nation. In the extraterrestrial context, the difficulty arises when the
damage occurs to another planetary body, which no nation has a territorial claim
to protect. There is a gap in the current practice and scholarship on international
law to show how a litigant could have standing to sue for damage to extraterrestrial
environments, such as that of the Moon. This Comment will focus on answering
this problem by using the legal concept of environmental personhood to articulate
what is damaged when the Moon is polluted and how third-party standing will
hold bad actors accountable.

III. L EGAL B ACKGROUND
A. Existing International Law for Celestial Bodies
The U.N. is the primary governing authority on international laws and
regulations pertaining to outer space. Through the U.N. Office for Outer Space
Affairs, the U.N. tracks satellites orbiting the Earth and works to implement the
five adopted space treaties. The two treaties most relevant to this Comment are
the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty. The Outer Space Treaty laid out an
initial framework for international ambitions to regulate outer space activity, but
it left gaps and ambiguities for subsequent treaties and regulations to fill in or
refine. The Outer Space Treaty’s general spirit provides a lodestar for subsequent
laws to follow. The Space Liability Convention, for example, built upon the Outer
Space Treaty to create a mechanism for nations to seek damages when debris fall
into their sovereign territory, an important building block for nations seeking to
55

Id.
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protect extraterrestrial environments from contamination or exploitation. Finally,
the Moon Treaty introduced additional protections for the Moon and represented
the most progressive attempt to prevent exploitative usage of extraterrestrial
resources.
While the Moon Treaty was less widely adopted, the Outer Space Treaty and
Space Liability Convention can work in concert to provide a path for a case to be
heard in the ICJ if the court were to adopt an environmental personhood reading
of certain provisions of the treaties. The Moon Treaty still provides a persuasive
example of where the international legal community might have gone had
competitive intentions been removed.

1. The Outer Space Treaty
The Treaty on Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer
Space Treaty) was the first attempt to establish an international regime for outer
space, ratified just 10 years after Sputnik and two years before the Apollo 11
landing.56 It has been ratified by 110 parties, including all major spacefaring
nations, and serves as the most widely adopted source of international space law.
Certain sections were later clarified by subsequent agreements such as the
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return
of Objects Launched into Outer Space.57
The preamble of the Outer Space Treaty recognizes “the common interest
of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for
peaceful purposes.”58 This language demonstrates the reliance on historic
conceptions of nature serving human needs, an idea that will be countered by the
concept of environmental personhood and subsequent U.N. treaty language. In
the absence of any foundational law for outer space, it may have seemed natural
to transplant the legal regime that governed the property of Earth to outer space.
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty establishes the broad jurisdiction of the
treaty as “[o]uter space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.”59 Article
II declares “[o]uter space, including the [M]oon and other celestial bodies, is not
subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means.”60 However, some commentators have

56

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35.

57

Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue
Agreement].
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35.

58
59
60

Id. art. I.
Id. art. II.
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speculated whether resources are similarly unclaimable once they have been
extracted. 61
Under Article IX, “States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer
space, including the [M]oon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration
of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination . . . .”62 The introduction of
tardigrades is clearly a form of contamination, but the harm caused by their
introduction is still unknown. Previous ventures to the Moon during the Apollo
missions left bags of human waste, which some scientists have hypothesized could
have introduced microbial life to the previously sterile lunar surface.63
Terraforming a planet would almost certainly be a harmful contamination as it
would purposefully change the ecosystem of a planet. The harm would be to the
natural planet itself, rather than to the human interests that are traditionally at the
core of human-centric Anglo-American property law. The environmental
personhood concept requires that the protection from harm given to the celestial
body be the same protection the law would give any human body. Even using the
most stringent and narrow definitions of harm, requiring potentially irreversible
decimation of any native lifeforms and the introduction of invasive species from
Earth as proposed by terraforming advocates would meet these criteria. Yet, the
current international framework has limited means to punish violations of this
treaty.

2. The Space Liability Convention
Following the Outer Space Treaty, the U.N. enacted the Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Space Liability
Convention) in 1972.64 The Space Liability Convention clarified language
regarding the consequences of damages derived from space travel. While the focus
of the treaty appears to be on compensation for damages stemming from an object
falling from space, much of the treaty is still operable for “damage being caused
elsewhere than on the surface of the earth.”65 Under Article I, damages can occur
to “persons, natural or juridical . . . .”66 The inclusion of juridical persons does not
appear to be limited to persons who are a citizen of a state party. Rather the injury
of any juridical person could be sufficient for a claim should the litigant have
standing, enabling monetary damages for harm to juridical persons under the
61

62

See Eric Husby, Comment, Sovereignty and Property Rights in Outer Space, 3 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 359, 366,
370 (1994).
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35, art. IX.

63

Andrew C. Schuerger, John E. Moores, David J. Smith & Günther Reitz, A Lunar Microbial Survival
Model for Predicting the Forward Contamination of the Moon, 19 ASTROBIOLOGY 730, 752 (2019).

64

Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24
U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Space Liability Convention].
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Id. art. II.
Id. art. I.
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environmental personhood model. Liability extends to “a State from whose
territory or facility a space object is launched.”67 Thus, had the SpaceIL rocket
caused damage, the U.S. would be the liable nation as the rocket was initially
launched from Cape Canaveral, Florida.68
The Space Liability Convention suggests that diplomatic negotiations should
be the primary means of settling damages claims. After stating a claim, a party
“may also present its claim to the Secretary-General of the United Nations” under
Article IX.69 Articles XIV–XX outline the use of an international Commission to
resolve disputes between the parties when negotiations fail. The Commission is
listed as the tertiary option, less preferable to negotiation or the assistance of the
Secretary-General. There has only been one resolution of a claim thus far under
the Space Liability Convention. In 1978, a Soviet nuclear satellite scattered
radioactive debris over Canada, leading Canada to claim several million dollars in
damages under the Space Liability Convention.70 The claim was then settled
through diplomatic means before the point at which the Secretary-General would
have made a recommendation. While this system worked for a state-sponsored
satellite,71 it has tremendous shortcomings in dealing with the coming private
space industry. In particular, the Space Liability Convention ostensibly requires
the claims of private parties to be sponsored by a state party to the treaty.72
Although not discussed in the text of the Space Liability Convention, the
consultation of the ICJ appears to be a possible avenue under a recommendation
by the Secretary-General. With no precedent demonstrating the mechanics of the
Space Liability Convention at a more contentious or substantive procedural point,
the Secretary-General would likely look to proven dispute resolution mechanisms.
The ICJ would be at the top of the list given its proven record of equitable
arbitration,73 statutory status under the U.N.,74 and reputation as the premier
international court. Demonstrating its institutional capacity, the ICJ has decided
claims over other extraterritorial areas, including a claim over whaling in Antarctic

67

Id. art. I(c)(ii).

68

See Grush, supra note 22; Osborne, supra note 24.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35, art. IX

69
70

Protocol on Settlement of Canada’s Claim for Damages Caused by “Cosmos 954”, Can.-U.S.S.R.,
1981 Can. T.S. No. 8, art. 2 [hereinafter Claims Protocol].

71

‘State-sponsored’ here describes space missions funded or executed by nation states rather than
activities done for private profit without the inducement of a national government.

72

See Dan St. John, Comment, The Trouble with Westphalia in Space: The State-Centric Liability Regime, 40
DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 686, 696 (2012).

73

Cases, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, https://perma.cc/CZ5G-CHWK (“Between 22 May
1947 and 11 November 2019, 178 cases were entered in the General List.”).
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Statute of the International Court of Justice, April 18, 1946, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ
Statute].
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water under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. 75
Hearing a case under the Space Liability Convention could become a routine
practice for the ICJ in the coming decades as space traffic increases. An
environmental personhood claim might eventually be heard as the ICJ produces
substantially more precedent proving institutional expertise in extraterrestrial legal
matters.

3. The Moon Treaty
The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty)76 was the final of the five U.N. space treaties. Since
its introduction in 1979, the Moon Treaty has been significantly less adopted than
the Outer Space Treaty, with only 18 states parties. While the Moon Treaty is the
most progressive on environmental issues, the lack of widespread adoption
“renders the instrument practically meaningless.”77 India is the only Moon Treaty
signatory to also have a significant national space program thus far.78 France is an
original signatory to the Moon Treaty and is also a member state of the European
Space Agency, potentially tying one of the largest space agencies to the Moon
Treaty through a key member. Other nations continue to slowly join the Moon
Treaty with accessions by Turkey and Saudi Arabia in 2012, Venezuela in 2016,
and Armenia in 2018. The slow pace of adoption has left a “vacuum” of
international law over the Moon,79 but the Moon Treaty still serves an important
role as the best expression of the international objectives for a legal framework to
govern the Moon.
The Moon Treaty’s status as the only treaty explicitly about the Moon should
still guide behavior and inform any future discussions over the law governing the
Moon. Most of the opposition to the Moon Treaty by the spacefaring powers at
the time, the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was based upon
reaction to the potential requirement to share extracted mineral wealth with other
nations.80 This Comment does not address the legality of lunar mining itself,
instead focusing on the legal ramifications for the environmental impact of such
activities. The Outer Space Treaty set principles broadly for outer space activity;

75

Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. 148
(Mar. 14).
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Moon Treaty, supra note 36.
Lotta Viikari, Environmental Aspects of Space Activities, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW, 717, 726 (Frans
von der Dunk and Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015).
Chandrayaan-2 Days Away from Moon’s Orbit. What Next, supra note 6.
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Michael Listner, The Moon Treaty: Failed International Law or Waiting in the Shadows?, THE SPACE
REVIEW (Oct. 24, 2011), https://perma.cc/K6JA-GJ43.
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See David Everett Marko, A Kinder, Gentler Moon Treaty: A Critical Review of the Current Moon Treaty
and a Proposed Alternative, 8 J. NAT. RES. & ENV’T L. 293, 302–06, 311–13 (1992).

Winter 2021

491

Chicago Journal of International Law

whereas subsequent treaties, such as the Moon Treaty, sought to fill in the gaps.81
The Space Liability Convention created the deeper legal framework initially called
for in Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty covering liability for space activities.
The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space82 built out the vision set forth in
Article V of the Outer Space Treaty. So, while the Moon Treaty received fewer
initial ratifications, it can serve as an explanatory document for the framework that
the signatories of the Outer Space Treaty had envisioned.
Article 1 of the Moon Treaty states that the treaty applies to the Moon and
also “to other celestial bodies within the solar system other than the earth.”83 The
Moon Treaty recognizes that outer space law is not separate from the international
law framework but rather a subset of it, as “[a]ll activities on the moon, including
its exploration and use, shall be carried out in accordance with international law,
in particular the Charter of the United Nations . . . .”84 Under this conception, the
broader international legal mechanisms, such as the ICJ and the Security Council,
still govern the operations of space actors.
Later sections of the Moon Treaty deal more directly with the importance of
environmental preservation. Article 7 § 1 states that “[i]n exploring and using the
[M]oon, States Parties shall take measures to prevent the disruption of the existing
balance of its environment, whether by introducing adverse changes in that
environment, by its harmful contamination through the introduction of extraenvironmental matter or otherwise.”85 This represents a more specific and
stronger version of the language seen in Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty of
1967. The examples of terraforming and the introduction of tardigrades would
likely be considered violations of this language. Under Article 11 § 1, “[t]he moon
and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind . . . .”86 Unlike the
“province of all mankind” language from the Outer Space Treaty, the phrase
“common heritage of mankind” is stronger and points to the Moon’s unique

81

82
83
84
85
86

Each of the preambles to the various space treaties refers to the prior agreements and the spirit of
law the new treaty seeks to build upon. See Moon Treaty, supra note 35, ¶ 15 (“Recalling the Treaty
on the Principles Governing the Activities in the Exploration and Use of Outer Spaces including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched in to Outer Space, the Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, and the Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space . . . .”).
Rescue Agreement, supra note 57.
Moon Treaty, supra note 36, art. 1.
Id. art. 2.
Id. art 7.
Id. art. 11 § 1.
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freedom from ownership.87 This language reinforces the human-centric attitude
toward natural resources, but also indicates a common interest in the regulation
or sustainable usage of the Moon. By recognizing a common heritage value of the
Moon to all humans, the Moon Treaty might create an avenue for a plaintiff to
bring a claim for the degradation of the lunar environment. The common heritage
aspect of the Moon can enable third parties to serve as guardian ad litem for the
environmental person that is the Moon.
Article 11 § 3 states that “[n]either the surface nor the subsurface of the
[M]oon, nor any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property
of any State . . . or non-governmental entity or of any natural person.”88 Based on
this language, it seems that there should be no ownership or territorial claims to
the Moon, creating a situation analogous to Antarctica.89 Additionally, it would be
hard to legally extract and sell material from the Moon if it cannot be owned.
Prohibiting ownership may prevent transfer or encourage actors to adopt a parallel
system more supportive of their commercial needs.
Article 11 § 5 requires that “States Parties to this Agreement hereby
undertake to establish an international regime, including appropriate procedures,
to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon as such
exploitation is about to become feasible.”90 Article 11 § 7 states that “[t]he main
purposes of the international regime to be established shall include: (a) The orderly
and safe development of the natural resources of the Moon; (b) The rational
management of those resources; (c) The expansion of opportunities in the use of
those resources . . . .”91 It is conceivable that these responsibilities could be
delegated to UNOOSA or COPUOS, but no regime or delegation of authority
exists yet to carry out the Moon Treaty’s vision. Article 15 §§ 2–3 set out methods
for resolving disputes, including consultation with the offending nation, the
assistance of the Secretary-General, or “other peaceful means of [the states
parties’] choice appropriate to the circumstances and the nature of the dispute.”92

4. Interpreting the U.N. Treaties
While the U.N. outer space treaties provide a legal framework, judicial
interpretation of the treaties’ terms can enable greater reach and regulation. In the
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See Nina Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer
Space, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 363, 410 (2004).
Moon Treaty, supra note 36, art. 11 § 3.
Juan Francisco Salazar, Antarctica and Outer Space: Relational Trajectories, 7 POLAR J. 259, 261 (2017)
(detailing how the Antarctic Treaty System and Outer Space Treaties both created “extraterritorial
zones” in which no nation could claim sovereign territory).
Moon Treaty, supra note 36, art. 11 § 5.
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common law tradition, judges have the power to fill in the gaps of statutes and
choose the rules that fulfill the enactor’s intent.93 While the U.N. treaties do not
define “juridical person,” the growing adoption of environmental personhood can
fill a gap in the law by providing a legal mechanism for the environmental
regulation envisioned by the treaties. Currently, commercial and national actors
engage in environmentally hazardous behavior with limited fear of international
sanction or economic penalty. Recognition of celestial bodies as juridical persons
will create a more sustainable and just future for humanity in space.

B. Environmental Personhood
1. Introducing the Concept
Protecting nature from exploitation is not a new legal problem: numerous
international agreements have sought to promote the conservation of the Earth’s
resources,94 atmosphere,95 and environments.96 Treaties are often drafted with
exceptions that later become problematic or offer nations the opportunity to
reject specific provisions. Without standing, nature and the organizations seeking
to protect it have no basis to seek remedy from those profiting from
contamination and exploitation. The concept of “environmental personhood”
presents a legal means for the preservation and regulation of natural resources and
can be extended to the outer space context.
Environmental personhood was first introduced by Professor Christopher
D. Stone in a law review article advocating a reconsideration of humanity’s
relationship with nature.97 Stone’s idea gained initial prominence when it was cited
by U.S. Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas in his dissent in Sierra Club v.
Morton.98 In Morton, the plaintiffs could not seek judicial review. They lacked
standing because the injury identified was to the natural environment and not to
the individuals themselves. Justice Douglas’s dissent drew analogies to other
juridical personhoods such as ships and corporations to illustrate that
93

See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 87 (1984) (discussing the interpretive modes judges use to fill gaps in statutes).
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Agreement System, 23 GLOB. ENV’T CHANGE 980 (2013) (finding over 747 international
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See Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 12,
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See Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter,
Dec. 29, 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter The London Convention].
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Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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environmental personhood could create a better sense of justice on behalf of a
harmed ecosystem.99
Stone subsequently expanded upon his initial article in a book of the same
name, detailing the inspiration for his idea and the challenges he foresaw.100 Stone
noted that “[t]hroughout legal history, each successive extension of rights to some
new entity has been, theretofore, a bit unthinkable,” citing the extension of the
franchise and other protections to women and African Americans.101 In order to
ensure the protection of an environmental person, a court would need to appoint
a guardian ad litem or a representative as courts do in cases involving incompetent
parties.102 The expansion of corporate rights is in many ways a precursor to the
current growth of the environmental personhood movement,103 and subsequent
proponents of expanding rights to non-natural persons have followed this
model.104

2. Subsequent International Adoption
In the years since Stone introduced his theory, there has been significant
discussion of the environmental personhood concept within academic circles,
with over 1500 articles citing his original journal article alone. Beyond academic
momentum,105 various national and local governments have adopted forms of
environmental personhood, either through legislative or judicial avenues. Around
the world, there is a growing movement to preserve and secure the rights of
nature. 106
Ecuador and Bolivia are the strongest adopters, implementing national
environmental safeguards through juridical personhood. Ecuador adopted a
constitutional amendment in 2008 to give nature the right to “exist, persist,
maintain, and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions, and its processes in
evolution.”107 Further, everyone in Ecuador has the right to sue on behalf of the
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environment.108 The principles of environmental personhood enshrined in their
constitution have been upheld in Ecuadorian court, with the Provisional Court of
Loja granting an injunction against the construction of a road and ordering the
remediation of the Vilcabamba River in a 2011 decision.109 The initial claim was
brought by two natural persons on behalf of the environment, demonstrating the
feasibility of environmental personhood claims in court.
Along similar lines, Bolivia introduced legislation granting “Mother Earth”
rights equal to those of natural persons in 2010 and 2012.110 Bolivia authorized the
creation of governmental agencies to litigate on behalf of the earth and oversee
climate change related policies. These laws, like Ecuador’s, promote the right-tolife for natural ecosystems and enable litigation on behalf of nature.
The U.S. and New Zealand have used a more limited approach, granting
juridical personhood to specific environmental features, rather than to the entire
environment. Within the U.S., the most notable effort to introduce environmental
personhood was the Lake Erie Bill of Rights passed by a ballot measure in the
City of Toledo, Ohio.111 The ballot measure gave Lake Erie the right to “exist,
flourish, and evolve naturally” and empowered citizens to sue on behalf of the
lake to enforce those rights against polluters.112 However, this measure was later
nullified by the Ohio General Assembly in a provision added to an annual
budget.113 The law stated that “[n]ature or any ecosystem does not have standing
to participate in or bring an action in any court of common pleas” and “[n]o
person, on behalf of or representing nature or an ecosystem, shall bring an action
in any court of common pleas.”114 Additionally, a U.S. district court later found
the Lake Erie Bill of Rights to be unconstitutionally vague and exceeding the
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power of a municipal government in Ohio.115 Although this effort to introduce
environmental personhood was thwarted, the fact that it passed democratically
shows the growing appetite for such legal solutions in the U.S. A number of local
ordinance proposals across the U.S. indicate interest among local environmental
activists.116 New Zealand passed legislation granting environmental personhood
to the Urewera Forest117 and the Whangangui River.118 The protection of the river
is grounded in recognizing it as an ancestor of the Māori people. A representative
of the Crown and a representative of the Whanganui iwi act as protectors of the
river and its rights, giving them standing much like Justice Douglas envisioned.
Just days after the New Zealand parliament granted rights to the
Whangangui River, a judicial ruling in India’s Uttarakand High Court extended
similar protections to the Ganges River.119 The court appointed two state officials
to serve as guardians of the river and its rights. This represents an interpretation
closer to the aim of this Comment: rather than granting new rights, the Indian
high court recognized the existing importance of nature and, thus, expanded legal
standing.
In 2016, the Constitutional Court of Colombia reached a result similar to
that of the Indian court, declaring that the “Atrato River basin possesses rights to
‘protection, conservation, maintenance, and restoration.’”120 This decision created
a joint guardianship between a representative of the government and a member
the indigenous peoples living in the river basin. Following the Constitutional
Court’s decision, the Supreme Court of Justice of Colombia recognized the
Colombian portion of the Amazon river as a “subject of rights.”121 Colombia’s
115
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decisions represent a model for a high court adjudicating a claim involving
environmental personhood.
In 2019, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh issued an even broader decision,
granting legal rights to all of Bangladesh’s rivers to protect them from pollution
and dredging.122 The Bangladeshi court appointed the National River
Conservation Commission, a government agency, to serve as the legal guardian of
the rivers and thus bring suits on the river’s behalf.
As can be expected from their extremely strong stances on granting the
environment juridical standing within their own borders, Ecuador and Bolivia lead
the way in advocating for international adoption of the environmental
personhood model. During a 2010 conference in Bolivia, the Universal
Declaration of the Rights of Nature was drafted with the intention of creating a
new international treaty similar to the laws found locally in Bolivia.123 Similarly,
Ecuador has supported the concept of an International Rights of Nature
tribunal.124 Neither of these ideas have gained substantial traction within the
international governmental community, but there has been support from
environmentalist organizations.125
The legal background for this Comment is bifurcated. Currently, the
international treaty regime fails to substantially address what appears to be an
imminent problem, creating a grim outlook for extraterrestrial environments. In
contrast, the potential solution for extraterrestrial environmental protection
appears to be taking off on Earth. The next section hypothesizes the fusion of
these two realities.

IV. R ECOGNIZING E NVIRONMENTAL P ERSONHOOD FOR
C ELESTIAL B ODIES AS A S OLUTION
Judicial application of the environmental personhood concept to the outer
space context can create an effective regulatory regime by utilizing the existing
treaty framework. Enacting large scale international legislation instituting
environmental personhood is unlikely as support for even the Moon Treaty has
been limited and corporate interests would likely oppose potential liability.
122
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Instead, environmentalists should pursue the judge-led expansion of rights for
celestial bodies through legal action. Although the application to outer space
might be new, the use of courts and judgments to enumerate and enforce rights
is a proven tactic.
Utilizing the Outer Space Treaty and the Space Liability Convention, to
which all major spacefaring nations are parties, can create a swift and clear result
in favor of the environmental rights of celestial bodies. Through the texts of these
two treaties, a case can be made that the ability to bring claims on behalf of
celestial bodies already exists––it merely needs to be articulated by a judge.
Section A below explains the jurisdiction of the ICJ over the current treaties
and environmental claims. Section B explores how a hypothetical plaintiff could
have third-party standing in a contentious claim, with the ICJ either explicitly
interpreting the term “juridical person” to include environmental person or using
a common law approach to apply environmental personhood. Section C discusses
the potential appeal for the ICJ to avoid a contentious decision that could be
rejected by a defendant and instead issue an advisory opinion at the request of a
specialized U.N. agency. The contentious claim is more binding but has less
viability when compared to an advisory opinion. Subsections B and C will discuss
their possibility of success weighed against their relative strengths. Section D
explores the shortcomings of the ICJ adopting environmental personhood, and
Section E discusses alternative solutions and their appeal.
Once environmental personhood for outer space bodies is implemented,
there will be a deterrent effect of liability for actors that fail to prevent
contamination through sufficient planetary protection protocols. A commercial
space venture might implement better precautions if it believes precautions are a
good investment to prevent or reduce potential liability. As a secondary benefit,
the ICJ could order remediation efforts or funds as well, but once a contamination
occurs it is hard to stop as we have seen with invasive species on Earth. Similarly,
the value gained by exploiting space resources and diminishing the common
heritage of mankind must be weighed against a potential judgment.

A. Jurisdiction of t he International Court of Justice
Under the U.N. Charter, the ICJ has jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions
and hear contentious cases.126 Members of the U.N. are automatically subject to
the authority of the ICJ, so it cannot be avoided the same way that so many nations
have simply failed to ratify the Moon Treaty. Presently, 74 countries have accepted
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, including Japan, Canada, and many members
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of the European Space Agency.127 In recent years, the ICJ has heard contentious
cases involving environmental claims, including a 2008 claim by Ecuador against
Colombia for the aerial spraying of herbicides128 and a claim by Argentina against
Uruguay for the contamination of the Uruguay River.129 Although both of those
claims were eventually withdrawn, they demonstrate the initial willingness of the
ICJ to adjudicate and potentially assess the compensatory damages for
environmental claims. In February 2018, the ICJ decided its first case involving
environmental injury, holding that Nicaragua had to compensate Costa Rica for
damages to the ecology along the border of the two nations.130 What is new to the
court is not the idea of environmental claims, but rather the setting and idea of
third-party standing on behalf of the environment.

B. Bringing a Contentious Claim
There is a growing belief that the ICJ can hear and settle disputes involving
space law.131 The logic under the current regime is as follows: if disputes arising
under the Outer Space Treaty fail to be resolved through diplomatic channels,
then resolution must come from “international law, including the Charter of the
U.N., in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and
promoting international co-operation and understanding.”132 Article 33 of the
U.N. Charter directs disputes between nations to be referred to the ICJ, granting
the court jurisdiction over unsettled space claims.133 The Space Liability
Convention also holds nations responsible for the actions of private parties
launching from within their borders. The International Law Association drafted a
proposed “Convention on the Settlement of Space Law Disputes” in 1984 before
revising the language and formally adopting the text in 1998. The drafted
Convention states a preference for a proposed International Tribunal of Space
Law but provides for adjudication by the ICJ as the next alternative means of
dispute resolution.134 This demonstrates a broader sentiment in the international
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legal profession that the ICJ has the institutional competence to handle such a
case.
The most important part of the case would not necessarily be the merits of
the claim, but the underpinning of the plaintiff’s standing. Examination of these
processes shows the path toward environmental personhood for celestial bodies.
The grounds for a contentious case could be based upon violations of the Outer
Space Treaty, particularly the aforementioned language in Article IX directing
parties to conduct their exploration and studies of celestial bodies while avoiding
harmful contamination. Introducing tardigrades to the surface of the Moon could
have negative consequences, as could plans to mine the lunar ice; a plaintiff would
need to sue an actor causing some substantial effect of environmental degradation.
If a private actor such as SpaceIL or the Arch Mission Foundation did
contaminate the lunar environment and substantial environmental damage were
subsequently proven, the U.S. would be the nation liable under the Space Liability
Convention.

1. Bringing the Claim
A plaintiff-nation such as Ecuador could bring a contentious claim against
the U.S. or Israel for their negligence in regulating their space industries and
allowing the contamination of the lunar surface with tardigrades. The plaintiffnation would need to sue the home country of any private actor rather than that
actor themselves since the ICJ would not have jurisdiction over non-state parties.
The defendant-nation could then seek to collect judgment from the private party
responsible for the environmental damage. Ecuador could claim that it has
standing based on the violation of the Outer Space Treaty through environmental
personhood of the Moon and seek judicial interpretation by the ICJ of the relevant
space treaties.
The Outer Space Treaty’s terminology prohibiting “adverse changes in the
environment” and “harmful contamination” are largely undefined.135 The ICJ
could conclude that exploitation or contamination of the lunar environment is a
violation of the Outer Space Treaty. This presents a relatively straightforward way
for a nation like Ecuador to bring a claim against offending nations. In order to
seek damages though, it would be more useful to receive a ruling granting thirdparty standing.

2. Deciding a Case Explicitly Under Environmental Personhood
The Statute of the International Court of Justice includes sections
determining the competence of the court and guiding the decision-making
process.136 Under Article 38, the ICJ is to apply law based on international
135
136
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convention, international custom, “general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations,” and “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations.”137 Utilizing this jurisprudential
guidance, the ICJ could find that the international momentum is shifting towards
recognizing environmental personhood as an increasingly accepted legal principle.
Article III of the Outer Space Treaty makes all public international law applicable
to space activities, so an international customary law of environmental
personhood could be thought of as operating in the background of the Outer
Space Treaty. The court would not have to reach far to see the many recent
examples of high courts adopting the principle of environmental personhood and
implement it in the international field of space law. Under this logic, the ICJ could
recognize the Moon as a juridical person under the text of the Outer Space Treaty
and enable other parties, such as Ecuador, to bring a claim on its behalf when the
treaty has been violated.
Beyond the Outer Space Treaty, the ICJ could look to the Moon Treaty as
the starting point for discussions regarding the laws governing the Moon.138
Despite its limited adoption, the Moon Treaty serves as the best articulation of
international law for the Moon and could be used as an explanatory companion
of the Outer Space Treaty as discussed previously. The language of the Moon
Treaty was the product of an extensive drafting process by the U.N., including the
American and Soviet edits that were implemented.139 While those nations
ultimately declined to ratify the Moon Treaty as an objection to specific language,
it still serves as the best demonstration of international intention in this area. In
the same way that New Zealand explained its implementation of environmental
personhood as recognition of the ancestry of the Māori people,140 the ICJ could
utilize the language of the Moon Treaty, which states that the Moon is part of the
“common heritage of all mankind.”141 Enabling claims by third parties brought on
behalf of the Moon validates the language of the Moon Treaty, with the New
Zealand implementation as precedent.

3. Deciding a Case Using a Common Law Approach
Beyond the argument that environmental personhood is becoming an
accepted principle, the judges could also be motivated by the even broader idea
that the creation of common law principles can be a form of regulation. Professor
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Fabio Tronchetti, a leading space law expert, has called for the development of a
legal regime that can protect the environment through reviewing and even
interrupting activity that threatens the environment.142 Tronchetti has theorized
that this regime could be an instrument attached to the Moon Treaty, Outer Space
Treaty, or an independent legal instrument.143 Creating a liability system for
environmental protection of celestial bodies would also be consistent with the
Moon Treaty’s call for the establishment of an international regime governing the
Moon. The Moon Treaty does not state that the regime must be administrative in
nature. A judicially constructed liability regime may qualify under the treaty as a
sort of delegation of authority by the States Parties under Article 11 § 5 of the
Moon Treaty. The regime would need to address the Moon Treaty’s stated goals
of safe and rational management of lunar resources and equitable benefits to all
States Parties. Enabling standing for claims of harm to celestial bodies would allow
states to sue when another state or private actor has acted in a manner that is not
safe for the juridical person of the Moon. The use of a more common law
approach through the ICJ would be a unique solution but still has the potential to
satisfy many of Tronchetti’s criteria. Under the common law framework, judges
will alter and improve rules in order to create a regulatory system of liability.
Indeed, the pollution of outer space brings in several familiar situations that
may be addressable based on common law tort and property theories. When a
river is being polluted upstream, there is an expectation in tort law that someone
will be able to show an ex post injury downstream, providing a regulating effect
through the plaintiff’s claim. Alternatively, a governmental authority can step in
before an injury occurs and create an ex ante regulatory system.144 But both
avenues to liability and thus regulation are absent in outer space. There is no
governmental authority with the power to regulate or levy fines. The ex post
deterrent is also weaker as it will be hard for any individual or government to
demonstrate their present harm from extraterrestrial pollution or even the
certainty that potential future harm will impact them specifically. A plaintiff such
as Ecuador would struggle to show causation for an environmental damage
occurring on the other side of the Earth, and it would be even more difficult when
that distance is multiplied nearly twenty-fold to the surface of the Moon. Through
the lens of property law, the resources on the Moon and other celestial bodies are
common resource pools and thus threatened by the tragedy of the commons.145
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Without some rule protecting their usage, these resources will be exploited. But
again, judges would be hard pressed to find who could claim the resources in order
to preserve them, and thus the common law approach at first appears to fall short.
These common law principles begin to work again when environmental
personhood is introduced. Recognizing the juridical personhood of the Moon
would allow individual or organizational custodians to sue on behalf of the
damaged ecosystem. While it would be necessary for another nation to bring the
claim, such as Ecuador, the ICJ could grant a custodianship to an organization or
select group of individuals. This is consistent with the models pioneered in
India,146 New Zealand,147 and Colombia.148 The U.N. Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space or the U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs could serve this
role.
Grounding a decision in the tradition of the common law might be more
appealing to ICJ justices. Rather than be accused of implementing a relatively new
legal concept without international proof of concept and giving substantial power
to single state-plaintiffs, the common law method is a smaller leap forward in
judicial reasoning. The ICJ would be much closer to the customary international
law sources of precedent in national courts and could draw on deeper wells of
international precedent in the environmental and tort areas of law, demonstrated
by Costa Rica v. Nicaragua and the Russian-Canadian settlement.

4. Prospect of Success
The potential of the contentious case strategy can be evaluated on two
factors: the probability of securing a favorable judgment in the law and the ability
to secure the desired remedy. Monetary damages are likely the best remedy for a
claim of lunar environmental degradation. This form of penalization gives
polluters an economic choice between adopting precautions and paying for
remediation. Alternatively, an injunction would be too hard for the ICJ to enforce
given that a defendant might choose to ignore the decision, knowing the ICJ lacks
serious enforcement power. The contentious case strategy is weaker in its
likelihood of success but stronger in its ability to provide a substantive remedy.
The probability of securing a judgment is undermined by the fact that it
requires a plaintiff nation who is willing to finance the litigation, risk the
diplomatic consequences of suing a powerful spacefaring nation, and lose future
space industry revenue as a result of an anti-space industry reputation. Although
Ecuador or Bolivia might be willing to take this step given their constitutional
dedication to the environment and present lack of a space industry, the ICJ might
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be concerned about the legitimacy costs of adopting such a new concept. But,
grounding the decision as common law progress could mitigate this concern.
Given the history of damages awarded in recent international environmental
cases, the contentious case strategy provides a useful avenue to secure the desired
remedy. The compensation paid to Canada by Russia evidences that monetary
damages can be appropriate compensation for damage in space.149 Instead of
payment by the offending nation to the nation bringing the claim on behalf of a
celestial body, the damages could be redirected toward lunar conservation or the
funding of environmental impact research through COPUOS. Rather than require
the direct sharing of economic benefits, which many industrialized countries
found objectionable with the Moon Treaty, the contribution to lunar conservation
could present a more acceptable tribute to the common heritage of all mankind.
The relevant U.N. organs could manage an environmental conservation trust on
behalf of the Moon. This idea combines the only precedent under the Space
Liability Convention, the Russia-Canada settlement,150 with the recent precedent
of environmental rulings at the ICJ, including the Costa Rica-Nicaragua dispute.151
Directing the use of funds towards the appropriate destinations is consistent with
the Costa Rica-Nicaragua ruling. If the ICJ continues to move in the direction of
awarding damages for environmental claims, the prospect of using a contentious
case for resolution will grow.
During contentious cases, States Parties not represented in the composition
of the ICJ’s bench have the opportunity to appoint an ad hoc judge pursuant to
Article 31 of the Statute of the ICJ. Even if the court were to dismiss a case on
the merits and not discuss the element of standing through environmental
personhood, a judge appointed by the environmentalist nation bringing the claim
could issue a dissenting or concurring opinion. An opinion approvingly citing
environmental personhood would create kindling for future claims in the same
manner as Justice Douglas in Morton.

C. Seeking an Advisory Opinion
Alternatively, the ICJ could reach a similar conclusion without the use of a
contentious case through its capacity to issue advisory opinions. The advisory
opinion offers several benefits: it would not require a single nation to initiate the
process, it would avoid creating an immediate loser, and it would offer an
opportunity to create a legal regime without limiting the ICJ to a presented set of
facts. Advisory opinions are not binding, but the requesting agency or organ can
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adopt the opinion to make it international law.152 Additionally, advisory opinions
carry the weight of the international court and can influence subsequent behavior
for actors wishing to avoid a detrimental contentious case.

1. Requesting an Advisory Opinion
Article 96 of the U.N. Charter says that “[t]he General Assembly or the
Security Council may request the [ICJ] to give an advisory opinion on any legal
question.”153 Further, “[o]ther organs of the United Nations and specialized
agencies which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may
also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the
scope of their activities.”154 Previous U.N. agencies that have received advisory
opinions include the World Health Organization155 and the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization, now the International Maritime
Organization.156
The most relevant part of the U.N., COPUOS, would likely be an entity
capable of asking for an advisory opinion as it operates as a subcommittee of the
General Assembly. In order to bring a claim, members of the committee would
need to pass a resolution asking the ICJ to clarify whether the term “juridical
person” from Article I of the Space Liability Convention extends to
environmental persons.157 Alternatively, an agency could request an advisory
opinion on the same question. There are currently 17 U.N. specialized agencies,158
with the International Civil Aviation Organization and the U.N. Industrial
Development Organization being the specialized agencies best positioned to
request an advisory opinion given their normal areas of expertise. The most
germane U.N. organ to request an advisory opinion would be UNOOSA, because
of its outer space expertise, but it is below the specialized agency status and
therefore lacks standing to request an advisory opinion. Generally, agencies might
be the more likely to act, since committees can be paralyzed by protesting nations
profiting from space exploitation.
The opinion would ideally come from an agency first requesting clarification
as to whether the term “juridical person” in the various treaties could be
interpreted as including environmental persons. The most important treaty for
152
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Funds, Programmes, Specialized Agencies and Others, U.N., https://perma.cc/4BME-UKSB.
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this part of the advisory opinion might be the Space Liability Treaty as it would
then give rise to claims for damages. The next part of a request for an advisory
opinion would seek to understand who can bring suit on behalf of juridical
persons within the ICJ. While the ordinary answer might be based on the
nationality of the juridical person, the space treaties would already prohibit the
celestial bodies as being considered part of any country. The ICJ may recognize
that any state party to the Outer Space or Space Liability treaties would have
standing to bring a claim against a violator. It is possible that the ICJ would
recognize the ability of natural persons to also bring suits on behalf of
environmental persons under the idea of “common heritage” similar to the New
Zealand example discussed previously, but this seems unlikely as the ICJ would
probably caution against a deluge of claims from individuals. Beyond states
parties, the next best plaintiffs would likely be the U.N. agencies themselves.

2. Advantages and Relative Value of an Advisory Opinion
In the context of an advisory opinion, the ICJ might be more willing to take
a bigger leap in protecting the environmental futures of celestial bodies. The ICJ
would be less afraid of losing legitimacy or seeing the immediate withdrawal of
nations from its jurisdiction. Furthermore, issuing an advisory opinion is an
inherently prospective exercise; it does not require adjudication between states
parties and therefore avoids the potentially undesirable optics of creating an
immediate loser in an area of previous legal uncertainty.
In comparison to a favorable contentious case opinion, securing a favorable
advisory opinion is less valuable. The advisory opinion is not binding on specific
parties and fails to deliver the precedent of monetary damages for extraterrestrial
environmental damage. Partially redeeming the value of the advisory opinion is
the limitation of the risk for the ICJ, with fewer political consequences for
generating a potentially controversial ruling. Weighing the comparative benefits
and risks, the contentious case likely offers the better strategy for
environmentalists to attract significant international attention to the problem and
potentially secure a remedy.

D. Shortcomings
Implementing environmental personhood for celestial bodies would be a
substantial step forward for the jurisdiction of the ICJ. Ordering substantial
damages or administrative action would likely stretch the boundaries of the court’s
power. A stronger ICJ may be necessary as the world becomes more connected
and some authority over space becomes essential to avoiding international
conflict. In the absence of the international committee envisioned by the Moon
Treaty, the ICJ may not be a perfect solution, but it might be one of the only
available solutions at present. This Section will discuss several of the difficulties
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associated with the proposed solution: national opposition, limits on institutional
capacity, and alternative interpretation of the outer space treaties.

1. National Opposition
Nations are clearly interested in promoting the development of their space
industries to grow their economies and acquire early dominance. The U.S. has
repeatedly introduced legislation to economically incentivize the development of
its space industry159 and has recognized the potential growth limiting factors of
cooperating with the international regime.160 A critical flaw of the plan is the
potential refusal or reluctance of the U.S. to comply with decisions of the ICJ.
After the ICJ ruled in favor of Nicaragua in Nicaragua v. United States,161 the
U.S. refused to pay damages. The U.S. protested the court’s jurisdiction despite
decades of previous compliance.162 While the U.N. Security Council has the power
to enforce judgments of the court, the U.S. is a permanent member with veto
power, a status it used repeatedly against attempts to collect reparations. The
undetermined level of compliance by the U.S., particularly given its withdrawal
from the Paris Agreement,163 may undercut the effectiveness of an ICJ judgment
in favor of protecting celestial bodies. One commenter noted that an international
regime regulating space would “be meaningless unless the U.S., the 800-pound
gorilla in space, agrees to go along with the results.”164 Major commercial actors
based in the U.S., such as SpaceX and Blue Origin, would be more shielded from
a judgment, although the overall industry may be more global in nature. However,
the language of the Outer Space Treaty, to which the U.S. is a party, does obligate
it to cooperate in the international law of outer space. To the extent that the ICJ
can dictate what the law is through advisory opinions and contentious holdings,
the U.S. would be bound to it, at least in principle.

2. Institutional Capacity
Currently, there are a limited number of spacecraft and the focus of
commercial spaceflight is on low Earth orbit, so it is conceivable to employ the
159

160

See Space Frontier Act of 2019, S. 919, 116th Cong. (2018); Invest in Space Now Act, H.R. 2358,
108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
See Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights: From the Earth to the Stars, 6 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 23 (2005) (discussing how the current space regime does not provide for property rights, a
major impediment for space exploration, exploitation, and development).

161

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
14 (Nov. 26).

162

See Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1445 (1985)
(noting that in 1985, the U.S. terminated its Declaration of Aug. 26, 1946, which had provided for
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ).
Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2015,
T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
Tannenwald, supra note 87, at 421.
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ICJ and state plaintiffs to establish an early common law system for governing
outer space environmental liability. More space traffic is undoubtedly coming as
outlined in prior sections, which may call into question the efficacy of using a
litigation-based regime. Hoping for environmentally virtuous nations to bring
claims requires that they track the movements of potentially thousands of
spaceflights and mining activities and then fund their claims at the ICJ. Even
asking for a U.N. body to perform a regulatory capacity of this magnitude could
quickly strain the resources of the U.N.
One possible remedy is to implement a regime of plaintiff’s attorney fees for
bringing a successful claim on behalf of the environment to incentivize nations or
organizations with standing to bring good claims. Attorney fees are common in
international commercial arbitration,165 although importing standards from
commercial arbitration could seem initially discomforting within the context of
the ICJ. Such a proposal might seem unappealing in more controversial contexts
such as war claims but could be acceptable in a specialized tribunal for space
claims.
Turning from international arbitration to the custom in domestic legal
systems, the English rule of loser pays is nearly universal outside the U.S.166 The
ICJ or another adjudicating entity could adopt loser-pays fees as customary
international law, but this might also disincentivize plaintiffs fearful of footing a
legal bill for a lost claim in an uncertain field of law.
There would be significant complications for a “polluter pays” liability
regime as it is hard to track debris and other contaminants to the particular space
craft depositing them.167 Further, the cost of pollution is difficult to calculate and
the resulting damages might exceed any economic benefit from space activity,
chilling adoption since an absolute prohibition is incompatible with human
need.168 Determining the cost of pollution might require a determination about
what has been taken from the commons entitled to all mankind or what cultural
diminishment comes from altering a faraway surface.

3. Interpreting the Treaties’ Gaps as Enabling Mining
A final issue would be a defensive claim that mining the Moon is legal under
international law. The language of the Outer Space Treaty and Moon Treaties can
be construed as allowing the extraction of resources from celestial bodies. While
lunar resources cannot be claimed as property while still in the Moon, it could be
165

John Yukio Gotanda, Awarding Costs and Attorneys’ Fees in International Commercial Arbitrations, 21
MICH J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (1999).

166

Jarno Vanto, Attorneys’ Fees as Damages in International Commercial Litigation, 15 PACE INT’L L. REV.
203, 204 (2003).

167

See Viikari, supra note 77, at 764.
Id.
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argued that extracted resources are claimable.169 A ruling by the ICJ in favor of a
defending extractor might occur under this interpretation, but it would not
foreclose arguments based on contamination.
While it is conceivable that the text of the treaties could be used to enable
private property, it requires creative and generous interpretation of the U.N.
treaties to find sufficient loopholes. Article II of the Outer Space Treaty states
that “[o]uter space, including the [M]oon and other celestial bodies, is not subject
to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation,
or by any other means.”170 This language, echoed in subsequent treaties, strongly
places the Moon in an extraterritorial category and potentially precludes property
rights over natural objects in outer space. The Outer Space Treaty also requires
states parties to ensure their citizens comply with the treaty, prohibiting private
property by extension. Arguments that the treaty only bans sovereign territorial
claims and not individual property claims fail on this point.171 Attempts by private
citizens to prospectively claim asteroids have been rejected by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit, which held that an individual could not charge NASA
for parking fees for landing on an asteroid he claimed to own.172 The district court
had held that the fact that the U.S. was not a party to the more stringent Moon
Treaty was not important; the plaintiff “failed to demonstrate that either statement
establishes legal basis for his claim of a private property right on an asteroid.”173
In practice, the U.S. and other spacefaring nations have taken possession of
samples from outer space bodies, representing a form of property for national
governments. Unlike the proposed large-scale mining operations, the samples
taken by national space agencies thus far are relatively small amounts of material
taken for scientific purposes with strict cross-contamination prevention protocols.
Extraterrestrial sample collecting runs parallel with the scientific presence in
Antarctica, pursuing scientific goals to benefit all with the resources belonging to
the “common heritage of mankind.” Private exploitation and profit-seeking
colonization does not fit within the spirit or straightforward reading of the U.N.
space treaties.
Even if the ICJ or another body were to clearly state that the current outer
space regime enables private property rights in what is meant to be an
extraterritorial zone, the environmental personhood argument remains valid.
Rather than deny the existence of private property rights in outer space, the
169

See Bilder, supra note 138, at 268.

170

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35, art. II.
Berin Szoka & James Dunstan, Space Law: Is Asteroid Mining Legal?, WIRED (May 1, 2012),
https://perma.cc/CNN6-FK2C.
Nemitz v. NASA, 126 F. App’x 343 (9th Cir. 2005).

171

172
173

Nemitz v. United States, No. CV-N030599-HDM (RAM), 2004 WL 3167042, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr.
26, 2004), aff’d sub nom. Nemitz v. NASA, 126 F. App’x 343 (9th Cir. 2005).
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juridical personhood of the Moon would enforce a common property right to
lunar resources. Bringing claims on behalf of the Moon would vindicate these
rights and collect damages for restoration or conservation efforts equal to what
the individual infringer has taken from the commons. Private actors would retain
rights to technology developed on the Moon, but any contamination caused by
research would be grounds for a judgment for restoration of the natural state of
the lunar environment.

E. Alternative Solutions
1. Establishing a Moon Authority
Many of the issues discussed in this paper, as well as other outer space legal
problems, could be solved by the establishment of a lunar authority. 174 Such an
authority could oversee permitting, conservation, and contamination prevention
protocols. This authority is authorized by the Article 11 of the Moon Treaty, but
the Moon Treaty’s limited adoption is perhaps prohibitive of the creation of the
organization. Any effort to organize an International Moon Authority would need
to address the concerns that prevented the adoption of the Moon Treaty, namely
the tension between nations with the capability to exploit celestial resources and
those nations still developing space technology.175 Utilizing the ICJ and
environmental personhood may be preferable to establishing an administrative
agency charged with the protection of celestial bodies. When the potential gains
are trillions of dollars, the threat of regulatory capture of any administrative
organization is grave.176 It is possible that the administrative body could become
used not to conserve the Moon but to conserve the opportunities for exploitation
of celestial bodies for those actors with the necessary resources and influence.

2. Permanent Court of Arbitration
An often-discussed alternative to ICJ dispute resolution is the Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA). Unlike the ICJ, the PCA can hear claims by private
parties, eliminating the need for a state to agree to bring a claim in the ICJ.177 If a
claim were first brought in the PCA, it is less likely that the PCA would seek to
progress international law and generate standing. The PCA also has fewer member
states and lacks any form of compulsory jurisdiction. As a result, it would be better

174

Blake Gilson, Note, Defending Your Client’s Property Rights in Space: A Practical Guide for the Lunar
Litigator, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1367, 1403–04 (2011).

175

Id. at 1404.
This refers to the idea that regulatory agencies can be “captured” by the influence of lobbyists from
the industries they seek to regulate in order to coopt them to meet the industry’s goals.
Dispute Resolution Services, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, https://perma.cc/8VHG-MSVG.
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for a claim to first come in the ICJ, establish standing, and then allow parties to
look to the PCA as a future alternative mechanism.

V. C ONCLUSION
Even if a requested advisory opinion was not sufficiently clear on the issue
of standing or a contentious claim failed on the merits, the act of bringing such a
claim could lead to action within the international community. Faced with the
possibility of liability for their extraterrestrial exploits, nations and private actors
may begin to independently craft their own legal regime. While law enacted with
the defendants might not be as appealing as a judicially crafted form of
environmental justice, the discussion around a regulatory or legislative framework
would at least bring attention to the risks already present. The U.S. and other
nations may become more comfortable with the Moon Treaty if the alternative is
a less predictable form of ICJ decision.
More broadly, outer space presents a carte blanche to explore a new way of
considering humanity’s relationship with nature. On Earth, we are tethered to
tradition and fear the costs of moving away from the known principles of standing
and torts. Yet, just as a pair of daring nations reached for the stars, now a few bold
nations are reconsidering what it means to exist with nature. Embracing
environmental personhood offers humanity an opportunity to test the legal
concept as a way to preserve the environment and imagine a new way of coexisting
with nature, rather than destroying it.
While the dividends of protecting celestial bodies may not be appreciated by
extraterrestrial human inhabitants for generations, there is a potential collateral
benefit to the adoption of environmental personhood of the Moon. It is possible
that a ruling by the ICJ in favor for environmental personhood spawns a reflective
impact on the international community of Earth. Nations may view
environmental personhood as a new international norm to which they should
conform. Alternatively, the success of an outer space regime for environmental
regulation could provide a roadmap for the establishment of systems to combat
climate change on Earth. The Paris Agreement sought to take an untested leap
forward, but perhaps an experiment in space will provide an example of
international environmental cooperation that can be replicated at home.
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Abstract
As digital services and electronic commerce have become more prevalent aspects of the global
economy, there have been concerns over how tax systems will adapt to this change. International
tax treaties in particular seem to be outdated and unprepared for the digital economy. Many
international tax treaties provide that businesses are to be taxed on their income only in
jurisdictions where they have a sufficient physical presence. By establishing their European
headquarters and digital servers in countries with low corporate income tax rates (such as Ireland)
and then using those headquarters to provide digital services to the rest of Europe, large,
sophisticated, multinational digital businesses have been able to generate much revenue from most
European countries without paying significant taxes in those countries.
The issues surrounding digital tax laws made news headlines in the summer of 2019 when
France passed a law that imposed a 3 percent tax on revenue earned from digital services in
France. Scholars have suggested that this tax may violate existing tax treaties, arguing that it
provides for the taxation of the income of businesses without a significant enough physical presence
in the country imposing the tax. This Comment analyzes this potential violation with regards to
the French digital services tax and the U.S.–France Treaty for the Prevention of Double
Taxation. This Comment concludes that the French tax does not violate the Treaty because the
tax is a consumption tax that falls outside the scope of the Treaty.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
As digital services and electronic commerce have become more prevalent
aspects of the global economy, there have been concerns over how tax systems
will adapt to this change. International tax treaties in particular seem to be
outdated and ill-equipped to adapt to the digital economy. Historically, these
treaties have provided that businesses should be taxed in the jurisdiction where
they have a physical presence.1 For example, the U.S.–France Treaty for the
Prevention of Double Taxation (U.S.–France Treaty) allows business profits to be
taxed only if the business has a “permanent establishment” in the country. 2
Permanent establishments include places such as offices or factories but do not
include facilities used solely for storage and delivery or subsidiaries.3 The relevant
provisions of the U.S.–France Treaty are typical across international tax treaties
between other countries as well.4
It has been relatively easy for firms participating in electronic commerce to
avoid creating a permanent establishment in a country while still doing much
business in and generating significant revenue from the country. Large,
sophisticated, multinational companies have often established their European
headquarters in countries with low corporate income tax rates (such as Ireland).5
This practice has contributed to the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)
scheme, whereby companies “exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to
artificially shift profits to locations with no/low tax rates and no/little economic
activity.”6 Google is just one example of a business that has taken advantage of
this phenomenon. For many years, Google issued its contracts for advertisements

1

See Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the French Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, Fr.-U.S., Jan. 1, 1996, 1994 U.S.T. LEXIS 216
[hereinafter U.S.–France Treaty].

2

Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 5.

3
4

Many bilateral international tax treaties are based on the model treaty released by the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). See OECD PUBLISHING, MODEL TAX
CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL: CONDENSED VERSION 12 (2017),
http://perma.cc/B8YR-VSCA [hereinafter OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION 2017]; see also
CENTER FOR TAX POLICY & ADMINISTRATION, FINAL REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL ADVISORY
GROUP ON MONITORING THE APPLICATION OF EXISTING TREATY NORMS FOR TAXING BUSINESS
PROFITS: ARE THE CURRENT TREATY RULES FOR TAXING BUSINESS PROFITS APPROPRIATE FOR ECOMMERCE? 6, http://perma.cc/S3WF-UGCM.

5

Laurel Wamsley, France Approves Tax on Big Tech, and U.S. Threatens to Retaliate, NPR (July 11, 2019),
http://perma.cc/H42P-44EZ.

6

OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD (2019), http://perma.cc/D3U7-MXFG
[hereinafter OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework].
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in Europe from its European headquarters in Dublin, Ireland.7 This allowed the
profits from those contracts to be taxed in Ireland, rather than the countries in
which the advertisements took place.8 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reports that governments lose between 100
and 240 billion USD annually as a result of BEPS tactics by multinational
companies.9 Furthermore, because it is particularly easy for digital service
providers to avoid having a permanent establishment in a country while still
generating much revenue there, some scholars argue that BEPS has contributed
to the discrepancy in the effective tax rate of digital businesses and more
traditional businesses—digital businesses pay an effective tax rate of 9.5 percent,
while traditional businesses pay 23.2 percent.10
European countries (notably France) have called for reform in order to
address the fact that large, multinational corporations are able to generate large
amounts of revenue from their countries without being subject to the countries’
taxes.11 The OECD and the European Commission (EC) have both issued reports
on digital taxes that outline the issue and propose possible solutions.12 The EC
has proposed a permanent solution that involves allowing countries to tax
businesses that have a “digital presence” in the country even if they do not have
a permanent establishment there.13 A business would have a digital presence in a
country if it met one of the following criteria: annual revenues of 7 million EUR
in that country, more than 100,000 users in that country annually, or over 3,000
business contracts for digital services created annually.14 The EC has also
proposed an interim policy to be used until a permanent solution is implemented.15
The OECD has “committed to continue working toward a consensus-based long-

7

Romain Dillet, Google to Pay $549 Million Fine and $510 Million in Back Taxes in France, TECHCRUNCH
(Sept. 12, 2019), http://perma.cc/B24J-AVH7.

8

Id.
OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework, supra note 6.

9
10
11

12

13
14
15

Wamsley, supra note 5.
See Liz Alderman, France Moves to Tax Tech Giants, Stoking Fight with White House, N.Y. TIMES (July
11, 2019), http://perma.cc/KHA5-FDAL.
See OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHARING PROJECT, OECD, TAX CHALLENGES
ARISING FROM DIGITALIZATION—INTERIM REPORT 2018: INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS
(2018), http://perma.cc/G8AT-HEGM [hereinafter OECD, TAX CHALLENGES]; Communication
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A Fair and Efficient Tax System in the
European Union for the Digital Single Market, COM (2017) 547 final (Sep. 21, 2017),
http://perma.cc/QFS9-ESEU; Proposal for a Council Directive Laying Down Rules Relating to the Corporate
Taxation of a Significant Digital Presence, COM (2018) 147 final (Mar. 21, 2018),
http://perma.cc/9P3K-U45P [hereinafter Proposal for a Council Directive].
See Proposal for a Council Directive, supra note 12.
Id. at 8.
See id.
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term solution”16 and has established a Program of Work for coming to a longterm solution.17
The issues surrounding digital tax laws made news headlines in the summer
of 2019 when France passed a law imposing a 3 percent tax on revenue earned
from digital services in France.18 This tax applies to companies that earn more
than 25 million EUR in French revenue and more than 750 million EUR in global
revenue.19 This law largely reflects the interim policy proposed by the EC.20 The
passage of this law generated strong reactions around the world, most notably
with the U.S. challenging the law as discriminatory against American companies
and threatening to impose tariffs on France in response.21 The U.S. and France
later reached a deal of sorts about the law, under which France promised to repeal
the French tax, adopt the OECD solution, and refund any difference in tax
amount once the OECD finalized its plans for a unified, international framework
for overcoming the problems presented by BEPS.22
There are potential legal problems with both the French tax and the longterm solution proposed by the EC. Scholars have suggested that both likely violate
existing tax treaties because they provide for the taxation of businesses without a
“permanent establishment.”23 This Comment analyzes this potential violation with
regards to the French digital services tax and the U.S.–France Treaty and
concludes that the tax does not violate the Treaty. The U.S.–France Treaty’s
permanent establishment requirement applies only to income taxes on “profits of
16

17

International Community Agrees on a Road Map for Resolving the Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation of
the Economy, OECD (May 31, 2019), http://perma.cc/NK79-XUHU [hereinafter OECD,
International Community Agrees]. The original deadline for reaching an agreement was the end of 2020;
however, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused delays in negotiations, and the OECD now hopes
to reach an agreement by mid-2021. International Community Renews Commitment to Address Tax
Challenges from Digitalisation of the Economy, OECD (Oct. 12, 2020), http://perma.cc/H3BT-WQEB.
OECD/G20 INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS, OECD, PROGRAMME OF WORK TO DEVELOP A
CONSENSUS SOLUTION TO THE TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF THE
ECONOMY (2019), http://perma.cc/9H8Z-3URD [hereinafter OECD, PROGRAMME OF WORK].

18

Wamsley, supra note 5. This Comment refers to this tax as the French digital services tax, the French
digital tax, and the French tax interchangeably.

19

Alderman, supra note 11.
See Fair Taxation of the Digital Economy, EUR. COMM’N (Mar. 21, 2018), http://perma.cc/V87HGXNK.
Wamsley, supra note 5; Alderman, supra note 11.

20

21
22

Hadas Gold, US and France Reach Compromise on Digital Tax, CNN BUS. (Aug. 26, 2019),
http://perma.cc/54M3-AXJF.

23

See, e.g., Vijay Govindarajan, Anup Srivastava, Hussein Warsame & Luminita Enache, The Problem
with France’s Plan to Tax Digital Companies, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 17, 2019), http://perma.cc/ZUP5L9NP; Isabel Gottlieb & Hamza Ali, Threat of Legal Challenges Hangs Over French Digital Tax,
BLOOMBERG TAX (July 11, 2019), http://perma.cc/2NXR-YMFW; Andrew Thompson & Louis
D.C. Grandjouan, Digital Economy Taxation: The OECD’s Report and European Commission’s Draft
Directives, 35 J. TAX’N INV. 23 (2018).
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an enterprise of a Contracting State.”24 Because the French tax is more aptly
characterized as a consumption tax on revenues rather than an income tax on
profits, the French tax is likely outside the Treaty’s scope and is therefore not
subject to the permanent establishment requirements. When appropriately
characterized as a consumption tax, the French tax does not violate the U.S.–
France Treaty.
This Comment proceeds as follows: Section II provides an overview of
international taxation principles, focusing on the historical desire to avoid double
taxation and the relatively recent rise of BEPS. This Section also explores the
differences between income taxes and consumption taxes. Section III provides an
overview of international tax treaties, focusing on how they came to be as well as
their primary purposes. This Section highlights the U.S.–France Treaty and its
provisions that apply to the digital services tax analysis. Finally, Section IV applies
principles of treaty law to the digital services tax and concludes that the French
digital service tax does not violate the U.S.–France Treaty.
This Comment is timely because of France’s recent action as well as
discussions that other European countries will follow France’s lead and impose
digital taxes of their own.25 As digital transactions become a more important part
of the global economy, base erosion continues to impact governments’ ability to
raise revenue.26 Additionally, the economic downturn caused by the COVID-19
pandemic is expected to drastically reduce most countries’ tax revenues.27
However, as many businesses and countries experience fiscal distress related to
COVID-19, revenues and profits from many companies providing digital services
have increased.28 These circumstances could make taxes on digital services an
appealing option for countries searching for a stable tax base and striving to
combat base erosion. As countries enact and consider digital taxes, it is important
for them to understand how they can change their tax laws and the effect those
24
25

U.S.–France Treaty, supra note 1, art. 7.
As of May 2020, in addition to France, Austria, Hungary, India, Italy, Turkey, and the United
Kingdom have implemented their own versions of digital services taxes. The Czech Republic,
Latvia, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain have published proposals for or announced
intentions to implement digital services taxes of their own. DANIEL BUNN, ELKE ASEN & CRISTINA
ENACHE, DIGITAL TAXATION AROUND THE WORLD 18–19 (2020), http://perma.cc/PVJ3-9JJS.

26

See Eli Hadzhieva, Impact of Digitalisation on International Tax Matters, POL’Y DEP’T FOR ECON., SCI. &
QUALITY OF LIFE POLICIES 16 (2019), http://perma.cc/X754-3V6F.

27

Special Series on COVID-19: Challenges in Forecasting Tax Revenue, IMF (Apr. 20, 2020),
https://perma.cc/XWQ4-D9P6; Michelle Harding & Hannah Simon, Consumption Tax Revenues
Under Covid-19: Lessons from the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, OECD (Apr. 29, 2020),
http://perma.cc/T2J7-43QH.

28

Daisuke Wakabayashi, Karen Weise, Jack Nicas & Mike Isaac, The Economy Is in Record Decline, but
Not for the Tech Giants, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2020), http://perma.cc/XM6H-MK3Q; Laura He, Zoom
Profit Skyrockets 3,300% on Remote Work Trend, CNN BUS. (Sep. 1, 2020), http://perma.cc/DEY9HR33.
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changes may have on treaty compliance. It is also important for countries to
understand what types of changes they may need to make to their treaties in order
to achieve their desired tax policy. Additionally, as the OECD works toward
finalizing a proposed multilateral long-term solution, it will be helpful to have
scholarly input and analysis.
While many scholars have noted the potential problems with digital services
29
taxes and suggested solutions for dealing with these problems,30 there is need for
greater study into the legality of these taxes under international tax treaties. This
Comment’s analysis of the legality of these taxes will provide a basis for evaluating
proposed solutions under the current treaty requirements.

II. O VERVIEW OF P RINCIPLES OF T AXATIO N AND
I NTERNATIONAL T A XATION
A. Income Tax vs. Consumption Tax
This Subsection will explain the background principles necessary for
understanding income taxes and consumption taxes and how they relate to
broader tax goals.31 Understanding the underlying theory behind these taxes and
some of the important differences between them allows for evaluation of
proposed and enacted taxes and the impact they are expected to have.
Additionally, because international tax treaties often refer explicitly to “income
taxes,”32 understanding what makes a tax an income tax allows for evaluating
whether a tax is covered by a treaty or not.
According to the Haig-Simons definition of income, “[p]ersonal income may
be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in
consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights
between the beginning and the end of the period in question.”33 This definition of
income (as consumption plus change in net wealth) helps define the differences
29

See Monica Gianni, OECD BEPS (In)Action 1: Factor Presence as a Solution to Tax Issues of the Digital
Economy, 72 TAX L. 255 (2018); Andrew D. Mitchell, Tania Voon & Jarrod Hepburn, Taxing Tech:
Risks of an Australian Digital Services Tax Under International Economic Law, 20 MELB. J. INT’L L. 88
(2019); Govindarajan et al., supra note 23; Gottlieb & Ali, supra note 23; Thompson & Grandjouan,
supra note 23.

30

See Gianni, supra note 29.
The most prominent types of taxes are income taxes, consumption taxes, and wealth taxes. Some
combination of these taxes is used by nearly all countries around the world. See JOSEPH BANKMAN,
DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, KIRK J. STARK & EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 51
(Wolters Kluwer, 18th ed. 2019). Wealth taxes are not implicated in the analysis of digital services
taxes and international tax treaties, so this Subsection will focus on income taxes and consumption
taxes.
See, e.g., U.S.–France Treaty, supra note 1.

31

32
33

BANKMAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 52 (quoting HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50
(1938)).
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between an income tax, a consumption tax, and a wealth tax. In broad strokes, an
income tax is levied on everything that a taxpayer earns during the taxation period,
regardless of whether the taxpayer spends what she earns or saves what she earns.
Conversely, a consumption tax is levied only on what a taxpayer spends
(consumes) during the taxation period. Income taxes differ from consumption
taxes primarily in their treatment of savings (savings are taxed under an income
tax but not under a consumption tax).34 Wealth taxes (such as property taxes or
estate taxes) are typically levied based on a taxpayer’s total wealth holdings. The
remainder of this Subsection will focus on the income tax and the consumption
tax, as those are most relevant for the discussion of digital services taxes.
The primary types of income taxes include personal income taxes, which are
levied on individuals’ wages and investment income, and corporate income taxes,
which are levied on the profits of corporations.
In contrast to income taxes, which are levied against both individuals and
businesses, consumption taxes tend to affect only individuals.35 “[O]nly sales to
ultimate consumers are appropriately included in the base of a consumption tax.”36
There is an assumption that “businesses, as such, are never consumers” because a
business purchases only that which is required for the business to prepare goods
or services for the ultimate consumers (individuals).37 Although consumption
taxes are often remitted to the taxing authority by businesses rather than
individuals, the ultimate burden of the tax is almost always paid by the individual
consumers in the form of higher retail prices.38
The most common types of consumption taxes are sales taxes and value
added taxes.39 Sales taxes are “simply a tax on final sales by businesses to
consumers.”40 Sales taxes can be levied on either the sale of goods or services but
are more commonly levied on the sale of goods. The value added tax is a tax on
the seller’s “contribution to the value of the product.”41

34

Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1145, 1149–
50 (1992).

35

Ronald D. Aucutt, The Vocabulary of Fundamental Tax Reform, 31 U. MIAMI L. CTR. ON EST. PLAN.
¶ 401.2 (2019).

36

Id.
Id.

37
38
39
40
41

Julia Kagan, Consumption Tax, INVESTOPEDIA (July 31, 2020), http://perma.cc/K6HV-V5LM.
Aucutt, supra note 35, ¶ 401.1.
Id. ¶ 401.2.
Id. ¶ 401.3.
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B. Double Taxation
The phenomenon of double taxation is not new and has been analyzed by
scholars for centuries.42 Double taxation, or “the taxation of the same person or
the same thing twice over,”43 stems from the increased complexity of trade,
income earning, property holding, and other taxable transactions.44 In the
international context, cross-border transactions can give rise to taxes from two or
more countries on the same underlying transaction.45 The relevant countries
compete with each other for taxing jurisdiction and both (or all) claim jurisdiction
to levy their taxes.46
This phenomenon is further complicated by the fact that the different
jurisdictions have different principles underlying their taxing claims.47 The
differing principles include taxing based on citizenship, temporary residence,
permanent residence, location of property, and economic interest.48 Without
consensus on the principles outlining where and by which jurisdiction taxation
should occur, there will continue to be double taxation. This concern is especially
prevalent in international contexts because countries worry about protecting their
tax sovereignty.49
Tax scholars and economists have criticized double taxation for centuries.
The OECD has gone so far as to say that
[the] harmful effects [of double taxation] on the exchange of goods and
services and movements of capital, technology and persons are so well known
that it is scarcely necessary to stress the importance of removing the obstacles
that double taxation presents to the development of economic relations
between countries.50

There are generally two lines of argument against double taxation. The first draws
on normative notions of fairness. The second relies on empirical and economic
arguments, including advocating for capitalistic free movement and economic
prosperity.

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

50

See EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION (Macmillan Company, 9th ed. 1921).
Id. at 98.
Id.
Id. at 99.
Id.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 111–13.
Sunita Jogarajan, Prelude to the International Tax Treaty Network: 1815–1914 Early Tax Treaties and the
Conditions for Action, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 679, 680 (2011).
OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION 2017, supra note 4, at 9.
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First, double taxation is often criticized for being unjust.51 For example, in
cases where people live in one country and work in a different country, it is seen
as an unfair burden that they might be required to pay tax on their income in two
countries, given that people who live in the same country in which they work
would only be required to pay tax on their income in one country.52
Second, double taxation is said to “hinder the free movement of capital,
technology and persons” around the world.53 The taxation of the same underlying
transaction by two different taxing authorities can create a disincentive to
participate in that transaction. Tax policy is often used to intentionally shape
economic behavior; for example, many countries have implemented tax laws
designed to incentivize investment in environmentally-friendly technology.54
However, uncoordinated tax policies that have not been carefully and intentionally
designed have the potential to distort economic behavior in unintended and
undesired ways. This risk is especially prevalent when separate and sovereign
taxing authorities independently tax the same transaction. Uncoordinated double
taxation could cause businesses to avoid cross-border transactions that would
otherwise have positive impacts on the economy. Furthermore, “[d]ouble taxation
is often cited as a major obstacle to unfettered economic progress.”55 Scholars
argue that “double taxation represents an unfair burden on existing investment
and an arbitrary barrier to the free flow of international capital, goods and
persons.”56 Therefore, eliminating double taxation “facilitate[s] international trade
by minimizing tax barriers in the exchange of goods and services across national
boundaries.”57
Depending on the taxing authorities’ policy goals and desired results of
taxation, double taxation is not necessarily always a problem.58 However, the type
of double taxation by two or more different sovereign countries that occurs in the
context of international transactions and multinational companies is typically not
a type of double taxation that is the result of a specific policy goal but rather is the
result of a lack of coordination between different countries. Therefore, it makes
51

SELIGMAN, supra note 42, at 114.

52

Jogarajan, supra note 49, at 690.
Id. at 680.

53
54

Renewable Energy Explained: Incentives, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 22, 2019),
http://perma.cc/YAU8-RT29; Ayodele O. Ogunlana & Nataliya N. Goryunova, Tax Incentives for
Renewable Energy: The European Experience, THE EUR. PROC. SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. (2017),
http://perma.cc/J2EL-JQSP.

55

Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 939, 942 (2000).
H. David Rosenbloom & Stanley I. Langbein, United States Treaty Policy: An Overview, 19 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 359, 365 (1981).
Richard L. Doernberg, Overriding Tax Treaties: The U.S. Perspective, 9 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 71, 71
(1995).
Dagan, supra note 55, at 942 n.6.

56

57

58
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sense to criticize double taxation in the international context. It also makes sense
for countries to take steps to reduce and eliminate any international double
taxation of the same underlying transaction, as doing so will encourage more
international transactions.

C. Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
The rapid development of digital services and electronic commerce creates
difficulty for countries as they attempt to maintain fair levels and methods of
taxation.59 The OECD reports that governments lose between 100 and 240 billion
USD annually as a result of BEPS tactics by multinational companies.60 BEPS
occurs when companies “exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially
shift profits to locations with no/low tax rates and no/little economic activity.”61
Such tactics are generally not illegal, but they are widely considered to be unfair.
An example of how a company is able to shift profits will be illustrative for
understanding the problem posed by BEPS. Google is just one example of a
business that has taken advantage of profit shifting. For many years, Google issued
its contracts for advertisements in Europe from its Irish subsidiary located in
Dublin, Ireland.62 The revenues from selling advertisements in other European
countries were collected by Google’s Irish subsidiary, but the Irish subsidiary had
no permanent establishments in these other European countries.63 This allowed
the profits from those advertisements to be taxed in Ireland rather than the
country in which the advertisement took place.64 Because Ireland has one of the
lowest corporate income tax rates in Europe at 12.5 percent (for comparison,
France has a corporate income tax rate of 34.4 percent),65 having profits taxed in
Ireland rather than the other European countries allowed Google to reduce its
overall tax liability. Overall tax liability is reduced even further by transferring the
revenue from the first Irish subsidiary to a second subsidiary located in Bermuda
but incorporated in Ireland.66 This revenue transfer is accomplished by selling
Google’s technology and IP to the second subsidiary located in Bermuda and
having that subsidiary license the technology to the first Irish subsidiary.67 The
59

Hadzhieva, supra note 26, at 16.

60

OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework, supra note 6.
Id.

61
62
63

64

Dillet, supra note 7.
Jeremy Kahn, Google’s ‘Dutch Sandwich’ Shielded 16 Billion Euros from Tax, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Jan. 2,
2018), http://perma.cc/XT6T-WYY2.
Dillet, supra note 7.

65

Elke Asen, Corporate Income Tax Rates in Europe, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 7, 2019), http://perma.cc/PTZ97B58.

66

Kahn, supra note 63.
Roger Royse, Double Irish Tax Sandwich, ROYSE L. (Nov. 1, 2013), http://perma.cc/V2L3-9EJQ.
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first Irish subsidiary then pays royalties to the subsidiary located in Bermuda,
which greatly reduces the profits of the first Irish subsidiary. This results in the
Irish subsidiary having little or no profits and the subsidiary located in Bermuda
having nearly all of the revenue generated from the sale of the European
advertisements.68 Due to the operation of the tax laws in Ireland and Bermuda—
the Bermuda taxing authority treats the second subsidiary as located in Ireland
because it is incorporated in Ireland, and the Irish taxing authority treats it as
located in Bermuda because its management and control are located in
Bermuda—the revenue now located in the second subsidiary in Bermuda is not
subject to tax in either Ireland or Bermuda.69 This tactic, known as a “Double Irish
Tax Sandwich” or simply a “Double Irish,” is not technically illegal—in 2017, the
Paris administrative court ruled that Google did not act illegally by using this
technique.70
The exact financial effect of such profit shifting tactics is difficult to calculate
because of differences in tax deductions allowed and tax credits provided in
different countries, but it is not difficult to imagine how shifting profits to
countries with lower tax rates would generate tax savings for a business. For one
potential measure of the success of BEPS techniques, France has previously
alleged that Google owed French taxing authorities 1.12 billion EUR in back taxes
for the period between 2005–2010.71 Google eventually settled disputes with
French authorities for taxes from 2005 to 2018 by paying a 500 million EUR fine
as well as 465 million EUR in back taxes.72
While BEPS does not apply only to digital service businesses, the ease with
which digital businesses are able to use these tactics has received much attention.
Some argue that this practice has contributed to the discrepancy in the effective
tax rate of digital businesses and more traditional businesses—digital businesses
pay an effective tax rate of 9.5 percent, while traditional businesses pay 23.2
percent.73
68

Id.

69

Id.
Gaspard Sebag, Google Spared $1.3 Billion Tax Bill with Victory in French Court, BLOOMBERG TECH.
(July 12, 2017), http://perma.cc/32KN-Z26G.
Id.

70

71
72
73

Dillet, supra note 7.
Hadzhieva, supra note 26. But see, e.g., MATTHIAS BAUER, DIGITAL COMPANIES AND THEIR FAIR
SHARE OF TAXES: MYTHS AND MISCONCEPTIONS 7 (ECIPE Occasional Paper No. 3, 2018),
http://perma.cc/842F-U7N3 (“[The European Commission’s] selective use of firms and [its]
obscure way of estimating effective corporate tax rates may . . . be convenient for the suggestion
that traditional businesses pay higher rates than digital businesses. Yet it is also a misleading way to
frame problems of international taxation. In fact, it is difficult to find the supporting evidence that
digital firms (irrespective of their definition) and their profits are a big reserve of potential tax
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III. I NTERNATIONAL T A X T REATIES
Bilateral tax treaties are the most popular mechanism for addressing
international double taxation.74 As of 2011, there were over 3,000 different
bilateral tax treaties in force.75 The first bilateral tax treaties were largely based on
a theory of reciprocity.76 Reciprocity in an international economic context is a way
of ensuring that both countries grant the same privileges to citizens of the other
country and thereby place citizens of both countries “upon an equal basis in
certain branches of commerce.”77 The early bilateral tax treaties also alleviated
double taxation by “allocating taxing rights for different types of income between
jurisdictions.”78 Taxing rights were allocated “based on the source of income or
the residence of the taxpayer.”79 These essential principles found in the very first
international tax treaties (reciprocity and allocation based on source and residence)
continue to be the principles that underlie modern tax treaties.80
Subsection A of this Section will provide a historical overview of bilateral
tax treaties from the first recorded treaty to modern day treaties. It will focus on
the purpose of these treaties and the extent to which the purpose of these treaties
has changed or remained the same. Subsection B will then turn toward the U.S.–
France Treaty for the Prevention of Double Taxation, describing the purpose and
scope of the Treaty and the requirements for taxation under the Treaty. Finally,
Subsection C will briefly describe the tax treaty between Ireland and France and
the treaty between the Netherlands and France. Because many multinational
companies based in the U.S. have operating subsidiaries to service Europe in
Ireland or the Netherlands, the relevant tax treaties when analyzing the French
digital services tax may often be those between Ireland and France or the
Netherlands and France.

A. Purpose
Beginning with the very first recorded international treaty on the topic of
taxation (an 1843 agreement between France and Belgium), a primary factor
revenues. Industry data rather reveal that 1) profitability levels are highly diverse among digital firms
as well as less digital and non-digital corporations, and that 2) traditional sectors also show a similar
variation in profitability and effective tax rates.”).
74
75
76
77

78
79
80

Jogarajan, supra note 49, at 680.
Id.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 682 (quoting JAMES LAURENCE LAUGHLIN & HENRY PARKER WILLIS, RECIPROCITY 1 (Baker
& Taylor Company 1903)).
Id. at 683.
Id. at 683–84.
Id.
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motivating the agreement was the promotion and maintenance of significant
economic benefit.81 Allowing Belgium access to markets throughout France
benefited the economies of both Belgium and France, and the 1843 agreement
facilitated this access by regulating the transfer of information between the two
governments to “assist the effective and regular collection of taxes imposed by
the laws of the two countries.”82 Modern tax treaties continue to include
information-sharing clauses.
The first recorded international treaty entered to prevent double taxation
was an 1899 agreement between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Prussia.83 This
agreement was designed to prevent double taxation in cases of dual nationality or
residence in border areas, which was perceived to be unfair to border residents.84
This agreement allocated taxing rights by requiring the countries to levy personal
taxes only on individuals with permanent residence in that country and business
taxes only on businesses with permanent establishments in that country. This
treaty was made in part with the goal of establishing strong political and economic
relations between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Prussia, as evidenced by
other trade agreements between the countries that implemented favorable terms
and attempted to strengthen the alliance.85 Prussia, the economically dominant
country, wanted to firmly establish its economic control by creating an alliance,
and the Austro-Hungarian Empire was eager to have greater access to the Prussian
economy.86 As this first treaty demonstrates,
[t]he political context of the early treaties highlights the fact that, although
countries may be concerned with the burden of double taxation on their
citizens and double non-taxation, action to address these issues does not take
place in isolation and is likely to be part of broader political and economic
relationships.87

As countries shifted away from the view that the primary purpose of the income
tax was government financing (especially of wars) to the view that its primary
purpose was justice and wealth redistribution, they became more concerned with
double taxation and worked to eliminate it.88 Because double taxation is often seen
as unjust, a desire to design a just taxing system could lead to a desire to avoid
double taxation, especially the double taxation of individuals. Eliminating double
81

Id. at 687–88.

82

Id. at 687 (quoting Convention Regulating the Relations Between the Administrative Services of
France and Belgium, Fr.-Belg., art. 1, Aug. 21, 1843).

83

Id. at 690.
Id.

84
85
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87
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Id. at 691–92.
Id. at 694.
Id.
Id. at 698.
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taxation of individuals is largely what the earliest treaties aimed to do by reducing
the tax burdens on border residents.
Tax treaties today play largely the same role that the earliest treaties played—
that is, “facilitating economic integration” by “enabling the movement of people
between states without the burden of double taxation.”89 This historical analysis
is relevant because tax treaties today are motivated by economic and political
factors just as they were in 1899.90 “Tax treaties do not exist in a vacuum and
consideration of economic factors and political motivation will always be
relevant.”91 Like the earliest treaties, the primary purposes of modern tax treaties
are the prevention of double taxation and the facilitation of information sharing.92
Modern tax treaties also aim to combat tax evasion and fraud.93
According to the introduction to the OECD’s Model Tax Convention on
Income and on Capital (the OECD’s model convention), modern tax treaties have
two primary purposes.94 First, tax treaties aim to “remov[e] the obstacles that
double taxation presents to the development of economic relations between
countries.”95 Second, tax treaties are intended to “improve administrative cooperation in tax matters, notably though exchange of information and assistance
in collection of taxes, for the purpose of preventing tax evasion and avoidance.”96
To further these purposes of removing double taxation and preventing tax
evasion, there have been movements toward standardization of bilateral and
multilateral tax treaties. This has led to the development of model treaties that are
intended to be used as templates for countries drafting bilateral and multilateral
treaties. Because the problems of double taxation and tax evasion are often
identical or extremely similar even across jurisdictions, countries can use common
solutions to combat these problems.97 The first model bilateral convention was
established in 1928 by members of the League of Nations; it was followed by the
Model Convention of Mexico in 1943 and the Model Convention of London in
1946, but none of these models was fully accepted.98 In 1956 the OECD began
89

Id. at 706.

90

Id. at 706–07.
Id. at 707.

91
92
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97
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See Dagan, supra note 55, at 942 n.7 (collecting sources); U.S.–France Treaty, supra note 1; cf.
Elizabeth A. Owens, United States Income Tax Treaties: Their Role in Relieving Double Taxation, 17
RUTGERS L. REV. 428, 430 (1963); Dagan, supra note 55, at 978.
Michael J. McIntyre, Model Tax Treaties: A Comparison of the UN and OECD Models, WAYNE ST. U. L.
SCH. at 2, http://perma.cc/GQ3W-HNUG.
OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION 2017, supra note 4, at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9–10.
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working on a model convention that would be accepted by all member countries,
which resulted in the 1963 Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and
Capital.99 This model convention has since been updated a number of times, with
the most recent amendments in 2017.100
The OECD’s model convention has had a significant impact. Since 1963,
“OECD member countries have largely conformed to the Model Convention
when concluding or revising bilateral conventions.”101 The model convention has
influenced non-member countries as well, serving as the basis for negotiations of
bilateral treaties between member countries and non-member countries as well as
between two non-member countries.102 The model convention also served as the
basis for the United Nation’s Model Double Taxation Convention between
Developed and Developing Counties.103 Finally, the commentaries to the model
convention have been generally accepted as a guide to the interpretation and
enforcement of bilateral treaties.104
The widespread use of the OECD’s model convention has furthered the
historic purposes of avoiding double taxation and facilitating information sharing
as well as the more modern purposes of avoiding tax evasion, tax avoidance, and
tax fraud.

B. U.S.–France Tax Treaty
The starting point for an analysis of whether the French digital tax violates
the U.S.–France Treaty for the Prevention of Double Taxation is the text of the
Treaty itself. This Subsection begins by describing the purpose of the U.S.–France
Treaty. It then turns to the scope of the Treaty as described in Article 2. It
concludes by describing the Treaty requirements for taxation of commercial
profits as established in Article 7, including the definition of a permanent
establishment as defined in Article 5.

1. The primary purpose of this Treaty is the prevention of double
taxation.
The stated purpose of the U.S.–France Treaty is the “avoidance of double
taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and
capital.”105 Furthermore, the letter of submittal from the U.S. State Department
99

Id. at 10.

100

Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.

101
102
103
104
105

Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S.–France Treaty, supra note 1.
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for the Treaty notes that the Treaty “also provides for administrative cooperation
between the tax authorities of the two countries in applying the [Treaty] and the
taxes covered by the [Treaty].”106
The U.S.–France Treaty was updated in 1996 to replace the 1967 income tax
treaty between the U.S. and France.107 Periodic updates to international tax treaties
such as this one are required to reflect changes in domestic taxation law and
policies and address new problems in cross-border transactions that arise in the
years between the tax treaties. The letter of transmittal from the U.S. President to
the U.S. Senate also states that the 1996 Treaty “more accurately reflects current
income tax treaty policies of the [U.S. and France].”108 The U.S. State Department
noted that an important improvement to the 1996 Treaty was the strengthening
of the compliance aspects of the Treaty.109 This strengthened compliance was
achieved by updating the provisions concerning exchange of information and the
provisions concerning associated enterprises.110
The primary purpose of this Treaty, the avoidance of double taxation, is
achieved in part through restrictions on when the U.S. or France is allowed to tax
a certain entity (described in Section III.C.3 below) and in part through Article 24.
Article 24 requires that the U.S. allow taxpayers in the U.S. to claim credits against
their U.S. income tax for certain taxes paid to France and that France allow
taxpayers in France to claim credits against their French income tax for certain
taxes paid to the U.S.111 By agreeing to only tax entities in accordance with the
Treaty and by allowing credits for foreign taxes paid, the U.S.–France Treaty
prevents a significant number of cases of double taxation.

2. The scope of the U.S.–France Treaty includes income taxes and
wealth taxes but does not mention consumption taxes.
Under Article 2, the U.S. taxes that are subject to the Treaty include federal
income taxes (except social security taxes) and excise taxes on certain insurance
premiums.112 The scope of French taxes covered by the Treaty is somewhat
broader. Article 2 states that “all taxes imposed on behalf of the State [of France],
irrespective of the manner in which they are levied, on total income, on total
capital, or on elements of income or of capital, including taxes on gains from the
alienation of movable or immovable property, as well as taxes on capital

106

Id. at Department of State Letter of Submittal.

107

Id.
Id. at Presidential Letter of Transmittal.

108
109
110
111
112

Id. at Department of State Letter of Submittal.
Id.
Id. art. 24.
Id. art. 2.
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appreciation” are subject to the Treaty.113 Article 2 specifically notes that France’s
income tax, company tax, tax on salaries, and wealth tax are all included. 114
Notably, the Treaty does not mention consumption taxes (such as France’s value
added tax or the U.S.’s sales taxes). These taxes are therefore presumably not
included in the scope of the Treaty and are unaffected by any of the Treaty
requirements.

3. A country is allowed to levy a tax on business profits only when the
business has a “permanent establishment” in the country.
Article 7 of the Treaty provides that
[t]he profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in
that State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting
State through a permanent establishment situated therein. If the enterprise
carries on business as aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise may be taxed in
the other State but only so much of them as is attributable to that permanent
establishment.115

A permanent establishment is defined in Article 5 of the Treaty as “a fixed place
of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried
on.”116 In particular, a permanent establishment includes “(a) a place of
management; (b) a branch; (c) an office; (d) a factory; (e) a workshop; and (f) a
mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry, or any other place of extraction of natural
resources.”117 The following do not constitute a permanent establishment:
(a) the use of facilities solely for the purpose of storage, display, or delivery
of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise;
(b) the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the
enterprise solely for the purpose of storage, display, or delivery;
(c) the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the
enterprise solely for the purpose of processing by another enterprise;
(d) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of
purchasing goods or merchandise, or of collecting information, for the
enterprise;
(e) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of
carrying on, for the enterprise, any other activity of a preparatory or auxiliary
character;
(f) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for any combination of
the activities mentioned in subparagraphs (a) to (e), provided that the overall

113
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activity of the fixed place of business resulting from this combination is of a
preparatory or auxiliary character.118

Importantly, the permanent establishment requirement only applies when a
country wishes to tax the “profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State.” The
Treaty does not provide an explicit definition of profits, but it does note that “[i]n
determining the profits of a permanent establishment, there shall be allowed as
deductions expenses which are reasonably connected with such profits, including
executive and general administrative expenses, whether incurred in the State in
which the permanent establishment is situated or elsewhere.”119

C. Other Relevant Tax Treaties
It is important to note that the relevant treaty is the treaty between the
country where the operating entity or subsidiary is based (which is not necessarily
the country where the parent corporation is located) and the country imposing the
tax.120 Because many multinational companies based in the U.S. have operating
subsidiaries in Ireland or the Netherlands that service Europe, the relevant tax
treaties may often be those between Ireland and France or the Netherlands and
France.121

1. The Ireland-France Treaty is substantially similar to the U.S.–France
Treaty.
The current tax treaty in effect between Ireland and France is the 1970
Double Taxation Treaty between Ireland and France (the Ireland-France Treaty).
This Ireland-France Treaty uses much of the same language that is found in the
U.S.–France Treaty.122 The stated purpose of the Ireland-France Treaty is “to
avoid, so far as possible, double taxation and to prevent fiscal evasion in the matter
of taxes on income.”123 The most relevant provisions of the Ireland-France Treaty
are Article 1 (describing the scope of the agreement), Article 2 (defining
“permanent establishment”), and Article 4 (providing for the taxation of
commercial profits).
The Ireland-France Treaty applies to “taxes on income,” which are broadly
defined as “all taxes imposed on total income or on the elements of income.” 124
118
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119

Id. art. 7.
Thompson & Grandjouan, supra note 23.
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Article 1 specifically lists the French individual income tax, complementary tax,
and tax on companies as well as the Irish income tax and corporate profits tax.125
Much like the U.S.–France Treaty, the Ireland-France Treaty does not mention
consumption taxes.
Article 2 of the Ireland-France Treaty uses the same language as the U.S.–
France Treaty to define “permanent establishment” as “a fixed place of business
in which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on.”126 The
Ireland-France Treaty also uses the same examples of permanent establishments
as the U.S.–France Treaty, with the addition of (g):
(a) a place of management;
(b) a branch;
(c) an office;
(d) a factory;
(e) a workshop;
(f) a mine, quarry or other place of extraction of natural resources;
(g) a building site or construction or assembly project which exists for more
than twelve months.127

The Ireland-France Treaty’s specific exclusions from the definition of
permanent establishments are slightly different from the U.S.–France Treaty’s
exclusions:
(a) the use of facilities solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery of
goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise;
(b) the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the
enterprise solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery;
(c) the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the
enterprise solely for the purpose of processing by another enterprise;
(d) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of
purchasing goods or merchandise, or for collecting information, for the
enterprise;
(e) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of
advertising, for the supply of information, for scientific research or for similar
activities which have a preparatory or auxiliary character, for the enterprise.128

Article 4 of the Ireland-France Treaty provides that “[t]he industrial and
commercial profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in
that State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State
through a permanent establishment situated therein.”129 It also states that the tax
125
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shall be imposed only on the amount of profits “as is attributable to that
permanent establishment” with deductions allowed for “expenses which are
incurred for the purposes of the permanent establishment.”130 Much like the U.S.–
France Treaty, the Ireland-France Treaty does not provide an explicit definition
of “profits.”

2. The Netherlands-France Treaty is substantially similar to the U.S.–
France Treaty.
The current tax treaty in effect between the Netherlands and France is the
1973 Tax Treaty, as amended by the 2004 Protocol (the Netherlands-France
Treaty).131 The relevant provisions of the Netherlands-France Treaty are Article 2
(describing the taxes covered by the agreement), Article 5 (defining “permanent
establishment”), and Article 7 (providing for the taxation of business profits).
The Netherlands-France Treaty applies to “taxes on income and on
fortune,” which are defined as “all taxes imposed on total income, on total fortune
or on elements of income or of fortune.”132 Article 2 specifically lists the
Netherlands’s income tax, wages tax, corporation tax, dividends tax, and fortunes
tax as well as the French income tax and company tax.133 Just like the U.S.–France
Treaty and the Ireland-France Treaty, the Netherlands-France Treaty does not
mention any consumption taxes.
“Permanent establishment” is defined as “a fixed place of business in which
the business of the enterprise is wholly or partly carried on.”134 The NetherlandsFrance Treaty uses the same examples and same specific exclusions of permanent
establishments as the Ireland-France Treaty.135
The Netherlands-France Treaty also uses the same language as the IrelandFrance Treaty to describe when “[t]he profits of an enterprise” are taxable.136
The fact that the U.S.–France Treaty, Ireland-France Treaty, and
Netherlands-France Treaty do not vary in any significant ways is not surprising
given the widespread use of the OECD model convention as a basis for bilateral
tax treaties.137 Because of the similarity of the treaties’ relevant text, this
Comment’s analysis will proceed using the text of the U.S.–France Treaty.
130
131

132
133
134
135
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137

Id.
See Convention Between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the
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IV. A PPLICATION —D O D IGITAL S ERVICE T AXES V IOLATE
I NTERNATIONAL T A X T REATIES ?
A. Defining Digital Services and Digital Business
Defining digital business is more complicated than it may first appear. The
spread of technology and the digitalization of the economy have affected
businesses in every sector and every market. In addition to the exponential growth
of the digital economy, the entire economy is going digital at a rapid pace.138 The
percentage of businesses with a web presence increased from 2009 to 2017 in
nearly all OECD countries, and 95 percent of businesses in OECD countries
benefit from a high-speed internet connection.139 The World Economic Forum
estimates that the value of the digital transformation will reach 100 trillion USD
by 2025.140 Digitalization has facilitated an increased number of businesses
providing services rather than tangible goods.141 Technological innovations, such
as machine learning, are facilitating the digitalization of traditional businesses such
as retailers, manufacturers, publishers, and health care providers.142 Digitalization
has also facilitated the globalization of businesses by making it easier for formerly
domestic businesses to interact digitally with customers around the world.143 As
digitalization becomes more and more ubiquitous, even small firms are becoming
capable of reaching customers worldwide.144 In a broad sense, the digital economy
can be defined as “all activities that use digiti[z]ed data,” which would encompass,
in essence, the entire modern economy.145 More narrowly defined, the digital
economy is comprised of “online platforms, and activities that owe their existence
to such platforms.”146

1. The three most common features of digital businesses are crossjurisdictional scale without mass, the heavy reliance on intangible
assets, and the importance of data, user participation, and network
effects.
According to the OECD’s 2018 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Interim
Report, the three most salient and common features of digitalized businesses are
138
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Hadzhieva, supra note 26, at 14.
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cross-jurisdictional scale without mass, the heavy reliance on intangible assets, and
the importance of data, user participation, and network effects.147 Crossjurisdictional scale without mass refers to the fact that digitalization “allows some
highly digitali[z]ed enterprises to be heavily involved in the economic life of a
jurisdiction without any, or any significant, physical presence.”148 Heavy reliance
on intangible assets means that investments in IP and “the intense use of IP assets
such as software and algorithms supporting [ ] platforms, websites, and many
other crucial functions” are important aspects of the business models of many
digital businesses.149 Data, user-generated content, and network effects from
increased participation are also central to the business models of highly digitalized
businesses; in fact, some digital businesses, such as social media networks, would
not exist without a high level of user participation.150 These three characteristics
are not exclusive to digital businesses, but they are more prevalent among digital
businesses and are helpful for defining what counts as a digital business.

2. The three main business models for digital businesses are the value
network, the value shop, and the value chain.
A common way of characterizing traditional businesses is based on their
business model, especially where the business generates value. Because existing
tax systems are based on the principle of taxing profits where value is created, 151
understanding how value creation in a digital business differs from that of a
traditional business will be helpful for defining what counts as a digital business
for tax purposes.
Digital businesses can take the general form of three different business
models: the value network, the value shop, and the value chain. Highly digitalized
businesses often take the business model form of value networks.152 In a value
network, value is created by organizing and facilitating an exchange between users
through the business’s mediating technology.153 This type of business model leads
to revenue generation that often differs from non-digital businesses.
Revenue in value networks may be generated through subscription fees (e.g.,
LinkedIn Premium) or pay-as-you-go fees when services are consumed (e.g.,
Airbnb, BlaBlaCar). In other cases, such as Instagram, Facebook, Twitter and
Weibo, the business may, in what may be perceived by some countries as a
type of barter transaction, offer access to the platform without a demand for
financial compensation upon the user providing some input valuable to the
147
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platform operator. Such input could be personal information about the user’s
interests that can be employed to generate revenue from targeted advertising.
It could also be content accessible by other users, which increases the
platform’s utility and value.154

The second type of business model that is common among digital businesses is
the value shop.155 In a value shop, a business uses its technology to solve a specific
customer demand or problem, such as specialized data analysis, software
development, or cloud computing.156 The final type of business model, the value
chain, is less common among digital businesses. In a value chain, a business
designs, produces, markets, delivers, and supports its products.157 The value chain
most often describes traditional businesses that produce tangible goods, but can
also include businesses that operate as resellers of goods and businesses that
produce intangible goods or services such as movies, games, music, or software.158
Additionally, as the business landscape and global economy increase in
complexity, many digital businesses span several of these three general business
models.159 “For example, Amazon’s retail business is considered a value chain . . .
whereas Amazon Marketplace, which links buyers and sellers in order for them to
trade, is considered a value network, and Amazon Web Services is considered a
value shop.”160

3. A definition of digital business for tax purposes must consider these
features and business models and the problems they create for
taxing authorities.
The most salient features of digital businesses, combined with the use of new
business models such as value networks, create certain problems for taxing
authorities as they attempt to tax these businesses. Cross-jurisdictional scale
without mass allows “a growing number of businesses [to] have an economic
presence in a jurisdiction without having a physical presence.”161 As noted in
Section III of this Comment, a lack of a physical presence could lead to an inability
to tax such business’s income under current bilateral tax treaties. Heavy reliance
on intangible assets means that “[t]he location in which a business’ intangible
assets are controlled/managed can [ ] have a material impact on where that
business’ profits are subject to tax” regardless of where those IP rights are used
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
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to generate revenue.162 Heavy reliance on intangibles also makes it easier for
“companies to structure themselves to minimi[z]e their tax liabilities and makes it
more cumbersome for tax authorities to assess how income from such assets
should be identified, valued and allocated amongst different parts of multinational
groups.”163 The importance of data, user participation, and network effects,
especially when used in a value network business model, can lead to barter
transactions in which the digital business provides non-financial compensation
(for example, data hosting, email services, or digital entertainment) to users in
exchange for user-generated content and the ability to collect the users’ data.164
Today’s income tax systems rarely capture this type of barter exchange (in which
no cash payment is made on either side of the transaction), but many believe that
this type of transaction should be subject to taxation.165 By way of summary, the
EC notes that
[t]he application of the current corporate tax rules to the digital economy has
led to a misalignment between the place where the profits are taxed and the
place where value is created. In particular, the current rules no longer fit the
present context where online trading across borders with no physical
presence has been facilitated, where businesses largely rely on hard-to-value
intangible assets, and where user generated content and data collection have
become core activities for the value creation of digital businesses.166

A definition of digital services must consider each of these characteristics of
digital businesses and business models and the problems they create for taxing
authorities. Additionally, the perfect definition would consider that the
characteristics of digital businesses and business models are not exclusive to digital
businesses nor comprehensive of digital businesses that pose problems for the
existing tax systems. Not all digital businesses reflect the characteristics described
above, and sometimes non-digital businesses can have those characteristics. For
example, a traditional manufacturing business can have cross-jurisdictional scale
without mass by selling products in countries where it does not have a
manufacturing site.167 Additionally, non-digital businesses can use the value
network and value shop business models, and digital businesses can use the value
chain business model. For example, a traditional employment agency uses the
value network business model by bringing together employers and job seekers.168
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4. The EC’s definition of digital services accounts for the wide
variance in the characteristics and business models of digital
businesses.
The EC considered these problems in defining digital businesses in its
proposed solution to the taxation challenges posed by digital businesses.169 The
EC defines “digital services” as “services which are delivered over the internet or
an electronic network and the nature of which renders their supply essentially
automated and involving minimal human intervention, and impossible to ensure
in the absence of information technology.”170 Its proposed definition explicitly
includes:
(a) the supply of digitized products generally, including software and changes
to or upgrades of software;
(b) services providing or supporting a business or personal presence on an
electronic network such as a website or a webpage;
(c) services automatically generated from a computer via the internet or an
electronic network, in response to specific data input by the recipient;
(d) the transfer for consideration of the right to put goods or services up for
sale on an internet site operating as an online market on which potential
buyers make their bids by an automated procedure and on which the parties
are notified of a sale by electronic mail automatically generated from a
computer;
(e) Internet Service Packages (ISP) of information in which the
telecommunications component forms an ancillary and subordinate part, in
other words packages going beyond mere internet access and including other
elements such as content pages giving access to news, weather or travel
reports, playgrounds, website hosting, access to online debates or any other
similar elements . . . .171

According to the EC’s guidance on this definition, “involving minimal human
intervention” refers to the amount of human service provided by the business
“without any regard to the level of human intervention on the side of the user.”172
A business that “initially sets up a system, regularly maintains the system, or repairs
it in cases of problems linked with its functioning” will be considered to involve
only a “minimal human intervention” and thus be providing a digital service. 173
Additionally, “the sale of goods or other services which is facilitated by using the
internet or an electronic network” is explicitly excluded from the definition of
digital services.174 According to the EC’s guidance, “giving access [ ] to a digital
169
170
171
172
173
174
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marketplace for buying and selling cars is a digital service, but the sale of a car
itself via such a website is not.”175
This definition of digital services appears to recognize and account for the
difference between truly digital businesses and traditional businesses that have
adopted some aspects of digitalization. By excluding the mere sale of goods or
services over the internet and requiring only minimal human intervention, the
definition excludes many businesses that might involve some aspects of
digitalization or digital service (such as a manufacturer with an online webstore)
but whose traditional business models of producing and selling goods do not pose
the same problems to the tax system that truly digital businesses pose.
The EC’s proposed solution to BEPS uses the term “significant digital
presence” to describe when a digital business has enough of a presence in a
country to be subject to taxes in that country.176 The EC proposed three different
ways for a business to meet the significant digital presence test. A business would
have a significant digital presence in a country if 1) the business’s revenues from
providing digital services to users in the country exceed 7 million EUR in the tax
period, 2) the number of users of the business’s digital services in the country
exceeds 100,000 in the tax period or 3) if the business’s number of business-tobusiness contracts for digital services exceeds 3,000 in the tax period.177
These three tests for significant digital presence were intended to “reflect the
reliance of digital businesses on a large user base, user engagement and user's
contributions as well as the value created by users for these businesses.”178 The
criteria therefore reflect the most salient characteristics of digital businesses.
Additionally, the use of three different criteria reflects an understanding that
digital businesses can assume various different business models179 and tries to
capture as many of these different models as possible. Finally, the minimum
thresholds were designed to leave out trivial cases where profits from a digital
presence are not even expected to be large enough to cover the cost of tax
compliance.180

B. Description of Enacted and Proposed Digital Services Taxes
The French digital tax law imposes a 3 percent tax on revenue earned from
digital services in France on all companies that earn more than 25 million EUR in
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French revenue and more than 750 million EUR in global revenue.181 This law
would affect over 24 companies, many of which are not French-based.182 The
passage of this law generated strong reactions around the world, most notably
with the U.S. challenging the law as discriminatory against American companies
and threatening to impose tariffs on France in response.183 The U.S. and France
later reached a deal of sorts about the law, under which France promised to repeal
the law and refund any difference in tax amount once the OECD finalized its
plans for a unified, international framework for the taxing of digital companies.184
As noted above, the EC’s proposed permanent solution would allow a
country to tax a business without a permanent establishment as long as that
business had annual revenues of at least 7 million EUR in that country, more than
100,000 users in that country annually, or over 3,000 business contracts for digital
services created annually.185 This solution may require the amendment of most
bilateral and multilateral tax treaties which still require a business to have a physical
location in the country in order for that country to tax the business.
The OECD has “committed to continue working toward a consensus-based
long-term solution”186 and has established a Program of Work for coming to a
long-term solution.187 The Program of Work focuses on two major areas in which
change and consensus is needed: 1) nexus requirements and profit allocation and
2) ensuring that a minimum global level of tax is paid.188

C. Analysis
Several scholars have pointed out that these proposed digital tax laws may
violate bilateral and multilateral tax treaties.189 It seems clear that companies falling
under the proposed digital taxes may not meet the permanent establishment
requirement under Articles 5 and 7 of the U.S.–France Treaty.
However, before the issue of permanent establishment arises, there is a more
basic question of how to classify these digital taxes. The permanent establishment
requirement applies only to taxes on “profits of an enterprise of a Contracting
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State.”190 The French digital tax is a tax on revenue, rather than income. It is not
immediately clear that such a tax would be categorized as a tax on “business
profits.”

1. Under the typical understanding of the term “profits,” the French
tax is not a tax on profits.
Article 7 does not include an explicit definition of “profits,”191 but the
analysis must begin with whether the digital services tax on revenue qualifies as a
tax on profits or not. Article 3 states that when the U.S. or France is applying the
Treaty, any undefined terms will “have the meaning which [they have] under the
taxation laws of that State.”192 The typical understanding of profit is revenue less
expenses required to earn that revenue. Revenue refers to “the total amount of
money the business receives . . . for its products and services.”193 Income, or
profits, refers to what remains after expenses are subtracted from revenue.194 This
understanding is reflected in the U.S.’s income tax law which allows deductions
for “all the ordinary and necessary business expenses” of the business.195 This
understanding is also reflected in France’s corporate tax law (l’impôt sur les
sociétés) which taxes profits (les bénéfices) earned in France and allows
deductions for normal business expenses.196 This understanding of profits is also
reflected in Article 7 of the Treaty, which notes that the countries shall allow
deductions for “expenses which are reasonably connected with such profits[.]”197
The French digital tax allows no such deduction of expenses. Given this
understanding of the difference between revenue and profit, it seems unlikely that
the French digital tax’s explicit tax on revenues without a deduction for any
expenses would be considered a tax on business profits.
In further support of this argument that the French digital tax is not a tax
on business profits, sales taxes are generally levied on the total sales prices, which
is equal to the total revenues, from the goods or services being taxed.198 Sales taxes
are classified as consumption taxes rather than income taxes (see Section II.A

190
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above). The French tax on revenue seems more like a sales tax than an income
tax. This characterization as a consumption tax seems especially apt considering
that, shortly after France announced its digital services tax, Amazon announced
that it would increase the Amazon Marketplace fees it charges its sellers by 3
percent (which Amazon then expects to be passed on to consumers in the form
of higher prices).199 This method of passing taxes through to the ultimate
individual consumer is a hallmark of consumption taxes (rather than income
taxes). These considerations would seem to imply that the French digital tax is not
a tax on business profits under Article 7 of the Treaty.

2. Revenue was likely not intended to be considered an “element of
income” under the Treaty.
One counterargument to the conclusion that the French tax is not within the
scope of the Treaty is based on an understanding of the term “element of
income.” Article 2 of the Treaty states that “all [French] taxes imposed on behalf
of the State, irrespective of the manner in which they are levied, on total income,
on total capital, or on elements of income or of capital” are subject to the Treaty.200
Revenue as a whole could be considered an element of income because income
equals revenue less expenses. This would imply that a tax on revenue would be
subject to the Treaty.
However, bilateral tax treaties that are based on the OECD’s model
convention should be interpreted using the commentaries to the model
convention.201 The commentaries to the 1992 OECD Model Tax Convention,
which was the model in effect when the 1996 U.S.–France Tax Treaty was signed
and ratified, refer to “items of income” several times, but never refer to revenue
as an “item of income.”202 The Model Tax Convention commentaries explicitly
acknowledge “dividends,”203 “interest,”204 “royalties,”205 “wages,”206 and
“salaries”207 as items or classes of income that are subject to the Treaty. Each of
these items is an element of income, in the sense that each is a component
included in the calculation of income. Yet each of these items is much narrower
199
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than the broad term “revenue.” If the drafters of the Model Tax Convention had
intended that taxes on revenue be considered taxes on “elements of income” and
thus subject to the Treaty, it seems likely that the commentary would have listed
“revenue” when it listed the other items and classes of income that are subject to
the Treaty. This leads to the inference that, although revenue is involved in the
calculation of income and therefore may technically be considered an element or
item of income, the parties to the Treaty did not intend for revenue to be
considered an element of income. Therefore, it seems likely that taxes on revenue
were intended to be outside the scope of the Treaty and not subject to the
permanent establishment requirement.

3. The Treaty would likely be interpreted to give effect to the parties’
intents, which would mean that the French tax is not within the
scope of the Treaty.
A second counterargument to the conclusion that the French tax is outside
the scope of the Treaty is based on the purpose of the Treaty. The purpose of this
Treaty is the “avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal
evasion.”208 One could argue that if France taxed the revenues of these companies,
but those same revenues were later taxed as income by the U.S., one of the primary
purposes of the Treaty would be frustrated. A broad reading of the Treaty in light
of the Treaty’s purpose would imply that the French tax on revenue should be
covered by the Treaty. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties would
seem to support such a broad reading. The Vienna Convention provides
guidelines for the interpretation of international treaties and states that “[a] treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.”209 This differs from the contractual, or intentionalism, approach by
focusing on the broad goals of the treaty rather than the subjective intent of the
parties.210 This broad reading could lead to an interpretation that, in light of the
goal of preventing double taxation, the French digital tax is prohibited.
However, because a tax on revenues is likely to be passed onto the final
consumer and is only collected by the taxing authority from the business for ease
of collection purposes, there is arguably no double taxation in the typical sense
because the tax burden is borne by different entities (the revenue tax is borne by
the individual consumers and the income tax is borne by the business). Across a
wide range of empirical analyses, it has been found that anywhere from 60 percent
208

209

210
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to over 100 percent of sales taxes are passed on to the final consumer.211 Shortly
after the French tax was announced, Amazon announced that it would pass the
tax completely on to its third-party sellers in the form of higher fees.212 A study by
Deloitte about the ultimate effects of the French tax estimated that large digital
businesses would be able to shift, on average, 96 percent of the tax burden to
individual consumers and businesses who use their digital platforms.213 The study
estimated that individual consumers would bear 57 percent of the ultimate tax
burden.214 To the extent that the French tax is viewed as being imposed primarily
on the final consumers, there would be no double taxation and thus no need to
interpret the Treaty in such a broad manner.
Additionally, U.S. courts generally take a contractual, rather than statutory,
approach to interpreting international tax treaties and, thus, attempt to interpret
treaties to give effect to the parties’ intentions.215 The Vienna Convention was
signed by the U.S. on April 24, 1970, but the U.S. Senate has never ratified the
convention.216 The U.S. State Department notes that the U.S. “considers many of
the provisions of the [Vienna Convention] to constitute customary international
law on the law of treaties.”217 However, the U.S. Supreme Court “has only cited
to [the Vienna Convention] twice and in an incidental fashion,” which leads some
to question its authority in the U.S.218 Using the contractual approach favored by
U.S. courts, the “primary object of interpretation is to ascertain the meaning
intended by the parties rather than focus simply on the text.”219
France is neither a party nor a signatory to the Vienna Convention,220 and
French judges do not explicitly refer to the Vienna Convention when interpreting
treaties.221 Although scholars have found it difficult “to determine positively the
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methods of interpretation of French judges,”222 French courts do consider the
intent of the treaty framers223 as well as the treaty’s purpose.224
Using an intentionalism approach, it seems that the U.S.–France Treaty
would not be read to apply to the French digital tax. The Treaty makes no mention
of any consumption taxes levied by either the U.S. or France and does not seem
to be intended to disrupt consumption taxes in either countries (for example,
neither the French value added tax nor U.S. sales taxes are affected by the Treaty).
Furthermore, it is generally understood that consumption taxes can be imposed
by the state in which the consumption occurs.225 Therefore, it seems likely that the
intent of the parties was that consumption taxes would fall outside of the scope
of the U.S.–France Treaty and that each country would be free to impose
consumption taxes without the restraints of the Treaty (and therefore without the
permanent establishment requirement).

4. The French tax does not come within the scope of the U.S.–France
Treaty and therefore does not violate the Treaty.
The French tax seems most aptly characterized as a consumption tax and
therefore outside the scope of international tax treaties. Despite the
counterarguments, it seems most likely that the French digital service tax does not
constitute a tax on “business profits” under Article 7 of the Treaty. Under the
typical meaning of “profits” and given the specific terms of the Treaty, the French
digital services tax does not fall within this understanding. Even considering the
Treaty’s inclusion of an “element of income” within the Treaty’s scope, it seems
most likely that the tax imposed on revenue does not fall within the meaning of
an element of income. Application of an intentionalism approach to interpreting
the Treaty would seem to lead to the conclusion that the Treaty was not intended
to reach consumption taxes such as a tax on revenues. The French digital tax
seems to be most aptly characterized as a consumption tax on the provision of
digital services that falls outside the scope of the U.S.–France Treaty and therefore
is not in violation of international tax treaties.226
222
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V. C ONCLUSION
The prevalence of digital services in the modern economy has generated
controversy about where and how much digital businesses should be taxed. As
multinational organizations, such as the OECD and EC, work toward agreeable
solutions, many countries (notably France) have become impatient and continue
to enact—or threaten to enact—their own unilateral taxes on digital businesses.227
Such unilateral action has drawn criticism for allegedly further complicating this
already muddled area of international tax law, increasing compliance burdens,
increasing double taxation, and adversely impacting global investments and
technological developments.228 Additionally, scholars have noted that these digital
taxes may violate existing law by violating international tax treaties, constituting
illegal state aid, violating non-discrimination clauses of national constitutions,
and/or violating the E.U.’s fundamental freedom to provide services.229 Questions
of illegal state aid, constitutionality, and European fundamental freedom are
beyond the scope of this Comment,230 but this Comment argues that the French
digital tax does not violate existing international tax treaties. Because the French
tax is a tax on revenues rather than profits, it is most aptly characterized as a
consumption tax rather than an income tax and thus does not fall within the scope
of the international treaties for the prevention of double taxation. Because many
bilateral tax treaties are based on the OECD Model Tax Convention (including
the U.S.–France Treaty), the analysis in this Comment can be applied to a wide
array of international tax treaties and could be useful if other countries follow
France in instituting taxes on digital businesses. Although there are still open
questions about the legality of the French tax and similar taxes, it seems likely that
they do not violate existing international tax treaties.
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